Just interests: Victims, citizens and the potential for justice by Holder, Robyn Lea
  
 
 
JUST INTERESTS:  
Victims, citizens and the potential for 
justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
of The Australian National University 
 
by 
 
Robyn Lea Holder 
December 2013 
 
i 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Robyn Lea Holder 
December 2013 
  
ii 
DEDICATION 
For my son, Liam, who is interested in justice for the natural world. Bon courage! You 
are my heart and my joy. To the rest of the gang – Dad, Mum, Jo, Christina, Philip, 
John, Ciara and Leila – thank you all so very much. 
 
  
iii 
ABSTRACT 
JUST INTERESTS: Victims, citizens and the potential for justice 
As a social and legal value, justice is a highly contextual and contested construct. In this 
thesis the ideal of and ideas about justice are told mainly through the narratives of 
ordinary people victimised by violence who then engage with the criminal justice 
process. Mapped alongside is the discourse of elite legal officials that sketch the 
discursive underpinnings to an institutional ideology about justice. For both – ordinary 
people and official elite – this is ‘justice in the real world’.  
The stories of these two groupings are often posed in counterpoint. Rather than call 
for complete or partial redesign of state administered justice, I explore the ways in 
which peoples’ thinking – from below – opens the space for justice that accommodates 
both public and private interests. In doing so, I refocus attention on the social and 
political status of the victim as a citizen first. Their institutional interactions create an 
engagement with justice that constitutes a practice of citizenship.  
When mobilising law, the victim-citizen draws upon an architecture of beliefs and 
values that operate in a particular time and space. Diverse ideas and images about 
justice open lines of action and stimulate attention to different objects of value. I find 
these cohere on a trilogy of relational interests: victim, offender and community. This 
justice trilogy accommodates multiple goals which are themselves accompanied by 
varied criteria and explanation. Face-to-face interviews conducted on three occasions 
with victim-citizens in a longitudinal prospective panel as they interact with different 
justice entities reveals these goals as partially ordered. The sequencing of these justice 
goals – whatever the differing priorities –allows public and private interests to be 
arranged and accommodated in a communicative process. 
However, after recording high levels of satisfaction with police intervention, the 
victim-citizen’s satisfaction with prosecution and court tumbles, and does not recover 
even six months after the case is finalised at court. Unpacking what lies behind this 
assessment reveals a rich dimensionality to justice judgments. Here reasoning about 
outcome, interpersonal treatment, voice, and respect for the offender is layered, 
iv 
nuanced and affirms the contingent nature of justice in different settings. Perhaps 
inevitably the resolutions experienced are partial and incomplete. 
The longitudinal design of the thesis not only reveals people’s thinking as responsive, 
contextual and dynamic but was indispensable in identifying the importance of 
interaction with public authorities. I show that victim-citizens want a voice that is 
influential, but they do not wish to dominate decision makers. They recognise justice 
as a unique public space in which they expect equal concern and respect accorded to 
the justice interests of their trilogy. I show victim-citizens were primarily interested in 
participatory opportunities that came after an authoritative finding. Justice emerges as 
a communal construct. 
The structured opening provided through law is an opportunity for people to rise to 
the demands their citizenship entails. Both justice and democracy lie at this point of 
convergence where the capacity of directly affected citizens is engaged. 
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PREFACE 
DAVID: Victim, citizen and his potential for justice 
David1 was one of the people interviewed for this study. His is a story difficult to 
classify. If the system does prefer ‘ideal’ victims then David is not one of them. He 
would not see himself as a victim. He said he was able to look after himself. He 
articulated a number of motivations in turning to the law following an incident of 
violence against him, and expressed preferences for what he wanted to see happen. 
To these he gave reasons and context.  
Over the course of three interviews, David used his experiences with the justice 
entities he encountered to reflect on the idea of justice and how it applied to people 
like him. It is through David’s own references to his membership of the community 
that, in this thesis, I radically re-position victims as citizens. 
***** 
I first met David after a neighbour had threatened him with a knife and after police had 
charged that person with an offence. David was living in small apartment in the city. 
Though it was a bright day, the curtains were drawn, the air was smoky and David was 
sleepy. Asked why he turned to the law after the incident, he said he wanted to make 
the person go away and this seemed the easiest way. But he also said he ‘was raised 
not to “dog” and not go to the cops. But now I haven’t offended for four years or more 
and am trying to work and was worried about my girlfriend.’ When I asked about his 
idea of justice prior to the incident he said it was about ‘police and the court system’. 
Perhaps these images were to the forefront of his mind in part because David also had 
a prior history of non-violent offending (fraud, drugs). He thought ‘cops’ understood 
crime but that magistrates were ‘too soft’. He wanted his neighbour to ‘do as much 
time as possible’ for the offence against him. ‘Punishment’ was the principle he 
prioritised. On this occasion I was struck by his frankness about his past and about 
himself. 
                                                     
1
 All names used in this thesis for the lay participants are pseudonyms. 
xxii 
The second time I interviewed David, some 10 months later, he was staying 
temporarily with his mother. I couldn’t ignore the fresh injuries to his face from 
another assault. Perhaps it was this alongside what he said on this occasion that made 
me more aware of how articulate he was. By that stage the earlier case had finished 
and I asked him about both the prosecution and the court. He had given evidence and 
the person had been acquitted. He said ‘I’ll never call the cops again. It was a waste of 
time and effort.’ 
He went on to say that: ‘I wanted to change my life and I went to the police but it’s left 
a bad taste. They did their best but there wasn’t enough evidence. We all waited 
around, I gave evidence but they brought up my old mental health history and that I 
wasn’t a competent witness.’ 
He said that, when he had been offending, ‘they treated me well and kept me out of 
prison’. This time, he felt he had been discriminated against and treated ‘unfairly’. He 
reckoned ‘if it had been a little old lady threatened, it would have been different ... 
they would have put a more experienced lawyer on it’. The young prosecutor, David 
said, did not respond to the attacks on him. As an offender he said he had barristers 
defending him. This time, ‘because I was an ex-offender, live in public housing and am 
a young man there was no effort in it’. 
On the third occasion, at our final interview a further 6 months later (and some 16 
months since the actual incident), David and his girlfriend had been allocated a new 
house in a new suburb. It was far away from his old life but he reiterated he wouldn’t 
call for help again except ‘if it was someone else then maybe’. Again he said, ‘if it was 
an old lady they would have done something. Maybe they think because of my history. 
It’s much harder as a victim. I guarantee you that. … I wouldn’t call or help them. I’ve 
never really felt like a member of the community really. Living in refuges etcetera you 
feel like a piece of shit. You get looked at. I’d deal with it myself next time.’ 
Reflecting on being a participant in the process David said, ‘I was always there. I did 
what I was required to do and testify and meet the prosecutor in advance. I wanted to 
change who I was and didn’t want to hurt others … I see it’s not like the movies or TV. 
It’s based on money and circumstances.’ Asked if he thought ‘justice had been done’, 
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David said, ‘if they try it’s sort of being done. They invest money and time but the way 
they treat the victim isn’t justified. You get torn to pieces on the stand. It’s ridiculous.’ 
His final comments were that, ‘Before I thought I had a choice to be a responsible 
citizen but now I see it’s also how they see you. Is it about the past or the 
circumstances of the past? I can understand it to want to help an old lady rather than 
me. Unless we design a computer program, we can never be objective or completely 
fair to everyone. There are definitely differences between rich and poor. It’s 
hypocritical.’ 
****** 
A person such as David (or any of the thirty-three lay people interviewed) is generally 
not allowed the luxury of self-representation, and almost certainly not in the public 
space of criminal justice. As a victim-citizen his capacity for reflexive and 
contextualised thinking is untapped. There is no room provided for thinking such as 
David’s that unfolds; nor for thinking that connects with different objects of value or 
different principles important in his life. The capacity, capability and ‘embeddedness’ 
of a person such as David is rich in potential for justice. 
In the rigid and scripted confines of criminal justice, socially and politically situated 
reflections such as David’s are routinely ignored. Whether he is an ‘ideal victim’ or a 
‘good citizen’ or neither of these, David is simply a thing in the institutional space. 
David is a critical thinker about his world where a focusing event – and process – has 
served to shift generalised opinion to something specific. Arguably both justice and 
democracy require just such critical thinkers. David is also explicit in drawing attention 
to his social and political status. These senses of himself exist prior, during and after his 
engagement with justice as a victim: ‘it’s how they see you’, he says. So this story is 
also then about a relationship with ‘they’ – power-holders who represent the state. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING IDEAS OF JUSTICE 
‘It belongs in utopia’, said Imogene. This was our third and last conversation. It 
had been over three years since the assault on her. My final question to her was 
‘after everything, what now is your idea of justice?’ She said (in part), ‘I’d have to 
say it’s an ideal. It belongs in utopia. It shouldn’t but it does. If it does exist it is 
more a lottery. It’s not what I believe but it’s what happens in practice.’ (Imogene 
2013) 
In a different place and time, during an interview with an ex-Director of Public 
Prosecutions, I asked a slightly different question – though I was trying to get at a 
similar concern. I asked, ‘What was the conception of justice you carried in your 
working life as a prosecutor?’ The reflection was (in part), ‘the requirements of 
justice point in different ways which makes it difficult to define it in any 
comprehensive way.’ (P3 2011) 
 
This thesis sits in an extended conversation about the idea of justice. I was working full 
time as a statutory advocate for victims’ rights2 when I commenced the research. 
Conversations such as these introductory two were commonplace. Daily interactions 
with victims of all types of offences involved in justice processes revealed to me their 
reflective and contextualised responses. Innumerable discussions and debates about 
the role and rights of victims with domain professionals (judicial officers, prosecutors, 
police, victim advocates, probation and correctional officers, policy makers and law 
reformers) served to emphasise as many perspectives as there were operational areas 
to justice. Justice was clearly important to everyone but were we all talking about the 
same thing? 
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 Pursuant to s14 Victims of Crime Act 1994 as the Victims of Crime Coordinator (VoCC) for the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The position was an appointment of the Attorney General. As an 
independent statutory position the VoCC combined the promotion of victims’ rights and investigation of 
breaches of rights. I was appointed in 1996 and served with successive appointments until 2011. I was 
instrumental in two major reforms to the legislation. Briefly, the first reform brought services for victims 
under the responsibility of the VoCC, and the second saw the position (and its powers) changed to that 
of a Victims of Crime Commissioner. The administration of justice involves diverse processes in police, 
prosecution, courts and tribunals, probation and corrections, and encompasses youth and adult 
jurisdictions as well as criminal and civil areas of law. The victims’ legislation is located at 
http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/1994-83/default.asp  
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From this grounded place I emerged with an understanding that people victimised by 
violence who engage with the justice system thought and talked in complex ways 
about the idea of justice. Listening to their many voices suggested to me that justice 
was about a whole host of things, just as their identity was more than that of ‘victim’. 
Much of this, however, was hidden from view by the way victims were excluded, 
ignored or diverted. This seemed to me to be a loss.  
Victimisation and the mobilisation of the criminal law in response present a unique 
opportunity to cultivate ‘the capacity of citizens to rise to the demands of justice in 
their own political lives’ (Sarat and Kearns 1996: 17). An opportunity, moreover, that 
recognises justice is a virtue of citizenship.3 Or, perhaps at a more concrete level, 
provides spaces for citizens to produce justice; that is, as an activity arising from their 
citizenship. Finding a way to describe and understand this capacity and the interests of 
victims as citizens in their multi-dimensional role emerged as central to my research.  
1.1 DIFFERENT TALES, ONE STORY 
Of course, as I heard in my working life and discovered anew in the course of this 
research, there are many tales in the story of justice. In one such are the astonishingly 
rare people who become victims of crime, who report the offence to police and who 
then see that case proceed through the criminal justice system. The vast majority vote 
with their feet and do not engage with authorities, especially if the offence against 
them involves physical or sexual violence. Part of this version, extensively told, is about 
the barriers, the casual humiliations and the structured alienation of people from 
access to justice. This is where the law fails in its promise. Another part, far less 
commonly told, is about those who enter this system. 
This is a different narrative; one where people believe (albeit tentatively) that a wrong 
may – or perhaps should  be recognised; where there is a sense that they, with their 
torn human dignity, will be treated with respect and concern, and where fairness is 
paramount. While they may be propelled by the circumstances of the victimisation, no 
                                                     
3
 Iris Young referencing Agnes Heller (Beyond Justice, Basil Blackwell, 1987) arguing for persons 
deliberating about problems and issues that confront them as opposed to justice as a particular 
distributive pattern (Young 1990: 33). 
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authority coerces them to report. At this point, where different interests and 
influences converge, conflate and conflict, decisions must be made.  
Here then is a profound story where ordinary people reasonably think that the 
meaning both of rights and their status as citizens will be respected. Indeed, that these 
two aspects of their social and political identity will be foundational to the manner in 
which the system will operate. Embedded within the telling is a perspective that the 
system is designed to deliver justice for all its citizens, ‘pure and simple’ (Sarat and 
Kearns 1996: 2). Indeed, that the system is somehow a servant to them in that 
honourable purpose. This story is about how justice is valued in the wider social world. 
Is this a fairytale? So bruising are people’s actual encounters, so taxing the process and 
so disappointing are its outcomes that a very real question hangs over what could be 
described as the fanciful expectations of citizens. So the idea and ideal of justice is the 
central concept of this thesis. It is examined mainly through the eyes of ordinary 
people but also through the reflections of legal officials. Rather than a philosophical 
ideal, it seeks an idea of justice in the real world. For the people in this study – 
ordinary and official – justice mattered very much.  
The stories of these two groupings are often posed in counterpoint. Nils Christie (1977) 
famously charges the state and its agents as thieves of the private disputes of citizens. 
This critique precipitated calls for complete or partial redesign of state administered 
justice. In this study I want to do something else – I want to open up a space for justice 
that accommodates both public and private interests.  
1.2 THE CONTESTED PLACE OF VICTIMS IN JUSTICE 
Human rights scholar Francesca Klug states ‘victims are at the heart of human rights 
thinking’. She goes so far as to say that ‘no other group of individuals has a more 
sacred place in human rights law’ (2004: 111). This claim is increasingly realised in 
international criminal jurisdictions and post-conflict justice sites. Over the past twenty 
years or so, rapid and radical adjustments have been made to recognise, respect and 
represent victims in these settings (McGonigle Leyh 2011; De Brouwer 2009; Mani 
2004). In consequence, the literature from these domains has opened new and rich 
lines of reflection about victims and justice. In contrast, in the domestic criminal 
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environment of liberal democracies such as Australia, legal and conceptual recognition 
of victims remains controversial and, perhaps in consequence, scholarly work feels 
locked down and stale. 
In these settings the marginal status of victims reflects their institutional irrelevance in 
criminal justice (McBarnet 1983). This was not always the case. The centuries-old 
practice whereby victims had initiation and carriage of prosecution of justice in 
England and Wales did make the transport to the Australian colonies. But in the 
modernist epic, bureaucratic centralisation and professionalisation was as rapid in 
Australia as it was episodic and inexorable at the centre of Empire. In both countries 
people as victims became instruments for institutional ends. Rationalising this process 
involved weaving different historic threads into a blanket account of an abstract and 
universal ‘public’ owning the common good. Now, people victimised by crime have 
come to make a profound and trenchant critique of their exclusion and thereby to 
question how that public is constituted and considered. They claim the system could 
not function without them. It is this person, group or entity who suffers the intrusion, 
articulates the violation, decides whether and how to inform and cooperate with 
formal or informal authorities, provides primary evidentiary and forensic information, 
is interrogated as a witness and is offered in validation (or not) of the outcome. They 
are also a part of the public. 
This person, however, is subjected to innumerable indignities – as is the individual 
accused – in a system that espouses principles of respect, rights and equal treatment. 
These indignities do not appear by happenstance but are made manifest as statements 
of institutional authority and value. Prior debate has centred on and probed this 
disregard. In particular, critical scholars have appraised as wanting the differential 
ways the law and its practice, and practitioners and institutions dealt with particular 
offences and associated characteristics of victims. 
Looking back in history as well as looking sideways to inquisitorial and other legal 
systems, more recent argument has emerged seeking recognition of victims with 
inherent civil and human rights, and – controversially – as parties (Doak 2008). In late 
modernity this argument joins the general tide of discontent with the alienation of 
peoples from institutions of democracy and governance. Here the agitation is for 
5 
participatory practices and participatory institutions that re-centre the inherent power 
of citizens (Fung 2012; Young 2000; Barber 1984; Pateman 1970). Positioning victims 
within this space conceives them as members of the social mass – the public. This 
public (or ‘publics’) is at once singularly sovereign and plural. It asks awkward 
questions about accountability of authorities, in particular about the normative 
heritage of that authority. It turns a harsh light on the representational claims justice 
entities make. 
1.3 VICTIMS AND IDEAS OF JUSTICE 
Most tales of victims and justice narrow their interests away from this broader public 
and locate them at an end point. In this confined space, assessments about justice or 
injustice are on the culmination outcome, and the influences upon it (Sen 2009: 215). 
From this place justice is viewed as a singular standard.  
Confining people’s viewpoints and assessments in this manner leads to an 
impoverishment of the idea and institutions of justice. The messages that are 
conveyed discourage citizens from their intrinsic and highly situated complex 
conceptualisations. They discourage thinking that justice matters, that they matter, or 
that the infraction matters. These messages are personal, social and political. They 
communicate information about values, about who and what is important, and about 
where power lies and how it operates.  
In this thesis I move firmly away from single representations to explore complex 
realisations of justice. My conversations took place ‘beneath the constitutional 
surface’ of the law (Dryzek 2002: 2). Unsurprisingly the approach opened space for 
articulating interpretations about justice that layer interpersonal, social and 
institutional influences. The reflections I bring to light from people who were victims of 
violence and who engaged with the criminal justice system are partial, ambiguous and 
yet at times both firm and contradictory. There is nothing single or simple to their 
contemplation on the idea of justice. Their thinking is refracted through a spectrum of 
ideas, principles, rules and criteria that act as heuristics. As victims of violence, people 
felt acutely the presence of power and the absence of justice. For them, the shift in the 
meaning of justice as a utopian ideal (Imogene’s comment) to ‘just a word’ can be 
jolting (Stover 2011: 139). 
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Most Australians display a disengaged cynicism about the law and its institutions. For 
those who become victims of violence this quickly becomes insupportable when they 
enter the portals of the criminal justice system. They have to think about what they 
think. They have to think about what to do and why, on occasions where pure feeling 
dances with reasons. Over time and in interactions with different entities, thinking 
about justice unfolds. People are informed both by the practical and the objective 
context in which they find themselves, as well as by their own moral and social 
intuitions. They become everyday philosophers of their situation.4  
1.4 THE IDEA OF JUSTICE IN THE REAL WORLD 
Even as we are stimulated to look for justice, however, it emerges with an ‘immense 
variety and complexity of meanings, applications and ideological associations’ 
(Campbell 2001: 9). Vast libraries speak to earnest and erudite depictions of justice. 
Much of this is abstracted and located in positions removed from the actual injustice. 
In the rough and tumble of the real world a malleable, more human, construct 
appears, one that interacts with the idea of justice from a range of different positions. 
Despite Klug’s claim about the centrality of victims, much of this theorising makes little 
room for injustice and its victims. Injustice can be messy, bloody and painful. So finding 
Sen’s 2009 book, The Idea of Justice, came like the discovery of a cool pond in heated 
and treacherous terrain. His attention to how justice lives and moves in the real lives 
of ordinary people proved a refreshing draught. 
Sen engages with justice in its social and political dimensions. In doing so, he explicitly 
incorporates ‘the presence of remediable injustice’ as ‘connected with behavioural 
transgressions’ as well as with ‘institutional shortcomings’ (p. x). He suggests that 
justice need not be about prioritising one good over another. He asks whether: 
the analysis of justice must be so confined to getting the basic institutions and 
general rules right? Should we not also have to examine what emerges in the 
society, including the kind of lives that people can actually lead, given the 
institutions and rules, but also other influences, including actual behaviour, that 
would inescapably affect human lives? (2009: 10)  
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 Antonio Gramsci, a radical political theorist and philosopher in early twentieth century Italy, argues all 
men [sic] are philosophers of the social and political concerns of their everyday lives.  
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What is inescapable in human lives, Sen argues, is a complex account of beliefs, 
motivations and interactions. His theorising is imbued with respect for these diverse 
lives in many settings – in any of which people may apply different criteria when 
claiming what is just or unjust. There is no point, he says, in attempting to find a 
transcendent principle and calling that justice as it will always leave something behind. 
Justice in the real world finds a plurality of grounds (or injustices) from which diverse 
reasoning flows (about justice criteria, what’s right, and what emerges). 
Different contexts and components of injustice and the resulting thinking about 
justice, will elicit attention to different objects of value, says Sen. In this thesis those 
objects emerge as victim, offender and the wider publics in which the former two are 
embedded. Judgments about justice ‘take on board the task of accommodating 
different kinds of reasons and evaluative concerns’ for the range of interests that flow 
from these different objects (p. 395). How this is done – the process of realisation – 
embraces emotion, reasoning, scrutiny and dialogue. Justice is not an allocation to a 
single reason. In the real world, Sen contends justice will inevitably see ‘incomplete 
resolution’ exist in a partial ranking of reasons. Plausible outcomes, as ‘rankings of 
alternatives that can be realised’ (p. 17), are distinguished from those which might be 
clearly rejected. Sen proposes that realisable justice makes room for non-congruence 
and partial resolutions. That is, going ‘as far as we reasonably can’ is justice in the real 
world (p. 401).  
As a theoretical framework and an analytic argument, Sen creates bridges between 
accounts that confine justice in the law to its rectificatory purpose, those who present 
justice as a supreme obligation, those who propose that justice is about maximising 
particular goods for the maximum number, and those who see justice as a rights-based 
conception. He does this principally by presenting justice coming through dialogue. 
The radical departure Sen makes from predominant ways of presenting justice is away 
from transcendence and towards particularity. He proposes an approach to justice that 
enriches ‘reasoned engagement through enhancing informational availability and the 
feasibility of interactive discussions’ (p. xiii). By this I take Sen to mean drawing 
information from different relevant sources and into deliberation on justice. Perfect 
justice is not what transpires from such an approach. Rather, we advance towards it. 
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1.5 JUSTICE INTERESTS AS POLITICAL INTERESTS 
In the arcane and rather closed world of contemporary criminal justice this type of 
approach may be tolerated on the fringes in diversionary practices, restorative 
conferences and therapeutic courts, for example. Although criminal justice systems in 
liberal democracies lay claim to long histories of organic evolution, there is no 
acknowledgment that change is a continual process. Tomorrow is viewed as more of 
the same. The principles of inclusion and participation are ribs to an umbrella of justice 
covering both innovative and conservative practices.5 By drawing on the democratic 
underpinning to Sen’s idea of justice as a discursive exercise,6 I aim to contribute a 
different and perhaps radical re-positioning of ordinary people in relation to state-
centric and law-centric versions of justice. Fringe reform, I suggest, does not disturb 
what is controlling whom.  
Institutional interests in justice argue that they represent a higher embodiment of the 
public in the form of the state. The various publics, it is said, are free to self-regulate 
with minimum interference. Limits are set in standards and rules for which there exists 
a normative social consensus. The state then, in the form of the criminal law, 
represents that consensus. Criminal law thus forms kind of law of the public. Should 
these norms and that law be transgressed, then the state will take what the victimised 
citizen proffers and says ‘we will take action not for you but for all of you’. 
Furthermore, the state then says, ‘we take the right and responsibility for punishment 
of those transgressions in order for you not to punish’. Doing these things becomes 
‘achieving justice’ or ‘delivering justice’ for the public’s common good. A universal 
conception of the common good, in turn, permits sacrifice of individuals or smaller 
interests.  
Ironically, this depiction of a paternalistic and monolithic state lends itself to 
‘capacious interest’ in its controlling and punitive nature (Crawford 2011: 17). This 
vision cleaves the idea of justice to both the state and its institutions, as well as to the 
centrality of punishment. The characterisation fuels different narratives. One says that 
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 Kathleen Daly and Brigitte Bouhours use the term ‘innovative justice’ to describe ‘non-traditional’ 
practices and procedures such as circle sentencing, restorative justice and special courts (Daly and 
Bouhours 2011). 
6
 The emphasis on discursivity seeks to detach deliberation from liberal institutional structures. It does 
not, however, pose these democratic dynamics as in conflict (Dryzek 2002).  
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the state and its institutions of justice reflect, adhere to and uphold the values and 
norms of the public, while at the same time are neutral to and removed from the 
disputing publics; and the other narrative says that the state sustains social order and 
control through the harsh instrument of criminal law. 
Into the gaps created by this state-centric and schismatic portrayal, the victimised 
citizen falls. Indeed, both victim and offender are extracted from the public, 
decontextualised and used in performance roles to an institutional script. The 
narratives characterise victims as moralising and interested in private goals and 
therefore illegitimate. So what are they to do? In the main they keep private pain 
private. They deal with it themselves. They do not approach the state. A small 
proportion may turn to the institutions of justice that claim to represent the public 
they came from and ask that the injustice they have experienced be acknowledged and 
addressed.  
The larger frame to this story asks what is that relationship between citizens and the 
state at this site of criminal justice? When the citizens themselves are in dispute or 
conflict with each other, what does the state owe to each of them at the site of 
criminal justice? What constraints are placed on citizens and on the state that we can 
approve of, take to ourselves and impose on others? What is the convergence and 
divergence between ideas of justice envisaged by state entities and those of its citizens 
– those directly affected and those more indirectly concerned?  
These questions are political as they ‘raise and address issues of the moral value or 
human desirability of an institution or practice whose decisions affect a large number 
of people’ (Young 1987: 73). They maintain an open question over the extent to which 
citizen interests, specifically for this thesis those citizens who are victims, coincide with 
the interests of the state through its justice entities. They ask for re-examination of the 
portrayal of public and private interests as rigidly and necessarily distinct. They take 
seriously the offer of law to citizens. This is a different kind of civic politics to the idea 
of justice. 
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1.6 JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY 
Within this characterisation of the debate, claiming the status of citizen for victims may 
seem obvious to some and deeply troubling to others. At one level it is recognition that 
people are more than what happened to them at a moment in time. At another it 
arises from noticing how simple and singular representations of victims act for the 
convenience of authority; how it blurs what is at stake. 
The demand for inclusion and participation in the justice space challenges narrow 
representations, but it also requires a more rounded portrayal of all involved. Inclusion 
and participation argue instead for recognition of diversity alongside what is shared, 
and hence for recognition of context and contingency. They introduce seeing people 
not solely or only as a victim, or indeed as an offender. They acknowledge that victims 
do not speak with one voice, and that the individual and the many victims have 
different ways of seeing justice. The idea of ‘public interest’ must openly acknowledge 
many publics and a range of interests. Including diversity and difference in 
participatory practices is core to citizenship in a mature liberal democracy (Young 
2000). Inclusion and participation both reflect and generate a thick belonging. More 
than an afterthought to institutional legitimacy, they are foundational. 
In the course of this thesis I subject these ideas of normative justice, of the democratic 
citizen, and of participation and deliberation, to critical attention. For now I take a 
further step and signal my interest in the justice system(s) as institutional arenas ‘in 
which competing demands can be listened to, argued about, and negotiated’ (Loader 
2006: 214). These are civic spaces for the public. The possibility of (re)connecting 
justice to these essentially democratic footings considers the courtroom (and other 
justice sites) as a place for the validation of belonging, a subjective experience of it, 
and a site of challenge in which social relations are made and re-made. 
This call for inclusion and participation in justice is not uncontested nor without 
troubling fringes. In highly charged debate it is claimed that the crime victim has 
become the ‘idealised political subject … whose circumstances and experiences have 
come to stand for the general good’ (Simon 2007: 77). The critical attention paid to the 
role of crime and victimisation in the politics of law and order has ensured that the 
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victim identity and experience remains subject to divisive and heated controversy. 
Justice, it is said, is not only about the victim. 
Jonathon Simon’s work, Governing Through Crime (2007: 7), deals with the United 
States but has been influential in Australia and elsewhere. He expands arguments 
against victim inclusion by claiming that new forms of knowledge to bring victim 
‘truths’ into the criminal justice process ‘undermine the forms of solidarity and 
responsibility necessary for democratic institutions’. He infers that citizens who 
become victims of crime and engage with authorities constitute new and dangerous 
anti-democratic actors.  
My professional and scholarly interest in exploring justice was agitated by this 
extraordinary claim and its attack on the legitimacy of any role for persons as victims. 
Just what, I thought, are citizens expected to be and do when victimised by violence 
and crime? Leave it to the professionals seemed to be Simon’s answer. At first 
sounding soft behind my probing and unpacking of the meaning of justice to ordinary 
people, questions about what justice was in a democracy and what democracy had to 
say to justice emerged to drive my thesis. Following Iris Young, I hold that democratic 
practice, here through an inclusive norm, is not confined to representational events 
(Young 2000). I argue that deepening democratic practices within criminal justice 
deepens justice itself. 
1.7 THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study is an exploratory one. I develop two main pathways, which I suggest are 
converging. One contemplates the meaning of justice (mainly) through the eyes of 
men and women victimised by violence who engage with the justice process. The 
second considers how the idea of justice is arrived at. This is about the participatory 
ideal, its origins in democratic theory and what it says to justice as an institution. 
The questions about both issues were put to the lay victim participants in a ‘real world’ 
setting. The research accompanied them on the journey they embarked upon as 
members of the public who were victims and – in a formal sense – witnesses for the 
Crown. I situate these reflections ‘from below’ alongside another ‘top-down’ 
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discourse. The narration of ex-Directors of Public Prosecution (DPP) serves to illustrate 
an ideology through which their institutional power is legitimated.  
The research setting is criminal justice that is local, and part of the liberal democratic 
architecture of contemporary Australia. When members of the public in the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT) call for police assistance following an incident of violence there 
is the usual taking of statements, gathering of evidence, locating a suspect(s), and 
consequent decision-making about whether all the information police have gathered 
amounts to an alleged criminal offence. If a charge results then a victim complainant 
should be told, given information about what is likely to happen and kept informed as 
per the Victims of Crime Act 1994. If they are a victim of a domestic assault or a sexual 
assault then – as a result of extensive and sustained local reform efforts – this process 
is almost uniform.7 If it is a different type of assault then it is much more hit-and-miss.8  
All criminal offences in the ACT are prosecuted by the statutory office of the DPP. This 
office will review the charges, and will (usually) liaise with both the investigating 
officers and with defence on the nature of the charges and the evidence. The DPP will 
come to its own decision about whether to prosecute and on what charges. If a charge 
is preferred then it is most likely to be heard and finalised in the lower court before a 
magistrate. The victims’ legislation similarly places certain requirements to inform on 
aspects of the process as they affect witnesses, and the availability of opportunities 
such as the making of a Victim Impact Statement (VIS).9 These requirements on 
prosecution and the courts are more uncertain in delivery. Nothing in the victims’ 
legislation constitutes a legal duty on any institution or an actionable right for the 
victim. Having been responsible for this particular statute for fifteen years I probably 
know too much about the compromises justice agencies make in juggling all their 
functions. For sure I know that the rights-promoting and rights-protecting role of the 
statutory advocate for victims of crime has limited authority and few powers.10 Since 
commencement in 2004, human rights legislation in the ACT has not been invoked by 
the Human Rights Commissioner in relation to victims of crime in any court 
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 The most recent evaluations of relevant programs are Cussen and Lyneham (2012) and Anderson, 
Richards and Willis (2013). 
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 For a critical overview conducted when I was the statutory advocate, see Holder, R. (2008). 
9
 Part 4.3 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/2005-58/default.asp  
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 Holder (2008), op.cit. For information on aspects of the criminal justice process in the ACT see 
http://www.victimsupport.act.gov.au/information_guides and see fn.1 for the legislative link. 
13 
proceedings. Where submissions have touched on the interests of crime victims, 
comment has tended to be extremely cautious.11 
From this environment, there were many questions that drove the original conception 
of my research and many more that arose in its course. My initial focus on how victims 
experienced procedural justice and how it was delivered became subsumed in a 
broader conceptualisation of justice. The people who were victims who spoke with me 
for my research commented on what motivated them to mobilise the law, what they 
sought, and what their feelings were about the person who had been violent towards 
them. I asked about their perceptions, expectations and experiences of the institutions 
of police, prosecution and court. I asked what outcomes they wanted from these 
institutions. Perhaps above all I asked for their reasons and their reasoning. I asked a 
lot of ‘whys’.  
Of the prosecuting elite, I invited them to reflect on their role within the longer history 
of an evolving criminal law system. I enquired into the underlying features of the 
concept of the public interest and where, if at all, private citizens stood within that 
system. I also asked what conception of justice they carried with them in their working 
lives, and how they understood the different demands that victims put on prosecuting 
authorities.  
In this enquiry I use a number of key conceptions that arise from theories of justice: 
that is, normative and duty-oriented features, ideas of fairness and accountability, 
moral and practical reasoning, relational and contextual aspects, process as well as 
outcome, and of the public and private reach of justice. By these means I make 
apparent the ways in which the thinking of the lay victim participants was threaded 
with intellectual strands of ancient lineage as well as being concretely situated. Citizen 
engagement is a demanding exercise from an institutional perspective, but it is equally 
demanding of citizens if adequate and authentic space, time and encouragement are 
provided.  
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 For example, a submission from the Human Rights Commission (HRC 2008) in relation to proposed 
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from the ACT Human Rights Commission is located at 
http://www.hrc.act.gov.au/humanrights/content.php/category.view/id/215  
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In the end, the meanings given to the idea of justice by both victims and legal officials 
were far richer than the original procedural focus. Ironically, the courtroom created a 
space where the two groupings shared (if different) interests in justice – though this is 
unacknowledged and unrecognised. A sense of justice appeared as a dynamic 
construct of human ingenuity in heightened circumstances. It was also fractured and 
elliptical. These rich reflections provide a springboard from which, in the final chapter, 
I make strategic reflections on the relationship between citizens and the state in this 
unique public space. 
My study is deeply influenced by feminist exhortations to make visible that which 
power renders invisible, and to scope multi-dimensional meaning where one (or even 
two) predominates. Feminist and other critical theorists in the grounded theory 
tradition encourage not only different ways of seeing, but also demand interrogation 
of dominant world-views. In the institutional setting, my analysis examines ways in 
which the ‘force of law’ reveals and deconstructs power relations (Bourdieu 1987). 
Developing Bourdieu’s analysis, I drew upon critical theory to mine historical legacies 
and justifications. In this manner we see ‘what the law does’ as well as understand 
‘what the law is’ (Silbey 2005: 324). I examine the discursive structure underpinning 
institutional boundary setting between an abstract ‘public’ and real private citizens in 
order to uncover a potential for interaction that is enabling as well as constraining.  
I began and remain deeply cognisant of critical scholarly opinion that the law routinely 
and persistently fails to live up to its promise. But I do not subscribe to positions that 
would see it diminished or abolished. Undoubtedly the ‘myth of rights’ described by 
Scheingold (1974) seduces attention from the more ‘ambivalent relationships to law 
and legal institutions’ that studies reveal (Silbey 2005: 340). But I have seen what 
violence does and the power it wields. I know there is a place for guardians of 
individuals and of the public interest. The problem is how comprehensively and 
exclusive that place is conceived. 
1.8 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY DESIGN 
A methodology of justice in the real world should give life to complexity. It should 
allow for contradiction and inconsistency. While it ought to look for the diverse 
influences on individual thinking and action, human dignity must be able to speak in its 
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own voice. Such a methodology should notice what is dominating and what is marginal 
in the portrayal of justice, as well as what structures these realities. Norman Denzin 
(2010: 421) has called this ‘the space of politics and moral discourse’. 
Both politics and moral discourse were strong presences during my professional 
career. For nearly fifteen years I worked in a complex and contested space where 
ordinary people encountered something they thought they would recognise and that 
would recognise them. In this space arguments about what was just/unjust, 
objective/subjective, and public/private were more than an academic binary. If I was 
to look at justice through the eyes of those to whom it mattered and in a place where 
it was supposed to live then I needed a design and methodology that could explore 
this complexity as well as to hold ‘tensions and conflicts’ (Nespor 2006: 123). 
Several small workplace studies that I designed and conducted during my time as a 
statutory advocate showed some ways forward. They exposed the importance of 
context and timing in survey responses, as well as nuance and perspective. The studies 
revealed that victims of all types experienced similar as well as different issues.12 None 
of this depth was well reflected in the academic or other literature on victims and 
justice.  
One of the workplace studies derived from a group of thirty-nine victims of domestic 
violence interviewed at the finalisation of their matter at court.13 About a quarter of 
those first interviewed displayed considerable ambivalence if not hostility to the 
justice process and its outcome. Twelve months later, fifteen of the earlier group (39%) 
were re-interviewed. At this second interview most people reported feeling very or 
fairly safe,14 expressed satisfaction and a feeling that ‘justice was done’. These results 
showed that to sample at one occasion locked people into a single and simple 
statement. A static reflection of opinion at a particular point in time becomes the 
research outcome. Surveying people twice, however, showed that attitude formation 
is a dynamic process, influenced by the context and timing of the questioning. 
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 Discussed in Holder, R. and Mayo, N. (2003).  
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 Only one indicated a new incident of assault. 
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A second study15 involved ninety-seven women and men answering a client evaluation 
survey from a community-based advocacy service – the Domestic Violence Crisis 
Service (DVCS). In one particular year, under half (41%) of the sample indicated that 
the prosecution of the violent incident was ‘not beneficial’ to them. Nine of those who 
expressed this view participated in a follow-up telephone interview exploring further 
their preferences for decision-control (or victim ‘choice’ in the literature – see Mills 
1999), their justice objectives and their predictions for future engagement. These 
specific lines of enquiry revealed that people were conscious of the decision-making 
authority of justice agents. It also showed some considerable overlap of personal 
objectives with official ‘public’ objectives of justice. The sample said that they wanted 
to be listened to but declined decision-making control, and – if faced with similar 
circumstances in the future – would re-engage with the system even when they had 
expressed dissatisfaction. 
The follow-up interviews in this second workplace study showed that it is not only 
important to ask people what they think but why they think it. The perspective that 
time and distance provided suggested that individuals could and did think in layered 
ways and from different ‘positions’ about the one issue. However, these were studies 
designed to describe, to probe and to sharpen attention. They were primarily for policy 
and reform audiences. They involved small and self-selected samples. It was not 
possible to determine whether they were representative of the populations from 
which they came. As the samples were offence specific it could also be said that the 
results could not be applied to victims in general. 
Workplace studies such as these have their own unique objectives and characteristics 
but much of the academic literature examining victims of violence and their 
experience of criminal justice is constrained in other ways.16 The victim of crime 
constituency is an extremely diverse population. Researchers and activists tend to 
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 See, for example, discussion from a US perspective in Moriarty, L. and Jerin, R.A. (eds) (2007), Current 
Issues in Victimology Research, Carolina Academic Press, and from a UK perspective in Goodey, J. (2005), 
Victims and Victimology: Research, Policy and Practice, Pearson Education Ltd, Harlow, Essex. In 
Australia, while there are a number of small scale and scattered studies derived from non-academic 
research, there are no comparable volumes or compilations. The report Victims’ Needs, Victims’ Rights: 
Policies and programs for victims of crime in Australia prepared by Cook, B., David, F. and Grant, A. in 
1999 comprised a desk-based review of practice and did not involve primary research. 
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respond to this diversity by focusing on offence-specific characteristics. The relevance 
of findings to victims of other types of offences is then open to contention. Commonly, 
research subjects self-select into studies, which produces well-known sampling biases. 
Typically, people are also sampled at one time and are asked to recall their experience 
and to reflect upon perceptions and judgments as a result of that experience. 
Retrospective recall is a flexible friend and issues of verification tend to be answered 
through examination of official records.  
Finally, what is not measured in justice studies is as important as what is and in what 
context. Measures of emotional resolution, cooperation, safety, fairness and advocacy 
have been examined in ‘real world’ settings. In the main, however, the victim and 
justice research has tended to focus on victims’ satisfaction with outcomes – what 
police did or didn’t do, whether a prosecution proceeded, if a conviction was reached 
and the sentence. There is very little knowledge of peoples’ journey and still less of the 
beliefs and expectations they held at the outset. The resulting representation of 
peoples’ perspectives is at once static, flat and passive. 
Seminal UK research conducted in the early 1980s by Shapland, Willmore and Duff 
achieved a more substantial depiction of victims and justice. The study involved a four-
stage interview process with victims: in the first instance after the recording of the 
offence by police, then after committal proceedings, then case finalisation and finally 
after the result of any application for criminal injuries compensation. Of the 276 
victims of violence interviewed at the first stage, final interviews were obtained from 
78% (n=218) of the original sample (1985: 7–9).17 The researchers stated that 
implementing a prospective study was ‘difficult to carry out *but] invaluable in 
detecting changes in attitudes and in enabling a full picture to be obtained at each 
stage of the process’ (p. 4). It was found that victims were ‘dissatisfied with the 
operation of various parts of the system, but their reasons vary … according to the 
agency being considered’ (p. 3).18 The study focused on describing victim experiences 
and did not attempt to probe or test for causal relationships between different factors. 
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 This study pointed to the differences in expectations and priorities between victims and justice 
practitioners (Shapland, et al., 1985: Chapter 5), a finding that was later reinforced by Robinson and 
Stroshine (2005) in their examination of the relationship between ‘expectation fulfilment’ and 
satisfaction for victims. 
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It is one of the only prospective, longitudinal studies of its kind to focus on victims and 
the justice system as a whole and, to my knowledge, only one replication has been 
attempted.19  
My experience combined with my frustration with the limits of existing literature led 
me to seek a research design that grounded people’s lived experiences in the broader 
context of their beliefs, expectations and motivations. I felt strongly that the nuance 
which people struggled to bring to their understanding of what was happening to them 
and around them needed to be teased out in ‘real time’. It needed to take account of 
their different agency interactions, to accommodate a dynamic and iterative process, 
and to enable contextualised reflection. I felt too that the dominance of the 
institutional perspective on justice needed a critical lens. A focus on individual victims, 
however rich and thick, would only enable a partial telling of this justice story. The 
social and institutional landscape also needed description. In short, I wanted a 
research design that would generate the complexity that I observed and experienced 
in the everyday. 
1.9 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The structure of this thesis presents a constructivist approach to the idea of justice. 
Chapters 1 to 3 develop this perspective through engagement with and elaboration of 
the theoretical literature.Chapter 2 opens with a brief critical examination of 
contemporary representations of victim interests in justice. I interrogate the nature of 
the ‘public’ in the civic realm, in the criminal law, and as an embodiment of difference. 
I particularly draw on Iris Young’s critique of the private/public divide and the manner 
in which this serves a picture of justice as universal, rational and objective. I then 
explore the idea of justice through consideration of selected literature from political 
philosophy and the social sciences. Given the enormous breadth of the scholarly 
discourse, I develop a number of dimensions to the idea of justice that serve both to 
frame the discourse of victims and professionals, and as analytic codes. Specifically, 
these dimensions pose justice as normative guide, as duty, as accountability, as 
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Australia have paid attention to the role of victims (Strang 2002; Daly 2002). However, the starting point 
of the studies has been at disposition and sentencing. 
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fairness, as relational, and as contextual. In order to accentuate the critical turn of 
later enquiry I broaden justice as an interpretive conception and as a heuristic in social 
and political consciousness. 
I then move from the esoteric to the concrete in Chapter 3 to consider relations 
between the social world, and law and its institutions. I sketch ways in which law 
presents itself as both strange and familiar, accessible and remote. Then, in order to 
decentre it in the social world, I emphasise the influences at work that open or shut 
down awareness of law, whether as boundary setting or as an available resource. From 
an analysis of different theories of legal mobilisation I identify and highlight key 
concepts as ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’. The movement people make from their 
everyday world to connect with legal authority is shown not as a simple and direct 
instrumental choice, but as beset by complex decision making. I outline the research 
that shows recourse to law to be a minority exercise and disentangle myth from 
evidence in critically analysing the literature on victim motive. The pathways 
(interpersonal, social and institutional) that are available (and not available) to people 
following a disruptive event are presented as both real and imagined; and as created 
by them as well as for them. There is nothing automatic or certain about turning to the 
law following violence. 
Stepping from these theoretical and review chapters, Chapter 4 describes the research 
design and the reasoning behind my choice of mixed methodology. I discuss the 
triangulation of data sources, data types and analytic method as means to engage with 
the multi-dimensional and multi-layered nature of justice in the real world. I define the 
characteristics of both the lay and the official participants in the research and also 
describe some of the scales developed from the data that are then used in later 
chapters. I emphasise the way different methods enable the lay participants in 
particular to author themselves and to place their thinking in wider context. 
Chapters 5 to 9 comprise the research that is new to the field. In Chapter 5 I introduce 
perspectives on justice from a group of ex-Directors of Public Prosecution. I situate 
these perspectives in both the present day and as products of certain historic 
transitions that are selectively told. I unpick core prosecution concepts of 
independence, representing community and public interest. The construct of public 
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interest is presented not simply as boundary setting but as a gap in the rules in which 
discretion flourishes. It legitimates as well as silences. At the same time, this gap is 
revealed as rich in prospect for dialogue and interaction.  
Chapter 6 moves to examine the grounded perspective of the individual men and 
women I interviewed who turned to the law following violence. I step away from 
narrow representations by re-framing people as voices from below, and situate them 
as citizens in a political arrangement to authorities. In making this transition to legal 
actor, I first sketch the contested construct of ‘victim’ and then provide an alternative 
rendering, drawn from cultural theory, of ‘ordinary people’. To this I add further 
comment on people’s citizen-status. I introduce the lay study participants and situate 
them alongside data drawn from larger national samples. I add flesh to bare statistics 
with people’s outlook on the law and justice prior to their current engagement. These 
comments are sharpened by reflection on their objectives and reasoning in reporting 
to police. In so doing, the tensions and contradictions inherent in meaning-making are 
explored.  
I then move in Chapter 7 to explore, through a substantive justice lens, what matters in 
the idea of justice. Using the concept of justice goals (Gromet and Darley 2009), I 
present an understanding of fairness that is both contextual (individual, social and 
institutional) and consequential (constructed over time and experience). In this 
manner I portray ideas of justice with multiple goals that face in different directions. I 
present the notion of a justice trilogy to encompass the concerns people show for the 
victim, the offender and the community.  
In Chapter 8 I explore further how people’s ideas about justice hold up against their 
lived experience within the criminal justice system. Here, a procedural and an outcome 
justice lens focus on what lies behind assessments of satisfaction. I ponder people’s 
reflections about their interpersonal treatment and dimensions to it. In the different 
contexts of the justice process the idea of justice itself becomes slippery and unstable.  
Chapter 9 narrows discussion to those lay study participants who contributed in all 
three interviews comprising the longitudinal study. I do this in order to explore how 
participation works and the extent to which individuals might want to influence 
decision making. I situate the discussion in a broader literature about citizen and user 
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participation in public and service spaces. I describe participation in the justice sphere 
as a unique citizenship practice. I further demonstrate that some participatory roles 
derive from state-centric priorities around the ‘decision’ and fail to delineate the 
nature of the interests that the state and victims may (or may not) share. I show that 
arriving at just decisions is derived, in large part, from a just process in which mutually 
constitutive public and private interests are articulated. Rather than insisting upon a 
rigid distinction between public and private, I show that these interests are co-
determining. The space of criminal justice is revealed as enabling the sequencing of 
justice objectives. I conclude that it is a deliberative space which provides 
opportunities for citizens to rise to the demands of citizenship. 
In the final chapter I develop, from the key findings of the research, an argument for 
participatory justice that draws upon deliberative democracy literature. I conclude 
with commentary on justice as foundational to the concept of citizenship. I argue that 
people’s interaction with justice institutions, as a deliberative system, is constitutive of 
democratic governance. I contend that the exclusion of constituencies of directly 
affected interests represents a democracy deficit and one that trends against 
contemporary demands for involved publics and the integration of pluralism within 
justice. I argue that coherence about the inclusion and participation of victims as 
parties within justice is not only desirable for our shared collective interest, but 
necessary. 
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CHAPTER 2: APPROACHING JUSTICE 
To me justice … you say the word and you know almost what it means.  
(Edward 2011) 
When we come to say ‘we just don’t speak the same language’ we mean 
something more general [than obvious variation]: that we have different 
immediate values or different kinds of valuation, or that we are aware, often 
intangibly, of different formations and distributions of energy and interest. 
(Williams, 1976: 9) 
The pursuit of a theory of justice has something to do with the kind of creatures 
we human beings are. (Sen, 2009: 414) 
 
2.1 JUSTICE MATTERS 
Justice matters. Why it matters will always be different. Justice encompasses both 
actual realisations in people’s lives, and acts as an imaginary against which we might 
evaluate and compare. It is a social and legal value that is not bound to law but may be 
found there. It can be invoked as a claim and as a weapon, and can also act to settle 
disputes and to distribute from them. It is the stuff of moral and political philosophy. 
Despite the many ways in which justice is understood, the concept has been under-
examined in literature on victims of violence. Like Edward (another of the people 
interviewed for this thesis), it is as if it is accepted that ‘you know almost what it 
means’. 
This chapter makes a path through the diversity of justice literature to identify 
meanings relevant to victims of violence. I commence in the real world by touching on 
two predominant notions that are ascribed to victims and that have particular 
resonance in wider scholarly work on justice. I suggest that these ideas are a partial 
rendering and fail to take account of broader conceptions of justice that circulate in 
and are relevant to everyday life. These more fluid accounts are drawn upon by people 
who are situated in various ways, including as victims and, I argue, are informed by 
philosophies of venerable lineage. They generate a richer depiction of justice in the 
social world.  
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This exercise is necessarily selective of a vast panorama of thinking. Reflections on 
justice have an unfortunate habit of slipping from one association to another. Justice is 
a norm, a philosophical ideal, a standard, an outcome and also an institution. Rather 
than fight this slipperiness, I come to emphasise the manner in which the idea of 
justice works; that is, as an interpretive tool,20 a trope in discourse, and as an analytic 
and critical code. In this manner justice is conceived as a commonplace and public idea 
that is also vernacularised in interpersonal worlds. In these more intimate spaces, the 
terms what is fair and what is right are more commonly used. Justice is a word more 
generally reserved for public discourse. Therefore it works as a connecting idea; 
something that links private to public, and offers opacity to language that, 
paradoxically, communicates what is important. 
I follow the work of critical political philosophers, such as Iris Marion Young and 
Amartya Sen, in interrogating dominant theorising which divides private from public, 
and which separates emotion and moral discourse from the notion of reason. Critical 
analysis is historically, socially and politically situated. While arguing from a normative 
or ideal basis, critical analysis is cautious of claims for the transcendent and universal. 
Critical theory, says Iris Young: 
does not derive such principles and ideals from philosophical premises about 
morality, human nature, or the good life. Instead the method of critical theory … 
reflects on existing social relations and processes to identify what we experience 
as valuable in them, but as present only intermittently, partially, or potentially. 
(Young 2000: 10) 
The chapter works with the analytic and interpretive characteristics that the idea of 
justice offers to victims of violence, located in existing social relations and processes. I 
find these provide a unique capacity for the idea to work at particular and general 
levels, and with social and political implications. The features of the word, I will show 
in later chapters, enable ordinary people to raise possibilities, to ask questions, to 
communicate, and to think broadly in the context of criminal justice. More specifically 
it facilitates participation in a unique public space. Finally, in highlighting dimensions to 
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the idea of justice that facilitate critical analysis, I consider the distinction between 
justice interests and needs. The difference applies a more political hue to the 
relationship between people as victims and criminal justice entities representing the 
state. 
Of course I am acutely aware of the classical concept of justice as duty, and the 
dominance of this idea in much moral and political philosophy. I distinguish between 
this concept, and conceptions of justice. The former is the broadly agreed ‘general 
structure’ of the term and the latter is a ‘particular specification of that “concept”, 
obtained by filling out some of the detail’ (Swift 2006: 11). Interpretive rendering of 
the idea of justice – explored in this thesis through the reflections of people who are 
victims of violence – are conceptions. It is in their real world settings that a more 
intangible, fluid and ambivalent conception of justice comes alive. 
2.2 VICTIMS AND JUSTICE CLAIMS 
I cannot explore these different ways of seeing the idea of justice without first taking 
note of some contemporary claims that are made about victims and justice. The 
debate is riven by a number of schismatic separations – between private and public 
interests in justice, between victim and offender, between outcomes that are 
retributive or restorative, between legal and communal justice, and between elite 
technocratic visions of justice and those that are more ambiguous and contingent. 
These orientations are thin and unnecessarily polarised.  
Discussions touch on deeper debate about the nature of human behaviour, especially 
in communal settings, and whether justice can be pinned to a universal and single 
standard. That people seek justice has been conceived as a product of social learning 
(Bandura 1977), of moral development (Piaget 1929/2007), of cognition (Levine et al. 
1993), and as a personal contract within the wider social contract (Lerner 1977). Early 
debate pitched the duty ethic of justice (Kohlberg 1976) against relational conceptions 
(Gilligan 1982). These, in turn, connected to philosophical argument about justice 
being what was right and that which was good in consequence (Sen 2009; Rawls 1971). 
What is said to be important to victims draws in a rather confused manner from these 
(and other) very wide fields of enquiry. A couple of assertions in particular are 
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frequently used against them. In the first instance, people who are victims are said to 
be focused on winning their own ends – the substantive outcome. A second contention 
is that people who are victims are unwilling or unable to see beyond their own 
position. Through these arguments it is suggested that victim interests are inimical to 
justice.  
2.2.1 Victims and outcome justice 
On the first claim it is said that, for victims, getting justice is getting what they want 
(Matravers 2010). The idea – discussed further in Chapter 3 – suggests that it is a 
rational calculation to maximise the utilities law brings. Moreover, the maximisation 
sought is characterised as vengeance or, at least, retributive punishment (Garland 
2001; Sarat 1997; Miller and Vidmar 1981). The privileging of substantive justice rests, 
to some extent, on studies that connect victim satisfaction with criminal justice, with 
outcomes such as arrest, prosecution and conviction (Erez 2004; Whitehead 2001).  
What people ‘get’ from their encounters with others and with authorities, is said to 
deeply influence their assessments of fairness. The idea suggests that justice is a 
matter of exchange in which cost-benefit assessments of fairness are embedded. Yet, 
there is no single standard upon which assessments of fair exchange rest. Distributive 
justice studies argue equity, equality, merit, need and desert as criteria to assess 
fairness in distributions of a ‘good’ (Deutsch 1985; Hatfield et al. 1978).21 Central to 
these lines of thinking are the consequential implications of the distribution. 
Moreover, it is argued that people who pursue self-interested advantage will prefer an 
adversarial process that achieves this (Thibaut and Walker 1975).  
However, other studies examining the relationship between assessments of justice and 
process and procedure, say that it is being treated well that is important to people 
(Lind and Tyler 1988).22 Procedural justice argues that the perception of their in-group 
value generates compliance with authorities. It is argued that, if legitimacy is the goal, 
then institutions must make (and be seen to make) an effort to discharge respect and 
courtesy in fair decision-making procedures (Tyler 2001). In combination, the attention 
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generally relevant to interactions between citizens and authority (Lind and Tyler 1988). 
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to fair process is said to address both the compliance of the governed and the 
legitimacy of the entity (Tyler 1990/2006). The latter point says that, regardless of 
actual outcome, if the process is fair then institutions have done their job. In this 
manner procedural justice has ameliorative effects for victims in justice processes. 
2.2.2 Victim self-interest and justice 
People who are victims are also said to be motivated by self-interest in engaging the 
law and consequently to perceive justice in terms of achieving their desired ends 
(discussed above). Not only does the observation frown on apparent selfishness and an 
inability to see beyond their own position (Simon 2007), it is claimed to be outside the 
frame of justice itself. More specifically, it is said justice is what we owe others, or 
what is owed others (Swift 2006; Scanlon 1998). It is not that connected to a self-
regarding imperative – preferences that are personally beneficial. When acting from 
self-interest, human beings are motivated by advantage and any social or collective 
benefits are incidental.23  
However, individualised accounts simplify, narrow, flatten, and de-contextualise 
human motivation and behaviour, while holding it static. They also tend to extract 
individuals from their interpersonal and social connections and to abstract them from 
their class, cultural, gendered and racial identities. In effect, the claim serves to 
undermine the social legitimacy of persons as victims seeking a role within the public 
sphere of justice. The representation of the unencumbered individual has been 
criticised by communitarian and feminist philosophers (Young 1990; Sandel 1984), as 
well as social psychologists (Lerner 2003; Montada 1998). Their more multi-
dimensional conceptions of humanity conceive of individuals as reflective and adaptive 
rather than calculative and passive.  
Victim self-interest is further categorised as ‘private’. This has, of course, been 
recognised as a historically and politically situated notion and one that, for centuries, 
excluded from public justice most violations of women and children that took place in 
the domestic sphere. More generally the rejection of the ‘private’ is understood to 
deny affective and relational concerns (Gilligan 1982). Iris Young further critiques 
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justification that others also have reason to accept (Scanlon 1998: 5). 
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positioning the private realm in opposition to an ‘ideal of the civic public’. The ideal, 
she says, rests on an ‘assumption of normative reason as impartial and universal’ that 
‘exhibits a will to unity’ that is, ultimately, exclusive of difference (Young 1987: 59). The 
abstract image of a universalist public, I show in Chapter 4, is a critical component of 
the rationale for public prosecution as a state instrumentality. 
2.3 VICTIMS AND PUBLIC JUSTICE 
Core to criticism of the assumed outcome focus and self-interest of victims is that 
justice is a public ideal. Thus it does not belong to any single constituency and is 
composed of the interests of many. Here I discuss some key dimensions to the public 
character of justice: the nature and scope of the public realm, what is ‘public’ about 
the criminal law, and the nature of people’s relationship to criminal law and justice.  
2.3.1 Conceptions of the nature and scope of the public realm 
One conception of the civic rests in ‘the public realm of sovereignty and the state’. This 
comprises a representation of a universal and homogenous public in and through 
which ‘citizens express their rationality and universality, abstracted from their 
particular situations and needs and opposed to feeling’ (Young 1987: 63 and 73). What 
remains untouched is the primacy of institutional dominance and institutional 
arrangements. It is the citizen who is problematised against a state that is purportedly 
neutral.24 The state itself is conceived in two principal ways: firstly, it is minimally 
facilitative of citizens pursuing their own ends, with no obvious other normative 
obligation; or secondly, it is deeply implicated in structures and relations of power in 
which ‘the common good’ acts to blanket difference, contestation and privilege.25 
Another conception of the civic emphasises openness and accessibility. This sense of 
the public incorporates variability arising from a ‘particularist and affective experience 
of moral life’. This is not just an idea of the public as multiple and messy. It is one 
where public is constitutive of private and vice versa. The representation is of 
embodied persons with history, and with diverse identities and community 
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memberships who comprise the public. People’s occupation of the individual and 
group identity of ‘victim’, therefore, is at best temporary and transitional. They still 
carry with them prior identifications and statuses. Furthermore, in an open and 
accessible public realm, ‘no persons, actions or attributes of persons should be 
excluded from public discussion and decision-making’ (Young 1987: 58 and 59). This 
particular claim firmly embeds the democratic ideal of inclusion within an open and 
accessible public. 
This latter conception of a deep civic public incorporates a discursive dimension (Young 
2000; Dryzek 1990). It envisages dialogue, reasoning and scrutiny of matters of shared 
and particular importance.26 While in discursive engagements ‘reason and emotion 
play complementary roles in human reflection’, there is good reason to be wary of 
‘reason’ itself. The notion of reasoning is more useful in allowing space for the 
expression of reasons, motivations, preferences and connections that may derive from 
the private but are given voice in public.27 Discussion on the nature and causes of 
injustice draws upon different experiences, observations and ideologies. Therefore the 
subjective is necessarily and rightly present. The discussion on justice that then arises 
takes account of these ‘plural groundings’ and ‘plural reasons’ (Sen 2009: 2–3). A 
consensus is not required. 
As theorists with their feet firmly in real worlds, neither Iris Young nor Amartya Sen 
presume that the spaces that are public are singular (an open air domain for example) 
or are confined to certain moments (an election for example). Their publics are many, 
as are the spaces they inhabit and visit. Because of this, they recognise that ideas 
about ‘universal’ standards and the ‘unity’ of the public can act to smother 
heterogeneity, dissonance and the incomplete resolutions that mark contemporary 
societies. The abstracted ‘public’ to which criminal justice frequently refers similarly 
ignores this diversity. 
2.3.2 The public justice of criminal law 
It is one of the ironies of criminal justice that it claims to ‘own’ harms and wrongs on 
behalf of the public while – at least in dominant discourse – setting aside particular 
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features of individuals, diverse communities and, in part, diverse offences. It does so in 
the interests of consistency and treating like with like. Part of the reasoning for the 
state’s ownership of the wrongs of crime is that there are ‘public dimensions’ to the 
harm that arises, and because of its role as a guarantor of overall security (Matravers 
2010: 7). Thus criminal law is a distinctive kind of public law that is intimately tied to 
the sovereignty, core functions and legitimacy of the state. 
There are a number of dimensions to criminal law’s public nature, but what is 
noticeable for this thesis is that it does not deal with the scope of this argument. 
Unacknowledged is the state’s extensive exercise of discretion in prosecuting wrongs; 
and unacknowledged is the absence of security that actually exists. More particularly it 
still says that, apart from prosecuting, the state arguably has no (human rights) 
obligation to those members of the public who are victims of wrongs (Cape 2004: 
14).28 That is, individual persons may be used for some version of the common good 
that the state decides upon. When used as an instrument for other ends, there is no 
respecting individual dignity. 
Alternative abolitionist arguments that claim conflict as the private property of citizens 
do not allow any room for the state (Christie 1977). While the state’s interest in 
security is acknowledged, the abolitionist approach does not envisage the multiple 
publics also having a vested interest in protection. An interest, moreover, that is not 
evenly distributed because, individually and collectively, people are situated differently 
in spaces that are laced with oppressive and discriminatory features. Different types of 
offending, in these contexts, are not neutral engagements around property. Similarly, 
as the segmentation and differentiation of social groups and neighbourhoods are 
lamented by abolitionists, cohesion and commonality are assumed to be the desired 
goal.  
A different case for recognising a role for the state is that civil society is not uniform 
and does not have unified goods. In mediating these differences therefore, ‘those who 
wish to undermine injustice cannot turn their backs on state institutions as tools for 
that end’ (Young 2000: 8). Thus there remains a regulatory role for the state in 
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responding to the disadvantage that victimisation (of various types) brings. This role  
encompasses decision-making and enforcement. 
Beyond focus on the state, a different account of the public nature of criminal law and 
justice has it grounded in and intelligible within human practices and the social world. 
The ‘normative moral language on which the law draws’ follows ‘thick ethical 
concepts’ that are shared – even when the specifics are vehemently contested (Duff 
2001: 191). The wrong of crime as a public one is twofold: first that it goes against a 
law that we accept, and can impose on ourselves and others by ‘virtue of *our+ shared 
membership of the political community’ (Duff 2009: 254); and second that these ‘are 
wrongs in which the community shares’ (Duff 2001: 63). This theoretical basis for 
criminal law is wider than the older proposition of justice in this realm as rectificatory; 
that it is only concerned with the justification of punishment. It is instead a far broader 
exposition of a normative29 system that seeks to take account of the basis of laws, the 
different spaces in which they are applied, and their relationship to the polity. These 
points, Antony Duff suggests, create different meaning to the notion of criminal law as 
a ‘common law’. 
The bringing in of the political community to the realm of justice is of course not new.30 
For my purpose, however, there are two key things to notice. The first is that Duff 
directs attention to the moral authority of criminal law as vesting in its constitutive 
relationship with the values of the collective. The second is to highlight the status of 
people’s pre-existing relationship as citizens to the state and hence to state 
authorities. Neither of these claims obviates contestation around those values, nor 
presumes a stable and solitary relationship between citizen and state. 
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2.3.3 Victim as citizen and member of the civic public 
It is this ‘citizen first’ perspective that directs attention from the exercise of human 
practices to their meaning in a social and political context.31 Ascribing citizen status to 
the victim gives pause on the significance of the term as it relates to citizenry as the 
ultimate source of authority and accountability. It then asks what being a citizen does. 
Firstly, it invites consideration of claim-making as a citizenship activity. Citizens – 
responsible, irresponsible or more commonly both – are said to make claims upon 
authority, indeed, do so on the basis of their status, while at the same time having a 
collective responsibility to the ways in which that authority works and works for all 
members (Isin 2009; Isin and Turner 2002).32  
Secondly, it creates a means of unifying people in their various relationships to a state 
which has different faces. From this vantage the criminal law is opened out as a site of 
challenge where, as a member of a political community, the victim-citizen acts to bring 
the criminal law to life. Similarly the person alleged to have committed a wrongdoing, 
as another citizen member of the political community, also acts to bring the law to life. 
Their shared political interest is in specification.33  
Thirdly, it is in this manner that citizens are ‘connected through the practices and 
values of that community to their fellow citizens … in a distinctive enterprise of living 
together *my emphasis+’ (Duff 2010: 5). For my purpose Duff’s interpretation helpfully 
merges two contesting notions of the citizen – that it is bounded (in some manner) and 
rights possessing, and that it rests in the ‘extent and quality … of one’s participation’ in 
a community (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 353). Citizens are said to enact their status 
at micro and macro levels – formal and informal, social and political – in equal and 
mutually respectful ways in the civic enterprise (Duff 2010: 5). Their citizenship (as 
activity and practice) connects explicitly with those schools of democratic theory that 
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emphasise the involvement and participation of citizens (Young 2000; Barber 1984; 
Pateman 1970). These points leave open (to be explored in later chapters) the nature 
and specifics of the unique citizenship activity that the victim-citizen enacts. 
2.4 MAPPING ANOTHER PATH TO JUSTICE 
The previous sections revisited some of the claims and debates made in relation to 
victim interests in justice. I sought to reformulate an inclusive public where affected 
persons with a direct interest in a matter ought to be involved as a foundational point 
of democratic theory. I also re-framed and situated the victim as a citizen in 
association with other citizens and alongside the state. In the next sections of this 
chapter I take up these invitations to place justice within human practices. To do so 
requires mapping another path through justice theory. Debates on justice as outcome 
or process connect only lightly to ancient dialogue about justice as a stern and virtuous 
end (what’s right), and justice being that which comes in consequence (what’s good). 
There is another story of justice as deeply constitutive of human engagements with 
one another in contexts where fairness matters. 
The dichotomy that is often posed between right and good has deep epistemological 
roots. The dialogue has, through the ages, been imbued with the colours of the world 
around it (Williams 1990). Since the ancient Greeks, scholars have discussed whether 
justice is the virtue or one of the virtues, and have presented nuanced conceptions of 
the nature of the outcome justice serves. Justice has been posed as universal or 
particular; and presented as either humane and benevolent, or chilly and remote. Still 
others have focused on justice as an evaluative framework for the arrangement of 
institutions and about procedures for the allocation of resources or decisions. There is 
extensive argument that justice is grounded in moral value; or that it is bound by pure 
reason excluding all other considerations. Some claim that justice is about the rules or, 
if not that, then it is about the rights. Philosophical approaches to justice also reveal 
divergence and contestation.  
The different approaches in part reflect the different domains in which the idea of 
justice is important. Context and standpoint clearly matter. Thus, while the language 
of justice is very different if one is reading philosophy or economics or psychology or 
law, it reverberates through everyday realities (Ross and Miller 2002). Here the 
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expression of justice is about what is fair or what is right or what is for the good. Since 
it is towards these everyday and ordinary interpretations that I look in this thesis, I 
intend to map a path through this literature in three steps. 
Firstly, I lay out some conceptions of justice. I intend to draw out core components or 
dimensions to the idea of justice that resonate in the everyday world. Secondly, I 
discuss justice as interpretation. I suggest that, when linked to injustice, the idea of 
justice works as a heuristic in rights and legal consciousness. Finally, I summarise 
where this different map of justice might take us. 
2.5 CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE 
In mapping some (and by no means all) conceptions of justice I aim to draw upon 
insights from the social sciences, as well as from moral and political philosophy. I do 
not mean to elevate these conceptions to empirical truths. Rather, these are a fleshing 
out of the concept of justice for people who are victims. I could also ascribe these 
conceptions to particular domains. It may seem logical, for example, to locate ‘justice 
as duty’ to institutional settings; or ‘relational justice’ purely to civil society. However, I 
resist the temptation. That type of schematic is unhelpful to my task of mapping 
complexity.  
The key conceptions I highlight are: 
 justice as normative guide 
 justice as duty 
 justice as accountability 
 justice as fairness 
 justice as relational 
 justice as contextual. 
2.5.1 Justice as normative guide 
A normative conception of justice says what ought to be. Setting out what ought to be 
or ought to be done can also be understood as a norm, some of which have a moral 
basis while others do not. A normative conception is also is a way of describing the 
rules, standards or norms that comprise a particular specification. 
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However, this leaves open how justice norms operate and are constituted. The 
normative question, according to moral philosopher Christine Korsgaard, is the way in 
which certain standards ‘make claims on us. *Claims that can+ command, oblige, 
recommend or guide’ (1996: 8). Whether claimed in desires, beliefs or judgments, 
normativity can be posed as ethics that operate to prioritise and organise our 
commitments and actions in personal, social and political realms. The idea of justice as 
a normative guide is that it makes a claim on how and why we might act (or not). 
Indirectly, guiding norms can act as a kind of algorithm for framing if not determining 
action.  
For people victimised by violence, a normative conception of justice provides a way of 
thinking through ‘what’s the right thing to do’. While this has a simple surface, the 
conception does hide ‘a more complicated picture’ (Sandel 2009: 9). It does not, for 
instance, say what justice itself ought to be comprised of. 
2.5.2 Justice as duty 
This is left to the conception of justice as duty. This is perhaps the most ancient of 
conceptions and is closely connected to justice as a normative guide or system.34 
Justice in this realm is imperative and demanding. It is about constraint. Justice as duty 
aims to be rational, objective, impartial and neutral as to consequence. It prioritises 
what is right over what might be good and is even said to be a ‘natural duty’ (Rawls 
1971: 115). Justice is giving people what is their due, and not giving what is not their 
due. 
Justice as duty and right speaks strongly to legal systems. It offers some explanation 
for why legal systems assert an obligation to obey. Institutional arrangements and 
rules emphasise this obligation by maintaining transparency, consistency, predictability 
and the absence of bias. Justice here prides itself on its rigour in the face of scrutiny. 
An institution will claim it is just through the existence of such rules. It will draw much 
of its legitimacy as well as its authority from them. 
This stern justice can reflect ‘unattractive or even incoherent assumptions about 
human interests and human community’ (Kymlicka 1988: 173). This type of justice 
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requires thin information for what is rich decision-making (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990: 
28). Obviously the conception of justice as duty has implications for how people act 
towards each other. It also has implications for the ways in which institutions act 
towards persons. 
2.5.3 Justice as accountability 
Justice as duty is closely related to justice as accountability. The Aristotelian idea of 
‘rectificatory’ justice addresses harms or wrong. Many streams then flow from action 
that brings a wrongdoer to account. Justice may generate effects that are retributive, 
punishing, restorative, rehabilitative, and that denounce and deter. These can be 
described as some of the aims of justice. Bringing wrongdoers to account (or ending 
impunity) is a common call to justice in many settings. 
Deeply embedded within the idea of justice rectifying harm or wrong lies consideration 
of the responsibility of people for their conduct, and hence their deservingness. It has 
an enduring, even commonsense, place within conceptions of justice (Sadurski 1985). 
Desert further connects to principles of merit, equity, equality, need or entitlement. 
Assuming the conduct does involve choice or intent, responsibility and accountability 
then informs the nature and content of what follows and could be just.  
The idea of responsibility and accountability is foundational to the theory of belief in a 
just world (Lerner 1977). This influential hypothesis says that an individual’s 
expectation of justice constitutes an internalised personal contract derivative of its 
environment and of the wider social contract. It is said that we believe just outcomes 
will eventually follow from our psychological, material and physical investments, and 
therefore we are able to accommodate short-term injustices.35 The proposition 
suggests that self-constraint is a component in a just world. 
2.5.4. Justice as fairness 
John Rawls’ corpus re-introduced fairness as a (if not the) central component to 
justice.36 Fairness emerges as a key determinant to the justice of allocations, of 
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procedures, and of decisions. It works to calibrate the distribution of benefits and 
burdens. 
Furthermore, fairness as a rubric performs routine even mundane assessment across a 
wide variety of human activity. Thinking about and asking what is fair in a given 
situation is a common human guide. In the discourse about justice, fairness operates 
as a vernacular grounded in the moral powers people have. Fairness brings to justice 
the consideration of others and moderates rational self-interest. Thus fairness is a 
‘cognitive shortcut’ that steers decisions about investments with others and in 
situations; and also guides assessments about these various involvements (Lind 2001: 
190). It is responsive to information-rich environments. Fairness as a guide is 
influential on the ways in which persons assess their relationship to others and in 
groups (Lind and Tyler 1988). It is particularly evident in situations of flux and changes 
in relationships – features that are typical for victims of violence. 
2.5.5 Justice as relational 
In a relational universe, people’s lives are deeply connected rather than individuated 
and separated.37 People’s justice judgments in this world are seen as emerging, not 
just from their own needs or the particular needs of others, but as evolving from 
particular relationships with others. This ‘ethic of care’ is cast as animated and multi-
dimensional (Gilligan 1982). It does not draw boundaries, nor pin down and suppress 
subjectivity. Relational justice challenges the ideal of impartiality (Young 1990). 
A relational conception of justice is often posed as gendered in noticing that a 
disconnected and detached masculine justice represents itself as a full account of 
civilisation and humanity. Rather than strive for universalism, justice that is relative 
performs as ‘a marker of the human condition’ (Gilligan 1982: xviii). From this 
perspective, the answer to the question ‘what is justice?’ becomes, it depends. 
Relational concerns in justice are not confined to the familial or to in-groups. A relation 
exists irrespective of the distance between persons. Justice is claimed as 
‘fundamentally an interpersonal construct’ because we do not live in isolation from 
others (Skitka 2003: 293). This particular reflection says that to think in terms of justice 
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necessarily asks us to think of others. To do so then argues room is made for the views 
and suggestions of others. From this point, conceptions of justice appear as 
provisional, multiple and even contradictory. 
2.5.6 Justice as contextual 
Relational justice recognises people as situated in a variety of ways in their social and 
political space. Identities are multiple and shift, merge and form. People are not 
singular. The spaces they inhabit are generally not settled or discrete. Highlighting 
different contexts in which the need for justice might arise thus questions any 
universalised standard. In making assessments and thinking what is just, people will 
draw on moral reasoning, a sense of fairness in distribution, and judgment about their 
treatment. That is, justice is context-sensitive, and emerges as contingent (Skitka et al. 
2010).  
In different contexts there is ‘complexity and flexibility of people’s justice reasoning’, 
and justice judgments are seen to ‘vary both between and within persons over time’ 
(Skitka et al. 2009: 1–2). This point is particularly important for victims who not only 
engage with a number of different institutions, but maintain varying levels of 
connection and distance with others (including the offender). The wider frame around 
the social and institutional spaces that victims traverse allows consideration of 
multiple assessments of justice using different criteria. This gives rise to the possibility 
of partial ordering of priorities for justice, as well as incompleteness (Sen 2009: 102–
105). Imperfect, though comprehensive, outcomes may result. Incompleteness, 
however, does not mean dropping particular concerns. 
Furthermore, in the wider frame, different dimensions to people’s individual and social 
lives come more clearly into view. For example, personal identity characteristics such 
as age or gender may become more salient. Similarly, emergent features consequent 
upon the victimisation, such as mental health or financial harm or family breakdown, 
will also become more apparent. People inhabit spaces and lives where concrete social 
and political practices precede their engagement with and search for justice (Young 
1990). Casting and recasting ideas of justice in these fluid environments suggest it is a 
never-quite-filled vision. 
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2.6 MAKING MEANING ABOUT JUSTICE 
The different conceptions of justice that I have highlighted do not indicate a fixed 
perspective. They demonstrate a concept that is enlivened in human hands. In this 
section I select further theoretical approaches that deepen understanding of this 
human context. 
2.6.1 Finding meaning in the world 
It is apparent that the idea of justice is open to different interpretations in different 
contexts. Three key premises underpin an interpretive approach. Firstly, ‘human 
beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them’. 
Secondly, the meanings attributed to things ‘is derived from, or arises out of, the social 
interaction that one has with one’s fellows’, and finally, ‘meanings are handled in, and 
modified through, an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the 
things he encounters’. Interpretation is a process ‘through which the individual 
handles his world and constructs his action’ (Blumer 1969: 2 and 14), and from which 
he might ‘map and construct lines of conduct’ (Turner 1988: 18). Human beings are 
profoundly social in this process.  
Contributing to meaning-making are ‘stocks of knowledge’ that presume a degree of 
shared understanding.38 The ideal of justice, therefore, is a ‘sensitising concept’ that is 
facilitative of action (Blumer 1969). Justice becomes an imaginary that serves as ‘a 
word of magic evocations’.39 The idea acts as a pull to those who have experienced 
injustice. Furthermore, institutionalised manifestations of justice can act as a symbol of 
‘outer power’ through which indeterminate experience may be mediated and 
managed (Crespi 1992: 99).  
As a theory, symbolic interactionism accommodates the constraints that context and 
situation impose on people by recognising adaption, adjustment, re-definition and re-
presentation. Many interactions and influences – interpersonal, cultural, and 
institutional for example – contribute to appraisal and reappraisal.  
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2.6.2 Reasoning and agency 
The different conceptions of justice form a prism through which to see, understand 
and engage with the world. Exploring this idea further requires identifying core 
features of the human condition. The first is our capacity to think and to reason.40 This 
capacity interacts with other features of our makeup: values, emotions, beliefs and 
attitudes. Secondly, human reasoning also interacts with our moral and relational 
sensibilities. Finally, I assume that human beings have agency; not of the individualist 
and atomised kind, but that which is encumbered in our social and political relations 
(Sandel 1984) as well as burdened by responsibilities, and by experiences of injustice 
and disadvantage (Meyers 2012). 
Presenting people in this manner does not require that persons are all rational or 
reason rationally; one simply has to acknowledge that especially (but not only) we 
think about what to do. While there are different understandings of practical 
reasoning I take a simple definition that it is ‘the sorts of reasoning that we attempt in 
contexts of action’ (O’Neill 2001: 11). Reasoning will not take place on a blank canvas 
either. Values, norms, and beliefs form an existing infrastructure. However, these can 
be ‘too abstract, general and incomplete to guide specific concrete action in specific 
concrete situations’ (Zelditch 2001: 51). Thinking and reasoning about what to do and 
how to interpret justice will be an information-rich exercise. Appraisal and assessment 
will weigh many aspects including features of the situation, prevailing norms, 
contextual power relations, and relevant criteria such as desert. Reasoning these 
combinations reveals the idea of justice to be a method of evaluation. 
Of course, static portrayals of persons do not emerge from these assumptions. Neither 
is their agency unconstrained. The ‘space for action’ is not the same between persons 
(Coy and Kelly 2011). Yet they emerge with moral status and ethical standing. They are 
conceived as whole persons who act in relation to prevailing norms in a relationship 
with a ‘range of bodies and people who are continuously mediating their daily lives’ 
(Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2004: 110). If persons are conceived as rights-bearing 
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citizens41 then there is compelling argument that they should not be sacrificed for 
some larger social good.  
2.6.3 Finding justice from injustice 
But something must make it occur to us to think about justice. It is people 
experiencing, claiming, perceiving and acknowledging victimisation, oppression, 
disadvantage, domination or discrimination that brings to life the idea of justice. 
Injustice animates thinking and signals certain human values at risk. Only looking at 
justice misses these deep roots.  
In recognition of this, Sen opens his book with a story about the indignity and affront 
of violence victimisation. An excerpt from Dickens’ Great Expectations describes Pip’s 
reflection on the violence in his childhood. Sen uses the story to pose ‘the 
identification of redressable injustice’ (p.vii) in the ‘lives and freedoms of the people 
involved’ (xii) as central to his theory of justice. The experience or perception of 
injustice with its ‘inequities or subjugations’ moves us, he says (p.vii). It is the 
emotional (indeed, moral) power of injustice that stimulates scrutiny (Sen 2009: 40).  
Violence – as an experience of injustice – acts as an instrument to undermine, if not 
destroy, human flourishing. Philosopher Christine Korsgaard claims that ‘*i+f justice is 
what makes it possible for a person to function as a single unified agent, then injustice 
makes it impossible’ (2008: 108). If there is an immorality in violence such that it stirs a 
moral response, it is that it targets human dignity and autonomy and makes self-
respect, ‘worthiness’,42 equality and freedom contingent.  
However, not all injustice is perceived as such. Human beings in a range of situations 
have been shown to believe powerfully that their world is just when it is, on objective 
fact, patently not (Lerner 2003, 1977). Therefore the interpretation of injustice is one 
often done with third parties. This ‘ideal observer’43 is said to be ‘in the realm of 
justice’ rather than in ‘the realm of fortune’ where ill luck, disadvantage and 
misfortune (the natural and social contingencies) are determinative (Snare 1986: 41). 
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From this distanced standpoint, we are invited to consider difficult dilemmas or 
decisions as they affect others.  
Empirical work, however, unsettles suggestions that injustice acts as an imperative for 
action. Studies reveal a complex picture. For example, it is possible for victims of 
injustice to live with or neutralise an awareness of the injustice (Mikula and 
Schlamberger 1985) or to not perceive a situation as unjust against objective criteria 
that reveals it as such (Sen 2009). Victims may minimise harm and deflect fault. They 
may assess the cost of doing something in relation to victimisation as too high. The 
experience of injustice does not necessarily prompt a feeling of discomfort or 
disadvantage, nor necessarily prompt action.  
Key to these scenarios may be judgments about something as just or unjust. That is, a 
perceived violation of rights or entitlements involves ‘attributions of causality, 
controllability and intent to an agent who is not the victim, as well as perceived lack of 
justification’ (Mikula 1993: 229). Furthermore, the responsibility attributed to the 
harm-doer and the degree of intention in particular ‘affect the evaluative, emotional 
and behavioural reactions of victims and third parties’ (Mikula 2003: 805). Taken 
together these findings suggest that the emotional weight of injustice may assume and 
carry more consequence than the perceived violation of entitlement or right.  
2.6.4 Justice in interaction 
This rich reflexive capacity to interpret and draw meaning is foundational to 
contemporary understandings of social action (Giddens 1984). Central therefore to 
specification about injustice and justice is dialogue. Dialogue is information gathering 
and information assessing. It brings forth different interests and different criteria in an 
evaluative exercise that takes account of different points of view. Justice on this 
account is dialogically constructed and constituted, and comes ‘within the human 
horizon’ (Williams 1990: 11). Furthermore, the dialogic nature of interpretation, 
communication and action potentially repositions individuals in a fundamentally 
powerful role in the polity. Dialogue and dissention inform a stronger civil society in 
relation to the state. 
Although justice’s call on the individual may be to ask questions, seek clarification and 
articulate principles, it is through a dialogic process that the self is understood in the 
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world. In Amartya Sen’s terms, ‘the evaluation needed for the assessment of justice is 
not just a solitary exercise but one that is inescapably discursive’ (2009: 337). This 
invitation to reciprocate and collaborate on an understanding of the meaning of justice 
involves not simply a confirmation but is also a creation. That is, an invitation to re-
pattern common interests and shared values. The call to justice ‘involves the 
transformation of existing interests and the creation of new, shared interests’ (Mendus 
1999: 68). These shared interests may involve alterations to the enterprise of living 
together, or the articulation of emergent norms. These too are not necessarily fixed. 
2.6.5 Reflecting on conceptions of justice 
This section has grasped hold of some strands of intellectual thought about justice that 
are current and circulate in society; and traces of which are found in debate about 
victims. Knitted together into conceptions, these thought trails can be used uncritically 
and unreflectively by ordinary people, and thus can appear conflicting and 
contradictory. Equally, the thinking resonates strongly precisely because it comes from 
and is used by people. 
These conceptions do not find fixed meaning – perhaps because the classic concept of 
justice being what is due to persons remains open to context. How then is this figured 
and decided? What will it mean between this person and the next, or between persons 
in conflict situations? These questions come when real lives, diverse social groupings, 
and actual institutions interact in ways that are socially and historically situated.  
None of these conceptions of justice are argued as a human need. Rather the emphasis 
is that people have interests in justice that derive from their status as citizens in the 
first instance, and as persons who have become victims in the second. I diverge from 
Iris Young’s restriction of ‘interests’ to those which are ‘self-referring’ and ‘whatever is 
necessary or desirable in order to realise the ends the agent has set’ (Young 2000: 
134). Her definition focuses on means to ends, and thus ‘instrumentalises’ the notion 
of interests. I follow Jane Mansbridge’s definition of interest as an ‘enlightened 
preference. That is, what hypothetically one would conclude after ideal deliberation 
was one’s own good or one’s policy preference, including other-regarding and ideal-
regarding commitments’ (Mansbridge et al. 2010: 68). My argument, consistent with 
the conceptions I have outlined, is that interests expand beyond the self and 
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incorporate individuals in their diverse social worlds.44 Citizens have interests in how 
others are treated, as well as themselves, and interests in the manner in which civic 
and state institutions work. Citizen interests comprise an instrumental and ethical 
meld. 
I do not argue against the notion that persons who are victims have justice needs 
(Herman 2005; Sebba 1996). I suggest that resolution of the justice interests of victim-
citizens is their priority when engaged with criminal justice. The resolution of their 
needs may be consequential upon the satisfaction of their interests. Furthermore, I 
suggest that the needs focus has diverted attention to various therapeutic arguments 
about what justice could be (Erez et al. 2011). Interests in justice speak to a form of 
civic membership, engagement and participation that has its roots in democratic 
ideals.  
2.7 SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE REAL WORLD 
This chapter illuminates the fluidity and contextualisation of ideas about justice. 
Following critical theorists, I have departed from a search for ‘transcendent’ justice 
while acknowledging the ways in which this ideal works. Ideas about justice help to 
connect people’s experience of violation, victimisation and injustice to wider public 
concerns. In this manner conceptualisations of justice animate consciousness of rights, 
and open possible lines of action. 
One of these lines of action consists of offers from the law. There are practical and 
actual concerns that violence gives rise to, involving self and others. It is a focal point 
from which we might begin to talk about approaching law. If the idea of justice feels 
malleable, law feels solid, ‘thing-like’, and something like a device (Mezey 2001: 158). 
It feels instrumental. It stands in contrast to the ductile nature of justice. The next 
chapter explores thinking about the way law is considered within social settings and 
ways in which it may interact with ideas of justice. It charts how the phenomenon of 
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law also starts to shift in people’s hands. Here too we encounter a similarly wide range 
of ideas about what law is, what law does and how law can be acted upon.  
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CHAPTER 3 APPROACHING LAW 
I would have said [the law is] there for our benefit. (Roslyn 2010) 
We tell ourselves stories in order to live ... We look for the sermon in the suicide, 
for the social or moral lesson in the murder of five. We interpret what we see, 
select the most workable of the multiple choices. We live entirely, especially if we 
are writers, by the imposition of a narrative line upon disparate images, by the 
‘ideas’ with which we have learned to freeze the shifting phantasmagoria which is 
our actual experience. (Didion, 1979: 11) 
 
3.1 THINKING ABOUT LAW 
Justice is a dynamic concept highly responsive to human practices. In the domain of 
law it collides with an institution that rests on a self-image as separate to the everyday 
world. Law leans towards certainty rather than to indeterminacy. The separation of 
law from discursive ideas of justice is, of course, neither a new nor an uncontroversial 
proposition. The institutions of criminal justice represent themselves as embodiments 
of the state. This stance presents neutrality as set in opposition to the private realm 
but as responsive to a disembodied public. Why, when and how do members of that 
public turn to law in search of justice? It is not an obvious choice. 
This chapter maps the landscape around these questions in a number of steps. First I 
sketch the dominant ways in which law presents itself in a social context. I then 
foreground everyday legal consciousness as counterweight to law-centric and state-
centric visions. I consider consciousness of the law and its constitutive relationship to 
social life in order to illuminate connections and disconnections between meaning-
making and action. As part of this, I outline conceptual and empirical enquiries into the 
ways people interpret victimisation. In this space there is much that is open to 
question and to construction by human actors. In this space law is powerful but 
limited, authoritative but uncertain. Therefore I also look at the different ways in 
which theorists acknowledge this ambivalent relationship in their various 
presentations on people’s actual recourse to the law.  
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One obvious aim in the chapter is to decentre formal legal institutions and procedures 
but also to take ‘seriously the idea that ordinary people can be legal actors’ (Marshall 
and Barclay 2003: 617). In so doing, I pay attention to law’s offer and how people 
understand its relationship to their situated selves. I suggest that the mobilisation of 
criminal law is as much a social and civil practice as it is a means to some self-
interested end. As a practice it is influenced by cultural as well as legal schemas and 
emerges from people’s membership of a bounded polity of citizens (Duff 2009). This 
argument highlights the interconnected and derivative nature between behavioural 
standards embodied in criminal law and wider social norms. Through legal mobilisation 
people seek to re-inscribe these norms and to re-establish their collective context. 
Finally, another of my aims in the chapter eyes the heterogeneity of the collective 
public and the nature of its status as a community of citizens. In particular I take note 
of the different ways in which people of diverse backgrounds and experiences organise 
around social and legal norms, and the law itself. Through this orientation I re-focus 
attention on the broader political character of ordinary people’s engagement of the 
criminal law as victims. I argue that it is political in that the interaction activates and 
signifies a relationship with state authority that has wider public implications. 
3.2 LAW’S IMAGE 
Law projects different images. In the ordinary and everyday worlds law is both ‘strange 
and familiar’ (Ewick and Silbey 1998: 16). As epiphenomena, law’s ‘own story’ 
emphasises its centrality to liberal democracy through the rule of law and its 
separateness to that which is common and unremarkable (Mezey 2001: 155). It is a 
formal presence and formal entity comprising lofty adherence to rule and principle, 
and immanent rationality. The authoritative discourse of legal text, legal doctrine and 
of professional legal actors such as judges, lawyers and legal academics is posed as a 
reality of continuity, form, truth and internal cohesion where law is its own master 
(Raz 1980; Austin 1998/1832). Within this view, law is foundational to the consensus 
basis of the sovereign order (Hart 2012/1961). Here law is command and its subjects 
are ‘ordered, dominated, and ruled’ (Bumiller 1988: 30).  
From this perspective, the impact of law and legal practices is unidirectional but works 
in different ways. Ordinary people – as citizens, complainants, defendants and litigants 
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– are acted upon rather than making legality. If approaching, they do so cautiously. 
They are submissive ‘before the law’. Law is taken to transcend individuals and 
moments, and justness is presumed. If law, legal procedure and law’s institutions are 
experienced in some frustration, this does not weaken their authority (Ewick and 
Silbey 1998: 47). If approached, ordinary people are most often portrayed as resisting, 
evading and re-casting law and legality (Merry 1990). They are said to be ‘against the 
law’ and may be mulish, resentful or defiant (Ewick and Silbey 1998: 48). However, this 
perspective minimises the ‘institutional autonomy and operational elasticity’ of the 
law. As a consequence it can make law ‘lifeless’ (Wong 1995: 221).  
Viewing law as detached and self-governing also detaches it from its context. This is 
particularly so for criminal law. A law-centric and state-centric position accentuates 
the threat and control of sanction. Other viewpoints emphasise law’s relationship to its 
social context. This view asks ‘what kind of criminal law, serving what ends and 
expressing what values, is appropriate for … citizens of a particular kind of polity’. Here 
there is a very direct connection: ‘the law should see and address those whom it claims 
to bind as citizens’ (Duff 2010: 3 and 5).  
Duff’s argument joins other critics of legal centralism. A law-centric stance renders 
ordinary people as external and passive, and invests law and legal institutions with the 
power to attract and repel. Although the law is ‘all over’ in ways that people – indeed 
whole constituencies – experience differently (Sarat 1990), it is also true that people 
‘understand and use law’ (Merry 1990: 5). How they do this, however, is also highly 
responsive. 
3.3 LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND LAW  
3.3.1 The everyday 
We see this ‘responsivity’ by looking at law and pondering justice from below. That is, 
from the everyday world of ordinary people. While the notion of the everyday is a 
construct,45 respect for the complexity of this empirical reality is central to authentic 
interpretation. It is a place of shared meanings and understandings where the ordinary 
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is dignified. Conversely, it is also a place where the marginality inherent in modernity is 
encountered.  
In the everyday, people act, react, interact and connect; they ignore, interpret and re-
construct; and they negotiate, manipulate, manage, mobilise and plan in a complex 
reality that is material and imagined (de Certeau 1984: xi). It comprises spaces where 
power is exercised, understood and resisted in lived experience (Foucault 1980). 
Multiple, often overlapping, realities jostle – for example, the ‘intimate intrusions’ of 
sexual and physical abuse (Stanko 1985, 1990); and racial discrimination being 
‘everywhere’ (Bumiller 1988). The everyday is riven with stereotype and competing 
narratives (Holmes 2008; Sarat and Kearns 1993; Deegan and Hill 1987). It is 
notnecessarily a beatific place.  
The activities of the everyday take place beneath the radar and the notice of the world 
of formal rules and formal institutions.46 It is as much places, spaces and occasions 
where rules and laws are evaded, reinvented and discounted, as it is where they are 
made, re-made and respected. The deep patterning of rules comprise habits of legality. 
Consciousness of the boundaries, standards, possibilities and mitigations of the social 
world do not require the formal institutions of the state. They are submerged frames 
and guides to social practices and interactions.47 As one of these frames, the ‘discourse 
of law’ provides language for meaning-making and ‘shaping our taken-for-granted 
understandings of the social world’ (Albiston 2006: 56). Legal consciousness works 
hand-in-hand with rights consciousness (Blackstone et al. 2009). Consciousness of rules 
and rights influences turning away from or towards law. 
3.3.2 Looking away from law 
Early studies of legal consciousness sought to depict ‘ways in which people make sense 
[of law], that is, the understandings which give meaning to people’s experiences and 
actions’ (Ewick and Silbey 1992: 734). More recent work examines the manner in 
which ‘legal life and everyday social life are mutually conditioning and constraining’ 
(Hunt 1996: 179; Fleury-Steiner and Nielsen 2006). These constitutive theorists 
emphasise that bottom-up engagement with law and legal institutions is as influential 
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on law’s meaning as top-down imposition. In this guise there can be more of the 
servant in law’s image. 
In their ground-breaking and deep ethnographic study of legality in everyday American 
life, Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey (1998) suggest three approaches to the notion of 
legal consciousness.48 One approach takes together the beliefs, attitudes and actions 
of individuals and social groups to ‘determine the form and texture of social life’ (p.35). 
Liberal political and legal theory stresses the consensus forged around ideals of 
fairness and equal treatment. A second approach conceptualises law and legal 
consciousness as ‘epiphenomena because a particular social and economic structure is 
understood to produce a corresponding or appropriate legal order, including legal 
subjects’ (p.37). An aspect of this perspective concentrates on the legitimating 
functions of law within the social order. Finally, legal consciousness is identified as 
cultural practice. It is conceived as ‘part of a reciprocal process in which the meanings 
given by individuals to their world, and law and legal institutions as part of that world, 
become repeated, patterned and stabilised, and those institutionalised structures 
become part of the meaning systems employed by individuals‘.49 Here human action 
and structural constraint are integrated and law is produced. 
The perspective argues that understandings of legality are constructed and mediated 
through signs, signals and storytelling in a socialised discourse (Bruner 2002; 
Greenhouse et al. 1994). These narratives encode and position people, places and 
events. However, they tell many complex and contradictory stories; stories which 
interact with other schemas. For example, political consciousness (McCann 1994), the 
‘injustice frames’ of feminism (Marshall 2005), workplace ideology (Hoffman 2003), 
legal imaginations (Daly 2002), legal norms (Zemans 1982) and local cultures 
(Greenhouse et al. 1994). Legal consciousness is soaked in change and contingency. 
3.4 LAW IN SOCIAL CONTEXT 
The law-centric and state-centric view tends to accentuate the instrumental functions 
of law. It is ‘used by the state to achieve the community’s chosen collective goals’. In 
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doing so law is ‘authoritative rules backed by coercive force, exercised by a 
legitimately constituted (democratic) nation-state’. As ‘stylised concepts’, law is both 
threat and umpire (Morgan and Yeung 2007: 4–6). In a social context it both shapes 
behaviour and gives expression to community standards.  
Yet this version of law in social context is insufficient. Following the constitutive 
theorists described in the preceding sections, law and legality also becomes something 
created and acted upon. They are manifestations of social bonds and of the collective. 
They signal boundaries and ways to do things that are devised by people in their 
diverse social contexts. I expand on the ‘stylised concepts’ from Bronwen Morgan and 
Karen Yeung’s work to add a third image and role to law (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Law in social context 
Law’s role Law’s image 
Law as threat Law as umpire Law as servant 
Law’s facilitative 
role: law as an 
instrument for 
shaping social 
behaviour 
Proscribing conduct 
and threatening 
sanctions for 
violation to deter 
that conduct 
Creating and policing 
the boundaries of a 
space for free and 
secure interaction 
between participants 
 
Enabling 
cooperation through 
defining and re-
defining standards 
and norms  
Law’s expressive 
role: law 
institutionalising 
values 
Legitimating 
coercion 
Reflecting shared or 
agreed morality of 
the community of 
players 
 
Enabling articulation 
and deliberation on 
values and priorities 
Law’s constitutive 
role: law and society 
as mutually 
constitutive 
 
Legality comprising 
of social practices 
Mediating 
indeterminacy of 
lived experiences 
Imagining the real 
Adapted from Morgan and Yeung (2007: 6). My additional text is shaded. 
My expansion incorporates ideas about legal consciousness (Ewick and Silbey 1998), 
mediated practices (Crespi 1992), law’s imaginative capacity (Geertz 1983), and law’s 
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discursive and definitional capability (Sarat et.al. 1998). Morgan and Yeung say that 
their original concepts were designed ‘to summarise patterns of empirical variation’ 
(2007: 339). The rest of the chapter considers these concepts alongside empirical 
patterns relevant to victimisation. 
3.5 LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND VICTIMISATION 
3.5.1 Thinking about victimisation 
The perception and experience of victimisation, unfairness, disadvantage and 
discrimination enlivens all aspects of the conceptual frameworks to law in its social 
context. These injustices lie deep within legal consciousness literature. As everyday 
experiences they invite questioning and act to sharpen definition to legality and rights. 
However, neighbour problems, abusive partners, employment issues and stranger 
transgressions are everyday experiences that are not automatically scripted as law 
problems, or even as problematic. 
Consciousness of wrong or harm can be considered along a scale from experience, to 
perception and recognition. A number of studies have shown that actual victimisation 
is not determinative of an assessment of disadvantage, harm or injury (Clare and 
Morgan 2009; Felsinter et al. 1981). Further, whether an event or condition is 
perceived as wrong or even harmful may be outside a pre-existing frame of reference. 
Problem perception and labelling are generally a requirement for action (Ruback et al. 
1984; Zemans 1982).  
Critical studies of help-seeking in relation to violence have shown how the formation 
of a consciousness of victimisation is itself rooted in internal psychological and 
cognitive processes that constantly interpret, re-interpret, construct and re-construct 
the bounds of ‘normal’ and ‘understandable’ or even ‘permissible’ and ‘expected’. 
What is culturally acceptable and unacceptable and therefore subject to 
considerations of what is ‘wrongful’ or ‘unjust’ has been shown to be historically and 
socially situated. There are different perceptions of what actually happened 
(Baumeister et al. 1990), different situational and social contexts (Jonzon and Lindblad 
2004; Vidmar and Schuller 1987; Greenberg et al. 1982), differential impacts of race, 
gender and relationship (Kaukinen 2004), and the disorienting effects of victimisation 
itself (Herman 1997). Diverse cultural and structural conditions reveal enormous 
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variety in the manner and style of handling interpersonal, group or social problems, 
disputes and victimisations (Menkel-Meadow 2004; Black 1984; Miller and Sarat 1981; 
Nader 1969). Victimisation then is only part of a puzzle. 
3.5.2 To act or not to act 
In examining further the interaction between victimisation and law, some emphasise 
the ‘subjective rationality’ of the individual decision-maker (Zemans 1982: 1069). 
Others emphasise what are ‘culturally available motives for action’ (Yngvesson 1993: 
9). Across this range of views, a solid body of research shows a strong tendency for 
people not to formalise an event or problem (of a wide variety) through recourse to 
law (Clare and Morgan 2009; Lievore 2005; Genn 1999; Carcach 1997; Bumiller 1988; 
Galanter 1981).  
Those who have experienced a ‘justiciable event’50 but who nonetheless do not turn to 
the law are described as ‘lumpers’, ‘self-helpers’ and ‘the advised’. Those who might 
‘lump it’ when confronted by a problem or event are cast as tolerant or accepting – 
however grudging that may be. Self-helpers use available resources and opportunities 
relevant to the issue at hand. Some will access advice and proceed no further. People 
move in and out of these categories and may occupy all of them in relation to a 
problem (Genn 1999: 19–21). Going deeper into these categories does reveal porous 
boundaries, however. Lumping a problem or event, for example, ignores coping 
strategies that can involve self-medication and self-harm (Kelly 1988). Similarly, self-
help may involve the deployment of multiple and multi-layered methods of resistance, 
accommodation, avoidance and negotiation. 
The complex interaction between consciousness and victimisation is found in relation 
to both public and private legal systems. Studies in these domains show the decision 
by a citizen to mobilise law is not a simple or singular reaction to a problem or event. 
At a meta level, population surveys ask people about incidents that have happened to 
them and their responses. Across different countries and systems, these find that, so 
widespread is non-reporting across countries with similar and dissimilar legal systems, 
‘legal inaction *is+ the dominant pattern in empirical legal life’ (Black 1973: 133; van 
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Dijk et al. 2007). Perceived victimisation and the availability of law are also only further 
parts of the puzzle. 
Reasons for not turning to law enforcement authorities refer to prevailing social and 
legal norms, situational assessments, perceptions of authorities, and perceived 
efficacy. On the contextual norms, people say the incident was ‘not serious’ or ‘too 
trivial’ or ‘unimportant’. This was the most common reason given for non-reporting in 
an international survey across twenty countries, and also in a number of national 
surveys.51 Johnson’s examination of the Australian component of the International 
Crime Victim Survey revealed similar reasons given for not reporting with 43% of 
assault victims and 33% of burglary victims indicating that the incident was not serious 
enough to warrant police intervention (2005: 43–44). Similarly, in the UK, the most 
frequently cited reason for not reporting to police was that victims perceived the 
incident as too trivial, there was no loss or they believed that the police could not or 
would not do much about it. For violent crime, the most common reason for not 
reporting was that victims considered the incident to be a private matter and dealt 
with it themselves.52 Analysis has also revealed gender and offence differences in 
reasons for not reporting. Reasons given reveal privacy concerns, fear of reprisal and a 
desire to protect offenders.53 The differences indicate a socially constructed deference 
to the private world.  
Perceived efficacy of the law and legal institutions is a strong feature in legal 
consciousness studies and is an important link to access to justice literature. Crime 
surveys expose assessment of the receptivity, efficacy and sensitivity of justice 
agencies, and of police in particular, as influencing non-reporting. About a quarter of 
assault victims say that they did not tell police because they took care of it themselves, 
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it would be inappropriate to do so, or because the ‘family solved it’.54 In New Zealand, 
a third of respondents felt that police could not have done anything, would not have 
been bothered, or were too busy to attend (Mayhew and Reilley 2007: 63). The 
International Crime Victim Survey found that a significant and substantial proportion 
of respondents felt that police could not or would not do anything, a factor that was at 
a higher level in main cities (van Dijk et al. 2007).  
The theoretical and empirical research outlined thus far point to ordinary people as 
actors in their world; not free and unburdened, but also not inert. Assessments of 
victimisation – of different kinds – are socially constructed as much as legally defined. 
However, legal concepts ‘influence the goals, options, choices, and problems of 
ordinary individuals’ (Marshall and Barclay 2003: 617). Yet the research shows people 
tend not to involve formal law and ‘deal with it themselves’. They may be in 
constrained and circumscribed contexts but encumbered agency is theirs. 
3.6 LEGAL MOBILISATION 
Chapter 2 highlighted perspectives which said that it is through injustice that people 
look for justice. In a similar way, something must happen to bring forward law as a 
possibility following violence victimisation. Naomi Mezey (2001: 153) has commented 
that the ‘law’ in legal consciousness could be lost except for legal mobilisation. In this 
section I outline different explanations for people’s recourse to law. I consider the 
importance ascribed to assessments of law’s relevance, availability and salience. I 
specifically draw attention to approaches that emphasise the political meaning to 
mobilisation of law. 
3.6.1 Legal mobilisation as social control  
In one of the earliest studies of legal mobilisation, Donald Black posed an 
‘entrepreneurial model of law’ whereby citizens rationally pursue their own interests 
in a kind of ‘self-help’ system but without a role in the law’s development. In so 
mobilising the law, ‘the greatest legal good of the greatest number presumptively 
[arises+ from the selfish enterprise of the atomized mass’ (1973: 138). Black suggested 
that a reactive legal system – such as a criminal legal system – ‘acts to reinforce the 
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tendency of citizens to use law only as a last resort, since it allows citizens to establish 
their own priorities’ (p.134).  
Black situated his discussion within a larger enquiry in which law itself was the 
quintessential ‘governmental social control’ (Black 1980). From this perspective ‘the 
common man’ is posed either as a mere instrument to ‘highly aggressive’ government 
entities intent on ‘ferreting out illegality’ or as naive, ignorant and often mistaken in 
their ‘legal intelligence’. As key determinants to legal mobilisation, Black suggested 
that the greater the ‘relational distance between the parties in dispute, the more likely 
is law to be used to settle the dispute’ in addition to the event seriousness, the 
community and institutional context, and features of the parties. Furthermore, he 
suggested the organisation of mobilisation, the social conditions of event distribution, 
the availability of legal opportunities, and the ‘countervailing normative system’ all 
influence legal mobilisation (Black 1973: 129–140). 
Black’s thesis of legal mobilisation further proposed that the mobilisation of the law by 
private citizens is based on ‘a margin of freedom or discretion’. Informing this 
discretion, he claimed, are ‘the moral standards of the citizenry’ and ‘particularistic law 
enforcement’. For Black these features rest upon moral diversity and prejudice and 
exemplify reactive legal systems as ‘the more democratic form of legal process’ (Black 
1973: 141–144).55  
3.6.2 Legal mobilisation invoking norms 
Richard Lempert critiques Black’s theorising as narrow, unidirectional and formalistic. 
Instead he depicts legal mobilisation as ‘a process by which legal norms are invoked to 
regulate behaviour’ (1976: 73). Legal norms, he suggests, are derivative of social norms 
and may influence actions taken even when law is not expressly engaged (p.174). 
Lempert claims two features to legal mobilisation. In the first instance, it is a 
mechanism for transferring disputes from one arena to another, that of the legal 
system. In this transition, third parties – such as lawyers – act as gatekeepers to 
interpret, divert, forestall and facilitate access. Second, he says that the goal of legal 
mobilisation is avoidance of future disputes or problems. Citizen perception of the 
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cost, efficiency, efficacy, and relevance of legal avenues as well as of the uncertainty 
and contingency of outcomes, all contribute to understanding that ‘it is not irrational 
to fail to invoke available … law’ and neither is it ‘a simple reaction to problems’ 
(pp.178–179).56  
3.6.3 Legal mobilisation as transformative 
Felstiner, Abel and Sarat (1981) discuss legal mobilisation from an analysis of how a 
problem or event shifts from the immediate environment of the parties to something 
involving external authority. Their influential model of dispute transformation posits a 
three-step process. The first step involves acknowledging something is injurious 
(‘naming’); secondly there is a perceptual shift to seeing the injurious experience as a 
grievance (‘blaming’); and finally a step to consciousness of the availability of some 
remedy (‘claiming’). Felstiner and his colleagues acknowledge that this 
transformational process is influenced by social structural features as well as personal 
ones. They explain, therefore, that the characteristics of transformation are its 
subjectivity, instability, reactivity, and its complexity and incompleteness (p.637). Their 
answer to the question, ‘why do so few people turn to law?’ – is a conclusion that 
‘relief from trouble’ is uncertain, contingent and costly (p.653). 
3.6.4 Legal mobilisation as political participation 
Frances Zemans (1983; 1982) marks out the participatory essence of legal mobilisation. 
She suggests it is a form of citizen ‘demand’ designed to influence or implement 
government policy and to receive entitlements (1983: 694). Zemans claims that the 
legal system ‘relies upon the individual actor to personally evaluate the burdens and 
benefits of invoking the law on his or her own behalf’ (1982: 989). She sees ‘legal 
mobilisation as analogous though not identical to other forms of help-seeking and 
resource use behaviour’ (1982: 1002). ‘The law’, Zemans suggests ‘informs the 
citizenry of the circumstances under which the power of the state can be employed’. It 
provides ‘an endorsement to action per se’ (p.1006).  
Zemans’ decision-making model is similarly transformational as in the work of Felsinter 
and colleagues but draws on more influences and information. First there is the 
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 Zemans reinforces this point by expressly stating that ‘it is rather perfectly rational not to expend  
scarce resources to pursue complaints if no positive results are reasonably expected’ (1982: 999). 
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perception of an event or situation that is ‘potentially in need of a response’ (1982: 
1003). The decision to act is described as a dynamic that is ‘continuous and not 
perfectly sequential’ where legal and social norms act alongside situational factors to 
stimulate or inhibit (p.1004). The model further ponders attributes of the decision-
maker and, in particular, the presence of ‘rights consciousness’. As Zemans notes, it is 
not knowledge of the law that is determinative of a decision to act but rather ‘the 
salience of rights on the one hand and the sense of justification in asserting them’ 
(p.1009). Rights consciousness is influenced by socialisation as well as socio-economic 
and other demographic aspects. Perceptual variables such as expectations of success, 
cost, time and space, as well as calculations of the ‘social costs’57 further influence the 
decision to act. The uneven distribution of these resources and of the social costs 
results in ‘an individualized system’ (Zemans 1983: 695). 
Taking action is posed not as a discrete and separate option, but more of a dynamic of 
conversation with others (formal or informal), acting for oneself, and engaging the 
intervention of others.58 The ‘subjective rationality’ embedded within the process 
acknowledges that, in practice, an individual’s decision ‘is bound by limited knowledge 
of alternatives and their consequences’ (p.1069). Zemans asserts that ‘the citizen’s 
assertion of perceived rights is central’ to the operation of the legal system and that 
‘the public good’ emerges from this fundamental point as an aggregation of demand 
(p.995).  
As a political scientist, Zemans claims this type of citizen initiative defines the citizen 
regulator as a critical actor not only in the enforcement of the law but particularly in 
the implementation of public policy from which law derives political authority (1982: 
996).59 Her definition casts legal mobilisation as ‘a form of political activity by which 
the citizenry uses public authority on its own behalf’ (1983: 690).  
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 Social costs being the impact on interpersonal and social relations including on family and friendship 
networks, and reputation (Zemans 1982: 1024). 
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 Zemans is critical of the ‘disenfranchisement’ of non-lawyers in the process of legal mobilisation and 
as a subject of scholarly enquiry (1982: 995). In making this critique she references the work of Edgar 
Cahn and Jean Cahn (1970). 
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 Zemans discusses the public policy outcomes from legal mobilisation as the aggregation of individual 
demands. Democratic theorists differentiate between this type of aggregation, and the public interest or 
common good (Dahl 1989: 71). I consider that there is rather less emphatic distinction between the two. 
58 
3.6.5 Legal mobilisation as strategic resource 
It is from this standpoint of legal mobilisation as a mechanism for political participation 
that Michael McCann extends enquiry by looking at how law is used by social groups 
and social movements.60 His 1994 examination of legal mobilisation in pay equity 
campaigns in the United States is interpretive and process oriented.61 Arguing against 
conventional understanding that legal mobilisation is ineffective and that legal and 
other rights are myths, McCann poses law as a strategic resource. He conceptualises 
rights as ‘cultural conventions in social practice’ (1994: 5). People’s legal consciousness 
is joined to their interpretation of inherited and learned legal symbols and discourses 
through which social relationships may be negotiated and strategies of action 
considered (p.6–7). However, as an inherited set of conventions, practices and 
structures, law is posed as contributing ‘only limited, partial, and contingent 
constitutive influences in most domains of citizen activity’ (p.8).  
In social and political contexts, the use of law is strategic. The diversity of settings in 
which legal ideas are deployed and the pluralism of the legal order suggest that turning 
to law is neither ‘insular or autonomous’ in people’s lives (p.10). Instead, legal 
mobilisation is ‘one among many constitutive and strategic dimensions’ of social 
movements (p.11). Legal consciousness is formative in that it ‘structures meaning’ 
even though it ‘dictates no particular course of action’ (p.283). McCann concludes that 
an analysis of legal mobilisation needs to accommodate the context of contingent 
factors and relational dynamics to capture the unstable, ambiguous and contradictory 
effects of consciousness (p.287). 
3.6.6 Legal mobilisation in summary 
Theories of legal mobilisation are intimately connected to ideas about the law and 
perspectives on the social context. One set of approaches are law- and state-centric. 
These emphasise the law’s role in shaping, directing, modifying and controlling 
behaviour. The interaction between law and society is generally unidirectional and 
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 McCann’s 2006 edited volume, Law and Social Movements (Ashgate), brings together the intellectual 
and research traditions of socio-legal scholars with those of social movement specialists. 
61
 McCann, M. (1994), Rights at Work, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
59 
presupposes remedy as the primary objective.62 Another approach attempts to 
unsettle law and to foreground the social context. In so doing, the heterogeneity of 
peoples situated in various ways to each other and to sources of power are necessarily 
acknowledged. In consequence, the salience and availability of law is contingent. Thus 
reciprocal meaning-making between the self, ‘individual action and larger social 
structures such as law’ is emphasised (Ewick and Silbey 1998: 151). The different 
concepts are summarised in Table 3.2. 
As an overall view, legal mobilisation is an uncommon enterprise in the realm of 
private and public law, whether initiated by individuals or social movements. Law looks 
different depending on insider and outsider perspective (Matsuda 1987). Problems are 
framed with diverse schema and invested with multiple meaning. At the same time, 
law itself frames and structures permissible action (Hadfield 2008). It is, at best, a 
‘structural opportunity’ (McCann 1994: 239). The relationship(s) between law and 
society is impregnated with deep ambivalence. 
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 The manner in which legislators ‘frame’ possible options and constrain the idea of remedy to a 
financial one is critiqued by Gillian Hadfield in her analysis of the development and implementation of 
the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund in the USA (Hadfield 2008).  
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Table 3.2: Theories of legal mobilisation 
Theorist Mobilisation 
concept 
Mobilisers Motivation Features 
Black 
(1980, 
1973) 
Law as 
governmental 
social control 
Entrepreneurial 
and rational 
pursuit of own 
ends 
Self-help 
informed by 
moral 
standards of 
citizenry 
Law as last resort.  
More likely use of 
law where greater 
relational distance 
between persons, 
event seriousness, 
community and 
institutional context, 
features of parties 
and social context. 
Lempert 
(1976) 
Legal norms as 
regulatory 
Aligning to 
social norms 
Avoidance of 
future disputes 
or problems; 
reaction to 
problems 
dependent on 
citizen 
perception  
Mechanism for 
transferring disputes 
from one arena to 
another. 
Mobilisation 
influenced by third 
parties. 
Felstiner, 
Abel and 
Sarat 
(1981) 
Dispute 
transformation 
(naming, 
blaming, 
claiming) 
Individualistic Search for 
remedy 
Process reveals 
uncertainty in 
dispute 
transformation 
Zemans 
(1982, 
1983) 
Form of 
political 
participation 
Subjective and 
constrained, 
rationalist, 
evaluating 
burdens and 
benefits.  
Assertion of 
perceived 
rights. Salience 
of rights on 
one hand and 
sense of 
justification in 
asserting them. 
Legal and social 
norms act alongside 
situational factors; 
analogous to other 
help-seeking and 
resource use 
behaviour 
McCann 
(1984) 
Constitutive 
and strategic 
assertion of 
rights 
Interpretive; 
conscious of 
self and 
context 
Structural 
opportunity 
not dictating 
action 
Law limited, partial 
and contingent but 
also structures 
meaning. Law as one 
resource for social 
change. 
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3.7 LEGAL MOBILISATION AND VICTIMISATION 
In that ambivalent space very few people turn to the law with problems, disputes or 
claims. But what of those who do? Deciding whether or to whom to tell about an 
incident is perhaps one of the most elementary help-seeking decisions for victims of 
any type of crime to make. Certainly reporting to law enforcement – as a first step in 
mobilisation of a criminal legal response – is selective, and a largely voluntary and self-
motivated endeavour.  
3.7.1 Help-seeking 
As an active behaviour help-seeking is a form of communication ‘directed towards 
obtaining support, advice, or assistance in times of distress’ (Gourash 1978: 414). It 
constitutes single and multiple sets of actions, and is generally divided between 
informal networks and formal helping agents (Pescosolido 1992). Actions can proceed 
through discrete stages but may not be linear (Willis and Gibbons 2009; Blackstone et 
al. 2009). Help-seeking is highly related to the nature of the problem and event, the 
characteristics of the help-seeker, and the availability and perceived efficacy of 
resources. It is deeply influenced by the socio-economic context (Kaukinen 2002; 
2004).  
There is a clear pathway from help-seeking in family and friendship networks to formal 
helping agents such as legal institutions (Blackstone et al 2009; Kaukinen 2002). 
Population-based surveys of crime victims support these findings. National and 
international surveys, especially of women victims of physical and sexual violence, 
consistently show people seek succour and support predominately from personal 
networks.63  
3.7.2 Legal mobilisation through police  
Following on from this, police can be viewed as a helping agent. It is important, 
therefore, to acknowledge legal mobilisation through police as largely discretionary 
and self-motivated. The majority of crime investigated by police results from 
notification by citizens (Black and Reiss 1967) and the vast majority of these are victims 
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 In New Zealand (Mayhew and Reilly 2008), the UK (Walby and Allen 2004), and Australia (Mouzos and 
Makkai 2004; ABS 1996). For Canada, Kaukinen (2002) found that male victims of violence tend not to 
disclose and when they do it is to police. On help-seeking patterns and behaviour in domestic violence 
see Liang et al. (2005) for an overview. 
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(Sced 2004; Hindelang and Gottfredson 1976). This is also true in relation to certain 
offences such as domestic assault (Holder 2007; Fleury 2006; Walby and Allen 2004).  
Across comparable countries, the decision to report an incident of crime to a formal 
authority such as police is made by about half or less than half of all crime victims 
(Skogan 1984).64 There is, however, considerable difference in reporting depending 
upon the type of offence. Property crime is generally highly reported but interpersonal 
offences are not.65 Reporting patterns have also been shown to differ over time. For 
example, reports to police of sexual assault and other forms of assault have increased 
in the US since 1973 (Baumer and Lauritsen 2010: 165).66 However, in the UK, the 
proportion of people participating in the British Crime Survey who indicated that they 
had contact with police fell from 43% in 1981 to 27% in 2005/06. In 1981 the reason 
most commonly given for the contact was to ask directions. In 2005/06 it was to report 
a crime (Janson 2008: 22). 
3.7.3 Reasoning legal mobilisation 
A question now remains as to what informs citizen-based assessments of priority for 
mobilising public law through police. This question has only recently become the 
subject of enquiry (Robinson and Stroshine 2005; Felson et al. 2002). Attention has 
focused on barriers and inhibitions rather than incentives and pathways. 
What then of the motivational complexity behind this voluntary endeavour? In 
examining both incentives and costs associated with victim reporting using data from 
the US National Crime Victimization Survey 1992–1998, Felson and his colleagues 
consider the behaviour to be ‘rational in the sense that victims are attempting to 
achieve something they value, whether it be something practical or something they 
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 More recent analysis suggests the proportions are lower. In the UK about 42% of all crime is reported 
(Kershaw et al. 2008). In the USA, between 1973 and 2005 only 40% of non-lethal violence and 32% of 
property crimes were reported to police (Baumer and Lauritsen 2010: 153). In New Zealand just 36% of 
crimes are reported to police (Mayhew and Reilly 2007: 62).  
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 In Australia, 74% of victims of a break-in will report to police, while only 31% of victims of assault will 
do so (ABS 2005). In the UK, 93% of victims of thefts from vehicles and 76% of burglaries report to 
police, while only 34% of assault without injury report (Kershaw et al. 2008). In the USA, 47% of all 
violent victimisations and 40% of all property crimes are reported (Rand 2009). In Australia, the UK, 
Canada, NZ and the USA the reporting of domestic violence is less than for other crimes (Mayhew and 
Reilly 2007, Walby and Allen 2004; Kaukinen 2002; Mouzos and Makkai 2004; Rodgers 1994). 
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 These increases were observed for violence against women as well as men, and stranger and non-
stranger violence, as well as for victims from all ethnic and racial categories. The changes are also 
discussed in Baumer, Felson and Messner (2003). 
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think they ought to do out of civic duty or a sense of justice’ (Felson et al. 2002: 619). 
The goal orientation of motivation as ‘something of value’ accommodates both 
instrumental and non-instrumental objectives. 
Early research tended to focus on situational characteristics especially incident 
seriousness (Skogan 1984)67 and assessment of ‘durable harms’ (Goudriaan et al. 
2004). However, this emphasis has obscured contextual and normative factors 
(Greenberg and Ruback 1992). For example, features of the social context that tend 
towards ‘collective efficacy’ of neighbourhoods are influential on engagement with 
authorities (Goudriaan et al. 2006; Morenoff et al. 2001). The normative influence of 
the social network is also clearly pronounced on female victims of violence reporting 
to police (Kaukinen 2004, 2002). 
Moreover, crime and safety surveys in three countries reveal clusters of motives 
around normative reasoning, a sense of civic duty and desire for protection. In the 
USA, the primary reason victims of violence give for reporting is a belief that the 
incident was a crime (30%). The second most common reason was self-protection (19% 
prevent future violence, 17% stop offender). A further 15% express a concern for 
others (9%) and their duty to tell police (6%) (Hart and Rennison 2003: 7).68 Of those 
who reported crime to police in the UK, 43% did so because they felt that crime 
‘should be reported’ and 37% reported because they wanted to see the offender 
punished (Allen et al. 2006).  
On violence categories, the motivations are similar. Responses to the 2000 
International Crime Victim Survey across seventeen countries showed that victims of 
sexual incidents and assaults were (predominately) more interested to stop the 
violence and (secondly) for retribution, than were victims of property offences. 
Between a quarter and a third of victims of violence offences reported to police 
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 Johnson’s study of the Australian component of the ICVS confirms incident seriousness as a predictor 
for reporting, along with factors including older aged persons and lower household incomes. Controlling 
for other factors, Indigenous victims of assaults were also more likely than non-Indigenous victims to 
report to police (Johnson 2005: 41). Carcach (1997: 4) also confirms seriousness as affecting victim 
reporting in Australia. Mayhew and Reilly (2007: 66) conclude for NZ that seriousness is an overriding 
driver of reporting. See also, Gottfredson and Hindelang (1979 and 1981)  
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 Victims of more serious offences such as rape and sexual assault, aggravated assault and serious 
violent crime express a higher degree of concern to protect others than do victims of other violent 
offences such as robbery or ‘simple assault’. 
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because they felt they ‘should’ and that it was ‘serious’. A further quarter reported ‘to 
get help’. Across all crime types, the majority of victims reported because they felt 
they ‘should’ and that it was ‘serious’ (Van Kesteren, et al. 2000: 68–69). Victims of 
domestic assault also reveal this mix of protective and other-regarding motivations in 
reporting to police. In the USA, for example, women are ‘more likely to desire 
protection, they are less likely to think that their partner’s violence is a private matter, 
and they are less likely to think the incident was trivial’. This study concludes that ‘the 
factors encouraging women to report to police are much stronger than the single 
factor that discourages their calling’ (Felson et al. 2002: 640). 
3.7.4 Summary 
Considering these data, the victim of crime is an informed citizen making contingent 
choices – expressed transparently or otherwise – about which of the resources 
available in the community will assist him or her with his or her purpose(s). They use, 
develop, ignore and create ‘networks of action’ (Blumer 1969). They seek guidance 
from a range of personal and social supports. They do so according to different 
circumstances and with different expectations. As citizens, victims of crime make 
judgments about whether and who to access, why and when. In Black’s terms, they 
use their discretionary authority and become legal actors. There is nothing automatic 
or certain, however, to the mobilisation of law. 
3.8 LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS, MOBILISATION AND JUSTICE 
The theoretical and empirical discussion in this chapter presents people’s 
interpretation of events and problems as deeply socially embedded and situated. Their 
meaning-making is influenced by the discourse of law and the legal, as well as through 
a justice imaginary. These ideas shape and guide but do not direct action.  
Perceiving victimisation and injustice, seeing the availability of law, making 
assessments about law’s salience, efficacy and relevance, and moving into the 
possibilities created by law all comprise part of the puzzle of legal mobilisation. The 
component parts reinforce an image of the citizen actor exercising discretion in ways 
that are socially and politically situated. At the same time schemas of legality interact 
with other frames to permissible and available action. The option of legal mobilisation 
is hedged by constraints and contradictions. 
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Notwithstanding, a conception of the victimised citizen as an agent in determining the 
frame and thereby – at least in part – the response to an incident, event or problem, 
centralises their role in civil society. Acting to invoke law and become a legal actor is 
but one option open to them. In aggregate, these actions draw attention through law 
to the boundaries set by public policy. They ‘enact’ law and ‘create the possibility of 
change’ (Marshall and Barclay 2003: 618). They give flesh and meaning to the flat 
letter of law. The discursive movement between peoples, laws and law’s institutions 
fashion and re-fashion the everyday. 
Republican theorists envisage these as ‘communitarian sources of order … empowered 
with opportunities and resources to participate directly in any local area of collective-
decision-making that has an important effect on their lives’ (Ayres and Braithwaite 
1992: 17). It is more than social order, however, that this chapter has highlighted. In 
particular, the role of ordinary people in forming, reinforcing, re-ordering and offering 
definition and specificity to communal norms in collective settings is revealed as social 
practice with civic implications. 
From this perspective Roger Cotterrell (2006: 164) goes so far as to pose the option of 
legal mobilisation as part of an ‘individual’s obligation to maintain mutual 
interpersonal trust in the form necessary for the particular relationships of community’ 
such that ‘betrayal of this trust … can give rise to liability, to some kind of sanctioning 
of the individual within the community’.69 The proposition fuses legal mobilisation as 
part of an individualist rights narrative, to that of a broader narrative of the social and 
political. This narrative is a complex one where cohesion and contestation are in 
dynamic tension.  
In this space law is not the neutral umpire it purports to be. It is potentially oppressive 
as well as liberating. How ordinary people as victims of violence view law and come to 
experience it comprise part of the new research in this thesis. The extent to which the 
law and legal institutions affirm or disabuse them of their faith in its fairness, the 
extent that it respects the equality and dignity of citizens emerge from an intense, 
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undertake crime prevention or to participate in law as an obligation of citizenship (Goodey 2005; Tapley 
2003; Young 1996).  
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long-term engagement. It is through a detailed examination of interaction with 
authority and involvement in commonplace conversation that this research considers 
the quest for justice through the law. 
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CHAPTER 4:  METHODOLOGY 
I didn’t fit in anywhere but it’s about me. It was weird. (Xenia 2011) 
Stories that are capable of countering the hegemonic are those which bridge, 
without denying, the particularities of experience and subjectivities. (Ewick and 
Silbey 1995: 220) 
 
4.1 THINKING ABOUT DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The multi-dimensionality and malleability to ideas of justice attracted me. An enquiry 
from this perspective required methods that were attentive to the ways in which 
people ‘create, enact, and change meanings and actions’ (Charmaz 2006: 7). Yet I also 
knew that the research project had to speak to different audiences about victims, 
violence, justice, inclusion and power.  
A mixed methods approach involving a ‘practice of active engagement with difference’ 
opens out the research question (Greene 2007: 14). In this, the integration of 
methods, analysis and interpretation is central to pragmatic, critically informed 
research. A pragmatic approach can, however, over-emphasise the what of research 
inquiry. I wanted a degree of fluidity in the design components that responded to the 
situated and real world process in which the lay participants were involved, as well as 
being responsive to the meanings that emerged from the surveys and interviews. I also 
needed a design that was not only open to storytelling, but was robust enough to 
examine attitude formation ‘fraught with ambiguities’ (Sebba 1996: 86). In short, 
mixed methodologies potentially facilitate recognition of the social construction of 
individual meaning-making alongside its acknowledged constraint by rigid, persisting 
structures and patterns. 
In deciding upon a research design that emphasised the social construction of 
meaning, I could not claim that the discoveries I hoped to make in this research would 
be unexpected. I was not entering the field unencumbered. I could not expunge the 
learning I had absorbed over the years. Neither could I pretend ‘the field’ presented a 
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clean slate for me.70 As Kathy Charmaz has pointed out, ‘we construct our grounded 
theories through our past and present involvements and interactions with people, 
perspectives, and research practices’ (2006: 10, emphasis in the original). However, as 
we will see, this creates a tension between a deductive starting point to research and 
later inductive theorising that arises from fieldwork – especially longitudinal fieldwork. 
At relevant points in the analysis I reflect on my role and influence in this interpretive 
endeavour.71  
4.2 A MIXED METHODS STUDY 
The research design attempts to mirror (though not replicate) the strengths of the 
pioneering research by Joanna Shapland and her colleagues in the UK and to use the 
insights from my earlier workplace studies discussed in Chapter 1. It is an exploratory 
study where I attempt to ‘unpack’ and explore experiences and assessments made 
about justice as an experience, and as an idea that is fluid as well as fixed (Stebbins 
2001).72 I assumed complexity and ambiguity, and I aimed for a ‘thick’ understanding 
of justice in the real world (Geertz 1973: 6).  
A mixed methodology supported this intention. Both quantitative and qualitative 
methods were used concurrently and at different stages of the research. As a core 
component of mixed methods, triangulation anchored the study. Although perhaps an 
overused word, triangulation here refers to ‘combinations and comparisons of multiple 
data sources, data collection and analysis procedures, research methods, investigators 
and inferences that occur at the end of a study’ (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009: 27). 
Figure 4.1 illustrates these components of my study design. It shows the use of survey, 
interview and secondary source data. It posits reflection from lay people as well as 
from legal officials. As methods to display the richness of justice conceptions, these 
also served the requirement for ‘inference quality’ and transferability (Teddlie and 
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 In discussing the influence and orientation of ‘standpoint epistemology’ within feminist research, 
Mary Allen argues that it is pretence to say researchers come with a blank mind (Allen 2011: 25–26). In 
being transparent about the journey that lead me to undertake this research on victims and justice I 
hope to have both honoured those from whom I have learnt much while at the same time displayed 
openness to differing realities. I stress that this capacity for reflexivity is shared and displayed by both 
the lay and legal participants in this study. That is, in us all. 
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 Researcher reflexivity is situated in validity debates and intends ‘consciousness of construction’ 
(Gergen and Gergen 2007: 467).  
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 Although with less emphasis on exploration as a form of ‘naturalistic’ enquiry and more on the idea of 
it as an examination of space, place and people from a number of perspectives. 
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Tashakkori 2009: 26).73 This approach to triangulation emphasises its usefulness in 
deepening and widening understanding as well as establishing the validity of a study 
(Olsen 2004).74  
Figure 4.1: Research design 
Data sources: lay and official participants, service data, national and local surveys, 
documentation, research literature. 
 
Data type:       Data method: survey, interview, 
qualitative, quantitative,    longitudinal prospective panel, 
primary, secondary     discourse mapping 
 
 
The components to the methodology are as follows (and described in later sections): 
 the use of lay and official samples (section 2.3) 
 a longitudinal prospective panel (section 2.5) 
 quantitative survey with repeated measures and scales 
 qualitative interviewing 
 discourse mapping and analysis. 
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Tashakkori 2009: 26–27). Triangulation also attempts to offset weaknesses and to explore findings 
(Creswell 2003: 217). 
74
 Wendy Olsen calls this a ‘dialectic of learning’ (Olsen 2004). 
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4.3 STUDY SAMPLES 
A purposive sampling strategy was used to identify both the lay participants and the 
legal officials.  
4.3.1 Lay sample 
The lay sample comprised persons who had been victims of violence and who were in 
contact with support services.. The selection criteria for the sample were that: 
 people were aged 18 years and over, 
 people were primary victims in that they had directly experienced the conduct 
from which the criminal charge arose, 
 the incident included some element of violence, and 
 the incident from which the charge arose was committed in the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT) and hence would be resolved in the ACT courts.  
No claims of population representativeness are made for the lay participants. Their 
characteristics suited the research purpose and were pertinent to refining my 
emergent ideas.75 The notion of representativeness is discussed in Chapter 6 in terms 
of the participants as ‘ordinary people’ in an extraordinary situation. Interviews with 
the lay participants were conducted in settings that emphasised their ordinariness – in 
cafes, libraries, parks and in their homes. Although a purposive sample, people did not 
differ markedly either from the local population, the population of violence victims 
locally or, on values and beliefs, from national Australian samples.76 Thus the findings 
that emerge are transferrable to victims in similar research settings (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori 2009: 193 and ch.12). 
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 The panel could also be described a convenience sample in that they were drawn from a locality for 
which it was practical for me to research (where I lived, worked and studied), and who made themselves 
available (they volunteered). 
76 The two national datasets are described in Murphy, K., Murphy, B. and Mearns, M. (2010b), The 2007 
Public Safety and Security in Australia Survey; Survey methodology and preliminary findings, Working 
Paper No.16, Alfred Deakin Research Institute, Deakin University, Geelong; and Braithwaite, V. (March 
2001), The Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey: Goals and measures, Centre for Tax System 
Integrity, Working Paper No.2, The Australian National University, Canberra. The validity and reliability 
of Braithwaite’s scales is further discussed in Braithwaite, V. (2005), Preliminary findings and codebook 
for the how fair, how effective survey: the collection and use of taxation in Australia, Australian National 
University, Canberra. 
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The sample comprised two sub-groups: female victims of male domestic (or spousal) 
assault,77 and male or female victims of non-domestic assault (committed by male or 
female non-family others).78 With these sub-groups the intention was to explore the 
nature of the offence and the influence of relational and gender factors on the justice 
judgments of victims. However, only six male victims of non-domestic assault by 
another male were recruited through the contact process (see below) and agreed to 
participate.  
In total, forty-five individuals agreed to have their contact information referred to me 
(section 4.3.1.2 describes contact arrangements). Five failed to respond to my contact, 
a further six either declined or indicated their unavailability in other ways, and one 
referral did not meet the selection criteria. Thus a final total of thirty-three individuals 
participated in the first interview. 
The decision to recruit only victims of violence was deliberate. This was done to 
constrain some of the more obvious differences in victimisation experiences. Mainly it 
was done in recognition that the experience of violence carries a unique assault on 
human dignity. I assumed that this characteristic transcended the gendered nature of 
the different experiences. I further assumed that the assault on human dignity would 
itself influence justice judgments (Tyler et al. 1997). 
The decision to recruit lay participants from only one region was also made in an effort 
to constrain irrelevant sources of variation. It was also a practical decision about access 
to people and the capacity to conduct face-to-face interviews over a long period of 
time. 
4.3.1.1 Lay sample characteristics 
The demographic characteristics of the lay sample were both consistent with and 
divergent from key demographic characteristics of the region as evidenced in census 
data.79  
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 Also known as domestic violence or intimate partner violence. 
78
 The term ‘stranger assault’ can be too narrow as it does not easily allow for relationship scenarios that 
involve acquaintances or neighbours. 
79
 Census information is sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (October 2007), 2006 Census 
QuickStats. 
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As a panel of people, most of the six men and twenty-seven women were Australian 
born. A small proportion (12%) hailed from far-flung countries in Europe, Africa, the 
Middle East, South America and Asia. Census data for the region as a whole shows 
nearly 30% of the population was born overseas. However, participants’ heritage was 
evidenced by 27% of the sample speaking a language other than English at home. This 
is a slightly higher proportion than the 20% of the region’s general population speaking 
a language other than English at home. None of the study panel described themselves 
as having an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander background, while 1% of the region’s 
population did so.80  
Participants’ socio-demographic profiles were equally diverse. While nearly a third of 
the ACT’s employed population are professionals, 21% of the panel described 
themselves as such. A similar proportion of the panel as in the region described their 
occupation as managers (15%); 11% of the region described themselves as employed 
in technical and trades, with 9% of the panel doing so.  
Employment and educational patterns also showed some differences to that for the 
region. Thirty nine per cent of the panel stated that they were employed full-time as 
opposed to 65% for the region. A further 24% were employed part-time with 26% for 
the region. Most of the study participants had a tertiary qualification as their highest 
level of education.  
Income for the lay participants was dispersed in a manner similar to that for the 
region. Over half (55%) reported their income level under $45,000 per annum, with 
42% reporting their annual income over this figure.81 Over half of the panel (55%) said 
that they rented their home, as opposed to 29% in the region. Finally, only 30% of the 
panel were married compared with nearly half (48%) of the region’s population.  
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the characteristics of the study participants as a total 
and as distributed between the two sub-groups of domestic assault (all female) and 
non-domestic or street assaults (all male). 
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 The selection criteria and contact process is described later in this chapter. No additional measures 
were adopted to boost numbers of people from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds, or 
from Cultural and Linguistically Diverse communities, or persons with a disability. 
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 N=32, one missing. 
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Table 4.1: Demographic characteristics of lay participants, number and %¹  
DEMOGRAPHICS82 Domestic assault 
(female) 
N=27 (%) 
Non-domestic 
assault (male) 
N=6 (%) 
TOTAL 
 
N=33 (%) 
Australian born 23 (85) 6 (100) 29 (88) 
English only spoken 19 (70) 5 (83) 24 (73) 
ATSI 0 0 0 
Disability 1 (4) 2 (33) 3 (9) 
Relationship status – single 19 (70) 4 (67) 23 (70) 
Children at home 19 (70) 2 (33) 21 (64) 
Home rental 13 (48) 5 (83) 18 (55) 
Employment status 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Other 
 
11 (41) 
6 (22) 
10 (37) 
 
2 (33) 
2 (33) 
2 (33) 
 
13 (39) 
8 (24) 
12 (36) 
Occupation 
Professional, managerial 
Clerical, sales, service 
Tradesperson, labourer, 
transport, factory 
Missing 
 
9 (33) 
4 (15) 
2 (7) 
12 (44) 
 
3 (50) 
1 (17) 
2 (33) 
 
0 
 
12 (36) 
5 (15) 
4 (12) 
 
12 (36) 
Level of education 
Tertiary 
Secondary 
Other 
 
9 (33) 
16 (59) 
1 (4) 
 
2 (33) 
3 (50) 
1 (17) 
 
12 (33) 
19 (57) 
2 (6) 
Gross annual income 
Under $25k 
$25–45k 
$45–100k 
$100–250k 
Missing 
 
10 (37) 
4 (15) 
11 (41) 
1 (4) 
1 (4) 
 
3 (50) 
1 (17) 
2 (33) 
0 
0 
 
13 (39) 
5 (15) 
13 (39) 
1 (3) 
1 (3) 
¹ Percentages rounded up or down to the nearest percentage point. 
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 Definitions and classifications are drawn from Australian Bureau of Statistics Census Survey. 
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4.3.1.2 Contact arrangements 
Participants for the domestic violence sample were invited to participate through their 
liaison with the Domestic Violence Crisis Service (DVCS). The DVCS is a non-
government agency that is engaged through both legislative provision and 
administrative memoranda as a partner to statutory criminal justice agencies in the 
ACT (Holder and Caruana 2006).  
A safety protocol for contact was negotiated with the DVCS that recognised the 
particular dynamics of domestic violence situations (Langford 2000). Once one of their 
clients had agreed to involvement, and with her agreement, her contact details were 
passed to me. Initial telephone contact or other contact method as agreed then took 
place according to any safety considerations advised by both the client and the service.  
Participants for the non-domestic violence sample were invited to participate in a 
similar manner through their engagement with a government agency, Victim Support 
ACT. This avenue did not generate any potential participants. Therefore agreement 
was later secured with the Australian Federal Police (AFP ACT Policing) to facilitate 
contact with non-domestic assault victims. AFP victim liaison officers offered an 
invitation to participate to victims with whom they would make routine contact after 
the initial report to police. If people indicated an interest they were asked to agree 
that their contact details be passed to the researcher. Following this I would make 
contact by the agreed method (usually telephone).  
In all circumstances, participants were offered information about the study by post, 
email and/or in person. This information package included a plain English statement 
about the research, consent form and details of support and justice agencies. 
Participants were asked to consent to three interviews, although they were advised 
that consent to the first interview did not imply consent to the second or third 
interviews. Additionally, participants were advised that they could withdraw from an 
interview at any stage. 
4.3.2 Legal officials sample 
The decision to use a new data source as a theoretical sample emerged during the 
second wave of interviews with lay research participants. Data from these interviews 
sharpened focus on the situation in which lay participants were acting and 
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constructing meaning. I needed a way to make transparent the structural and 
ideological conditions in which they found themselves. 
I decided to sample persons with a particular perspective of the public interest in 
justice. These legal officials had all been (but were no longer) Directors of Public 
Prosecution in different Australian jurisdictions. Directors have experience and 
expertise in their field. Ex-directors were further assumed to have greater latitude to 
speak freely about the tensions and challenges to the role vis á vis victims of crime. 
Fifteen potential legal officials were identified through a key informant and an internet 
search. There are nine criminal jurisdictions in Australia. Eight persons from a range of 
these jurisdictions were approached directly with a request for an interview. Six 
persons accepted the invitation. The sample of six persons had practiced as Directors 
in six different criminal jurisdictions in Australia.83  
Interviews with the legal officials were semi-structured (Appendix A). This allowed for 
improvisation and judgment in the conduct of the interviews (Fontana and Fey 2000). 
All but one of these experts was interviewed in a professional setting – these 
surroundings created a ‘meta-narrative’ of authoritative ease. They were in a place of 
performance. 
4.4 RESEARCH ETHICS 
A critical ethical aspect of the research was the potential vulnerability and security of 
the victims of violence. Understanding the traumatic and practical impacts of the 
incident as well as the possible exposure of the lay participants to further assault, 
threat and intimidation were fundamental.84  
In addition, the research was mindful of the implications to lay participants of being in 
a complex legal environment. All respondents were de-identified. Furthermore, the 
consent documentation needed to address the potential – albeit limited – for 
subpoena of survey documents as well as the existence of obligations on reporting 
suspected child abuse.  
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 One (ex) senior prosecutor had undertaken an interview as a pilot. This interview is not included in the 
analysis. 
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 In addition to my own professional expertise and experience, guidance was derived from ‘Principles 
and Guidelines for Research with Vulnerable Individuals and Families’, May 2003, Centre for Children 
and Families in the Justice System, Ontario, Canada. 
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Finally, there was some small scope for actual and perceived conflicts arising from my 
having obligations as a statutory appointee under the ACT Victims of Crime Act 1994. 
This appointment overlapped with the research until early 2011. While not a conflict, it 
was also possible that the lay participants may seek to access, or I might offer, ‘insider’ 
knowledge of the justice process and the availability of various entitlements and 
remedies for victims. In fact this did transpire on a few occasions. In general I provided 
factual, contextual and/or contact information. Where an opinion was asked for it was 
provided at the end of an interview but with the suggestion to contact other formal 
sources of advice. Given these issues, the plain English statement contained service 
and other contacts, information about people’s rights in the justice process and 
information about the role of the statutory advocate in assisting them to access these 
rights.  
Ethical issues with regard to the legal officials related mainly to the importance of 
anonymity to them. Those interviewed thus received an information sheet setting out 
assurances that no personal or professional characteristics would be used in any 
publication of their data. This restriction extended to the identification of the 
jurisdiction in which they had served as a Director of Public Prosecutions.  
All participants – lay as well as official – were offered a movie voucher as a token of 
appreciation for their time and expertise. The lay participants were offered a voucher 
for each successive interview. 
The ethics application and two subsequent variations were approved by the Human 
Research Ethics Committee, The Australian National University (2007/0104).  
4.5 A LONGITUDINAL PROSPECTIVE PANEL 
A unique feature of the study is that it involved a longitudinal and prospective panel of 
victims of violence – the lay participants. Such a design is particularly suited to an 
examination of the dynamics, influences and characteristics of attitude formation, as 
well as social processes (Ruspini 1999). Panel design is commonly used in household, 
economic and labour force studies. Other types of panel can be repeated cross-
sectional studies (eg US National Crime Victim Survey), or retrospective such as in oral 
histories.  
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The participants formed a cohort panel based on sample selection criteria. They were 
not a cohort in commencing and finishing at the same time. They were also not a 
cohort as recipients of the same ‘treatment’ but rather through their shared 
experience of participation in the standard and routinised procedure of criminal case 
processing. The panel was prospective in that participants were recruited at the 
commencement of this process.  
A problem with panel design is attrition. Dropping out of the study was anticipated as 
arising from people’s personal circumstances as well as possible perception of the 
survey and interview as confronting and complex. Nonetheless the rate of attrition was 
not unusual.85 Participant retention from the first to the third interviews was 58% (see 
Table 4.2). While the participant experiences are described at each of the three 
interviews, only a core nineteen participants can be said to constitute the completing 
panel. 
Table 4.2: Numbers and % of interviews at three stages 
INTERVIEW TOTAL (%) 
TIME 1 33 (100) 
TIME 2 26 (79) 
TIME 3 19 (58) 
 
Attrition creates a missing data problem. The majority of the participants who left the 
study after the first or second interviews were domestic assault victims.86 No 
explanatory pattern (other than this characteristic) could be discerned for this. While 
only 18% of participants at the first interview were non-domestic assault victims, by 
the third interview these comprised 26% of the final panel. Although all participants 
agreed to contact for a second or third interview, the majority of those who were not 
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 The attrition rate of approximately 25% at each stage is consistent with other studies (Wenzel 2000: 
161).  
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 In this study retention of domestic assault participants was lower (52%) than for non-domestic assault 
victims (83%) at the third interview. 
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interviewed beyond the first occasion simply failed to respond to multiple attempts to 
contact them.87  
Panel conditioning is also described as problematic (Van Der Zouwen and Van Tilburg 
2001; Trivellato 1999). Conditioning refers to the effect that participation in the study 
has: that is, the questioning, the interviewer, and the terminology. Some say that it is 
important to ‘trigger’ an interviewee’s response in a concept study so that pre-existing 
beliefs and attitudes become accessible. Others say that the panel conditioning effect 
must be managed and made transparent (Ruspini 1999). I chose to use the rapport 
developed over the life of the panel between myself and the lay participants as a 
constructive aspect of the study. In later chapters I discuss the manner in which the 
interviews helped people reflect upon, digest and ‘frame’ what had happened and 
what was happening. I came to consider the idea, practice and theory of deliberation 
as critical to participatory research as it is to participatory justice and participatory 
democracy (see Chapter 9). 
The time between the first and final interviews varied between six to thirty-six months. 
The key factor to the length of time was whether the case finalised quickly in the court 
system or whether a contested trial ensued. Each participant commenced and finished 
their participation in the justice process – and hence in the research process – at 
different times. The fieldwork commenced in November 2009 and completed in March 
2013. Participants were interviewed at three stages (see Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: Prospective interview schedule 
INTERVIEW PROCEDURAL INTERVIEW POINT 
TIME 1 After police had charged an accused person with an 
offence and prior to a court hearing 
TIME 2 After the finalisation of the matter at court 
TIME 3 Approximately six to eight months after finalisation 
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 Of the fourteen who only had one interview, nine failed to respond to multiple attempts for further 
contact, two declined further interviews (one after consultation with her partner), two made a number 
of appointments that they did not keep, and one commenced an interview and then declined to 
continue. 
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4.6 SURVEY AND INTERVIEW DESIGN WITH LAY PARTICIPANTS 
The surveys and each of the three interviews with lay participants combined 
quantitative and qualitative questions. Both data were gathered concurrently. In the 
first interview, the enquiry was deductive with quantitative data dominant.88 By the 
third interview, qualitative questioning reflected an inductive shift.  
This shift in the dominance of a particular method was informed by grounded theory 
but also emerged from the fluidity of the longitudinal design. Discussed later in the 
section on interpretation and representation, grounded theory respects the research 
participants and the research data as central to concept development (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990). Thus, while the first interview of lay participants focussed on concepts 
drawn from the literature, the second and third interviews created opportunities for a 
higher degree of narrative. This accommodated the different levels of engagement and 
participation with prosecution and with court that was experienced by individuals. The 
third interview involved more open-ended questioning as lay participants looked back 
on their experience after some months. 
The quantitative variables were drawn from the literature, especially that dealing with 
procedural and distributive justice. These acted as ‘sensitising concepts’ and formed a 
conceptual analytic frame (Bowen 2006) through which the unsettling reflection – the 
‘why’ – could be directed (Charmaz 2006: 133). This contextualising and the 
integration of interview and survey data recognises the social construction of 
perspective.  
The questions at the first interview (Appendix B89) grouped around: 
 contextual and situational variables (personal and social, including relationship 
to offender), 
 emotional state as well as the emotional orientation to the offender, 
 attribution to the offender of the offence, 
 the nature and impact of the incident and assessment of seriousness, 
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 See Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998: ch.3) for a discussion on dominant–less dominant design issues in 
mixed methodology.  
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 There were only a couple of small differences between the first and second surveys for domestic and 
non-domestic assault victims to do with the nature of their relationship with the violent person. 
Therefore only the surveys for domestic assault victims are included in the appendices. 
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 perceptions of community attitudes to victim help-seeking, 
 the initiation, reasoning about and experience of police contact, including prior 
experiences, 
 preferences for outcome at court, preferred sentencing principle, and through 
which preferred court processing method, and 
 attitudes towards Australia’s law and justice system, trust in civic institutions 
and personal values. 
At the second interview the lay participants were asked what they wanted prosecution 
or court to do (and why), and what the agencies actually did (Appendix C). The 
interviews at each stage went on to ask about participants’ experiences and opinions 
with the decision-making process and the outcomes of each agency’s decision. The 
agency decisions constituted the substantive outcome relevant to distributive justice 
theory (see Table 4.4). The third and final interview reflected back on the justice 
system as a whole (Appendix D). 
Table 4.4: Nature of the substantive outcomes 
INTERVIEW SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME 
TIME 1 The police arrest and charge decision 
TIME 2 The decision to prosecute or not, and on what charges 
 The court verdict and sentence (if any) 
TIME 3 The justice system outcome 
 
Final decisions on the design and questions of the second and third surveys and 
interviews were influenced by what had gone before. Early proponents of grounded 
theory emphasise the constant comparison of data and its ‘verification’ by participants 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967). In this study, participant authentication evolved through 
iterative narrative from interview to interview. 
4.6.1 Lay participant survey questions 
Framing questions about the decisions, outcomes and process preferences of lay 
participants was one of the more challenging components of the survey design. A 
starting point for the research acknowledged people were in a real process and facing 
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real choices, dilemmas and opportunities that would have an impact in their own real 
world. It was important that in the interviews the detail and language of the 
possibilities before them reflected the institutional and personal reality in which they 
found themselves.90  
The first and grounding questions to be asked at the first interview were whether the 
person had initiated the contact with police, had wanted the arrest, and – looking 
ahead – whether they wanted the violent person found (or to plead) guilty, to be 
found not guilty or to have the charges dismissed. From this point, people were then 
asked their preference on a range of seventeen actual sentence options,91 and from 
this list then asked to rank their first, second and third preference. Finally, they were 
asked which of the statutory sentencing principles92 they felt should be applied by the 
judge or magistrate to the sentence.  
The questions about what steps and process the participants would like to use in their 
case were complicated. Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) seminal research on procedural 
justice posed options that asked subjects to consider from the perspective of an 
accused person. More recent literature has tended, since the explosion of interest in 
restorative justice, to discuss options for ‘traditional’ court or ‘restorative’ processes as 
opposing alternatives. The restorative justice studies tend to commence after a plea 
decision (Strang 2002). However, a key feature of my research was to explore the 
complexity of opinion and opportunity from the beginning, rather than pose binary 
options. I wanted to see if and how, in the real world, people displayed and sought 
multiple ‘justice objectives’ and through what process (Gromet and Darley 2009). 
Therefore the process preference questions in the survey came after people were 
asked their opinions and preferences for verdict and sentence. Then the process 
questions posed eight possible pathways: diversionary, traditional, traditional plus 
victim input, and versions of a traditional and restorative hybrid. Visual flowcharts 
were prepared as interview aids. Where a particular option was not in fact currently 
available in the justice system for the types of cases under examination, interviewees 
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 A senior legal policy officer with experience of court practice, and in-depth knowledge of the ACT 
Crimes Act 1900 and the ACT Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 was consulted on appropriate terminology 
for this section of the survey. 
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 ACT Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 sections 6 and 7, located at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au  
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 Ibid. 
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were informed so as to avoid their being misled. At the second interview a more direct 
question was asked requesting a narrative response: ‘if offered a face-to-face 
discussion with the accused and with a trained facilitator would they have taken it up 
and, if so, when in the process?’ 
At the second interview, actual decisions had been made in each case. That is, to 
prosecute (or not), to convict (or not) and with what sentence. Therefore the survey 
had to deal with the possibility that for a proportion of victims, the case may have 
finalised when the prosecution made a decision not to proceed. The questions asked 
participants not only what outcome was arrived at (by prosecution and by the court) 
but also what they would have preferred to see happen; a ranking of preferences; their 
perspective on the suitability and effectiveness of the decisions; and their perspective 
on the justice principles they thought had been applied in the case. 
All the domestic assault victims knew the actual outcome of the matter at court by the 
time of the second interview. It was noteworthy that some of the non-domestic 
assault victims did not. This reflected the different local arrangements in place for 
victim notification. Where non-domestic assault victims did not know the outcome at 
court, they were given contact information to assist them in finding out. Eventually the 
information was secured by participants.93 
In the first and second interviews, participants were also asked whether they had a 
prior experience of victimisation and prior experience of the justice agencies, police, 
prosecution or courts. If they responded in the affirmative, they were asked questions 
designed to determine if these had been positive or negative experiences, and in what 
ways.  
4.6.2 Quantitative measurements and scales 
A number of repeated measures were used in the survey design to examine lay 
assessments of justice across the three interviews and in relation to the different 
justice agencies. The measures related to procedural and distributive fairness. 
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 This issue of notification affects research outcomes in addition to it being a perennial problem for 
members of the public involved in the system. In one of her procedural justice studies in Canada, 
Professor Jo-Anne Wemmers has said that she could not assess the relative importance of procedural 
and outcome measures because the respondents generally did not know the outcome (personal 
communication 14 September 2011). 
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Across the three interviews with lay participants, some questions asked for categorical 
yes or no answers. Others invited a response to a statement on a Likert-type scale. The 
majority of such questions used a five-point scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. Four-point and seven-point scales were more appropriate to some 
questions. Prior to performing any statistical analysis, the data were cleaned and some 
variables were reverse scored or recoded. Descriptions of participants’ experience 
used the mean and standard deviation derived from the software program SPSS.94  
The first survey comprised eighty-two questions, generating 273 variables plus 
qualitative narrative. Factor analysis of assessment of justice items was used to reduce 
the data and to identify clusters. This analysis is discussed in depth in Chapter 7.  
Scales relating to various aspects of people’s civic identity and orientation were 
created. A scale aimed at capturing the participants’ overall beliefs (or opinions) about 
justice separate to their personal victimisation experience was derived from a national 
Australian study of citizen attitudes towards crime and policing (Murphy et al. 2010a) 
(see Table 4.5). The measures were chosen above the more well-known ‘belief in a just 
world’ (Lerner 1980). Lerner himself came to argue that suggesting a belief in a just 
world was ‘a fundamental delusion’ did not fully account for the complexity of 
people’s opinions and beliefs in real world settings (Montada and Lerner 1998: 247–
253). Murphy’s study employed phrasing that is in more common usage and that 
relates directly to the Australian justice system. 
The research sought to situate the respondents not only as rights-bearing citizens but 
also as citizens per se. Therefore the first questionnaire asked about their community 
and other activities, political beliefs, trust in civic institutions and their personal values. 
Conceptions about citizenship ranging from active citizens to relational ideas were 
developed using variables from Professor Valerie Braithwaite’s studies into the micro 
foundations of Australian democracy.95 Participants were asked to respond to 
statements using a five point Likert scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree. Trust in civic institutions was measured using a four-point scale from 1 = trust 
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 Standard deviation (SD) is a measure of how well the mean represents the data. Large SD (relative to 
mean) indicates that the data points are distant from the mean (Field 2000: 6). 
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 Located in the Micro Foundations of Democratic Governance Project, Regulatory Institutions Network, 
The Australian National University at http://regnet.anu.edu.au/demgov/home  
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them a lot to 4 = do not trust them at all.96 People’s personal values, ranging from 
security-orientated values to harmony-oriented values, were measured using 
Braithwaite’s (2009a) seven-point scale from 1 = reject to 7 = accept as of utmost 
importance. Scales were created using factor analysis (see Table 4.6). These scales, and 
those in Table 4.5, were used as repeat measures. 
Table 4.5: Items comprising the disinterested justice assessment scales (N=1204), from 
Murphy et al. (2010a) 
Scale Variables Reliability 
scoreᴬ 
Obligation 
to obey 
 
Obeying the law is the right thing to do 
I feel a moral obligation to obey the law 
I may not like all the laws and rules we have in place, but 
obeying them is a part of life we must accept 
0.857 
Confidence 
in justice 
 
I feel our criminal justice system reflects the needs of the 
community 
The laws of our criminal justice system are generally 
consistent with the views of ordinary Australians about 
what is right and wrong 
I have a great deal of confidence in our criminal justice 
system 
Our criminal justice system needs to undergo significant 
changes to make it a fairer system for allᴮ 
Australia’s criminal justice system does not protect my 
interestsᴮ 
0.769 
ᴬ Cronbach’s alpha; ᴮ Reverse scored 
 
Finally, scales were created as measures of each participant’s sense of agency and of 
their perception of the violent person and the offence (see Table 4.7, p.87).  
4.6.3 Qualitative analysis 
Qualitative coding is ‘the process of naming segments of data with a label that 
simultaneously categorises, summarises and accounts for each piece of data’ (Charmaz 
2006: 43). Early grounded theorists emphasise repeated cycles of coding from the data 
as inductive generators of theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). However, as a mixed 
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85 
method study examining, in the first instance, a priori concepts of justice, this research 
moved from deductive to inductive in its analysis of data. Thus the coding was 
managed through the specific lines of questioning contained in the interviews of both 
lay and official participants rather than line-by-line analysis. These provided fertile 
ground for the later thematic analysis, and their location with other dominant 
concepts drawn from the literature. 
The interviews with lay participants were completed face-to-face and as part of the 
surveying. Participants usually marked the survey paper with their answers to 
questions, and then handed the survey back to me to write responses to open-ended 
questions. Transcription was therefore a relatively simple process of typing up, coding 
and filing. I taped and transcribed interviews with official participants myself. 
For the lay participants, the interview questions related directly to actions they or 
others had taken or were about to take, and asked them to reflect on these. The 
coding, therefore, translated easily into: 
 objectives and motivations 
 preferences 
 expectations 
 reflections. 
 
The codes – crafted manually – depicted the ‘intentional understanding’ of lay 
participants (Kögler 2007: 365). Through the reasoning and context provided in 
narrative by lay participants, I aimed for an understanding of what was behind their 
intentions rather than explanations. I sought depth and perspective to people’s 
accounts through an integrated analysis of the qualitative and quantitative data. For 
example, a description of how many participants might have wanted prosecution is 
unsettled by narratives that diverge or join on different reasoning. Therefore, variation 
and variability leveraged multi-level understanding. 
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Table 4.6: Items comprising the social value scales (N=3558) from Braithwaite (2001) 
Scale Variables Reliability 
scoreᴬ 
Self-reliant 
citizenship 
Good citizens give a helping hand to others 
Good citizens work hard and do their fair share 
Good citizens accept that others have a right to be different 
Good citizens get on with their own lives and let others live as 
they want to 
0.739 
Involved 
citizenship 
Being a good citizen is about becoming involved in your 
community 
Being a good citizen means taking an active interest in politics 
Being a good citizen means standing up for what you think is 
right even if others disagree 
0.646 
Harmony 
 
Self-knowledge  
Inner harmony 
Self-improvement 
Wisdom 
Self-respect 
Pursuit of knowledge 
0.867 
Security Recognition by community 
Economic prosperity 
Authority 
Ambition 
Competition 
0.755 
Trust in 
authorities  
Trust – local government 
Trust – federal government 
Trust – local law courts 
0.603 
Trust in 
public 
services 
Public schools in your area 
Fire stations in your area 
Hospitals in your area 
Police stations in area 
0.667 
Personal 
agency 
 
What happens in the future depends on me 
I have control over the direction my life is taking 
I often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of lifeᴮ 
There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I 
haveᴮ 
0.659 
ᴬ Cronbach’s alpha; ᴮ Reverse scored 
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Table 4.7: Items comprising the personal and offender assessments (N=33) 
Scale Variables Reliability 
scoreᴬ 
Fear/distress At time of incident I felt: 
 fear 
 distress 
0.900 
Humiliation At time of incident I felt: 
 humiliation 
 other 
0.588 
Warm feelings toward 
offender 
Feelings for offender: 
 love 
 empathy 
 forgiveness 
0.722 
Distanced feelings 
toward offender 
Feelings for offender: 
 frightened 
 confused/puzzled 
 sadness 
 pity 
0.567 
Intentional offence Offender knew what he was doing Not scored 
Unintentional offence Offender did not mean to hurt me 
Offender influenced by drink/drugs 
0.326 
Offence provoked Offender provoked 
Offender influenced by others 
0.499 
ᴬ Cronbach’s alpha 
 
In addition, aspects of the qualitative data were transformed quantitatively. The core 
concepts that arose are discussed alongside other research findings on victims and 
justice. I aimed to identify convergence and difference. The repetition of certain 
measures through the three stages of interview reveals what matters in justice 
assessments, when and why. 
The ideas and concepts that emerged from the coding were framed by the themes or 
dimensions of justice identified in the literature. These dimensions, as well as my 
professional knowledge, provided ‘analytic choices’ for sifting the data (Miles and 
Huberman 1994: 8). Analysis involved comparing and integrating statements relevant 
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to the themes. While early grounded theorists abjure this approach, later 
constructivists acknowledge that ‘social phenomena exist not only in the mind, but in 
the objective world as well, and there are some lawful, reasonably stable relationships 
to be found among them’ (p.429). This position recognises that individual views and 
actions are marked and underpinned by the patterning of social processes. Direct 
quotes from the participants serve as exemplars of these connections. 
As the longitudinal process generated a considerable volume of qualitative data, visual 
displays further categorise the meanings given to the idea and experience of justice, 
and locate these within particular places and times. Discourse analysis of the legal 
officials’ interviews noted what meanings to justice were privileged, and in what ways. 
As a critical tool, discourse analysis considers the meaning of what is said within and 
alongside the social and institutional structures in which things are said. As such it 
looks at power relationships and seeks to make hidden power more visible (Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough 1999). As an analytical tool, discourse analysis sharpens the boundaries 
between, and distinctiveness of, the multiple perspectives and multiple realities 
thrown up by the lay and official participants.  
4.7 LIMITATIONS 
Exploratory studies such as mine are necessarily tentative in asserting findings. The 
self-selection and small number of lay participants in itself limits generalisability. 
Similarly, the disparity between the sub-groups of domestic and non-domestic assault 
victims limits analytical power in relation to gender and other relational 
characteristics. The study is also limited in the significant disparity in numbers between 
the population samples from the various national datasets used and that for the study 
sample. However, as the intention was to explore in depth and over time the idea and 
experience of justice in a real world situation, the study possesses depth, detail, 
emotionality, nuance and coherence. 
4.8 INTERPRETATION AND REPRESENTATION 
Constructivists say that analysis and interpretation are two sides of the same coin 
(Miles and Huberman 1994). However, if analysis is sorting and classifying, 
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interpretation is the patterning, its continuity and ruptures. Interpretation asks what 
these ways of accounting can mean.  
In this sense, interpretation is about choices that have social and political resonance. 
One of my choices is to privilege the perspectives of ordinary people, but also to 
present their rounded as well as discordant selves. There is no point in replacing one 
simplistic image with another. In a further instance of choice, this ‘imaginative 
rendering’ (Charmaz 2006: 149) is attuned to and reflexive with the ‘space of politics 
and moral discourse’ in which research about victims and justice is located. This space 
is historically and ideologically situated. I intend this deeper understanding of ordinary 
people’s complex reasoning to illuminate a path through this space for the reader.  
I want my re-centring of ordinary people to provide a representation that challenges 
state-centric discourse about authority and legitimacy. A critical perspective doesn’t 
determine how we see the world but works as a strategy for exploring; stimulates 
analyses of competing power interests; and examines the social construction of 
identity and experience (Benhabib and Cornell 1987). Giving pseudonyms in this thesis 
to the lay participants was an essential part of re-centring – and perhaps a not-so-
subtle argument against power. Through their eyes I was conscious of critical readers.  
My interpretation of the prosecutorial discourse about justice resists its hegemony. I 
view their discourse as power/knowledge formations that serve institutional authority 
(Foucault 1980). In this I recognise that institutional imperatives create straightjackets 
for practitioners as well as for the lay publics (victim and offender). Denzin and Lincoln 
have called for ‘compassionate, critical, interpretive civic social science … [to] produce 
radical democratising transformations in the public and private spheres’ (2000: 1019). 
This invitation can also be extended to all those who work for justice where public and 
private interests intersect in the private/public spaces of justice. 
In the end, not only do analysis and interpretation interact but they do so also with 
representation. Interpretation is not the conclusion. My sympathies lie with those 
struggling within ‘structured circumstances which consistently work to deny them any 
effective voice at all’.97 For this research I re-present an examination of one supreme 
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idea – justice – from different perspectives in order to create new possibilities in the 
real world. 
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CHAPTER 5: MAPPING INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE ABOUT JUSTICE 
You are not running a service for the victims who want to feel better. (P1 2011)  
Competition for control of access to the legal resources inherited from the past 
contributes to establishing a social division between lay people and professionals 
by fostering a continual process of rationalization. Such a process is ideal for 
constantly increasing the separation between judgments based upon the law and 
naive intuitions of fairness. (Bourdieu 1987: 817) 
Institutional fundamentalism may not only ride roughshod over the complexity of 
societies, but quite often the self-satisfaction that goes with alleged institutional 
wisdom even prevents critical examination of the actual consequences of having 
the recommended institutions. Indeed, in the purely institutional view, there is, at 
least formally, no story of justice beyond establishing the ‘just institutions’. Yet, 
whatever good institutions may be associated with, it is hard to think of them as 
being basically good in themselves, rather than possibly being effective ways of 
realising acceptable or excellent social achievements. (Sen 2009: 83) 
 
5.1 WHERE POWER LIES 
This chapter considers institutional and legal orientations to the victim in criminal 
justice, and to the idea of justice itself. The discussion looks back to identify some key 
conceptual transitions in the historical evolution of criminal law and justice, pauses on 
present-day realities, and then looks forward to touch on future possibilities. The 
rather panoramic depiction situates lay people and professionals – as well as their 
narratives – in a specific socio-historical context.  
I start with a brief description of the processes and entities that comprise institutional 
aspects of this environment. In particular I explore the evolution of public prosecution 
and contrast some differences between Australian and English histories. I enquire into 
the perspectives and orientation of prosecuting authorities – using the reflections of 
an elite sample – as exemplifying a dominant (and dominating) paradigm about justice. 
While I identify and trace the contours and strands of thinking both in appreciation 
and as critique, my ultimate aim is to situate the various discourses on justice within a 
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political frame.98 The analysis works through the question ‘where power resides’ in 
criminal justice (Kearon and Godfrey 2007: 33). From this perspective I will argue that 
the authoritative prosecution discourse on justice acts as an ideology that legitimates 
the practices through which power becomes hegemonic.99 In concrete terms I argue 
that the exercise of discretion as a practice is central to prosecution power. 
Nonetheless, discretion also emerges as rich in potential for dialogue and engagement. 
5.2 WHY FOCUS ON PUBLIC PROSECUTION? 
In today’s world the institutions of criminal justice are imbued with an extraordinary 
degree of power and authority over ordinary citizens. Mostly this is indirect and 
criminal justice lies in the background of people’s everyday lives. Whereas police and 
the courts are sharper in focus, prosecutors conduct their business largely hidden from 
the public eye. Theirs is an under-researched practice and an under-theorised role, yet 
its central organising concepts are emblematic of criminal justice as a whole. 
In this chapter I use the reflections of six Australian ex-Directors of Public 
Prosecution100 in single narrative form in order to map representations of justice and 
to articulate institutional orthodoxies. Discourse analysis treats individual reflections 
as a whole and as connected to the production and reproduction of power (Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough 1999). The six performed their public role in six different jurisdictions. 
Between them they had over fifty-one years of prosecuting experience (average 8.5 
years). Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner and comprised over 10 
hours conversation in total (one and three-quarter hours per person on average) 
(Pfadenhaeur 2009: 84).  
As an elite grouping, theirs is not posed as a ‘truth’ or source of objectivity. Indeed, 
their disciplinary and institutional settings impose ‘cognitive and social norms’ that are 
habituated and routinised in their professional lives (Meuser and Nagel 2009: 18–19). 
As legal officials, prosecutors inhabit a space where their decision-making in the name 
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of the state or Crown – discretionary and unseen – moves them ‘from the language of 
administration to the language of power’. In making decisions to prosecute or not, 
they decide what is to come under the purview of law and what is not. In a modern 
democracy, public prosecution enacts ‘the logic of sovereignty’ (Sarat and Clarke 2008: 
387).  
5.1.2 Prosecution as legal mandarins 
As legal professionals, prosecutors abjure any suggestion of such monopolistic 
command. They commonly situate themselves as one in a chain of decision-making 
sites, as ‘just one cog in the process’ (P3). This perspective accords with some criminal 
justice scholars who refer to it as a process rather than as a system.101 In the process, 
prosecutors are pragmatic actors who are prosecuting ‘because you have a case’ 
(P1).102 Their role is described modestly to act ‘professionally with the body of 
evidence and wherever that and the law and the guidelines take him or her’ (P3). This 
managerialist approach103 presents prosecutors as administrative practitioners and 
dissociates criminal justice from their authority. In counter-pose, prosecutors tend also 
to make a further claim as ‘ministers of justice’ (P4, P5).104 The depiction serves to 
emphasise the point about prosecution intimacy with sovereign authority. At this end 
of their representational spectrum prosecutors take this ‘responsibility really really 
seriously’ (P2). They will typically refer to their ‘duty’ (P1, P4, P5, P6) and ‘obligation’ 
(P1, P4) and, as high mandarins (Gordon 1984), invoke higher principles in language 
that has been critiqued as ‘unworkably vague’ (Plater 2011: 166). 
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The disjuncture between these pictures of their work – the mundane and the lofty – 
could be almost a stereotype of criminal justice per se. As legal officials they contribute 
to shaping a ‘dominant vision’ (Gordon 1984: 71). However, it is important to take 
these accounts seriously ‘without losing sight of the particular settings and 
circumstances in which they were developed and articulated’ (Blumenthal 2012: 174).  
The term ‘mandarin’ captures a sense of the features of Directors of Public Prosecution 
as higher officials modelling the justice discourse and pauses on a picture of 
‘benevolently competent authority’ (Duff 2001: 8).105 Their disciplinary and ‘social 
cohesion’ confers them particular authority (Bourdieu 1987: 819). Whereas doctrinal 
mandarins speak to the legal system in wrapping the law ‘in hyper-formal elaborations 
of its doctrines, or mechanical rigidity in applying its rules or precedents’, the legal 
mandarins of prosecution speak to the general public in circumstances where one can 
see ‘the low-lying details of how law makes itself felt’ (Gordon 2012: 205). At this 
interface, prosecution acts to delineate between that claimed as legitimate, credible 
and worthy, and that which is not.106 It is here also that one can appreciate ‘the stakes, 
intellectual and political, that the managers of the legal system [have] in their own 
constructs’ (Gordon 2012: 208). It is from this starting point that I commence tracing 
areas of dissonance and congruity in perspective between lay and official ideas of 
justice.  
5.2 CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
The discussion first requires grounding in the present day and locating prosecution 
alongside other key justice entities. I follow the notion of criminal justice as ‘a 
sequence of decision situations’ (Findlay et al. 2010: Preface xx) in order to sketch the 
contemporary institutional landscape. The description emphasises the pragmatic and 
administrative interdependence of the various justice entities, and their work as social 
practice. I touch on the responsibilities of authorities to the victim-citizen who 
becomes involved with these bodies in later chapters.  
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My simplified picture risks presenting the various justice entities as having common 
purpose, shared values, and both internal and external coherence. These are all 
contestable presumptions. In the interests of brevity I also do not engage with the 
various debates and controversies associated with the powers of the respective 
agencies and the extent to which they fulfil their mandate.107 However, it is relevant to 
acknowledge the expansive use of discretion – as low-lying detail – across all 
agencies.108  
Police are the most visible and accessible to ordinary citizens of all criminal justice 
institutions. As such they are a likely first port of call for those acting in relation to an 
incident.109 They are ‘official gatekeepers of the criminal justice process’ (Findlay et al. 
2010: 115). They receive and harvest a wide range of information. The police function 
is an interpretive, selective and filtering one. Thus they may record an incident as a 
crime or not, and may (or may not) mount an investigation and determine the level of 
investigative effort. In electing whether to divert, caution or charge it is police who 
decide the resolution pathway for an incident. They determine whether to summons 
or to arrest an alleged offender (with resultant decisions about bail), and they decide 
the nature and number of initial charges. It is the police preparation of the brief of 
evidence that provides prosecution with its preliminary orientation. In doing so, they 
assume the role of informant. 
Prosecutors110 present this early brief at court and will have carriage of the finalisation 
of the matter on behalf of the state or the ‘Crown’. Usually at the first appearance of 
the defendant in court, prosecution will make further representations about bail. The 
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prosecutor has discretion in framing charges and may amend, add to or discontinue 
charges – an authority that paves the way for charge negotiation and highlights 
prosecutorial power.111 Prosecution guidelines commonly describe a two-step 
decision-making process on whether to proceed to prosecute. The first step considers 
whether the evidence is sufficient to suggest that there is a reasonable prospect of 
conviction. The second step ‘is that, having regard to the provable facts and the whole 
of the circumstances, it is in the public interest to prosecute’ (Refshauge 2010: 4).112 
The basis of this discretion is said to derive from the statutory independence of 
prosecution and is claimed to be unbound ‘by any enforceable standard’.113 While 
most matters are resolved by way of a guilty plea,114 prosecutors will be central to 
those which proceed to trial, often by way of committal proceedings, and will also 
determine the exact nature of the indictment. 
The majority of all crimes prosecuted in Australia are usually resolved in a lower court 
before a magistrate – the vast majority by way of a guilty plea from the defendant.115 It 
is in higher courts that a trial is conducted before a judge and may also involve a jury. 
The low proportion of criminal cases resolved at this level has led some to suggest this 
aspect is a showcase of ceremony and formality.116 It is here also that the adversarial 
performance is at its most ritualistic. The role of the judicial officer is ‘to supervise 
proceedings, to act as umpire, to determine questions of law, and to direct the jury in 
their task of determining the factual issues’ (Findlay et al. 2010: 166). The judicial 
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officer will, upon a verdict of guilty, determine the nature of a sentence (if any) for the 
accused. In Australia, the aims of sentencing are commonly described as retribution, 
deterrence, rehabilitation, denunciation and incapacitation. A sentence may seek to 
address one or more of these aims. 
5.3 A CIVILISING TRAJECTORY 
Two key features engender ‘power to project a discourse of inevitability and 
naturalness’ to the legitimation of justice entities (Harris 1997: 110). That is, the 
association of law with an arc of social and political enlightenment, and the 
appropriation and reformulation of certain historical moments as inevitable 
modernisation.  
5.3.1 Framing criminal law and justice 
The institutional landscape is saturated by the criminal law itself. Prosecution interacts 
with the ideas, principles and assertions of law in sustaining a self-referencing world. 
Their perspective on the law in social context drew on both the stern threat image and 
the benign umpire (see Table 3.1). Asked what was the role of criminal law and justice 
in society, prosecutors invoke both descriptive and normative theories of law (Wacks 
2006). In the former vein, law was described as if it were a piece of equipment – a 
‘mechanism’ (P1, P4) and a ‘brake’ (P5). The metaphor extends to reflection on its 
operation as ‘more like a sledge hammer than a jeweller’s pliers’ (P1) and ‘pretty blunt’ 
(P5). 
Prosecutors draw out the instrumental meaning behind the imagery by emphasising 
functionality; that is, law as a means to various ends. 117 It is a mechanism ‘for keeping 
order ... for controlling the power of other public officials … for protecting the 
community … for publicly expressing the community view of what ought to or ought 
not to be permitted ... And essentially in its day-to-day activities it is a mechanism by 
which persons accused of things are prosecuted and dealt with …’ (P1).  
More broadly the law’s instrumentality is explained as a means ‘to ensure that the 
society can be managed in a way that allows people to get the benefits from the 
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society’ and ‘to regulate and promote positive interaction’ (P4). Criminal law comprises 
‘the rules that govern conduct’ (P5). Normatively, criminal law expresses ‘what ought 
to or ought not to be permitted’ (P1) and as drawing ‘the lines within which the 
community can comfortably live’ (P4). It is ‘the first and most basic system of norms’ 
that any society – democratic or despotic – requires (P5). Furthermore, these norms 
involve ‘moral wrongdoing easily recognised and readily acceptable throughout the 
world’ (P5). Law’s multiple relationship(s) to peoples range from it as a ‘subservient 
construct on society’ (P4) to it as a ‘guard’ (P2). 
These statements about the criminal law invariably draw on an account of social, legal 
and political historical change that steadily progresses towards liberal democratic 
capitalism and which systems of laws naturally and properly enable (Gordon 1984). 
Emphasised variously as a civilising process (Elias 1939), as ‘the solidarity project’ 
(Garland 2001:199), and as ‘the Enlightenment project’ (Lacey 2007), these changes 
are posed as following a linear path with an air of inevitability. ‘*A+s time progressed’ 
(P1) informal or fragmentary rules would ‘gradually solidify’ in ‘an evolutionary 
process’ (P4).  
It is a common claim that the evolution of laws and societies follows ‘a generally 
enlightened, humanitarian and progressive trajectory’ (Emsley 2005: 2).118 As such, the 
system of laws evolves from an image of medieval brutishness (P1), to claim liberty 
against autocracy (P3), to disinterested professionalising of a ‘flawed’ process (P4), and 
finally to provide a stern independence of decision-making against the venality and 
arbitrariness of a politician – Attorney General or other (P2, P3, P5). Through the flow 
of history criminal law nonetheless is said to claim ‘a common core of values’ that 
reaches back to the Babylonian era and is found infused in the world’s major religions 
(P5). The historical references constitute markers in a ‘chain of legitimation’ (Bourdieu 
1987: 824). 
5.3.2 Evolutionary claims  
The association of criminal law with the civilising of human societies gains power not 
simply through the air of inexorability but in depictions of English legal history –
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claimed as Australia’s inheritance (P1–P6) – ‘that occurred over hundreds and 
hundreds of years’ (P5). In particular, successive efforts from the twelfth century to 
introduce ‘the concept of offences being a breach of the King’s peace’ are viewed as 
foundational to the present idea of criminal offences being notionally committed 
against ‘the public’ rather than against individual members of that public (Kearon and 
Godfrey 2007: 19–20). More pointedly, the origin of British criminal law, it is claimed, 
‘was to prevent victims from taking the law into their own hands’ (P1).  
As a classic doctrinal text in this system of thought, Blackstone's Commentaries asserts 
that crime was an offence against the Crown ‘because the sovereign, in whom centres 
the majesty of the whole community, is supposed by law to be the person injured by 
every infraction of the public rights belonging to that community’ (Blackstone 1769: 
12). In practice ‘indictments ... are preferred ... in the name of the King, but at the suit 
of any private prosecutor’ (p.303). Acting on behalf of this public is ‘converted into 
accepted facts’ (Bourdieu 1987: 817) by contemporary public prosecution 
notwithstanding its historically intermittent actual appearance in the daily court 
calendar. 
5.3.2.1 The English context 
As a question of political history rather than legal history, the forces behind the 
‘inexorable centralisation of power’ (Ziegenhagen 1977) are empirically contested in 
the English situation.119 Industrialisation and urbanisation in England over the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provided the foundations to later consolidation 
and professionalisation of state justice bureaucracies.  
However, that the institution of public prosecution was a ‘historical latecomer’ in 
England has not been widely acknowledged (Langbein 1973: 313).120 At its origin public 
prosecution was tightly restricted to treason and related state trials.121 It was more 
extraordinary than ordinary. Indeed, features such as adversarial trial procedure and 
the involvement of legal counsel (prosecution as well as defence) developed slowly 
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and patchily over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.122 Even with the 
establishment of an organised urban police service in 1829 and the gradual evolution 
of a ‘system of police-conducted prosecution’, by the mid nineteenth century in 
England prosecution counsel was used only in one in twenty cases (Langbein 2003: 
256).123 Criminal procedure and hence the criminal justice system as a whole relied 
upon private prosecution124 well into the nineteenth century (Langbein 1973: 317).125 
It was, says historian Douglas Hay, ‘the paradigm of prosecution’ (Hay 1983: 167).126 
While the indictment might be brought in the name of the Crown, it was usually 
carried by a private individual or a private association of individuals.127  
Pressure for reform of English prosecution was intermittent and a long-drawn out 
affair. Through the various reform attempts in the nineteenth century, arguments for 
greater involvement of a public official in criminal prosecutions railed against the 
inefficiencies and inconsistencies of the existing laissez faire system. The greater 
capacities of the state were invoked as well as the spectre of an urbanised, fractious 
and unruly populace. Private individuals were castigated variously as frivolous, 
vexatious, unreliable, ignorant, helpless and easily intimidated.128 They were described 
as blocked by the expense and inconvenience of prosecution, or diverted with bribes 
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from accused persons, or simply uninterested in the effort to support a common good 
(Rock 2004: 336-339). At the same time arguments against centralisation and 
professionalisation found fertile ground in references to allegedly oppressive state 
practices in continental France and Cromwellian England, as well as fear of state 
indolence or indifference (Rock 2004: 333; Hay 1983). The ‘monopolistic control of 
prosecutorial power’ was generally viewed with some alarm (Cardenas 1986: 361; Hay 
1983: 173). 
This centuries-old right to a private prosecution was not viewed as resulting from 
administrative oversight. Rather it was ‘of great constitutional significance’ to people’s 
hard won freedoms against tyranny and their sovereign status as citizen-subjects.129 
On the occasions establishing the Director of Public Prosecutions (1879) and the Crown 
Prosecution Service (1985), the retention of the right to private prosecution was 
argued as ‘a valuable constitutional safeguard’ (Hetherington 1989: 153).130 Indeed 
numerous and diverse submissions to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure in 
1981 argued for retention of the right to private prosecution as the ‘ultimate safeguard 
against official inaction, whether due to corruption, inefficiency, or other causes’ (Hay 
1983: 181).  
A ‘very small’ office of the Director of Public Prosecutions was finally established in 
England in 1879 (Rock 2004: 342), operating under the Attorney-General and with an 
emphasis that prosecuting would be an exception rather than the rule. 
Notwithstanding these reforms, the principle endured – prosecutions ‘remained 
largely private in law and in practice’ (p.333). The governing statute establishing the 
Director of Public Prosecutions in England and Wales in 1879 was explicit that this right 
to private prosecution was not to be interfered with. It would not be until 1985 that 
the prosecution of offences would finally be taken out of police hands by a new Crown 
Prosecution Service (Rock 2004; Krone 2003).  
Clearly the assertion that private individuals had and have no place in the criminal 
justice system is a tale of twentieth century construction. In his study examining the 
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importance and ultimate disappearance of the English private prosecutor, Douglas Hay 
comments that it: 
marks how far memories of executive tyranny have receded, as well as how far 
the assumption that a universal franchise ensures benign government has 
proceeded. (Hay 1983: 181) 
5.3.2.2 The Australian context 
The English emphasis on the constitutional importance of private prosecution as a 
defence against ‘executive tyranny’ (Hay 1983: 180) was absent in the Australian 
environment.131 Similarly, the assertion of an organic and grounded evolution made in 
relation to the English common law and the lay institutions of magistracy, justices of 
the peace, village bobbies and the like becomes something different during the 
dramatic rupture of a penal and later settler colony (Godfrey and Dunstall 2005; 
Braithwaite 2001).  
The profound differences in social, economic and political beliefs and practices – and 
not least in the geography of the colonies, dispersed European populations, and 
hostilities with Aborigines – caution against too many assumptions of commonality 
with English developments. The dispersed Australian colonies struggled to survive – 
literally and as emergent state identities (Hughes 1986). People’s relationships to the 
slowly establishing instruments of law were both intensely intimate, and distant and 
uncertain.  
David Neal’s work The Rule of Law in a Penal Colony (1991) argues that New South 
Wales was colonised on the cusp of old and new systems then in transition in England 
(p.14). Despite or really because of the penal origins of the colony, he stresses the 
importance of law – especially the idea and role of law. A rule of law ideology,132 
articulated most trenchantly in Blackstone’s Commentaries, declared ‘… the law is the 
birth right of every subject, so wherever they go they carry their laws with them’. The 
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colonists – whether convict or free, Neal argues, drew on the power and tools of this 
ideology as ‘the means of expressing and contesting the differing conceptions of social 
and economic relations in the colony’ (Neal 1991: xii and 24; Hughes 1986: xii). 
Australia’s convict heritage – referred to delicately by Dowling J in 1831 as ‘local 
difficulties and peculiarities’133 – required attention from a legal tradition that could be 
both inclusive and exclusive. Thus the rule of law as inheritance and as tradition was 
important to the construction of identity among all classes in colonial Australia 
(Hughes 1986).  
With this background, contemporary prosecutors assert that ‘we came to this country 
with the Magna Carta in our back pockets’ (P5) and ‘inherited the English system lock, 
stock and barrel in the beginning’ (P3). At the same time, both colonial and 
contemporary changes are seen to have shaped differences (P3) between the local and 
imperial systems (Woods 2002; Neal 1991). Therefore the capacity of the systems of 
thought to ‘drift [...+ apart’ (P3) and, at the same time, to remain ‘closely aligned’ (P5) 
reveal elasticity and relevance of the ideology of tradition.  
While much archival historical research into colonial prosecution practices remains to 
be conducted in Australia,134 it is apparent that, as in England, the criminal law was 
‘put into effect by victims’. Indeed, ‘it was the responsibility and obligation of 
individuals’ to do so (Woods 2002: 108 and 192). The penal administration provided 
for the establishment of civil and criminal courts but, for the first thirty or so years, 
decision-making was exercised by an autocratic executive with a ‘military element’ 
(Woods 2002: 49). Legislative reform in 1823 placed initiation of the criminal process 
in the hands of an Attorney-General. However, the responsibility of Attorneys-General 
to initiate and conduct prosecutions was, as in England, restricted to serious crimes. 
Regulation of police in the 1830s and 1860s reflected the spread and demands of 
growing settler and emancipist groups for security as much as for good government. 
By the 1890s the institutionalisation and centralisation of policing in the colonies 
enabled development of permanent and specialist police prosecutors.135  
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The trends towards institutionalising, centralising and standardising of criminal 
practice and procedure that commenced in the nineteenth century and accelerated in 
the twentieth in England were similar if not more pronounced in Australia. However, it 
would not be until the 1980s and 90s that independent prosecuting authorities were 
established in the Australian states and territories.136  
5.4 CONTEMPORARY GUARDIANS OF CORE PROSECUTION CONCEPTS  
This sketch of the main themes and markers of history affirms the rationalising and 
bureaucratising underpinnings of the appearance of public prosecution in both 
Australia and England. The result of which is an institution with ‘a great deal of power’ 
(P3). It ‘is legally approved but generally unchecked, legally exceptional but yet almost 
totally commonplace’ (Sarat and Clarke 2008: 411). However an ideology ‘does not 
passively exist as a form of dominance. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, 
defended, and modified’ (Williams 1997: Preface xx). Contemporary public prosecution 
maintains exclusivity by becoming ‘commonplace’ administrators137 in sustaining an 
‘official-centric’ jurisprudence (Marcus and Waye 2004: 114) and affirming and 
reaffirming its custodianship of certain core concepts.  
Within the institutional landscape, prosecution has been described in neutral terms as 
forming ‘the crucial link between law enforcement and penal sanction’ (Sanders 1996: 
xi), and – more caustically – as ‘the most secretive, least understood and most poorly 
documented aspect of the administration of justice’ (Australian Law Reform 
Commission 1980: 61). The degree of discretionary privilege and independence 
enjoyed by prosecuting authorities has been noted in the USA (Frederick and Stemen 
2012), Japan (Johnson 2002), England and Wales (Ashworth 2000), Canada (Stenning 
1986) and New Zealand (Stenning 2008).  
Contemporary prosecution authorities are ‘organized around a body of internal 
protocols and assumptions, characteristic behaviours and self-sustaining values’ 
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(Terdiman 1987: 806). The legislative framework and published guidelines for 
prosecution demonstrate a pronounced emphasis on certain classifying concepts such 
as independence, representing community and public interest. It is through these core 
concepts – as internal and institutionalised patterns of knowledge – that the discourse 
of the ex-Directors of Public Prosecution interviewed for this study is arranged. 
5.4.1 Independence 
Prosecutorial independence is a prized attribute and signifier.138 Independence is 
maintained against a number of influences; that is, from politics, police and the public. 
Its special significance is claimed in the first instance to politicised interference in the 
form of actions (or inactions) of recent and long past Attorneys-General (P2, P3, P5, 
P6).139 Prosecution was ‘in private hands probably until the 1880s, 1890s when the first 
Director of Public Prosecutions was appointed. It was in political hands in this country 
for a very long time. The Attorneys-General used to do it ... they are basically 
politicians.’ This came to be ‘regarded as quite wrong – there was a perception at least 
– that they should be making decisions about persons [..] they might be beholden to …’ 
(P6).  
Independence from political intrusion is also pragmatic. Directors of Public Prosecution 
tend to say to Attorneys-General ‘don’t try and second guess us because once you do 
that you buy into the argument and then you have to make the decision. One of the 
points about having a DPP is to have someone else making the decision and wear the 
opprobrium’ (P4). It also recognised that prosecution is an intrusive power – ‘it is the 
line that protects everybody because one day … who is to say that a weakened and 
futile prosecution ought to be run this week but not next week?’ (P2). 
While police have a more extensive history in prosecuting,140 prosecution 
independence from police as investigators assumed greater significance over the 
twentieth century (Rozenes 1996). In England and Wales, this is claimed in relation to a 
succession of miscarriages of justice (McConville and Wilson 2002: 155; Hetherington 
1989) and, in Australian jurisdictions with police prosecutors, in relation to more 
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generalised concerns about probity if not outright corruption (Krone 2003). Here the 
argument is that police seek to ‘win at all costs’ whereas the obligation of justice 
institutions is to abide ‘by your oath to act according to the law’ (P1). Nonetheless 
there is a continuum from, at one end, an ethical stance about what is the ‘appropriate 
moral censure’ a prosecutor seeks (Young and Sanders 2004: 194), to understanding, 
at the other end, ‘that every prosecutor ever born wants the person to be found guilty 
– which is different to being convicted’ (P6).141 
More generally contemporary prosecution is said to operate in a charged environment. 
Some claim ‘there was a period when what the Director said was not questioned, it 
was accepted publicly and by politicians’ (P2). There is unanimity (P1–P6), however, 
that the ‘rantings of the shock jocks and the media tabloids and all the rest of it’ (P3) 
have produced a tense atmosphere. 
Finally, argument about independence finds traction in the day-to-day decision-making 
of prosecution. Here independence was not being told what to do, whoever was 
expressing a preference. It is an institution of the state that decides on the exception 
(Sarat and Clarke 2008). Discretionary decision-making both indicates independence 
and enacts it. A noble rationale is that discretion ‘is a tool indispensable for the 
individualisation of justice’ (Davis 1975). More prosaically it ‘allows for compromise 
and expediency’ (Findlay et al. 2010: 114). Without discretion it is said ‘our system 
would grind to a halt’ (P5). While there are different perspectives on discretion and the 
independent role,143 there is a shared view of what it is not; that is, being directed by 
an individual what to do – it is ‘quite wrong to *prosecute+ because the victim wants 
to’ (P1). Rather, it is a matter of ‘professional judgment’ (P1) framed by ‘extensive’ 
guidelines (P3, P6). 
From whatever perspective independence is discussed in the discourse, there is a 
sense in which contemporary public prosecution can see itself as misunderstood if not 
assailed from all sides. A central challenge is perceived to be ‘to protect the 
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prosecution process from all external pressures, whether blatant or subtle, which can 
arise in a divided society’ (Cowdery 2013: 18). 
5.4.2 Representing community 
In its assertions of independence, public prosecution commonly refers to founding 
statutes supported by judicial decision.144 These provide the constitutional footing to 
prosecutorial independence and their status as part of the apparatus of the state.145 
Being ‘the state’ requires close attention to integrity and fairness, and mindfulness of 
the imbalance in power and resources vis a vis the accused (Dal Pont 2009). Beyond 
the constitutional legality, however, public prosecution claims normative roots in the 
privilege to ‘represent community’ (P2, P3, P4). That is, to prosecute ‘on behalf of 
society’ (Myjer, et al. 2009: 1) – ‘the whole community’ (P3). The normative and legal 
dissimilarity between the concepts and forms of Crown, state and community appear 
unacknowledged.  
The term ‘community’ evokes a ductile, more exposed assortment of publics – ‘those 
who can’t protect themselves’, ‘the weak and vulnerable’ (P2) who should be kept safe 
‘from aggression’ (P4). At the same time, and linked with the curse of ‘expectations’, 
communities can become something wielded as a kind of threat (P1) but also in 
entreaty (P4). It is a source of those blatant and subtle external pressures. As a word 
‘community’ can obscure the fact that it ‘is made up of many disparate groups and 
individuals with widely divergent views’ (P5) and there is some cynicism in the 
perception that it can ‘mean whatever a politician wants *it+ to mean at a particular 
time’ (P1).  
Conceptualising the subjects of victim and offender as members of community are 
both abstracted and particularised for the former, and generally situated in rights 
discourse for the latter. The individual offender as rights bearing is uncontested – ‘we 
do bend over backwards to be fair’ (P6). Public prosecution will easily turn to say ‘we 
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have to ensure that the accused is treated fairly’ (P5, P6).146 There is equal readiness to 
reach for particular stories that act as exemplars for certain representations of victim. 
On the one hand, for example, there’s the image that the victim is ‘hysterical, out of 
control’ (P1) and, on the other hand, a gesture to those who ‘have hope and optimism, 
are still kind and concerned’ (P2). A more detached image of the victim evokes 
‘somebody who has been wronged … who is looking for a remedy which we call justice’ 
(P3). But as rights-bearing individuals in the community, victims ‘don’t have any rights. 
No, certainly not’ (P6).147 It is declared that ‘of course the victim is a member of the 
public’; but then ‘… one can’t say I represent the public which means I represent the 
victim, therefore I am the victim’s advocate … to represent the community as a whole 
means that you take an objective approach’ (P2). In the discourse, therefore, the idea 
of community becomes ‘figments of fiction, of imagination’ (P4). An answer to the 
question ‘what’s the cut of community’ is that ‘it’s the greater community interest’ for 
‘the greater good’ (P2) – it is a circular argument. The prosecutor is left, it is said, to 
‘take a holistic view of what’s in the interests of the community’ (P4). 
As an alternative term, ‘public’ can allude to a harder, more astringent entity. In this 
guise, the public guardian role depends on a distinct characterisation of a public in 
which criminal law and justice are required ‘to guard against anarchy and vigilantism’ 
(P2) and contain ‘unrestrained passions, vengeance, criminal acts’ (P5). A more specific 
Hobbesian characterisation colours observations that ‘a society without *law+ is 
anarchic, out of control’ (P1). Indeed, law both accompanies and assists the move out 
of ‘the realm of stone-age thinking’ (P5). Here the criminal law is simply ‘to protect the 
society from the bad people’ (P6).  
Within discussion about prosecution and community, there is recognition that ‘the 
community generally has [no] high regard for the operational workings of our criminal 
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justice system’ (P5). But with this recognition public prosecution walks a conceptual 
tightrope – it is representing community as a greater, a holistic, an almost 
incandescent ideal; is responsive to community norms as it sees them, and yet is 
extremely sensitive to contentions of accountability from community – or from 
sections of community. Responsiveness to changing community norms, for example in 
prosecuting offences such as domestic violence and child abuse as serious public 
concerns,148 or indeed responsiveness to regional and local circumstances,149 is set in 
contrast to perceived obligations to resist a punitive public (P1, P3, P6) (Garland 2001) 
and to resist notions of direct answerability to the public or specific publics.  
Where the idea of accountability is viewed ‘in a unitary mode that if you are 
accountable then you are beholden in some way or subservient or at the direction or 
at the behest of the person’ then ‘most prosecutors I suspect would, as soon as you 
talk about victims and accountability in the one phrase, run a mile’ (P4).150 
Consequently ‘there *is+ no mileage in explaining’ prosecution decisions (P1). Formal 
accountability as a state agency rests in ‘superintendence’ by the Attorney-General, 
annual reports, court rules and providing reasons for decision ‘in certain 
circumstances’ (P3).151 A mid-way point in the debate might accept that, where 
persons might be ‘heavily invested in something they are entitled to a proper 
explanation as best we can give them’ (P2). There is recognition that ‘many 
prosecution decisions made by independent prosecutors are not reviewable by the 
Courts and it is important to maintain public confidence in the fairness, integrity and 
impartiality of prosecutors’ (Bugg 2007: 7). However, with the spectre of invested 
others directing prosecutorial decision-making there is little to no specificity to 
depictions of accountability in the everyday prosecutorial world.  
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Furthermore, and central to the claim to represent community and, consequently, to 
debate about accountability, is the separation of private and public interests (P2).152 
Contemporary prosecutors strongly assert that ‘the Crown is acting for the public, the 
people, the State’ (P1). They invoke ‘the theory behind that *being+ when somebody 
commits a crime that crime is committed against the whole community not just 
against any individual victim’ (P3). With the sovereign origins of criminal law per se 
extending back over centuries, it is common for prosecution authorities to claim 
similar longevity. However, as discussed earlier, this claim is tenuous at best. 
Nonetheless, the institutional depiction is that ‘when you come to the court room 
there are only two parties, one is the community or the Crown (the prosecutor) and 
the other is the accused. There is no place at the bar table for the victim in our system’ 
(P3). The rejection of the interests and involvement of particular publics in the form of 
the victim complainant on the grounds that these are private (and therefore 
illegitimate) is emphatic. It is in this assertion that ‘the sovereign power of prosecutors 
is most vividly on display’ (Sarat and Clarke 2008: 387).  
5.4.3 Public interest 
It is largely because the term ‘public interest’ is so indeterminate and malleable yet so 
normatively resonant that it holds a central place in the ideology of public prosecution. 
The phrase has a unique capacity to silence questioning. Elish Angiolini QC, Solicitor-
General in Scotland, commented in 2005 that it can serve ‘as a useful decoy to dazzle 
those who would otherwise probe decisions taken under that label’.153  
Public interest, it is said, ‘can't be found by way of mathematical or political 
calculation’154 and has been described as ‘a highly political concept’ (Bronitt and 
McSherry 2005: 58). At its most benign, the concept of public interest in politics, for 
example, is claimed to be ‘indispensable as benchmark and guide. It requires us to 
think about means as well as ends. It commits us to good process as well as good 
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policy. It broadens our understanding of the interests that are relevant when 
considering policy and it compels us to think and act beyond the constraints imposed 
by self-interest.’155 
The notion of public interest is said to be ‘the underlying philosophy’ (P2) to 
prosecution guidelines. These then specify a long list of criteria that may be taken into 
account when deciding what is in the public interest – ‘if you are looking for a peg to 
hang your coat on you might find one there’ (P3). The policy frameworks conclude 
that, ‘in many cases, of course, the interests of the public will only be served by the 
deterrent effect of an appropriate prosecution’.156 In practice, however, thinking will 
turn to ask ‘are there reasons as to why in the public interest nevertheless the case 
should not be prosecuted?’ (P3, P6). In this ambivalent and media-saturated space it is 
suggested that ‘the thing that Directors are most criticised for is not prosecuting’ 
(P2).157 With the core two-part test through which the assessment is made, it will 
either be on the sufficiency of evidence or the public interest to which that criticism is 
directed. 
In a classic depiction, Sir Thomas Hetherington describes the role of Director of Public 
Prosecutions in the UK as one whose: 
paramount duty is to the public, and every action he takes, and every decision, 
must be in the interests of the public as a whole or in the interests of an individual 
member of the public. These two interests sometimes conflict as, for example, 
when the prosecutor has to balance the interest in protecting society by 
prosecuting someone who appears to have committed an offence against society, 
against the interest of the individual who will benefit by not being prosecuted. 
(Hetherington 1989: 137) 
As a statement about prosecutorial ethics it is said that the standards that a 
prosecutor should apply when weighing up the public interest ‘should be the highest 
standards to which the community would or should aspire if it were aware of all the 
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facts and were equipped to make an objective and informed decision’ (Crispin 1995: 
181). At the same time, it requires consciousness of ‘several audiences’ (P5). As an 
activity, this weighing up ‘requires you to look back, to look out and to look forward’ 
and ‘acting in the public interest is taking that continuum, that historical continuum 
and balancing all the factors that are operating now in a way that will serve that 
continuum satisfactorily’ (P3). As a practice it is largely to internal discussants – 
‘colleagues, their supervisors, with senior people’ (P3) – that prosecutorial 
determinations about the public interest are made as ‘informed by some shared 
understanding … within the legal community’ (P4). Engaging with the public on the 
nature and scope of their interests is largely formal – through speeches and 
presentations – and cautious (P2, P3, P4, P5, P6). 
How public interest is more generally vernacularised in prosecution discourse does 
vary – in part because of the multiplicity of formal criteria – but there is a shared view 
of what it is not. That is, prosecution is a decision made free of any sectional or 
representational interests in the name of ‘the public’ (P1–6), never ‘simply because it 
might get the media off my back’ (P2), or ‘in some atavistic interest of somebody who 
is pressuring you into doing something’ (P1).158 An individual, asking where they as a 
member of the public fit in the conception, might ‘often think that the public interest is 
at one with theirs’. Consequently, prosecution sees little that is constructive arising 
from such ‘inflammatory’ discussion (P2). The preference is to conceive ‘an 
independent statutory authority casting his or her mind over the entirety of the case’ 
(P5) as properly arriving at a decision about the public interest in a particular 
circumstance that is ‘buyable by the community’ (P4). 
Ultimately it is prosecution prerogative to decide what is in the public interest. ‘Their 
decision has to be final … I don’t know of any other public official with quite the same 
role’ (P4). 
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5.5 VICTIMS THROUGH PROSECUTION EYES 
Accompanying the decision-making power of an ascendant institutionalised public 
prosecution is the power of definition and narration. To it the victimised citizen is said 
to have ‘surrendered’ their constitutional authority to prosecute (Plater 2011: 71–72). 
In the end is a system in which there is no ‘legal or conceptual role for the victim’ 
(Sebba 1996: 40). As there is no structured space or resources159 for victim 
representation or advocacy of their interests, they are ‘ignored as a class of people’ 
(P6), ‘nowhere to be seen’ (P4) and thus allowed to become ‘forgotten’ (Rock 2007: 
38). If there is a competition for the control of access to legal resources, it is won, in 
the late twentieth century, by the professional legal elite (Bourdieu 1987). Arguing as 
an institution for ‘more resources to deal with people’ (P1) leaves untouched the 
structural void in which the victim-citizen finds him or herself. 
From prosecution perspective – ‘in the old days’ (P3) – ‘victims were simply another 
witness on the list and came and went and were given … no special consideration at all 
and treated quite heartlessly really’ (P2). The victim was ‘expected to put up with 
whatever happened to them [in the witness box] and too bad’ (P3). People who were 
‘caught up in the criminal justice system’ (P3) were ‘irrelevant’ (P4). They could be 
conceived, on the one hand, as ‘merely the vehicle by which the *community+ norm 
has been broken’ (P4) or simply as ‘cannon fodder’ (P6) for the machinery of criminal 
justice.160 While there may be ‘a whole range of influences that cause someone to 
come forward and complain’ (P5), in such a heartless environment (P2), public 
prosecutors could reasonably ‘wonder why’ (P1) members of the public might come 
forward to report and cooperate with authorities. People cooperate ‘because they 
have got to’ (P1). It was taken ‘for granted’ (P3).  
In the present day there is some recognition in common law countries that this state of 
affairs is no longer acceptable (Doak 2005; Beloof 2005). The drivers of change range 
from the political and social ‘rise of victims in recent times’ (P1), to humanitarian 
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recognition that victims are ‘people for crissake’ (P6), and to broader political pressure 
that ‘people don’t these days put their trust in authority figures who are opaque and 
unaccountable or unquestioned’ (P4). Consequently, a range of legislative and 
administrative measures has been put in place in attempts to address victim concerns 
(Hall 2009). Nonetheless there remains ‘an uneasy tension between prosecution and 
victim’ (P4). Victim-oriented reforms are still regarded in some quarters as a ‘danger’ 
and a ‘throwback to medievalism’ (P1), and authorities are – to some extent – 
‘frightened of being seen to be pandering to victims’ (P4). As a constituency, victims 
are contaminated with this danger – notwithstanding acknowledgment of the diversity 
of expectations and responses to the formal justice process and its outcomes (P2, P3, 
P4, P5, P6). 
Of course the question is whether the reforms create (or recreate) legal and 
conceptual roles for victims. In the main, public prosecution views communication as 
‘part of the solution to the problem’ (P3). That is, communication with both the 
broader public as well as with victims. While occasionally spoken of as ‘dialogue’ (P3), 
the discourse reveals a predominant top-down emphasis consistent with prosecution’s 
discretionary authority. Communication is informing. In this vein, some ‘can’t 
contemplate prosecuting a matter without keeping the victim informed’ (P2). And 
some will go so far as to say ‘there is an entitlement for the victim to have an 
explanation’ for a decision (P4). Here prosecution is ‘discharging a duty … to explain 
and to inform and that’s where it ends’ (P4). 
Communication is also conceived as consultation at a ‘proper level’ and ‘something 
we’ve learnt over the last 10 or 15 years which didn’t exist before’ (P3). Prosecution is 
‘required to take into account the views of the victim, not to act on them as 
instructions’ (P3). At the same time, the institutional culture of prosecution challenges 
the consultative effort – ‘the buggers wouldn’t do it and we had to work like hell to get 
them to do it’ (P6) – thus giving rise to pleadings that ‘listening to people and caring 
about them doesn’t impede your effectiveness’ (P2). Notwithstanding these 
sentiments, contemporary offices of public prosecution will maintain they are as 
resource poor as other government services in meeting public demands (P1, P4, P5, 
P6). Consequently consulting is a ‘second order consideration’ (P4) and it is an 
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‘unfortunate truth’ (P3) that the individual victim remains a tool in the process, with 
no unique human rights, identity or agency.161  
Even though there is acknowledgment that, when ‘caught up in the criminal justice 
process, the victim wants to have a champion, wants to have a representative, wants 
to have somebody working for them’ (P3), this does not extend to welcoming the 
possibility of representation. It would ‘distort what the court is on about’ (P1) and 
challenge the ‘theoretical foundations’ of the current system (P3). Existing 
requirements to keep victims informed and consult them in some circumstances to 
some extent recognises interests that are distinct from the overall public ,but there is 
no structural recognition (P3), and a sense that one ‘can’t take an independent 
prosecution to a more closer relationship than that’ (P2). To move further would 
require authorities and civil society to ‘clearly define what the role and expectations 
are’ for a victim representative, ‘to work it through’ (P4). For public prosecution ‘the 
big change has happened’ (P3) with legislative reform modelled on the 1985 United 
Nations instrument.162 There is no ‘particular juggernaut’ demanding structural change 
and the shifts to victim inclusion and participation at the level of international courts 
and tribunals is ‘only a result of very strong lobbying’ (P3).  
5.6 REPRESENTING JUSTICE 
5.6.1 The justice of prosecution 
It is of course possible to conceive conceptual space for victim inclusion and 
participation within prosecution objectives. However these too are somewhat 
contested. On one hand, prosecution is ambiguously depicted as ‘fearlessly’ protecting 
‘the greater good’ (P2) in the public interest, and on another it is claimed not to ‘set 
standards’ but to do ‘his job and that’s it’ (P3). In between these depictions it is 
suggested prosecutors ‘have to value add, to bring something to it’ (P4) and that the 
reason for prosecution ‘is to enable the court to do these things [apply the sentencing 
principles] (P6). Arguably ‘empty formalism’ is what emerges from ticking the boxes of 
public interest criteria (Young and Sanders 2004: 207).  
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A coherent, normatively-based conception of what is the public interest or of justice 
itself is missing. Procedural formality becomes the fallback (P5). Ideas of doing justice 
or achieving justice or delivering justice in their daily practice are articulated as being 
‘professional’ because ‘on a day-to-day basis you run the case that you are doing … the 
process takes over and you hope in some sort of way ultimately that it gets to, in 
general terms, a just result’ (P1). Professional public prosecution does ‘the best we can 
with the tools we have’ (P2) to ‘achieve a generally acceptable outcome’ (P3) 
‘according to the law’ (P1). Prosecutors model constraint (P4).163 Doing the best one 
can is described as scrutinising the case ‘as closely as you can’ because ‘justice can’t be 
perfect’ (P2). Not doing this means not being ‘properly prepared’ and being unable or 
unwilling to make an ‘effort at persuasion’ (P2). The idea of justice is – in the parlance 
of a modern bureaucracy – the prosecution mission (P6). That is, to be independent, 
professional, effective, to operate with integrity and to be fair and just. Being fair and 
just is ‘broad overall consistency’, ‘equality of treatment’ (P5), ‘dealing with the 
individual fairly’ (P6), and ensuring that ‘the same test applies to you and to me but 
not one for the high profile cases and not for others’ (P2). In this frame, prosecution 
argues that it does not deal with ‘some abstract concept of justice’ (P1). 
In the discourse, public prosecutors shy away from expressing what might constitute 
justice as values or the type of outcome that is just (P2, P4). These are ‘going to 
depend on judgments that are made by people’ (P3): ‘the requirements of justice point 
in different ways which makes it difficult to define it in any comprehensive way’ (P3). If 
pressed, ‘I suppose you come out with a few basic things like convict the guilty and 
acquit the innocent, fairness, fair trial, sentences that were proportionate’ (P4).  
5.6.2 The justice of victims 
The menace of the vengeful victim to these conceptions of justice is never far away in 
the discourse of public prosecution – ‘many victims are punitive’ (P4). Yet in the day-
to-day ‘all kinds of reactions’ are acknowledged – ‘it varied enormously’ (P3). Of course 
prosecutors see victims struggling with ‘unbearable losses’ (P2) such that they get a 
sense of the ‘depth of harm that can actually be done beyond what you might 
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otherwise think’ (P5). Additionally they see those who are ‘victims at a very minor level 
who just react badly’ (P2).  
People who are victims are located at ‘both ends of *a+ spectrum’ (P2) from those who 
are ‘reasonable’ (P6) and ‘restrained’ (P5) to those ‘who will never be happy’ (P2) 
‘whatever the outcome’ (P3). The focus of victim attention is also seen to vary. To 
some it is the outcome that victims focus on – ‘the decisions we make’ (P3). Theirs is a 
‘desire for redress’ (P5). For others it is wanting the accused ‘to know how they felt’, to 
acknowledge ‘fault’ and to get ‘some sort of explanation’ (P6).  
Accounting for the differences in victim perspective from prosecution eyes varies 
greatly. To some, the range of reactions result from the ‘quirks of human nature’ and 
as ‘part of human makeup’ (P3), to noticing those who may ‘have really good quality 
people helping them through’ (P2). While victims are ‘entitled to feel exactly as they 
feel’, their perceived volatility necessarily legitimates the moderating role of the public 
prosecutor (P4). 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
The skill of the modern bureaucratic state is to portray that moderation – to look 
competent, appear benign and to nestle in neutral phraseology that ‘is capable of 
compelling universal acceptance’ (Bourdieu 1987: 818). Mandarin pronouncements on 
the body of ideas, beliefs and claims that comprise the liberal legal ideology consecrate 
particular legal norms. These depict a way of seeing and engaging with the world. 
Hegemony is the capacity to both fashion a field according to that world view and to 
require it. Prosecution mandarins not only define what is correct, but have the 
authority to compel conformity. It is through the claim to be the entity representing 
public and the mandate to determine who and what among the publics are legitimated 
and with definitional authority on the interests of that public that the ideological 
power of prosecution achieves pre-eminence.  
Acknowledging the state monopoly of criminal justice is of course not new. However 
consideration of the state’s use of its monopoly power has, in the main, focused on the 
rule-breaker. The implications of the sacrifice of individual members of the public, as 
victims, in furtherance of the law’s role in promoting ‘the common good’ has been 
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rather less explored (Harris 1997: 124; Duff 2001). The individuation of procedural and 
substantive fairness extended to the accused has only recently been proffered to 
victims. However these are not rights upon which citizens can rely. The legal ideology 
upon which prosecution authority rests has, to date, successfully promulgated the 
view that the interests of the individual victim correspond to the interests of the 
prosecution and that rights are an unnecessary encumbrance. ‘Trust me’ (P6) says the 
prosecutorial mandarin. 
Trust is assumed in the exercise of discretion as it takes the legal official ‘beyond the 
bounds of formal legality’ (Findlay et al. 2010: 112). In this ‘gap’ the exercise of 
discretion creates ‘exceptions and exclusions’ that impact directly on individuals (Sarat 
and Clarke 2008: 410; Levenson 1999). This capacity and authority to act unbound is 
revealing of where power resides in criminal justice. 
Yet the discourse of public prosecution is as textured as it is deeply patterned. Their 
narration on their work is redolent with complexity and nuance. Their daily exposure 
to claim and counter-claim lays bare that ‘human beings are messy’ (P1). Their retreat 
into a sanitised procedural version of justice and reliance on abstraction perhaps tells 
of this. But there is honesty enough to acknowledge that victims’ ‘sense of justice is as 
diverse as is the sense of justice in the community’ (P4). 
What the narration also reveals is that the exercise of discretion does not exist simply 
in a gap in the rules. Discretion is enacted in a space where public and private 
intersect; and where formal rules and informal other knowledges co-mingle. The 
elasticity of the norms of public interest and community representation are powerful 
not because they are meaningless but precisely because they are meaningful. They 
resonate within deeper societal norms alongside commitment to a justice imaginary.  
The gap in the rules thereby exposes a further gap – an opening for a greater degree of 
interaction and communication. This possibility, however, requires deeper recognition 
of the mutually constitutive nature of criminal law and its public; a recognition, 
moreover, that is put into practice with those citizens whose direct and affected 
interests are engaged. What has been characterised as a struggle for control and 
domination of the public over the private is therefore rather ‘overdetermined and 
ambiguous’ (Bourdieu 1987: 851). In the chapters that follow, what members of the 
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public – as victims of violence – might bring to the world of justice is probed and 
explored. The multiplicity of voices that can be heard from the community, and the 
citizen interests they carry, ponder the potential – in the gap – for democratising 
justice.  
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CHAPTER 6: ORDINARY PEOPLE ACCESSING JUSTICE 
*It’s+ having your rights and feeling you need to be protected by the system. If you 
don’t feel safe and your rights aren’t protected then what’s the point. (Winona 
2010) 
They are ordinary people, after all. For a time they had entered the world of the 
newspaper statistic; a world where any measure you took to feel better was 
temporary, at best, but that is over. This is permanent. It must be. (Guest, 1976: 
94) 
 
6.1 FOCUSSING IN 
Institutional narratives on punitive or pathetic victims perform two key functions. In 
the first instance – as explored in the last chapter – they cast monopoly power in 
mellow light. In the second, they disconnect people from their communal context and 
fragment rounded identities and perspectives. In this chapter I sit down with the 
selection of ordinary men and women who participated in this research and bring to 
the fore some of who they are as persons.  
Here I enable people to author themselves, to sketch a little of how they portray their 
social values, their interpersonal and social environments, and how they orient 
themselves towards law and its institutions. In preceding chapters I have used the 
terms ‘victim’ and ‘ordinary people’ without definition. In this chapter I interrogate the 
meaning and usefulness of the terms. I emphasise the way in which a depiction of 
people as ordinary works to embed them in their everyday worlds without washing 
them of variation and grittiness. As ordinary people they are joined more fully to their 
various publics, and make a stronger distinction to the institutions of the state. This 
indicates a political position from which I develop a link to people’s citizen-status. 
Finally, the chapter focuses in on the decision to mobilise the law as one of the 
responses people made to the incident of violence against them. Using Zemans’ 
decision-making model of legal mobilisation introduced in Chapter 3, I analyse the 
narratives put forward to contextualise people’s actions. In doing so I pay particular 
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attention to the ways people link their thinking to perceived community norms and 
perspectives on the availability of law to them. I sketch people’s ‘psychological 
infrastructure’ as it interacts with the circumstances of the incident (Braithwaite 2009: 
40). Through this contextualised rendering I show people turning to law with distinctly 
variable degrees of confidence.  
6.2 ORDINARY PEOPLE 
The discussion in the previous chapter on legal consciousness and its material 
manifestation, legal mobilisation, begs the question of who are the ordinary people to 
whom they relate. In two texts that are central to legal consciousness literature, Sally 
Engle Merry’s Getting Justice and Getting Even and Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey’s 
The Common Place of Law, the notion is not defined. Yet groups and group definition 
are central to law and society scholarship. The availability of an identifiable ‘group’ and 
specifically one that may be deemed disadvantaged or powerless is influential in legal 
consciousness and legal mobilisation literature. Groups such as working class 
Americans (Merry 1990), the welfare poor (Sarat 1990), victims of sexual harassment 
(Nielsen 2000), and organised labour (McCann 1994) are key examples of this feature. 
These are ‘non-ruling communities’ (Barzilai 2003). 
The idea of ‘victims’ as one such grouping is both powerful and inherently unstable, 
given their diversity. Victims of violence are ‘not a natural social group’; they ‘neither 
share a distinctive background nor common ties of sentiment; [and] they vary greatly 
in their life situations’ (Sarat 1990: 348). If this research focused specifically on social 
location, for example on female victims or child victims, then definite social group 
identities could be used. The analysis would more easily focus on issues of social 
discrimination, structural oppression and the operation of power. However, the base 
characteristic that unites the lay participants in this research is their experience and 
perception of victimisation. Second is the fact that the violence was reported to police. 
These points acted to sharpen victim identity through an institutional imperative. Of 
course there is irony in seeking to depict victims as ‘ordinary’ when their experience of 
victimisation and their participation in the criminal justice system generates an 
exception that is decidedly not common. Notwithstanding, the concept of ‘ordinary 
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people’ is deployed here as an analytic and interpretive device to overcome the 
confines of the ‘victim construct’. 
6.2.1 The victim construct 
The political and academic discourse on victims has tended to pose one-dimensional 
representations depending upon the ideological inclination. They have been drawn as 
passive and pathetic; often as punitive and pernicious. Victims have been cast as a 
pawn in some wider game of social control and as political actors who have distorted 
criminal justice policy. In these ways victims are posed as somehow different to the 
wider community or as toxic within it. Representations join around victims as a 
problematic. Stereotypes such as these make exclusionary practices possible if not 
permissible and serve to facilitate injustice.  
A singular notion of victim is clearly limiting and narrow. Kristin Bumiller’s 1988 study 
of race discrimination and civil rights in the United States provides a useful framework 
identifying dimensions to the construct. She says that, in social and legal discourse, 
historical personality is irrelevant, and that individuality and plurality of persons as well 
as their humanity are actively suppressed and denied. Features that enable the victim 
construct are the docility of the grouping, a weak basis to group identity, and their 
powerlessness in network situations. The social formation of victims is ‘dependent on 
the stability of power relations’, in that their relative powerlessness serves to reinforce 
dominant political and legal structures and discourse (1988: 59–71). The mask of victim 
is a construct both of legal reasoning and a socially fashioned abstraction.164 Ironically, 
when victims do claim agency through public action, this frequently attracts a response 
that is blaming – both for not acting responsibly to avoid victimisation, and for 
perceived vengeance or avarice (Hadfield 2008; Scheingold 1974/2004). 
Just at the time that the victimisation experience atomises individuals and detaches 
them from their normal, the social and legal constructs of victim, complainant or 
witness further render them as ‘other’. People’s identities, their connectivity, their 
intents and their experiences become wedged – and judged. In the media and in 
popular imagination, a sacrificial victim stirs both revulsion and reverence, and 
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‘community’ is thereby bonded against disorder (Young 1996: 16). In the late 
twentieth century, the ‘victim’ also emerged as a political and professional construct, 
and as an instrument of policy (Walklate 2007a; Rock 2006). People are no longer 
presented as multi-dimensional individuals who navigate, construct and re-construct 
their relationships with each other and with social institutions.  
The victim construct also obscures the historicity and plurality of legal cultures within 
communities (Barzilai 2003; Sarat and Kearns 1993). There are differing experiences of 
victimisation and power, given features of race and gender in particular (Marchetti 
2008; Davies et.al. 2007; Cossins 2003; Newburn and Stanko 2002; Crenshaw 1991). 
Communities and the people within them are at once different and the same. 
Returning people to their ordinariness is a way to side-step these constructs. 
6.2.2 Constructs of ordinary people 
Since the label of victim is a construct of many features, so too is the description of 
people as ‘ordinary’. Cultural theorists use it as a term to distinguish between those 
who have power, status, resources and knowledge, and those who don’t. In this sense, 
ordinary people are construed as those other than ‘professionals’ or ‘technicians’, as 
voices from below or from the margins (Thumim 2006: 266), and ‘the seldom seen and 
rarely heard’.165 At the same time, the boundary distinguishing the ordinary from 
others is permeable, and continually constructed and reconstructed (Couldry 2000). 
Theorists are careful to acknowledge that, while the social realities of ordinary people 
are a construction, ‘these constructs have real, lived consequences’ (Thumim 2006: 
265). 
In the political realm, the concept is variously handled. One account has ordinary 
people as intentional actors who shape history. They are not simply political subjects. 
They rise up at extraordinary moments to defy rules and to disrupt institutions.166 Here 
ordinary people mould and sculpt their own lives as ‘sovereign’ personalities. 
Deliberative democrats thus pose ordinary people as a counter-weight to the power of 
elites (Dryzek 1990). Another account has ordinary people claimed and valorised by 
rival ideologies. Creating connections with their lot serves a legitimating function. 
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When so deployed, however, the concept is often promptly decried as oppressive and 
as bleaching diversity (Sarat and Kearns 1993). There is inherent instability and 
volatility to the relationship between ordinary people and sources and institutions of 
power.  
In other domains, the idea of ordinary people has been developed with active intent. 
In public health care, for example, the idea of ‘bringing in’ ordinary people as service-
users is connected both to the discourse of participatory practice and of ‘democratic 
renewal’ (Martin 2008: 35). In the cultural sphere, the idea of ordinary people acts in a 
bifurcated manner where members of the public are invited to participate and create 
representations of themselves and their ‘place’, and are posed as a source of 
accountability. As a matter of self-representation, ordinary people are said to author 
themselves.167 In the cultural enterprise, previously excluded experience is re-centred 
(Thumim 2006: 265).168 Stanley Deetz talks about this as the ‘amplification of voices’ 
(1992: 53). 
Nancy Thumim captures these various meanings in four broad senses of the term: 
hierarchical-pejorative, hierarchical-celebratory, customary and public. In the first 
iteration, ordinary people are beneath and a ‘mass’. They are defined ‘in opposition’ to 
differentiated others: experts, special people, and those above. As such, ordinary 
people can be ‘inferior’, ‘mundane’, and without identity. In the second meaning, 
ordinary people are celebrated precisely because they have been marginalised. 
Thumim suggests this sense ‘indicates a political position, which disputes whose 
account of reality matters’. Here, groups of people are united across their differences 
before some dominant and dominating account. A third sense of ordinary people 
refers to people whose practices are ordinary. It acts both as a claim to commonality 
and as a means of including the banal and the bizarre. Finally, ordinary people are cast 
as citizens of democracy: the public. Political force is located and invoked in the people. 
For public institutions, the use of the term in this manner has dualist meaning where 
the people are both a source of legitimacy and accountability, and are a consumer 
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base (Thumim 2006: 262–265). In this thesis I mine all these categorisations of the 
term.  
In summary, ordinary people are neither simple nor singular. Their identity is plural, 
with numerous influences on personal and group identity formation and deployment. 
Multiple, often overlapping, realities of what is ordinary jostle, just as violations and 
oppressions are casually deployed and made ordinary. Ordinary people act, react, 
interact and connect; they ignore, de-code and re-construct; and they negotiate, 
manipulate, block, manage, mobilise and plan in a complex reality that is both material 
and imagined.  
6.3 ORDINARY PEOPLE IN EVERYDAY WORLDS 
In this section I put more detail around ordinary people. I examine what the lay 
participants in this research share with other ordinary Australians, and what is distinct 
to them. How different are they from others in the community? Are they more or less 
‘moralistic’ than others? Do they have greater faith in the power of the law? Are they 
more trusting of authority? I do not provide definitive answers. Mainly I aim to show 
that what is in people’s heads is an important part of the influences on their recourse 
to law. Further, I situate the lay participants in their wider social world. 
The ordinariness of those interviewed for this study is evidenced in their diversity. The 
thirty-three people included senior federal government officials as well as mothers 
drawing social security. There was a body piercer and an IT analyst, private business 
owners, a warehouseman and a hospital technician, a musician and a service worker 
among others.  
Within the group were doctoral and masters students, law graduates, and trades 
qualified persons. People had varying levels of involvement in local activities such as 
sport, culture and community. Very few described themselves as active in religious or 
political activities although nearly half said they were very or fairly interested in 
politics. They were busy in their ordinary lives – taking children to school and expecting 
new babies, working in high-pressure policy jobs, studying hard, and going to the gym 
and to parties. They were trying to establish new businesses and make existing ones 
flourish. As individuals in a social world, the lay participants referenced to many 
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different relationships that defined and connected them. Some of these personal 
networks came to sustain them through the experience of violence and their journey 
through the justice process. Others in their social circle did not.  
While victims are often popularised in terms that emphasise their passivity, the study 
group displayed a high sense of personal agency. Over half (58% n=19) felt that they 
had control over the direction their life was going, and slightly less (49% n=18) felt 
good about themselves all or most of the time. This strong sense of self is a shared 
characteristic with other Australians. Using a scale derived from Valerie Braithwaite’s 
large national sample (N=3465), the sense of personal agency of the lay study sample 
was similar.169 This characteristic may, of course, be a feature of selection bias in the 
sample. But the strong sense of personal agency is also reflected in the fact that 64% 
of the study participants reported the incident to police themselves.170  
However, nearly a quarter (24% n=8) of the lay study sample felt good about 
themselves only ‘now and then’ or ‘hardly ever’. They also expressed significantly 
higher pessimism compared to the national sample. Eighteen per cent agreed that it 
was very much like them that ‘there is really no way I can solve some of the problems I 
have’ whereas just 5% of the national sample agreed that this was very much like 
them. This reflects a grounded estimation of their circumstances and the upcoming 
justice processes. 
6.4 ORDINARY CITIZENS 
In ordinary and everyday worlds, who people are and what they do form a submerged, 
deep social fabric. When they come into contact with public authority these features 
come closer to the surface – in an easy glide or with a jolt. The nature of their 
relationship with those authorities is questioned and becomes more specific. In this 
process their political identity is foregrounded and their citizen identity becomes 
salient.  
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There are as many conceptions of the idea of ‘citizen’ as there are of ordinary people. 
As an issue of status it is a term that can mark sharp boundaries between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ in a manner similar to the terms victim and offender. Defining the ‘us’ of 
community membership is of central concern in citizenship literature. Antony Duff 
answers the question by asserting ‘we’ are ‘citizens of a particular kind of polity’ 
‘whom its laws claim to bind’ (Duff 2010: 3 and 5). While placing citizens within 
normative boundaries, there is recognition too that the various visions of the citizen 
are plural, multiple and overlapping (Young 2000). This account of their status carries 
more robust import than people simply being community members. 
There is considerable political and academic debate about what citizens owe 
themselves, each other and the state, as well as what the state owes and can expect 
from its citizens. Undoubtedly posing ‘citizen-as-status’171 affects how we view 
people’s relationship to the state and its entities. It suggests that the structure and 
application of power requires careful calibration. It further suggests that the tone and 
conduct of institutional relations with citizens ought, as a default, be respectful and 
abjure paternalism. This can only be because of the authority inherent in 
understanding the foundational nature of the citizen to democratic theory (Barber 
1984). Certainly there is nothing in this cast to citizen status that differentiates 
between persons who could be either or both ‘victim’ or ‘offender’ at any given 
moment.172 Both are part of ‘the public’.173 
Here I am particularly concerned to focus on the citizen as politically sovereign in order 
to create a sharper boundary between their interests and the interests of ‘the state’. 
Thus, ordinary people are conjured as citizens within communities, in direct contrast to 
institutions and their power to define. This representation nonetheless calls for a 
closer examination of values, attitudes and beliefs of the demos – those comprising the 
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 That is citizen as social and political status, in addition to the more usual citizen-as-legal-status. For a 
thorough discussion on the various models of citizen and citizenship see Bosniak (2000). Scholars such as 
Bosniak are concerned with citizenship as a transnational concept as well as one determined through 
the nation state. In this thesis, I focus on the citizen as a member of a particular bounded and territorial 
community. 
172
 However, for a thoughtful discussion of the proposition that convicted and imprisoned offenders 
should be viewed as temporarily foregoing some citizenship rights see Hampton (1994).  
173
 I acknowledge that the citizen-status of some ‘subjects’ (for example, refugees, itinerant workers) 
and their concomitant enactment of citizenship activities are topics of deep debate (Isin 2009; 
Rubenstein 2000). 
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study sample and the wider society – as a precursor to exploring how these influence 
interaction with authorities. 
6.4.1 Values, attitudes and beliefs 
Values, attitudes and beliefs are the ‘psychological infrastructure’ underpinning social 
action as well as relationships to authority. Foregrounding these features reveals 
people’s agency, ‘both moral and otherwise’ and their capability to choose ‘to 
cooperate overtly *with authorities+ and defy covertly’ (Braithwaite V. 2009b: 15 and 
18). From this standpoint, we understand that a decision to turn to the law is not 
simply a feature of circumstance, in which people act like automatons. To explore this 
infrastructure the lay participants were asked questions, drawn from three different 
national surveys,174 about their personal values, their trust in society’s institutions and 
certain of their attitudes towards law and justice. Because of the very large N 
difference between the surveys I looked at general trends and patterns rather than for 
specific values. 
In a series of large-scale studies, two key dimensions to the personal values of 
Australians were identified. The security dimension comprises strength, order and 
social and economic status. The harmony dimension focuses on ‘the quality of 
relationships, knowledge, understanding and human dignity’ (Braithwaite 2009a: 122). 
The two value systems point to different, although not mutually exclusive, bases for 
considering people’s orientation towards others as well as towards authority 
(Braithwaite 1998). One orients to exchange and security, while the other to 
commitment and the communal. The lay participants in this study were found to share 
the Australian tendency towards the harmony value system.175 Given the greater 
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 Braithwaite, V. (March 2001), The Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey; Murphy, K. et al. 
(2010 a, b), The Public Safety and Security Surveys 2007 and 2009; and Mackenzie, G. et al. (2012), 
Australian Sentencing and Confidence in Justice Survey 2012. When examining the comparisons between 
the local sample and all three of the national studies I expected the means to be roughly equal because 
the samples come from the same population. I would expect large differences between sample means 
to occur very infrequently (Field 2000: 208). On this basis I have drawn conclusions observable from the 
means.  
175
 The mean of the harmony scale for the national sample was 5.8 (N=3523), and for the study sample it 
was 6.4 (N=33). The mean of the security scale for the national sample was 4.4 (N=3523), and for the 
study sample it was 4.0 (N=33). Derived from a seven-point Likert scale where 1 = reject and 7 = accept 
as of utmost importance. 
129 
number of women than men in my study sample, there may be a gender influence at 
work.176 
People’s civic ideas and their level of involvement in community and political affairs 
provide further insight into the way in which they orient themselves within the wider 
community and towards others, as well as how they orient towards authority. Two 
scales developed from Braithwaite’s national sample captured conceptions of 
citizenship – one being of ‘self-reliant citizenship’, and the other of ‘involved 
citizenship’. Once again, the conceptions held by the study sample were similar to 
those held by other Australians.177 Both groups are more strongly oriented to a self-
reliant citizenship conception. 
The lay participants expressed a high degree of trust in the public services in their area 
(being public schools, emergency services, neighbours), at a level similar to that of 
other ordinary Australians.178 In the local and national groups, trust in authorities 
(being local and federal government and law courts) was not strong. In the study 
sample, this pattern of trust in community institutions was broadly similar for domestic 
and non-domestic assault victims, although the former had stronger trust in those 
communal institutions commonly associated with relational features such as public 
schools and neighbours. The non-domestic assault group had a stronger sense of trust 
in law courts, hospitals and charities.  
The lay participants were also asked a series of questions about some of their beliefs 
regarding law and justice. These were drawn and adapted from another national study 
examining people’s experience and assessment of police performance (Murphy et al. 
2010a, b). Both domestic and non-domestic assault victims in the current study 
displayed a strong adherence to the idea of rules, with a strong majority agreeing that: 
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 The gender balance in the national sample was more equal than in the study sample. The national 
survey comprised 47% men and 51% women (Braithwaite 2001). 
177
 The mean of the self-reliant citizenship scale for the national sample was 4.1 (N=3535), and for the 
study sample it was 4.5 (N=33). The mean of the involved citizenship scale for the national sample was 
3.5 (N=3535), and for the study sample it was 3.5 (N=33). Derived from a five-point Likert scale where 1 
= strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. 
178
 The mean of the trust in authorities scale for the national sample was 2.2 (N=3544), and for the study 
sample it was 2.3 (N=33). The mean of the trust in public services scale for the national sample was 3.4 
(N=3544), and for the study sample it was 3.0 (N=33). Derived from a four-point Likert scale where 1 = 
do not trust them at all and 4 = trust them a lot (reverse coded). 
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 Obeying the law is the right thing to do. 
 I feel a moral obligation to obey the law.  
 I may not like all the laws and rules we have in place, but obeying them is a part 
of life we must accept. 
The mean of the scale measuring this obligation to obey was similar between the study 
sample and the larger Australian sample.179 The ‘confidence in justice’ scale measured 
people’s sense that laws and justice were aligned with the wider community. For both 
the national and the local samples, this confidence is moderate.180 Indeed, the 
responses of the local lay participants reveal a high degree of uncertainty. A 
substantial proportion could neither agree nor disagree that the justice system 
reflected the needs of the community (42%) or that they had confidence in the justice 
system (49%). A slight majority (52%) agreed/strongly agreed that they ‘sometimes 
question the laws we are asked to obey’. The sense that the justice system is not fair 
for all is also reasonably strong for the study sample (58% agree/strongly agree), as 
well as for the national sample. In addition, 64% of the local study disagreed/strongly 
disagreed with the statement that ‘the justice system did not protect [their] interests’.  
In terms of preparedness to comply with and accept authority, there was a three-way 
split on the question that ‘people should accept the decisions of police even if they 
think they are wrong’, although 42% disagreed/strongly disagreed that ‘disobeying the 
law was sometimes justified’ (27% agreed).  
Australians’ cynicism about the application of our laws and justice is generally well 
established.181 For example, there is a belief that the criminal courts have greater 
regard for defendants’ rights than for victims’ rights,182 and only a slight majority (52%) 
agree that they deal with matters fairly (Roberts and Indermaur 2009). But Australians’ 
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 The national sample asked confidence, legitimacy and performance questions primarily in relation to 
police. Therefore the scales developed for the current study are different to those reported by Murphy 
and her colleagues (Murphy et al. 2010b: 23–25). For the national sample, the mean of the obligation to 
obey scale was 4.3 (N=1173), and for the study sample it was 4.6 (N=33). Derived from a five-point Likert 
scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. 
180
 The mean of the confidence in justice scale for the national sample was 3.2 (N=1125), and for the 
study sample it was 3.0 (N=33).  
181
 Similar comment is made about others in comparable societies. See, for example, Tyler (2006/1990) 
for the USA and Roberts (2007) in relation to Canada.  
182
 With 70% agreeing the courts have regard for defendants’ rights and 47% agreeing they have regard 
for victims’ rights (Roberts and Indermaur 2009). 
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commitment to the ‘moral credibility’ embedded within legal arrangements is also well 
established (Robinson 2000: 1865). The views of the local lay sample accord with this 
paradoxical stance – although this ambivalence is much more pronounced for women 
than men. However, in the national sample, responses by men and women were 
similar on confidence in justice and for their critical orientation to authority. 
Related to people’s beliefs about our laws and justice is their opinion on the 
sentencing applied by courts. Overall the views of the study sample are similar to those 
of victimised respondents in a national study conducted by Geraldine Mackenzie and 
colleagues (Mackenzie et al. 2012). Nearly two-thirds of both samples agree that the 
sentences handed down by courts are too lenient/much too lenient (76% in the study 
sample and 74% in the national sample). About a quarter of the local sample and a 
third of the national sample say that sentencing is ‘about right’.183  
6.4.2 Interrelationship of elements 
The picture of the ordinary people in this study appears broadly consistent with 
national characteristics in that they have: 
 a strong sense of personal agency 
 a moral pathway mapped between their personal values and their stated 
beliefs 
 a personal value set that orients them towards communal trust norms 
 a strong moral and normative commitment to the rule of law, alongside less 
robust confidence in the fairness and efficacy of the legal system 
 a belief that sentencing by courts for offences in general is too lenient 
 an orientation to a concept of self-reliant citizenship 
 a sense of trust in society’s helping responses alongside weaker trust in 
authorities. 
The objective of this section was to construct a more rounded portrayal of the study 
sample as not so different to other ordinary people in Australia. Their values are 
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 Although the local study sample appears slightly less punitive than the national sample in that 21% 
say the sentences are much too lenient as opposed to 34% in the national sample. However, the study 
sample is too small to regard this difference as reliable. In the national sample there is a tendency for 
victims to be more punitive than those who have not been victimised (74% of victims answering a little 
too lenient and much too lenient versus 67% of non-victims), but this tendency is not very strong. 
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presented as shaping their inclinations and orientations, and as influencing their 
expectations. While values and beliefs are interconnected, beliefs cluster in particular 
circumstances (Scholz 1998) and are important to constructions of identity (Harris 
2007). Both are influential on the idea of trust in society’s institutions as a dynamic 
rather than static construct (Levi 1998). The overall conceptual model of the latent 
structures informing assessments of experience and then of judgments about justice is 
portrayed  in Figure 6.1.  
Figure 6.1: Conceptual model of interrelationship of latent factors in justice judgments¹ 
 
There may be a temptation to view the victim participants as ‘ideal’184 but this is not 
my intention. As unique individuals, some had little or no knowledge of the justice 
system prior to their current experience while others had previous involvement as 
offenders. Human actions arise from a complex interaction of personal and social 
factors and differing identities, and not solely from the calculation of cost-benefit or 
the avoidance of threat. A tendency to ‘think morally’ and from a sense of ‘ethical 
identity’ may be triggered by engagement with authorities (Harris 2007). This can be 
seen, for example, in the civic duty reasoning people often give when reporting crime 
to authorities.185 These reasons suggest that ethical identity may underpin ethical 
citizenship practices such as cooperative participation in criminal processing.  
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 A representation that is particularly relevant to representations of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ victims and the 
function these constructs serve justice agencies (see Christie 1977). 
185
 As discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Within the personal and social worlds ordinary people inhabit, institutions move 
‘between states of irrelevance and relevance’ (Braithwaite 2009b: 254). As such, 
assessments made from a position of some social distance may be subject to rapid 
reappraisal when the authority is approached cooperatively or approaches in a manner 
that is somehow experienced as threatening.186 The extraordinary circumstances of 
victimisation stimulated cooperative approaches to authority from the lay participants 
in this study. 
6.5 ORDINARY PEOPLE IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES 
In this section, the lay participants are described as ordinary people in extraordinary 
circumstances. Firstly the incident of violence sets them apart, although for some 
people the abuse was an unfortunate regular visitor in their lives. Secondly, their 
mobilisation of justice resources is outlined as uncommon. 
6.5.1 The incident and its effects 
All of the lay participants had been a victim of violence for which another person had 
been charged with a criminal offence. At the first interview (from which the data in this 
chapter are drawn), the case had yet to proceed through the justice system. All of the 
six men had been victims of acquaintance or stranger assault,187 and all of the twenty-
seven women had been victims of a partner or ex-partner. 
The participants described a range of experiences with abuse and violence. The 
incidents of non-domestic assault took place either in social or neighbourhood 
settings. 
He was the ex-boyfriend of a person in a group of friends. He made a scene, 
smashed a glass and left. Then I walked to the door to make sure he had left. I saw 
another friend leave and go up to this man to confront him to say ‘you can’t do 
that’. She pushed him on the shoulder. I pushed her aside and he hit me instead. 
(Bailey) 
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 McAdams presents the idea that law provides a ‘focal point’ for the ‘coordination’ of behaviour 
(McAdams 2000). This idea of the focal point can expand to accommodate the idea, also posed by 
Zemans (1983), that citizens use an event (or series of events) that gives rise to some adjustment or 
decision around which to consider other criteria to the possibility of mobilising law. 
187
 Two were victims of neighbors known casually or by sight. 
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His body language was like he wanted to fight. I couldn’t get away from him. After 
he punched me, I grabbed him and took him to the ground. He yelled to let him 
go. I did and then he stood up and punched my friend full in the face. (Finn) 
The incidents of domestic assault commonly comprised part of a pattern of abuse that 
took place in relationships, some of which were long standing. Some incidents were 
unexpected or arose from particular circumstances.  
He’d belittle me to such an extent – everything was wrong. He’d beat me but then 
be the nicest person. He was really controlling on everything I bought or did. He 
was that possessive. Said I was ugly and useless and he wanted full control. 
(Molly) 
He’d never done this *hit me+ before. He was just really down but he flew at me 
and was insulting and abusive. I sat down. He was hitting me on either side of the 
face. (Ursula) 
The incidents of non-domestic assault were described predominately as physical 
assaults while the incidents of domestic assault were accompanied by a high degree of 
verbal abuse (Table 6.1).188  
Table 6.1: Victims’ experience of violent incident assessed as ‘quite a lot/quite a bit’, 
number and % 
NATURE OF  
INCIDENT 
Domestic assault 
N=27 (%) 
Non-domestic assault 
N=6 (%) 
TOTAL 
N=33 (%) 
Verbal abuse 25 (93%) 3 (50%) 28 (85%) 
Physical abuse 13 (48%) 5 (83%) 18 (55%) 
Other abuse 8 (30%) 0 8 (24%) 
Sexual abuse 1 (4%) 0 1 (3%) 
 
Perhaps because of the combination of the verbal abuse within the intimacy of a 
relationship it is unsurprising that the domestic assault victims described stronger 
emotional after-effects than the non-domestic assault victims (Table 6.2).  
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 Tables 6.1–2 derived from four-point Likert scale where 1 =‘none at all’ and 4 = ‘quite a lot’. All 
percentages in the tables in this chapter are rounded up or down to the nearest percentage point. 
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Table 6.2: Victims’ assessment of injury arising from incident as ‘quite a lot/ quite a 
bit’, number and % 
NATURE OF  
INJURIES 
Domestic assault 
N=27 (%) 
Non-domestic assault 
N=6 (%) 
TOTAL 
N=33 (%) 
Emotional injury 26 (96%) 2 (33%) 28 (85%) 
Physical injury 9 (33%) 4 (67%) 13 (39%) 
Damage to property 9 (33%) 0 9 (27%) 
Other injury 7 (26%) 2 (33%) 9 (27%) 
 
The physical effects were described in stronger terms by the non-domestic assault 
victims. 
I was spitting blood out.’ (Edward) 
My ear was hurting. I put my hand up and there was blood. (Finn) 
He’s been harassing, stalking, nasty. It just never stops. (Quinn) 
The lay participants described feeling a high degree of distress and fear at the time of 
the incident (see Table 6.3).189 A small majority also felt humiliation. These feelings 
were distributed in a similar pattern for domestic and non-domestic assault victims, 
although in stronger proportions.  
Table 6.3: Victims’ assessment of their feelings at time of incident as ‘very/ extremely’, 
number and % 
FEELINGS AT TIME 
OF INCIDENT 
Domestic assault  
N=27 (%) 
Non-domestic assault 
N=6 (%) 
TOTAL 
N=33 (%) 
Distressed 26 (96%) 1 (17%) 27 (82%) 
Frightened 24 (89%) 1 (17%) 25 (76%) 
Humiliated 17 (63%) 1 (17%) 18 (55%) 
Angry 12 (44%) 4 (67%) 16 (49%) 
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Overall 61% (n=20) assessed the incident they experienced as very or extremely 
serious, although victims of domestic assault were twice as likely as victims of non-
domestic assault to make such an assessment (67% and 33% respectively). 
Of the twenty-seven domestic assault victims, just over half (52%) described the 
assailant as husband, de facto partner or boyfriend, and a third (30%) as ex-husband, 
ex-de facto partner or ex-boyfriend. One-quarter (26% n=7) had been in that 
relationship for over ten years, one-third (33% n=9) between five and ten years, and 
over a third (37% n=10) for under three years. One person had been in the relationship 
for three to five years. A significant majority (82% n=22) indicated that they 
definitely/maybe did not want the relationship to continue. Five domestic assault 
victims (19%) indicated that they may have wanted or definitely wanted the 
relationship to continue. 
Only those who had experienced domestic assault described experiences of violence 
from the same assailant prior to the most recent incident.190 Of the twenty-four 
victims who indicated previous violence, nearly half (48% n=13) revealed that it had 
happened quite a few/many times before. Reflecting the repetitive nature of domestic 
abuse, these participants were further asked to assess whether their situation was 
escalating in seriousness and whether the situation they were in was worsening. Half 
of the twenty-four victims (52% n=14) described the abuse as becoming very/pretty 
serious, and over half (56% n=15) described their situation as becoming very/pretty 
bad.191  
In summary: 
 The lay participants indicated that they were subjected to a high degree of 
verbal abuse and quite a lot of physical abuse in the incident. 
 A majority said that the incident was extremely or very serious, with this 
perception being stronger for domestic assault victims (67%) than for non-
domestic assault victims (33%). 
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 Of the non-domestic assault victims, in their narratives three persons described experiencing 
violence at other times from other assailants. These experiences were not part of this study. 
191
 On a six-point Likert scale where 1 =‘a lot less serious/a lot less bad’ and 6 =‘very serious/very bad’. 
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 The majority indicated that there had been quite a bit/a little bit of physical 
effects arising from the incident and quite a lot of emotional effects. Domestic 
assault victims identified more emotional effects arising from the incident, 
while non-domestic assault victims identified more physical effects. 
 Overall the participants said that they had felt a high degree of fear and distress 
at the time of the incident, with these feelings being significantly stronger for 
domestic assault victims. 
 The vast majority of domestic assault victims revealed prior abuse and assessed 
this as worsening. 
 The majority of victims initiated the contact with police. 
6.5.2 Survey participants as a sample of victims in the ACT 
The lay participants found themselves in extraordinary circumstances not only by 
virtue of their victimisation, but because they formed part of that reasonably small 
proportion of people who report violence to police and the even smaller proportion 
for whom the report to police actually resulted in a matter being charged, prosecuted 
and resolved in court action. In the representative year 2007–2008, just over 26,000 
individual victims reported a wide range of offences to police in the ACT. Of these, less 
than 10% were victims of offences against the person (homicide, assault, sexual 
assault, other offences against the person, robbery).192  
Of the 26,000 victims of crime, nearly 11,000 (42%) were male and 8500 (33%) 
female.193 As Figure 6.2 indicates, males were the majority of victims of assault. Figure 
6.2 presents, by offence type, this breakdown of the type of victim for each offence. 
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 ACT data are derived from a report by McGregor, K., Renshaw, L. and Andrevski, H. (2013). Data for 
2007–08 was supplied to the researchers by the Australian Federal Police (ACT Policing). 
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 The percentages do not add to 100% because some victims were recorded as unknown, as an 
organisation or as Regina. For the latter, these are where the victim is an ACT/Commonwealth 
representative or ACT/ Commonwealth property is offended against. 
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Figure 6.2: Gender/ type of victim by offence type, ACT, 1 July 07 to 30 June 08194 
 
Source: McGregor, Renshaw and Andrevski (2013: 17) 
 
Of the male victims, 15% were also recorded by police as an alleged offender over the 
same period. Of the female victims, 9% were recorded as an alleged offender 
(McGregor et al. 2013: 17). In the police recorded data, male victims also constituted 
the largest proportion of victims of assault.  
The vast majority (82%) of all offences reported to police in the region were recorded 
by them as ‘not cleared’, with 5% cleared by way of arrest and 1% charged and before 
the court for 2007–2008. For assault matters, 20% (n=453) were subject to arrest with 
1% (n=27) recorded as charged before the court (McGregor et al. 2013: 21). Thus the 
study sample of thirty-three is distinctive of the small overall proportion of victims of 
violence for whom the matter reaches court. 
Although not directly comparable data sets, another report using ACT Policing data 
showed police recording 2807 family violence195 incidents in 2007–08 of which 84% 
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 Note: Regina is the victim who is an ACT/Commonwealth representative or ACT/Commonwealth 
property. Figure created from specific data request made to ACT Policing, April 2009. 
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(n=1085) involved female victims. Males comprised 83% of offenders. Approximately 
50% of incidents attended by police were recorded as offences, although only half 
resulted in a person being apprehended. Of the formal resolutions to the incidents, 
94% resulted in formal charges. The most common offence type leading to formal 
charges were assault matters. In the representative year 2007–08, 435 defendants 
appeared before the court for family violence offences. Of the adult defendants, 88% 
were male (Cussen and Lyneham 2012).  
By way of further background, the twenty-seven female participants were among the 
800-plus crisis visits conducted by a community-based victim agency within the ACT.196 
While the service assists people subjected to violence as well as people using violence, 
the overwhelming proportion of clients are females subjected to violence (DVCS, 
undated: 47). A client evaluation conducted by the service in the representative year 
2007–08 was responded to by sixty-six persons, of whom fifty-eight were female (88%) 
and eight (12%) were male. Of this sample, forty-eight (73%) had contact with the 
police in the year in question with 40% seeing criminal charges arise from the incident 
(DVCS, undated: 25–43). 
This snapshot of victim reporting, and the responses of both justice and community 
services confirms the general picture that, for the region from which the lay sample 
was drawn, turning to the law is an uncommon response from victims of violence. 
Moreover, it is an even more unusual occurrence when victim reporting results in 
court action.  
6.6 CONTEMPLATING LEGAL MOBILISATION 
The fabric and busy-ness of daily life was a backdrop to the contemplation of legal 
mobilisation by the lay participants. Their lives are patterned by habit, punctuated by 
interactions of various kinds, and suffused with meaning. These continuities framed 
people’s victimisation experience and during the long months of the justice process.  
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 ACT Policing record a range of incidents as ‘family violence’. A sub-category is described as 
‘spouse/ex-spouse’ (or domestic violence and assault). Using ACT Policing data, Holder (2007) has 
described the key differences in characteristics between the ‘spouse/ex-spouse’ sub-category within the 
‘all family violence category’. 
196
 Domestic Violence Crisis Service (DVCS undated), Annual Report 1988–2008, DVCS, Canberra, p.44. 
The service receives nearly 9000 calls per annum on its helpline. 
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These influences also comprised multi-factored decision-making. The possibility of a 
resolution or the attainment of an outcome for the incident was just ‘one among many 
reasons to invoke the law’ (Zemans 1983: 994). As a precursive frame to reporting, this 
section describes the ways in which people understood what had happened to them 
and the meaning it held. I further discuss how their orientation to the perpetrator of 
the violence and their sense of attribution informed decision-making. I then consider 
how others acted as facilitators to legitimate pathways to law enforcement within a 
specific social and cultural milieu. I draw on legal consciousness theory discussed in 
Chapter 3 to reflect on the mutually constitutive relationship between private and 
public elements to assessments of the incident as potentially justiciable. Throughout, I 
touch on how differently these issues appear to work in relational terms. Finally, I 
sketch how the evocation of justice was moderated by participants’ assessments and 
expectations. 
6.6.1 Making meaning of the event 
The lay participants deployed a number of interpretive ‘frames’ to assemble meaning 
and to construct possible lines of action (Blumer 1969). Self-assessment is, without 
doubt, no neutral exercise. It is riven with community values, infected by personal 
doubt, and influenced by third party views.197 An incident or event thus carries 
potential for either action or inaction. 
People’s ‘ambivalent invocation’ of victimhood is stultifying on many levels and this 
was certainly evident with the lay participants (Bumiller 1989: 99). Interestingly, there 
was much more tentativeness and ambivalence in the comments about their actions 
from the men. Young men hear polarised social messages about their involvement in 
violence as well as mixed messages about their representation as victims (Clare and 
Morgan 2009; Burcar and Kerström 2009; Löfstrand 2009).198 In this environment the 
male participants more readily verbalised the criteria they considered for their 
engagement of police. That is, clear attribution of the incident to the violent person, a 
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 Studies by Morenoff et al. (2001) and Sampson et al. (1997) have examined the characteristics and 
nature of the social context that contributes to the ‘collective efficacy’ of neighbourhoods in enforcing 
collective norms and informal social controls. A Dutch study confirmed the importance of social 
cohesiveness and socio-economic disadvantage of the neighbourhood as factors affecting reporting 
(Goudriaan et al. 2006). The normative influence of the social network is also clearly influential on 
female victims of violence reporting to police (Kaukinen 2004, 2002).  
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 For a discussion of this issue in a context of mass violence, see also Linos (2008).  
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sense of blamelessness on their part, the absence of any provocation, and assessed 
seriousness. 
For a couple of the men the fact that police were on the scene and witnessed the 
incident lent an immediate reliability to assessments of what and who was in ’the 
wrong’. Said Bailey: 
The incident took place directly opposite a police van. They intervened. I pushed 
him away and then the cops came. They told me to sit down. He resisted police 
and had drunk far too much. They took him into custody. They had seen 
everything. They dispersed the crowd. 
The men were also explicit in asserting their blamelessness. The statement of one man 
typifies this point and further sets out another criterion – that of initiation – that 
would have diminished his assessment of being the innocent party. 
I hadn’t invited the violence upon myself. It had just happened. I’m not sure what 
happened. If I had somehow started it I’d feel more like taking responsibility and 
accept my losses. But I hadn’t. (Charlie) 
That the violence apparently came ‘from nowhere’ also contributed to a sense of 
blamelessness. Finn was assaulted in his neighbourhood. He said: 
I remember thinking ‘how dare he hit me?’ Basically because I had my daughter’s 
birthday [the next day] and I felt very indignant and felt it was very unwarranted 
and random. 
In contrast, these validating criteria were largely absent from the accounts of women 
as victims of domestic assault. Instead, a stronger sense of social support was in 
evidence, perhaps as one outcome from repeated government and community 
assertions over previous decades that ‘domestic violence is a crime’ (National Council 
to Reduce Violence Against Women and their Children 2009). One comment 
encapsulated this combination of the breached personal, community and legal norm 
with the identification of the entity appropriate to deal with it. 
I knew *it+ was illegal, a crime. It was obvious to me … I just knew that this was not 
on and that the best way of dealing with it was to go to the police. (Aimee) 
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The issue of social or relational distance has been raised as influential on people’s legal 
mobilisation (Black 1984). However, for both men and women in this study, the idea 
that the less relational distance between victim and assailant brings less law was only 
part of the story. Other factors came into play. David, assaulted by a neighbour, 
referred both to his desire to change his previous cultural milieu as well as his concern 
for others as influencing his report to police. He said: 
As a kid I was raised not to ‘dog’ and not go to the cops. But now I haven’t 
offended for four years or more and am trying to work and was worried about my 
girlfriend. I don’t want them to look closely at me so I ‘m cautious about what to 
tell them and whether to get help from them. 
Alex, also assaulted by a neighbour, suffered retribution following his report to police. 
He said: 
I think the biggest issue I had was actually talking to police because of how this is 
viewed by others. Others think this is dobbing. Maybe this is something the judge 
can say when sentencing: ‘people have the right to ask for help from police’. 
Because I talked to police I had repercussions. Like-minded people to *…+ see 
police as different. I see police as protectors of society. They see police as those 
who come and lock you up, as authority. When the protection order was served, 
people drove by and said ‘dog’. When I was down the street people yelled out and 
I tried to defend myself and I got a black eye. In this type of neighbourhood there 
are repercussions to talking to police. In Sydney you get your house burned down. 
Notwithstanding their stronger sense that they had community support for turning to 
the police about domestic violence, a number of the women referred to differing levels 
of validation they received from family and friends. Two comments represent the 
extremes experienced – said one: 
My sister said I deserved it. I didn’t like that. (Zola) 
Winona received a different response. She said: 
Yes, my friend told me to *contact police+. I knew I didn’t want any more contact 
with him [the assailant] but I was not sure about telling police. I wasn’t sure what 
his reaction would be. 
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The qualitative comments and survey responses suggest different cultural schema at 
work for the different groups when ‘framing’ the incident and interpreting it. For all 
the participants, family and friends were the most likely source of help,199 but 
considerable nuance was expressed about how this worked at a micro level. For 
example, Charlie deciphered the complex messages and information he received in the 
following way: 
I had a cut above my eye so the level of injury also mattered. It was more serious. 
My friends and family are all fine and thought it was the right thing to do to tell 
police. My nearest and dearest were upset that it had happened at all. That was 
tempered by their view that I was out at 4am and alcohol was involved. My father 
thought I’d been careless. My friend had his brother assaulted and his jaw broken 
and all our friends knew. I saw what they went through. The general view is that it 
was the right thing to do. 
Overall, however, this group of people saw the incident as embedded within a strong 
community norm with 70% of participants agreeing (‘agree/strongly agree’) that ‘the 
community saw incidents such as happened to me as serious’.  
Event seriousness is certainly not posed as determining action but the lay participants 
frequently remarked that it was the perceived seriousness (or lack) of the incident 
either to themselves and/or to others that served as a motivator. Cathy’s comments 
encompassed her child and unborn baby: 
It happened in front of [our son] and I was hit in the stomach and was afraid for 
the baby. I was not having [our son] grow up thinking it’s ok. 
In counterpoint, Roslyn (who did not initiate the contact with police herself) said that 
she would call police: 
If he was physically violent to me or threatened me somehow that I perceived 
there was a grave danger [I would call police]. 
Distress and fear were particularly salient for victims of domestic assault in informing 
their assessment of the situation, with 89% saying they were very or extremely 
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frightened and 96% saying they were very or extremely distressed at the time of the 
incident (see page 135). The sense too that their situation was worsening and the 
violence was escalating added to the cold feeling of dread. For example, Deanna said, ‘I 
was very fearful for my life’ and Eliza commented, ‘I was extremely terrified of him’.  
The emotional landscape was vastly different for the non-domestic assault victims. The 
men were significantly less likely to feel distress and fear at the time of the incident, 
with shock and anger being predominant. Anger was expressed by 67% of the men as 
opposed to 44% of the women. Anger has been associated with a sense that the social 
order is ‘under siege’ (Tetlock et al. 2007: 201). While this is an overstatement for the 
men in the study, a couple did refer to the problems of violence in social settings as 
providing secondary motivation to the report to police.200 Said Bailey: 
And fighting in general shouldn’t be supported then if there’s a way of preventing 
it. There’s a huge lack of young people not getting this message. 
In the next chapter I show these emotions are an element to people’s orientation to 
the violent person and a consequent assignment of attribution to this person. The 
attribution for causality has been shown as an important component of ‘an 
exculpation continuum’ (Tetlock et al. 2006: 197). 
6.6.2 Making meaning in a social context 
The previous sections have situated the lay participants in various ways. This section 
explores the importance of their social milieu in influencing meaning-making. Third 
parties act as important validators and facilitators of both interpretation and action 
(Galanter 1981; Marks 1976; Ladinsky 1976). Similarly to other researches, people in 
this study turned primarily to friends (79%) and family (68%) for assistance. The 
domestic assault victims were more likely than non-domestic assault victims to seek 
help from family and friends quite a few or many times. Just over 40% had never 
sought help from a health or a community service, and were significantly more likely 
not to seek assistance from a lawyer, a mental health service or a spiritual leader.  
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145 
Conversation with informal others is a form of advice seeking without deliberate 
intent. In these networks, social norms and contacts are highly influential.201 The 
conversations the lay participants described were with friends, colleagues and family. 
Bailey said: 
Later that night a lawyer friend and I were having a drink. He advised me to go 
over and make a statement to police. I felt supported to do that. 
Winona commented: 
I haven’t told my parents. I called another friend and she got me to go. I called 
police next morning. 
Both domestic and non-domestic assault victims used these conversations to test out 
their interpretation of the events and to gain information about likely responses from 
the justice system. The concept of social validation is important to the interpretive 
exercise and works to assess the calibration of one’s views with trusted and respected 
others (Harris 2007), as the following examples show. 
Later I discussed it with a lawyer colleague at work. They talked to me about the 
system. (Edward) 
My best friend’s partner is a police officer and he talked to me about it. (Nada) 
In my current job I … was very across the issues. I knew the justice system was 
pretty strong. (Aimee) 
Not all these conversations were supportive of the victim or of decisions to report 
incidents. While the majority of lay participants (70%) agreed or strongly agreed that 
the community saw incidents such as theirs as serious, this feeling was neither 
uniformly nor robustly held. Some recognised that their decision to turn to police went 
against the practices of their cultural and social sub-group. These nuances are 
evidenced in the responses of the participants to reflections on how third parties may 
perceive incidents such as theirs. As a formal third party, police are more usually 
emphasised in the victim literature as disinterested or discourteous to crime victims 
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(Belknap 2001; Pagelow 1984). However, for this study, police were viewed as a 
sympathetic source of assistance (see Table 6.4).202  
Table 6.4: Victims’ perception of third party views of the incident; assessed as ‘strongly 
agree’ with statement¹, number and % 
REFLECTION ON THIRD PARTY VIEWS 
 
Domestic 
assault 
N=27 (%) 
Non-domestic 
assault 
N=6 (%) 
TOTAL 
N=33 (%) 
Police see incidents such as happened 
to me as serious 
17 (63%) 2 (33%) 19 (58%) 
Police understand how it feels to be a 
victim of violence 
11 (41%) 3 (50%) 14 (42%) 
The community sees incidents such as 
happened to me as serious 
11 (41%) 1 (17%) 12 (36%) 
¹Five-point scale where 1 = ‘Strongly disagree’ and 5 = ‘Strongly agree’ 
 
It is interesting to note that the domestic assault victims in this study felt strongly that 
police would view the incident against them as serious. A similar analysis from the US 
National Victimisation Study describes the context given for reporting to police as 
‘incentives’ (Felson et al. 2002). Later work examining the US National Violence Against 
Women Survey emphasises the complex influences of social relationships on decision-
making. Closeness to or distance from the offender is influential on victim decision-
making but it is neither linear nor determinative (Felson et al. 2005: 607). Perhaps a 
simpler proposition can be made with regard to Australia that the social marketing 
messages, delivered by governments and law enforcement over the past twenty years, 
have been heard by women in the community. These messages are that domestic 
assault is serious and that police will take reporting seriously.  
However, turning to informal or formal sources of help does not translate into 
certainty. The lay participants in this study perceived support sources to be contingent. 
Asked a series of questions probing their expectations of the reception and possible 
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it feels to be a victim of violence.  
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outcome of their mobilisation of legal resources, participants revealed moderated and 
grounded perspectives (see Table 6.5). Again it is interesting to note that domestic 
assault victims had significantly higher expectations for participation and for efficacy. 
Table 6.5: Victims’ expectations of the justice system; assessed as ‘strongly 
agree/agree’ with statement¹, number and % 
EXPECTATION Domestic 
assault  
N=27 (%) 
Non-domestic 
assault 
N=6 (%) 
TOTAL 
N=33 (%) 
I expect the justice system to be fair 23 (85%) 5 (83%) 28 (85%) 
I expect that the prosecution lawyers 
will ask me what I want to see 
happen to the case 
15 (56%) 3 (50%) 18 (55%) 
I expect to have my say at court 
about the case 
17 (63%) 1 (17%) 18 (55%) 
I expect the justice system to be able 
to stop the violence 
15 (56%) 2 (33%) 17 (52%) 
¹Five-point scale where 1 = ‘Strongly disagree’ and 5 = ‘Strongly agree’ 
 
In summary, this section reveals a body of people operating with a complex set of 
social messages to their mobilisation of law. We see their legal consciousness 
conceived as ‘part of a reciprocal process in which the meanings given by individuals to 
their world, and law and legal institutions as part of that world, become repeated, 
patterned and stabilized’ through their various interactions and conversations (Ewick 
and Silbey 1992: 741). Thus both consciousness and mobilisation of law are deeply 
socially embedded and constitutive.  
Moreover, a picture of these ordinary people as rationally calculating individuals 
attracted by the incentive of certainty in the law as a tool is destabilised. This more 
contingent representation goes to Frances Zemans’ comment that a resolution or the 
attainment of an outcome for a problem is just ‘one among many reasons to invoke 
the law’ (Zemans 1983: 994). I now turn to consideration of these many reasons. 
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6.7 A JUSTICE IMAGINARY 
The striking finding that the vast majority of lay participants in this study expect the 
justice system to be fair (even when a majority also generally agree that the justice 
system is not fair to all) requires some examination. Here I discuss justice as an 
imaginary that is both stable as an ideal and unstable as a civic resource. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the notion of fairness performs a unique set of functions to 
perceptions of justice. It is firmly embedded within everyday ideas of justice. What is 
imagined about a set of social institutions infuses meaning into situations and 
interactions, influences interpretation and acts to open and to close pathways. The 
orientation and views of citizens about different aspects of justice – often 
characterised in terms of ‘confidence’ – have been extensively examined largely 
through population surveys. However, these fail to capture the nuanced and situated 
perspectives revealed in this study.  
To illuminate this richer prior thinking, I built a representation of the citizen evaluator 
by asking the lay participants two key questions at their first interview: ‘prior to the 
incident [in which they were the victim], if someone had asked you what you thought 
about the justice system in our community, what might you have said?’, and ‘when 
you think about the idea of justice, what sorts of things come to mind for you?’ For 
many the formal legal world barely registered until it was propelled to relevance for 
them. Said Yvette, ‘I probably wouldn’t have had any thoughts about it because I’ve 
never had anything to do with it.’ Others drew on their exposure to the legal world as 
jurors, students, and as litigants or parties. Still others had prior experience as 
offenders and as victims in other situations.203 
Nonetheless, the ostensibly disinterested interpretive mode of citizen appraisal 
facilitated participant comment, and enabled them to place themselves in a different 
social and political space than simply as victim. Legal liberalism suggests that, within 
this space, law has encoded ideals of fairness and equal treatment in ordinary people 
(Silbey 2005: 337). On the surface of it, the lay participants appeared to reflect these 
‘taken-for-granted assumptions of shared values and common identities’ of liberalism 
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(Sarat and Kearns 1998: 2). Said Quinn (for example), ‘I would have said I assume the 
justice system did what it was supposed to do and that I believed in it.’ Yet 
considerable variation and ambiguity was expressed.  
6.7.1 Thinking about the idea and institutions of justice 
Overall, people’s evaluative citizen narratives clustered into four themes: symbolic 
acknowledgment, assessments of efficacy, the governance functions of justice, and the 
system’s normative performance. Symbolic representations acknowledged (for 
example) ‘the legal scales of justice’ (Edward), and ‘police and the court system’ 
(David). 
The efficacy assessment was, perhaps not surprisingly, readily mentioned. Many 
opinions were critical, such as from David, who said, ‘It’s too soft, very liberal. 
Magistrates are useless. Cops are OK and understand crime and what should happen 
but Magistrates just don’t follow through.’ Ursula had been on a jury years ago and 
‘came out of there thinking it sucks’, while Lorraine thought ‘they’re probably not very 
good’. Olivia connected her view on efficacy to inputs by saying that ‘we do the best 
we can with the resources we have’. Relativity also informed Winona’s claim that ‘if it’s 
really big then they help. If it’s small, it’s not important to them …’ 
Others offered a generally confident view that moderated with direct experience. 
Asked about her prior view of justice, Roslyn (for example) said that, ‘I have the belief 
that it’s there for our benefit. I just had no idea how long and convoluted it would be 
using it for myself.’ 
Some people had positive assessments of efficacy. Nada thought that ‘it was adequate 
so far as I knew about it’. Teresa, born outside Australia, thought that the system was 
efficient and not corrupt. She said: 
I think I always had a high opinion of the Australian system in general. The [other 
country] system is quite good but the size of the population affects the capability 
of the system to address all the issues. I think the number of police and the 
system can cope better here [in Australia] with demand. It was all more efficient – 
even the tax system. Processing works better. 
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Comments on the governance functions of justice touched on its role and purpose for 
the polity. Charlie said it was about ‘adherence to the law’. Ursula claimed that: 
Well to me it’s just like rules – you have to have rules to keep people in check so 
they don’t go running amok and doing strange things. They’re here to protect 
people – hopefully. 
Reference to the public function of justice was also made. It was ‘common-sense that I 
put it in the hands of the public’, suggested Zola.  
Observation on the governance functions of justice also referenced its rectificatory 
purpose. Aimee said that it was about ‘rightful outcome, truth, safety, protection’. 
Quinn’s idea of justice embodied common understandings of ‘deservingness’ being 
‘just the guilty will be charged and innocent will come through. People pay for their 
mistakes or that they’ve done wrong.’ Bailey said that his idea of justice: 
Would be fitting retribution. Basically making sure that people who do wrong are 
corrected in their ways and giving remedies to those who are affected. 
The rights-protecting function of justice was acknowledged by some. Winona, for 
example, said that justice was ‘having your rights and feeling you need to be protected 
by the system. If you don’t feel safe and your rights aren’t protected then what’s the 
point?’ 
Connecting the governance function of justice strongly to its normative appeal, Olivia 
said it was: 
Ensuring a fair and equal chance for everyone to live their life in a fair and equal 
way and for everyone to live the lifestyle they choose without fear and regardless 
of background. Justice is about a support network, about community and laws for 
a cohesive community. 
The theme of normative fulfilment reflected upon the extent to which the justice 
system calibrated to the practices and values of perceived relevance and importance 
to the community at large. How the ideal of fairness worked proved a common refrain. 
To Xenia, for example, justice was about ‘fairness and professional[ism]. *It’s+ looking 
after the victim and a fair outcome.’ Whereas Molly said simply, ‘it’s unfair’. Polly 
claimed that ‘they do what they think is best in their eyes but it might not be best in 
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actuality *…+ half of it was very fair and the other half is downright toxic’. Nada was 
indignant that ‘Criminals have got more rights than victims … I don’t have the right to 
be treated like a human being. Where are my basic human rights?’ 
Other normative criteria prioritised protecting people over property. Said Bailey: 
I think it does serve a purpose to the best of its ability but it is lacking 
enforcement or is misdirected. There’s a huge undertaking on traffic 
infringements and disproportionate to tackling minor crimes but violence in the 
city at night is a greater risk to social conduct. 
In his comments, Finn took a long view and said that ‘in historical accounts justice was 
blind and swift but these days it can take a long time and doesn’t really get any 
results’. 
Reflections on justice norms also included that of consistency. Svetlana (for example) 
commented that justice was about ‘not going from one extreme to the other on 
certain matters’. However, she felt that ‘there are too many differences between the 
judges and it depends who you get and the mood they’re in. It can also come down to 
the lawyer.’ 
These citizen appraisals worked as stocks of knowledge and rendered the law as both 
available to and distant from their everyday life. People’s general and particular stories 
revealed schematic complexity about what the justice system did or was to them in 
their community. While the codes of legal liberalism were indeed powerful, they were 
not accepted uncritically. As citizens, the perspective of the law in action was that it is 
unstable, uncertain and ambiguous. At the same time, the justice system was 
acknowledged to play social roles with a number of purposes, in which the ideal of 
fairness was deeply embedded as well as imperfectly executed. 
6.8 CONCLUSION 
Constructing meaning is not a simple exercise. It comprises both rapid appraisal along 
with information gathering and interpersonal reflection. The components to meaning-
making that emerged from the lay victim participants are summarised in Table 6.6. It 
should not be taken, however, that the features drawn on to construct meaning 
applied to all the persons in this study. Indeed, some were more salient for the 
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domestic assault victims, and others for the non-domestic assault victims. Similarly, 
the features are perceived by the participants as available and salient. 
Table 6.6: Victim meaning-making informing legal mobilisation 
Situational Perceived seriousness 
Attribution to violent person 
Blamelessness 
Absence of provocation 
Social Relevant and available communal norm breached 
Salient public policy discourse 
Social legitimacy to legal mobilisation 
Concern for others 
Interpersonal Validation by social supports 
Relevant and applicable information from social 
networks 
Civic Symbolic imagery 
Perceived efficacy 
Governance relevance 
Normative salience 
 
Drawing on this mix of elements and soliciting an intervention from legal authorities 
constitutes an act of agency. For victims, it is agency that is bounded as well as 
‘burdened’ (Meyers 2011). As an activity that is ‘with the law’, it imagines consensus 
forged around ideals of fairness and equal treatment (Ewick and Silbey 1998), while at 
the same time actually expects remarkably little. The encoding that law is said to work 
on ordinary people clearly must accommodate a context of conditional factors and 
relational dynamics to capture the unstable, ambiguous and contradictory effects of 
consciousness.204 
We are drawn, therefore, to Michael McCann’s contention that legal consciousness 
may help structure meaning, or ‘imagination’, but it does not dictate a particular 
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course of action (McCann 1994: 283). Law, he suggests, merely creates a ‘structural 
opportunity’ (p.239). Thus, both the incident itself, as well as public pronouncements 
about the availability of protective law, generates separate and distinct opportunities 
for ordinary people that could be said to lubricate the potential for action. They can be 
seen to recognise, from their status both as persons in need and as citizens, the unique 
opportunity created through legal mobilisation to enable the law to ‘step up’ and do 
the work they imagine it is there to do. They also recognise, however, that they are 
stepping into uncertainty. The next chapter considers how people’s mixed 
expectations interact with the goals they seek from justice. 
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CHAPTER 7:  EXPLORING JUSTICE GOALS 
*It+ was mean and nasty and he shouldn’t have done it. (Zola 2010) 
What is … central to the idea of justice is that we can have a strong sense of 
injustice on many different grounds, and yet not agree on one particular ground 
as being the dominant reason for the diagnosis of injustice. (Sen 2009: 2) 
 
Those who experience an injustice only infrequently access the institutions of justice. 
As an imaginary, justice acts as a lure to the law. However, when people do mobilise 
law in response to violence victimisation they think of justice in a variety of ways. It is a 
concrete assortment of entities and institutions; it is processes and activities as well as 
an authority with specific civic purpose and effect. They carry with them a bundle of 
paradoxes and contradictions that expect fairness as well as a degree of ineptitude. 
Just as importantly, ordinary people carry with them a set of ideas that emerge from 
their social and civic imagination that intermingle with the act of legal mobilisation. 
The potential that the law embodies lies within it as a structural opportunity. Within 
their reading of the social and civic world, ordinary people imagine it is just possible 
their ideas may be realised. Ideas including that their understanding of justice will be a 
shared understanding; that they will be treated with courtesy and respect; that their 
status and identity will be affirmed; the problem may be resolved equitably and with 
needs addressed; and that they will be able to communicate with influence with 
decision-makers. 
The previous chapter considered some of the personal and social influences that act 
upon decisions to mobilise the law. This chapter will lay out more of the specific 
contextual issues as motivations and objectives. I unpack Sen’s suggestion that there 
are different grounds to ideas about justice which give rise to multiple goals. I argue 
that the different objectives people give combine deontological and consequential 
reasoning, and expand to consider the interests of the victim, the offender and the 
community. Moreover, from conversations conducted over three occasions, I show 
that these multiple objectives are sequenced. 
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The longitudinal prospective panel provides particularly rich and unique data in this 
exploration of the relationship between precipitating motivations, justice goals and 
justice outcomes. In particular, the data reveals much continuity and some 
discontinuities between what people say are their overarching objectives alongside 
their preferences for sentence outcome. 
I start with some emotional and relational features to the context in which people 
express their objectives, and then move to consider the specific reasoning people gave 
at their first interview for their mobilisation of law. I particularly attend to the issue of 
victims ‘getting what they want’. Their narrative on this is seen to speak to the 
complex and sometimes contradictory perspectives that people have of justice.  
7.1 WHAT VICTIMS WANT 
People who are victims of crime are popularly portrayed as vindictive in motivation 
and retributive in their objectives, and that these are rooted in anger. The next 
sections explore this representation through the different reasons people gave for 
their mobilisation of law, and the concrete outcome preferences they express. 
Outcome favourability has been described as something that is ‘personally beneficial’, 
being the attainment of a personal goal(s) (Krehbiel and Cropanzano 2000: 340–341). I 
consider aspects of the context, their influence on these preferences, and their 
consistency over time. I reflect on the extent to which ‘getting what they want’ is 
influential on justice appraisals. 
Statements about justice are highly contextual. The next section considers the 
emotional content of victims’ situations; their circumstances and their orientation to 
the offender as critical components of context. The small numbers in this study, 
especially those at the second and third interviews, caution placing undue weight on 
the statistical analyses. Overall, in this and the next two chapters, I emphasise the 
narratives people give. 
7.1.1 Emotion and context 
Emotion is a key driver to human action. It lay entwined with explanations and 
reasoning about justice by the lay participants. However, emotion is also a complex 
phenomenon that interacts with different subjects. Said Finn, ‘I remember thinking 
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“how dare he hit me?” Basically because I had my daughter’s birthday and I felt very 
indignant and felt it was very unwarranted and random.’ Aimee’s emotional reaction 
also encompassed others. She said, ‘I didn’t think about any other course of action ... 
His son was witness to it and so my maternal instincts came forward. I wanted to 
protect him.’  
So how is it, if at all, that the after-effects of the incident and the emotions of the 
situation influence people’s preferences and viewpoints about justice? More generally, 
research shows a relationship between emotion and justice, especially injustice 
(Mikula 1998). Some, for example, have found a correlation between post-traumatic 
impacts of the incident on the victim with feelings of revenge (Orth et al. 2006). 
However, other studies have unsettled the punitive picture (Doak and O’Mahoney 
2006; Strang 2002). The assumption that the idea of ‘just deserts’ is equated with 
punitivensss has also been questioned (Darley and Gromet 2010; Gromet and Darley 
2009).  
Emotion was certainly present for the lay participants. At the first interview, people 
told of a high degree of distress and fear at the time of the violent incident (see 
Chapter 6, page 135). A small majority also felt humiliation. These feelings were 
stronger for domestic assault victims, who were numerically dominant in the first and 
second interviews.205 Most victims (85% n=28) signalled emotional after-effects from 
the incident (‘quite a bit/a lot’).206 At the second interview, a little over half (58%) 
described these emotional effects as continuing. 
Notwithstanding these effects, the lay participants displayed a strong sense of 
personal agency. Nearly three-quarters felt strongly that ‘what happens to me in the 
future mostly depends on me’. A majority also felt they had control over the direction 
their life was taking, and disagreed that they felt helpless in dealing with the problems 
of life. Furthermore, a majority (61%) felt good about themselves all or most of the 
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157 
time. The sense of personal agency was similar at the second interview after the case 
had finalised at court.207 
People’s emotional orientation towards the violent person also showed complexity 
and fluidity over time. Overall, the most common feelings expressed at the first 
interview by people towards the violent person at the time of the incident were anger, 
fear, confusion and sadness. These feelings moderated substantially over time (see 
Table 7.1).208 While feelings of anger subsided, it remained dominant among other 
emotions and dominant for both groups of victims.209 Feelings of fear were dominant 
for domestic assault victims at the first interview but these also moderated 
substantially over time.  
Table 7.1: Victims’ feelings about the violent person at Time 1 and Time 2 (% saying 
‘maybe/definitely yes’)  
‘I FEEL … ‘ Time 1 (%) 
N=33 
Time 2 (%) 
N=26 
Angry about this person 79 69 
Frightened of this person 55 39 
Confused/puzzled about this person 55 54 
Sad for this person 55 54 
Numb about this person 46 35 
Empathy for this person 46 38 
Pity for this person 36 42 
Forgiving to this person 33 27 
Like getting even with this person 27 23 
Love for this person 24 35 
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feel numb, empathy, getting even, forgiveness and pity. However, given the small numbers in the 
samples, these findings are treated with caution. The sub-group numbers were even smaller at Time 2 
and so are not broken down. 
209
 Anger is especially associated with the experience of injustice (Mikula et al. 1998). 
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People’s feelings about the violent person were clearly not narrow and one-
dimensional. At the first interview this range of feelings factored along two 
dimensions. One reflected warm feelings of love, empathy and forgiveness. The other 
reflected more emotional distance from the violent person and included fear, 
confusion, sadness and pity. These scales both measured moderately and did not shift 
noticeably over time.210 
At the time of the first interview five (15%) of the lay participants indicated that they 
wanted a relationship with the violent person to continue. All of these were domestic 
assault victims. At the second interview four of these people maintained this intention. 
Unsurprisingly, there was a strong and significant relationship between this desire and 
warm feelings toward the violent person.211  
At the second interview the lay participants had varying perceptions of how the violent 
person felt about what he had done (see Table 7.2). A majority (65%) felt that the 
violent person blamed them for the incident. The sense of blame was felt most 
strongly by domestic assault victims. Under half of this group thought that the violent 
person felt a degree of remorse for, sorry about and shame for what he had done.  
Table 7.2: Victims’ perception about the feelings of the violent person regarding the 
incident at Time 2 (% ‘agree/strongly agree’)  
‘THE OFFENDER … ‘ Time 2 (%) 
N=26 
Blames me 65 
Feels justified 46 
Feels shame 42 
Feels sorry 39 
Feels guilty 38 
Feels remorse 35 
                                                     
210
 The scale measuring warm feelings toward the offender had a Cronbach alpha reliability score of 
0.72. At Time 1 the mean score was 3.0 and at Time 2 it was 2.7. The scale measuring distanced feelings 
toward the offender had a reliability score of 0.57. At Time 1 the mean score was 3.1 and at Time 2 it 
was 3.0. 
211
 Spearman’s correlation coefficient at Time 1 was rs = 0.67 (p<0.01) and at Time 2 was rs = 0.69 
(p<0.01).  
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Another emotional realm for lay participants was their view about the violent person’s 
conduct. In laboratory research, the extent to which people in general ascribe 
intentionality to an offender’s motivations has been shown to be an important 
component of ‘an exculpation continuum’ (Tetlock et al. 2006: 197) and to influence 
interests in retribution (Gromet and Darley 2006; Carlsmith 2006; Darley and Pittman 
2003). In the current study, the lay participants had a very strong perception, at both 
their first and second interviews that the violent person knew what he was doing at 
the time (see Table 7.3). Both domestic (81%) and non-domestic assault victims (83%) 
held this impression. The ascription of intentionality to the violent person 
strengthened over time as did, paradoxically, an assessment that the person had been 
influenced by drink or drugs at the time of the incident. 
Table 7.3: Victims’ perception of offender attribution at Time 1 and Time 2 (% 
‘agree/strongly agree’) 
‘THE OFFENDER … ‘ Time 1 (%) 
N=26 
Time 2 (%) 
N=26 
Knew what he was doing at the time 77 85 
Was influenced by drink/drugs 50 62212 
Was influenced by other people 27 23 
Did not mean to hurt me 12 15 
Was provoked by me 12 12 
 
There was a strong and significant relationship between the sense that the violent 
person ‘knew what he was doing’ and feelings of emotional distance from that 
person.213 At the second interview, there was a significant negative relationship 
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 Of the eight participants interviewed at Time 1 but not at Time 2, four agreed/strongly agreed that 
the violent person was influenced by drink/drugs, two neither agreed nor disagreed and two 
disagreed/strongly disagreed. 
213
 Correlation coefficient at Time 1 was rs = 0.575 (p<0.01). 
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between the sense that the violent person ‘knew what he was doing’ and perceptions 
that the person did not mean to hurt and felt sorry for what he had done.214 
The strength of the intentionality assessment could be an artefact of the sample. 
However, it is consistent with research in legal mobilisation and social psychology 
more generally. In essence, emotion bonds to the experience of an injustice; and 
emotional distance connects with but is not causative of the attribution of 
intentionality.  
However, the emotional complexity and nuanced reflections the lay participants made 
about the violent person complicates certainty. A focus only on the broad structural 
relationship of the variables does not allow an account of the expressive content of 
this relational landscape described in this section. Neither, however, does the 
emotional context account for the intricate reasoning about engaging formal authority 
that accompanies decision-making by these ordinary citizens. 
7.2 MOTIVATIONS AND GOALS 
The research literature on decision-making reveals a raft of instrumental and non-
instrumental reasoning. The binding characteristic, however, is that the decision is a 
subject-based assessment of priority located within perspectives drawn from their 
social and cultural environment. 
From the standpoint that the lay participants were neither ill-informed nor 
inexperienced in accessing forms of support more generally available in their 
community, why did they turn to police and the legal system? Given that their prior 
thinking about the institutions of justice was largely negative, and that this criticism is 
widely held, the question is pointed. Turning to the law is not simple and clear-cut as 
Teresa’s reflection shows. She said:  
When I went to talk with [the police] I had already kept a logbook of what 
happened. I wanted them to take my statement and make a report. But I didn’t 
know what they were going to do. When the sergeant came out and said he 
would be arrested I felt a mix of emotions and I had to tell myself it wasn’t me. I 
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 ‘Did not mean to hurt me’ had a correlation coefficient at Time 2 of rs = -0.5 (p<0.05) and ‘feels sorry’ 
correlated at rs = -0.418 (p<0.05). 
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wanted a clear decision, that it was wrong and it wasn’t the right thing to do. I 
wanted him to know he had done wrong and to stop. 
Indeed, analysis of responses to the question about turning to police showed clustered 
and layered thinking with people giving more than one reason (see Table 7.4).  
 
Table 7.4: Victims’ reasons for reporting to police at Time 1 (N=33) 
Why reported to police? Frequency of mentions¹ 
Safety/protection 13 
To stop the violence 10 
For others (children, the public, others) 10 
It’s a police function 9 
Justice/response to wrongdoing 9 
To get help 7 
To get help for the assailant 4 
¹ Total mentions do not add to 100% because people cited more than one reason. 
 
For many of the lay participants, the general evaluation appeared to be that the nature 
of the incident warranted a particular set of responses that would most likely be 
forthcoming from police. Police were viewed as a trusted help agency that had both 
legitimacy and authority to deal with the issue. This is evidenced in the following 
observations: 
I wanted them to fix it up, for the stats about what’s happening. It’s just what you 
do if you are growing up and you’re a kid and you’re in trouble. You’re told to go 
to them. (Edward) 
The police would have to do something. A neighbour he would have just sworn at. 
(Molly) 
For others the levels of reasoning about turning to the law encompassed longer term 
goals as well as the immediate purpose. Two quotes say similar things about their 
desire for future safety – one from a domestic assault victim and one from a victim of a 
neighbour assault: 
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I wanted him arrested. I just wanted to be safe at the time. (Cathy) 
I knew they’d calm the situation and put an end to it. [I wanted them to] put an 
end to the incident so I could feel safe again. (Ari) 
Others also focused on the short and longer term but with different and specific goals. 
The first quote is from a victim of a stranger assault, and the following three from 
victims of domestic assault: 
Justice, retribution – they’ve done something wrong so something has to happen. 
To make sure they’re punished. (Edward) 
I just wanted him to stop doing it. I wanted them to identify the support services 
and make him go to hospital or get counselling and make him aware of the 
consequences of what he was doing. (Olivia) 
Other of the participants recalled an initial motivation that evolved in layers. The 
following reflection from Teresa encapsulates this fluidity: 
I wanted to be able to move on with my life. I wanted him to know he was doing 
the wrong thing and to stop. I thought police would tell him that. I didn’t really 
have in mind to have him arrested. I wanted justice, to leave me in peace. 
Teresa went on to acknowledge a wider social context to her decision. She said: 
This is why police step in to say these are the rules we live by and this is what we 
are going to do. If there is a breach of the law then there has to be a 
consequence. 
The overwhelming immediate priority of the lay participants was to feel and be safe, 
and to end the violence. These are the selfish motivations for legal mobilisation. 
However, these were accompanied by other goals. While there is an extensive 
literature canvassing the constraints, barriers and restrictions to ordinary people’s 
access to law and justice (Morash 2006; Buzawa and Buzawa 2003; Genn 1999; Dobash 
and Dobash 1992), significantly less discusses ‘incentives’ such as those given by the 
participants (Felson et al. 2002).  
The next section further explores these layered goals through questions asked of the 
lay participants at the first interview about their preferences for the finding of the 
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court, for a sentence (if any) and for the type of justice principle(s) they would like to 
see the court apply to their case.  
7.3 OUTCOME PREFERENCES 
Much of the research about outcomes are laboratory studies in which disinterested 
respondents are asked to make a judgment (Gromet and Darley 2009: 2). In real world 
settings opinions are more fluid. The previous section showed people’s objectives for 
involving police (as the gateway to the justice system) cluster around the instrumental 
imperatives of safety and protection, and stopping the violence. A further substantive 
cluster is for the protection of others, notably children and the public in general. But, 
confronted by a looming and, in many ways unknown process awaiting them, what 
precisely did people want the various justice agencies to do or to decide in order to 
achieve these goals? Do these outcome preferences equate with outcome 
favourability? This section considers the findings and the qualitative narrative that 
people gave for their preferences. It is divided into seven sections: 
The first interview: looking back and looking forward. 
 Reflections on the findings of the first interview. 
 Assessments made at the second interview. 
 Summarising discussion of the second interview. 
 Co-determination of private and public interests. 
 Reflections arising from the third interview. 
 Third summarising discussion. 
7.3.1 Looking back, looking forward – the first interview (N=33) 
The lay participants were interviewed a first time after the police intervention and the 
police decision was made to charge a person with an offence, but before the matter 
had finalised at court. The time lapse between the actual incident and the first 
interview varied between two weeks and two months.  
At the first interview a slight majority (52% n=17) confirmed that they had wanted 
police to arrest the violent person and take him away, with 18% (n=6) being unsure 
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what they wanted.215 A greater proportion of the non-domestic assault victims said 
they had wanted police to arrest (83% n=5) than did the domestic assault victims (44% 
n=12). Of the latter group, a further proportion (19% n=5) were unsure what they had 
wanted, and another 11% (n=3) had wanted the violent person taken away but not 
arrested.216  
The greater sense of uncertainty displayed by the domestic assault victims did not 
immediately translate into an attempt to get police or prosecution to drop charges. A 
strong majority (85% n=28) indicated that they had not asked the police or prosecution 
to drop the charges arising from the incident. Five (19%) individuals said that they did 
ask for them to be dropped. A further two stated that they thought they couldn’t do 
this. Of those who did ask to have the charges dropped, one did so because she felt 
her husband was mentally unwell, another because she felt shared culpability for the 
incident, another because she felt the arrest was sufficient to produce changes in 
behaviour, and two because of their emotional attachment to and concern for the 
violent person. Further nuance arising from individual cases is discussed later at pages 
177-178. 
Of those who did not ask to have the charges dropped, the most common concern was 
for accountability and from a normative perspective.217 Said Winona, for example:  
I wouldn’t drop it because he needs to learn he shouldn’t touch females. 
As a non-domestic assault victim, Charlie said something similar. Asked why he wanted 
the charges to proceed, he said: 
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 Of the demographic and incident type variables, only level of education correlated with significance 
to this preference (rs = 0.49 p<0.05). People’s sense of their agency (‘I feel I have control over the 
direction my life is taking’) also had a strong and significant correlation (rs = 0.52 p<0.05). No incident 
variables correlated with this preference. 
216
 This study did not set out to examine gender differences in conceptions of justice. It did aim to 
examine differences and similarities as they may relate to offence type. The ambivalence shown by 
domestic assault victims towards formal external intervention is well researched (Hoyle 2000). 
Distinguishing the differential influence of gender and of offence type on victims’ justice judgments is an 
important area for future research. The influence of personal characteristics is a contested area. For 
example, Scott and his colleagues noted significant gender differences in distributive justice norms 
(Scott et al. 2001). Brockner and his colleagues also noted that the interactive relationship between 
procedural and distributive justice was more pronounced among those with more interdependent forms 
of self-construal (Brockner et al. 2000). They argued that the nature of the interpersonal and social 
culture of respondents needed also to be better explored. 
217
 ‘Bringing people who commit crime to justice’ was rated as the top priority for the criminal justice 
system in the 2007–2008 British Crime Survey by both victims and non-victims (Smith 2010: 19). 
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Because of the nature of the event. I don’t believe [in] punching people on the 
head and getting away with it. If I thought I got into a fight of my own accord I 
would have a different view and there were injuries sustained. 
Variants to this theme related to a concern that ‘truth’ should be known and that 
wrong behaviour highlighted.  
He should know better, know what’s right and wrong. (Svetlana) 
The next most common reason for not dropping the charges was for protection and 
stopping the violence. Said Teresa: 
Because this has been going on for quite a while … this is my last resort to stop 
him. I have tried counselling, AVO [Apprehended Violence Order] and he has not 
accepted the boundaries. This is all I have left. 
Looking forward to the justice process ahead of them and assuming charges were not 
dropped, people were also asked about their preferences on the court outcome. An 
issue here is that some research suggests that respondents give a response to a survey 
question that they think they should, or that they think the researcher would prefer 
(Carlsmith 2006; Carlsmith, Darley and Robinson 2002). These problems were 
mitigated in that people were in a ‘real world’ situation and, in fact, had to think about 
and confront this question. The problems were further addressed by asking different 
questions on the nature of outcome. The participants were asked what decision at 
court they would like made, what sentence outcome they would prefer, and what 
principles of justice they thought were important to apply to their case.  
On the first query about the finding, people were overwhelmingly in favour of a guilty 
verdict with 85% saying they were strongly in favour/in favour. Equal proportions of 
domestic and non-domestic assault victims (67%) strongly preferred this verdict. To 
the majority of people, the reason for the preference was simple. Asked why this 
choice, Charlie said, ‘because they were [guilty]’. Some research would suggest that 
this firmness is consistent with the a priori viewpoint that led to the initial engagement 
(Folger 1996). It is also consistent with the problem-judgment element of Zemans’ 
decision-making framework. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there was a strong and significant 
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correlation for the preference for a guilty verdict with more distanced feelings held by 
these victims towards the offenders (and see p.160 on attribution of intentionality).218  
In addition to the question about verdict, the participants were asked to indicate their 
preference for a sentence outcome from a menu of seventeen items. The items were 
real-world possibilities open to the sentencing court.219 Strong preferences were 
expressed for sentence outcomes that were protective, rehabilitative and drew on the 
authority of the court. Numbers add to more than the number of participants because 
they could cite more than one item as ‘essential’ (see Table 7.5).  
Neither domestic nor non-domestic assault victims displayed a strong interest in a 
written or a verbal apology at this stage. The number of non-domestic assault victims 
is too small for substantive comment on their sentence preferences. However it is 
noteworthy that they distributed their preferences evenly across the sentence options. 
Domestic assault victims clustered strongly towards protective and rehabilitative 
options. 
When asked their first and second priority out of the sentence preferences, people’s 
views sharpened and reflected ‘partial ordering’ (Sen 2009: 394). Of equal primary 
importance was that the violent person attend a drug and alcohol rehabilitation 
program or have a custodial sentence of some type220 (seven first preferences each). 
As a second priority, most people reported a preference for a violence rehabilitation 
program (five first preferences).  
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 The correlation coefficient at Time 1 was rs = 0.554 (p<0.01). 
219
 As set out in the ACT Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005. Special thanks to Nicole Mayo, (then) Director, 
Criminal Law Section, ACT Department of Justice and Community Safety, for reviewing the accuracy of 
the options posed to lay participants. 
220
 The different types of custodial sentence were weekend detention, a suspended sentence or full-
time custody. 
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Table 7.5: Victims’ preferences for sentence outcome at Time 1 (number rating 
preference as ‘essential, the highest priority’)ᴬ 
Sentence preference Domestic 
assault 
N=27 
Non-
domestic 
assault 
N=6 
TOTAL 
N=33  
Be ordered by the court not to come near me 16 2 18 
Attend a violence rehabilitation program 15 1 16 
Be ordered by the court to follow certain 
directions 
13 2 15 
Attend a drug/alcohol rehabilitation program 11 2 13 
To receive a good behaviour bond from the 
court 
10 2 12 
Receive a custodial sentence 8 2 10 
Apologise to me in writing 7 1 8 
Perform a service for the community 7 0 7 
Apologise to me in person 6 1 7 
Pay me for the costs I incurred as a result of the 
incident 
5 2 7 
To hear a message of condemnation from the 
judge/magistrate 
4 0 4 
Pay a fine to the court 4 0 4 
Other outcome 2 2  4 
Not have any sentence imposed 3  0 3 
Not have a sentence imposed but to hear a 
message of condemnation from the 
judge/magistrate 
2  0 2  
Perform a service for me 2 0 2 
Perform a service that I decide 2 0 2 
ᴬ Total mentions do not add to N=33 or to 100% because people cited more than one 
sentence as ‘essential, the highest priority’. Five-point scale where 1 = ‘Undesirable, 
would make things worse’ and 5 = ‘Essential, the highest priority’ 
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While people were asked to prioritise their sentence preferences, all were comfortable 
with the idea of having a number of choices. Combined choices fitted with the multiple 
goals expressed. Said Bailey: 
With regards to this I don’t think it should go unpunished because he did have a 
short-term impact on me. You do wrong, you get punished – that’s how our 
society works. I think something should be done to get rid of violence. I don’t like 
it. I’m not a violent person. This may be done through rehabilitation. I don’t feel a 
personal need for protection but if these things happen more and more then the 
society might need protection. There’s nothing to restore *with him+. He can’t give 
me the week back where I looked bad. I think denouncing it will help deter it 
amongst the community in general. 
Finally, people were also asked to indicate which justice principle or set of principles 
they would like a magistrate or judge to apply to their case. Table 7.6 shows that the 
participants thought the principles of rehabilitation, specific deterrence and victim 
protection were of the utmost importance to their case. While the lay participants 
prioritised the rehabilitation principle, this was largely driven by the domestic assault 
sub-group. The principle of next priority – specific deterrence – was of strong interest 
to the non-domestic assault sub-group.221 Once again, however, the principles 
reflected goals that were multiple. 
The participants were asked what was important to them about the particular justice 
principle they wanted applied to their case. Again, these clustered around the desire 
for accountability and that the person ‘learn a lesson’. A further strong cluster felt the 
wrongfulness of the behaviour needed to be recognised. One comment encapsulated 
these interests in a multi-faceted manner. Xenia said: 
The most important ones are to rehabilitate the person. To see what they’ve done 
is wrong and to change. Protecting the victim is important and letting the 
community and the person know it is not acceptable. 
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 Gromet and Darley (2009: 55) note that ‘in-group offenders who commit serious offences are likely 
to elicit a complex set of emotions and cognitions from respondents’. 
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Table 7.6: Victims’ preferred justice principle at Time 1 (number rating principle as 
‘accept as of utmost importance’)ᴬ 
Justice principle Domestic 
assault  
N=27 
Non-
domestic 
assault 
N=6 
TOTAL 
N=33 
To rehabilitate – do something to help the violent 
person face their problems and to help them 
change 
21 2 23 
To deter [specific] – do something to stop the 
person from committing violence again 
13 4 17 
To protect [victim] – do something to the violent 
person for the protection of the victim 
15 1 16 
To deter [general] – do something as a message to 
stop others in the community from committing 
violence 
11 2 13 
To denounce – do something to give a stern 
message about how wrong the violence is/was 
11 1 12 
To punish – do something to 
punish/discipline/penalise/chastise the person 
10 1 11 
To restore – do something to recognise the harm 
caused and to help restore all parties 
9 0 9 
To incapacitate – do something to remove the 
capacity of the person to commit violence in the 
future 
8 1 9 
To protect [community] – do something to the 
violent person for the protection of the 
community 
5 1 6 
ᴬ Total mentions do not add to N=33 or to 100% because people cited more than one 
principle as ‘accept as of utmost importance’. Seven point scale where 1 = ‘Reject’ and 
7 = ‘Accept as of utmost importance’ 
 
Wider social meanings were further recognised in a number of different ways. Edward, 
for example, was inclined towards the punishment principle but with a rehabilitative 
sentence. He commented that it was: 
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Better for them to give something back to the community. Better to do this than 
sending them to jail. It’s the same message but it doesn’t cost as much. As it’s a 
lower offence it may help rehabilitate. The costs are significant, thousands of 
dollars. I was in the wrong place, now I’m out of pocket. 
A bivariate statistical analysis shows no correlations between the stated outcome 
preferences at the first interview and any demographic variable. There was a strong 
and significant positive correlation between the verdict preference and the attribution 
of intentionality (rs = 0.57 p<0.01).
222 The preference for a guilty verdict had a 
significant relationship with the scale measuring adherence to self-reliant citizenship 
(rs = 0.52 p<0.01), and strong relationships to the harmony scale (rs = 0.42 p<0.05), and 
to the measure demonstrating a commitment to laws (rs = 0.43 p<0.05).  
Overall, the proposition that people would exhibit consistency in their outcome 
preference in both concrete and abstract terms was affirmed. Contrary to common 
representations of victims as punitive, this sample of people indicated their preference 
for sentence outcomes that were protective, rehabilitative and authoritative. Those 
with closer relationships to the violent person, albeit strained, exhibited a stronger 
inclination towards protective outcomes. Clearly, people indicated a number of aims 
and preferences to the main goal of ‘achieving justice’. What is also noticeable is the 
clear and strong perspective that a court should find the violent person guilty. This 
feature is emphasised in the recurring theme of accountability. 
7.3.2 First summarising discussion 
In summary, at the first interview the lay participants: 
 wanted arrest and had a strong preference for a guilty verdict 
 joined this preference with a desire for accountability and the reinforcement of 
a normative standard of behaviour 
 wanted sentence outcomes that were protective, rehabilitative and which drew 
on the authority of the court 
 wanted the principles of rehabilitation, specific deterrence and victim 
protection applied to their case. 
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 Darley and Pittman (2003) suggest that the desire for retribution derives from moral outrage in 
response to harm inflicted intentionally. Harm carelessly inflicted produces a reaction to seek 
restitution. 
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People’s outcome preferences maintained consistency in both concrete and abstract 
terms. The outcome preferences were also consistent with people’s stated motivations 
for legal mobilisation being for safety, stopping the violence, and protecting others.  
7.3.3 Assessments and reflections – the second interview (N=26) 
The second interview was conducted with the same panel of participants (albeit a 
smaller number n=26) after the case was finalised at court. Finalisation could have 
been a guilty verdict following a plea (the majority of cases), charges being dismissed 
or a verdict after a contested trial. The time lapse between the first interview and the 
second varied considerably between those who finalised within four to twelve months, 
and those who finalised after twelve months. The shortest time between first and 
second interview (that is, to court finalisation) was four months. The longest was 
twenty-seven months.223 
At the second interview, a greater proportion of the lay participants than at the 
beginning indicated that they had asked police or prosecution to drop the charges. Just 
over a quarter (27% n=7) as opposed to 19% at the beginning said they had asked for 
them to be dropped. All of these – as on the first occasion – were domestic assault 
victims.  
The reasons given for asking that charges be dropped are all familiar from the 
domestic violence literature and were often interrelated (Hoyle 2000). Some were 
particular to the incident and the relationship.224 Others related to the parties 
reconciling or to a concern about the possibility of a jail sentence. Two women 
mentioned the length of time involved in the process. A further two discussed direct 
pressures placed on them. Finoula said the violent person ‘talked me into it’ and Polly 
that she was intimidated by both the violent person and the court. She said: 
I definitely didn’t want to testify. I was frightened what would happen from 
people he knows. I thought there’d be retaliation. I didn’t think the system would 
protect me. I had my tyres slashed. I was wondering what might happen. 
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 The majority of cases resulted in a guilty plea being entered in the Magistrates Court. The case that 
took the longest involved a contested trial at the Supreme Court. 
224
 There were no correlations between the overall satisfaction with prosecution handling or the scale 
measuring outcome preference, and any contextual variables related to the relationship with the 
offender, emotional after-effects or continuing physical abuse. 
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Others commented on both positive and negative reasons. Said Aimee: 
I sought legal advice about [dropping charges] and was told it was not really 
possible. The police told me if I did it they would not be as helpful next time it 
happened. I wanted to drop it because we were reconciling and the length of time 
the court case was taking was causing a lot of stress. 
Notwithstanding these minority views, when asked specifically what they wanted 
prosecution to do, only 15% did not want any prosecution and indicated preferences 
for counselling or a restorative conference. Thus 81% said they preferred all or some 
charges to be prosecuted.225 All of the non-domestic assault victims wanted this (100% 
n=5). Despite prosecution being what the majority wanted, only 35% expressed high 
satisfaction with prosecution handling (discussed later at p.192).  
The participants reiterated strongly their concern for accountability as a core reason 
for wanting the case to proceed to prosecution. This was voiced in terms of the violent 
person accepting responsibility for and the consequences of his actions. One of the 
non-domestic assault victims, Finn, said simply, ‘I believe something had to be done 
about what happened’. 
As a domestic assault victim, Roslyn emphasised accountability with regard to her own 
values. She said: 
I did want him to be accountable for what he did because I didn’t want to be 
afraid in my own home. If I’m not true to myself, if I give up on my strong sense, 
then that’s not good. It’s being true to my values. 
A proportion of the domestic assault victims indicated that prosecution combined with 
counselling or just counselling would have been preferable. The idea of the violent 
person ‘getting help’ was influential, as was concern for their children.  
Others were clear that they wanted punishment or some other meaningful 
consequence. However, this interest in the consequence focused mainly on its possible 
longer term effect. Said Karla: 
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 All those who said they did not want any prosecution (n=4) were domestic assault victims plus one 
who was unsure what she wanted. Therefore, of all domestic assault victims, 19% indicated no 
prosecution. Of all domestic assault victims, three indicated an interest in a process that mixed 
prosecution and offender interaction (ie, counselling or restorative conference). 
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I think primarily [I wanted it to go ahead] because he did the action and if he 
suffered the consequences maybe he won’t do it again. It was a serious thing he 
did. 
Edward also emphasised this point. He said, ‘Why withdraw it? They’ve done all this 
work so why stop it? Mainly the deterrent effect.’ 
Another proportion indicated that prosecution recognised wrongfulness, seriousness 
and the degree of harm caused, and that accountability and responsibility were 
desirable. Taken together, these interests go to the manner in which ‘justice’ equates 
with ‘accountability’ (Folger and Cropanzano 2001).226  
Also at the second interview, the majority were in favour of the court making a guilty 
verdict or finding, with 58% (n=15) being strongly in favour and a further 31% (n=8) 
being in favour. Similar proportions of non-domestic assault victims (60%) and 
domestic assault victims (57%) were strongly in favour of the guilty verdict. Three 
participants, all of whom were domestic assault victims, were in favour or strongly in 
favour of the charges being dismissed and two were in favour of the violent person 
being found not guilty.227 However, as shown in Table 7.7, the overall proportions 
displaying a guilty verdict preference did not change markedly over time.  
Table 7.7: Victims’ preferences for a guilty verdict at Time 1 and Time 2 (% ‘in 
favour/strongly in favour’) 
Preference Time 1 Time 2 
 Domestic 
assault 
N=27 
Assault 
N=6 
TOTAL 
N=33 
Domestic 
assault 
N=21 
Assault 
N=5 
TOTAL 
N=26 
Guilty 
verdict 
 
22 (82%) 
 
6 (100%) 
 
28 (85%) 
 
18 (86%) 
 
5 (100%) 
 
23 (89%) 
 
The nature of the sentence provided further definition to the meaning of the outcome. 
Between the first and second interviews there were small changes to people’s stated 
                                                     
226
 There was no statistical correlation between overall satisfaction with prosecution handling and the 
scale measuring outcome preference (or getting what was wanted). 
227
 Participants could rate more than one preference. 
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preference, the actual outcome and the evaluation of the sentence (see Table 7.8). The 
majority (58% n=15) said that they felt the sentence was ‘about right’. 228  
Table 7.8: Individual outcome preferences and perceived outcome favourability (N=26) 
Time 1 Time 2 
Sentence preferenceᴬ 
 
Actual sentence Sentence 
assessment 
Drug and alcohol program Custody A little too tough 
Violence rehabilitation program Good behaviour bond (GBB) 
and supervision 
About right 
Drug and alcohol program GBB and supervision About right 
Drug and alcohol program Suspended sentence and 
GBB 
About right 
Custody GBB A little too lenient 
Custody GBB Much too lenient 
Community service GBB About right 
Community service GBB About right 
Drug and alcohol program GBB A little too lenient 
Custody GBB A little too lenient 
Court ordered directions GBB About right 
Drug and alcohol program Custody About right 
No conviction recorded and 
message of condemnation from 
magistrate 
Community service and 
violence rehabilitation 
program 
A little too tough 
Custody GBB About right 
Custody GBB and supervision About right 
Charges dismissed Dismissed About right 
Court order to keep away GBB and supervision A little too lenient 
No conviction recorded GBB About right 
Charges dismissed Dismissed About right 
Order to pay victim costs GBB A little too lenient 
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 Percentage calculations refer only to twenty-four cases, as one person did not answer the question 
about perceived leniency. 
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Violence rehabilitation program GBB and supervision About right 
Community service Conviction recorded and 
court costs 
About right 
Good Behaviour Bond (GBB) Dismissed - 
Custody Dismissed Much too lenient 
Community service GBB, supervision and 
reparation order 
About right 
Court ordered curfew and school 
attendance 
GBB A little too lenient 
ᴬ Stated as a first preference out of three top preferences for sentence outcome. 
 
Those who expressed views that the sentence was too lenient or too tough did so from 
particular perspectives and circumstances. A small proportion (31% n=8) felt that the 
sentence outcome was too lenient. Four of these had indicated a preference for a 
custodial sentence. Two of the non-domestic assault victims had experienced an 
assault in their neighbourhood. David felt that the violent person had ‘gotten away 
with’ the assault against him. Finn felt that the good behaviour bond was not a 
sufficiently strong ‘lesson’ to the assailant about the wrongfulness of violence and the 
harm it causes. 
The domestic assault victims who felt the sentence was too lenient also revealed 
particular circumstances as to why, and only two maintained a preference for a 
custodial sentence. None wanted a continuing relationship with the violent person. 
Zola was already financially disadvantaged and suffered further the cost of property 
damage done during the incident. She indicated at the outset that her preferred 
sentence was that the violent person be ordered to pay the costs and to keep away 
from her. At the second interview the case had finalised at court with the violent 
person being sentenced to a bond. Zola maintained her preference for a court order 
for the costs. In addition she added that the property damaged had been of 
sentimental value to her and that breaking it ‘was mean and nasty and he shouldn’t 
have done it’. 
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Karla had preferred a custodial and, when the violent person received a bond, felt that 
a custodial sentence would have provided ‘time to think about it and to learn from 
what he’d done’. She maintained her preference for a custodial sentence. 
Janelle had stated her preference for a full-time custodial but upon conviction the 
sentence was deferred, with the violent person subject to regular drug and alcohol 
testing. She felt this was too lenient but also at the second interview said she preferred 
rehabilitative sentences such as drug and alcohol and violence programs. She said: 
He definitely needs to get off the pot. It’s the biggest problem and a big part of 
why he did the things he did. And he needs to control his anger as well. And stay 
away from me so it doesn’t happen again. 
Winona had indicated an early preference for a court order to keep the violent person 
away but, upon conviction, had preferred a custodial sentence. The court had recorded 
a suspended sentence with supervision and community service. She said she came to 
prefer the custodial sentence ‘because they are harsher, he deserves it. He did 
apologise in writing though I’d prefer face-to-face.’ 
Imogene had indicated a preference for a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program but, 
upon conviction, indicated a first preference for a violence rehabilitation program. The 
court ordered a good behaviour bond and did not record a conviction. Imogene said 
that her ex-partner needed violence rehabilitation ‘for his sake and others’. She went 
on to say, ‘I believe in this more than punishment. But public shaming is the only thing 
that would work with him at the moment. He couldn’t give a stuff except for others 
knowing.’ 
Finally, Nada felt her ex-partner’s behaviour had been very serious. She felt that a 
bond neither addressed his problems nor provided a means for him to serve the 
community. While she had expressed a preference for a custodial sentence at the first 
interview, at the second she said she would prefer drug and alcohol and violence 
rehabilitation programs and community service. That is, something that would 
commonly be regarded as rehabilitative. 
The two who expressed a view that the sentence was too tough did so from very 
particular circumstances. Birgit favoured the guilty verdict, but did not feel that 
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custody actually helped the violent person. She expressed a preference for court 
orders to keep the violent person away from her and for alcohol treatment. She did, 
however, want her child to have a relationship with his father. Roslyn also felt the 
sentence was too tough. She wished to remain with her partner and shared a business 
with him. While she did favour the guilty verdict, she felt that a message of 
condemnation from the magistrate would have adequately indicated to the violent 
person that the ‘bad behaviour’ had been noted and had to change.  
On the surface of it, the majority of participants ‘got what they wanted’ from the 
court. However, when asked directly, just under half (46% n=12) indicated that the 
outcome was what they wanted (Table 7.9). The variation in assessment seems to 
suggest that people apply different criteria in their thinking about a ‘right’ outcome 
other than preference. Indeed, the notion of ‘outcome’ may be understood differently. 
When referencing to self it is noticeable that assessments are more negative. 
Table 7.9: Victims’ assessments of outcome at Time 2 (N=26) 
Assessment of outcome % Agreed/strongly agreed 
Outcome ‘fair’ 69 
Satisfied with outcome 62 
Sentence ‘about right’ 58 
Outcome what I wanted 46 
Outcome what I expected 42 
Outcome what I deserved 38 
 
For the majority (n=22) of the twenty-six lay participants who were interviewed twice, 
the cases were resolved at court by way of a guilty plea. Of the remaining four cases, in 
three the prosecution offered no evidence and the charges were dismissed at court 
(one non-domestic assault and two domestic assaults); and one non-domestic assault 
resulted in an acquittal. Those that did not resolve in a manner that tallied with the 
preference stated by the victim at the onset of the court proceedings are described as 
follows: 
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Case 1: At the first interview this domestic assault victim stated a preference for the 
matter to be dismissed. By the second interview the violent person had entered a 
guilty plea and was sentenced to a good behaviour bond. The victim indicated at this 
stage that she preferred this guilty verdict. She indicated satisfaction with the outcome 
and agreed that it was what she wanted. She was neutral on whether the outcome 
was fair. She agreed that she was ‘satisfied with the outcome and that justice was 
done’. She and the violent person continued in their relationship, with a child in 
common. 
Case 2: At the first interview this domestic assault victim stated a preference for the 
matter to be withdrawn and dismissed. By the second interview the violent person had 
entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to a good behaviour bond. The victim 
maintained her preference at the second interview that the case should have been 
withdrawn and dismissed. She nonetheless strongly agreed that she was satisfied with 
the outcome, and agreed that it was fair and what she wanted. She agreed that she 
was ‘satisfied with the outcome and that justice was done’. 
The non-domestic assault cases that resolved in a manner different to the original 
stated preference are outlined as follows: 
Case 3: At the first interview the non-domestic assault victim stated a preference for a 
guilty verdict. By the second interview the prosecution had offered no evidence and 
the case was dismissed at court. At this stage, the victim maintained his preference 
that the violent person should have been found guilty. He indicated that he neither 
agreed nor disagreed that he was satisfied with the outcome but agreed that it was 
fair. He disagreed that the outcome was what he wanted. He did not agree with the 
statement that he was ‘satisfied with the outcome and that justice was done’. 
Case 4: The non-domestic assault victim stated his preference for a guilty finding at the 
first interview. The violent person was acquitted at court. At the second interview, the 
victim maintained his preference for a guilty verdict. He voiced strong dissatisfaction 
with the outcome, that it was fair, or what he wanted. He strongly disagreed with the 
statement that he was ‘satisfied with the outcome and that justice was done’. 
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The particularities described in the cases that did not resolve in the way people 
preferred or were somehow judged insufficient suggest that making assessments of 
satisfaction and fairness of the outcome are different to those that are self-regarding. 
Furthermore, outcome preference is – for this study group – different to outcome 
favourability. 
7.3.4 Second summarising discussion 
In summary, at the second interview after the case had finalised at court: 
 the majority maintained a preference for the guilty verdict 
 the main reason for this preference was for reasons of accountability and that 
there be consequences to the behaviour of the violent person 
 the particular circumstances of some domestic assault cases influenced victims 
towards a preference for charges to be dismissed 
 the majority felt that the sentence allocated was ‘about right’ even when it 
wasn’t what they had wanted 
 perceptions of sentence leniency did not necessarily translate to a preference 
for punitiveness – that is, if punitiveness is equated with incarceration 
 satisfaction with prosecution and with court handling was not strong 
 there was a distinction between assessments of satisfaction and fairness of the 
outcome, and getting what one wanted or what one deserved. 
This detailed examination of goals and preferences shows that people’s complex 
reasoning reflects deontological thinking about right and wrong, as well as 
consequential thinking about the offender and the wider community. The multiplicity 
of goals and preferences expressed at both the first and second interviews renders 
statistical analysis difficult. Nevertheless, the reasoning given throws doubt on the idea 
that outcome favourability can be reduced to something of singular and personal 
benefit. Overall, there was a remarkable degree of stability across time between 
preferences, outcomes and assessments on those outcomes. 
7.3.5 Co-determination of private and public interests 
At their first and second interviews the lay participants gave more than one reason for 
mobilising the law and in reasoning their preferences. These were (unsurprisingly) 
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instrumental (stop the violence) but also ethical (protect others). Both men and 
women frequently drew on public policy concerns in giving robustness to their 
reasons, saying that violence against women is wrong and violence in public is a 
problem. People did not see their recourse to law or their engagement with the 
criminal justice system as divorced from the communal and the civic. Only a couple of 
the participants viewed theirs as a ‘private dispute’ (Christie 1977). It is difficult to see 
private interests in this study as anything other than co-determined by wider public 
interests of which they were also a part.  
7.3.6 Final reflections – the third interview (N=19) 
The third interview was conducted approximately six months after the finalisation of 
the matter at court. Of the original thirty-three study participants, nineteen were 
interviewed on the final occasion, comprising five non-domestic assault victims and 
fourteen domestic assault victims. 
Just under half (47%) indicated that they were somewhat satisfied overall with how 
the justice system handled their case, and another third (32%) indicated that they 
were extremely or very satisfied overall. There was a strong and significant correlation 
between overall satisfaction, and a feeling that their interests as a victim of violence 
were looked after (rs = 0.83 p<0.01). A strong and significant correlation was also found 
between overall satisfaction and the view that, in a similar situation in the future, the 
victim would like the justice system to deal with it in a similar way (rs = 0.65 p<0.01). 
When asked how well people felt their interests as a victim of violence were actually 
looked after, there were decidedly mixed views. While 42% felt they were 
definitely/maybe looked after enough, 42% felt that they were definitely/maybe not, 
and 16% were unsure.  
Looking behind these data through personal reflection, some of the lay participants 
came to qualify their earlier assessments of unqualified satisfaction or unqualified 
dissatisfaction. Ursula was one of those in the latter category. At her second interview 
she said that the mental health condition of the violent person – her husband – was 
not appropriate for the criminal justice system to deal with and, given this, that justice 
was not done. While they remained married and living together and the criminal 
charges had been dismissed – rightly in her view – she had also wanted some form of 
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compulsion to his engagement with mental health services. Six months later at her 
third interview, she was consistent in the focus of her dissatisfaction but she also 
included an element of uncertainty with regard to her own interests. Ursula’s 
comment was that: 
Supposedly he didn’t know what he was doing. He got the outcome for him but I 
haven’t. I’m no safer than I was then. 
A greater proportion of participants shifted from unqualified satisfaction with the 
outcome and that justice was done at the second interview, to a more qualified 
satisfaction at the third and final interview. All were domestic assault victims, three of 
whom expressed their qualification on the sentence arrived at by the court. They were 
satisfied that there had been a result but questioned its appropriateness. Said Deanna: 
On one hand, I was content to see [the defendant] being convicted and sentenced 
but on another, I felt the sentence was a tad too light and the case was not 
finalised as thoroughly as I would have hoped. 
Winona compared unfavourably the result in her situation with others: 
I’m just unsure. It could have been done better and the punishment didn’t fit 
what happened. Other similar cases got more punishment. 
Xenia, who remained married and living with the violent person, indicated that her 
dissatisfaction stemmed from the emotional, personal, family and financial 
consequences of the case. The matter had finalised with a guilty plea to some of the 
charges, with others withdrawn and the matter resulted in the conviction not being 
recorded but with a good behaviour bond. She had expressed great difficulty in 
communicating with prosecution while also giving voice to a degree of ambivalence 
about her personal situation. She expressed the complexity of her viewpoint in the 
following manner: 
I’m not sure what justice I wanted. I just wanted it to go away. At the end of the 
day they eventually listened. I can only guess it was from all the letters I wrote. 
7.3.7 Third summarising discussion 
Consideration of the particularities of cases highlights the challenges to globalising 
interpretations of people’s experiences with substantive outcomes. In particular, the 
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dominance given at the second interview to offender and community goals appears to 
be softened by a sense that the goals for themselves as victims were somehow lost or 
unattended.  
The dilution of attention to victim-related goals may lie behind the ambivalence 
contained in the final reflections. Goals for the offender and for community – here 
about rehabilitation and deterrence – may be satisfied, but the sense of something 
else missing points to justice as a composite concept being incomplete. 
Nonetheless, and perhaps paradoxically, 74% of people who participated in all three 
interviews said that they would seek help from the justice system if something similar 
happened to them in the future. There is clearly something to the logic of institutional 
fit with peoples’ instrumental motivations in mobilising the law, especially law 
enforcement. This necessarily highlights the contingent nature of satisfaction and 
draws attention once again to the nuance and particularities that layer and refract 
assessments that justice has been done.  
7.4 MULTIPLE AND LAYERED GOALS FOR JUSTICE 
This chapter has highlighted an informationally rich depiction of people’s thinking 
about justice goals. These ordinary people carry, interpret and manage their own and 
others’ ideas about justice as a multi-directional conception infused with relational and 
emotional content that responds to shifts in context and emphasis. They think as 
citizens with perspectives on the implications to others around them of narratives in 
the public sphere. They also think as people who have been injured, and with ideas 
about responses for themselves as well as the offender. Deep and wide thinking such 
as discussed in this chapter is commonly unnoticed or diverted.  
The idea of accountability emerged as a clear threshold to thinking about other justice 
goals. Indeed, people made a clear distinction between the guilty verdict – which they 
equated with accountability – and the sentence – which they equated both with 
consequence and future conduct. The interest in accountability did not equate with 
punitiveness. A particular interest in the accountability of the violent person is 
underpinned by a more general position that accountability is but one point to both 
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law and justice. Thus, accountability is both a motivating as well as a justifying feature 
of legal mobilisation. It is a first order preference. 
I also demonstrated that people as victims direct their thinking about the good of 
justice in three ways: towards themselves as the subject victim, and to other objects of 
value being offender and community. This trilogy of justice interests attracts diverse 
and multiple goals. Achieving justice is a compound notion that has been obscured by 
a ‘fixation on punishment’ (Gromet and Darley 2009: 2). This layered conceptualisation 
of justice goals is depicted in Figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1: Justice outcomes for victims: different objects of value, multiple goals and 
reasons 
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My grounded and fine-grained analysis throws into question the notion of ‘outcome 
favourability’ being simply what is personally beneficial. People’s thinking about the 
offender is nuanced, particularly and obviously for domestic assault victims, but not 
only for them. On a meta level, it has been claimed that greater social distance 
between victim and offender tends to a greater tendency to harshness (Black 1980). 
However, this is not strongly evident here. The notion requires more attention to 
particularity and to the motivational norms at play, as well as to the dynamic nature of 
attitude formation. I have also shown that a close or intimate relationship is not a 
requirement for thinking about the offender. A connection is forged not just in prior 
association but through the incident and responses to it. This has an emotional 
composition but not only that. Some of these feelings shift over time, notably anger.  
At the same time, there was a strong perspective in both groups of victims that the 
offender ‘knew what he was doing’. The assessment of intentionality is important to 
offence attribution as well as to perceived wrongdoing. However, the strong and 
significant relationship between offender attribution and the preference for a guilty 
verdict did not translate to punitive retribution. Rather, victims were interested in 
sentences that were protective, rehabilitative and which drew on the authority of the 
court. As such, they prioritised the principles of rehabilitation, specific deterrence and 
victim protection. There was very little interest in expelling the offender from the 
community. Even with feelings of fear and anger and a sense that the offender blamed 
them for what had happened, both domestic and non-domestic assault victims wanted 
outcomes that sought to address the causes of the behaviour and to constrain future 
occurrence. In taking the opportunity provided by law, people accept overarching 
public goals to justice while at the same time maintaining focus on private interests. 
These are not an either/or proposition as evidenced by reflections arising from their 
composite personal, social and civic identities. 
When asked to think about justice – in the abstract as well as in their particular 
circumstances – people ‘necessarily’ thought expansively and considered others’ 
concerns (Skitka 2003). Their justice trilogy looked to the victim, the offender and the 
community. Their priorities were consistent in both concrete and abstract terms at 
different points in the justice process and remained stable over time. Yet what was 
particularly striking was the almost complete silence – even with open and 
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supplementary questions – about what might be owed them, or what they might be 
entitled to. Put another way, it appears the concern for others can overwhelm 
concerns for oneself. Therefore, underneath ‘surviving contrary positions’ to 
assessments of justice, may lie partial ordering of priorities (Sen 2009: 394–400). In 
that ordering, attention to others may supersede attention to oneself. 
My interaction with the lay participants over the three interviews made transparent 
their intrinsic capacities for reasoning as well as this ordering and contrariness; 
people’s reasoning evolved and unfolded through our interaction.  
The next chapter takes another approach to unpacking what people think is fair and 
just. It looks more closely at how people were treated and considers further the 
interactive relationship between this experience and outcomes. It also poses a 
question about the iterative dynamic between the subjective justice of ordinary people 
and their encounters with authoritative decision-makers. 
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CHAPTER 8:  EXPERIENCING JUSTICE 
[They] treated me like a normal person, not sorry for me or anything, like I had a 
right to be there. (Janelle 2011) 
Justice is fundamentally an interpersonal construct, one that would be 
unnecessary if people lived in isolation from others. (Skitka, 2003: 293) 
 
As we saw in previous chapters, ordinary people invest multiple meanings in the idea 
of justice and seek multiple goals through the mobilisation of law. There is remarkable 
stability and consistency over time and process to what they say they want from 
justice. The trilogy of interests underlying their goals reflects relational, social and civic 
concerns.  
This chapter attempts to get behind, into and generally engage with the assessments 
that people make about justice. As I showed previously, as disinterested citizen-
evaluators people use themes of symbolic acknowledgment, assessments of efficacy, 
the governance functions of justice, and the system’s normative performance to 
imagine justice. When they then actually experience justice as a series of interactions, 
these themes persist or change. However, just as this pre-existing thinking is not fixed 
and narrow, neither do people have a single and simple encounter with the justice 
system. As an institutional manifestation it is a long and complex process made up of a 
number of parts. As a journey, it tests and changes the understanding that ordinary 
people have of justice to themselves and to others. The idea of justice becomes 
slippery and unstable.  
8.1 THEORISING ON JUSTICE JUDGMENTS 
Debates in the social psychology of justice have attempted to pin down this 
slipperiness. Since the 1960s the two paradigms of distributive and procedural have 
dominated. The frame of distributive justice argues that people in conflict will agree 
that a settlement is fair and just using different criteria of deservingness, equity, need, 
or merit (Adams 1965; Blau 1964; Homans 1961; Deutsch 1975; Hatfield et. al. 1978). 
The first two criteria are commonly referenced in assessments about the fairness of 
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criminal justice. In distributive justice theory, people are said to prioritise what they 
‘get’ of a valued resource. A just process thereby becomes something that maximises a 
just outcome to the individual and their group (Thibaut and Walker 1975). The 
metaphor of homo economicus for this mode of thinking assumes humans are selfish 
beings who rationally calculate the costs and benefits of the attainment of goals 
(Skitka et al. 2009: 100).  
In the second paradigm of procedural justice is embedded a metaphor of homo 
socialis. Here human behaviour is assumed to rest on relational concerns. Procedural 
justice attends to ‘people’s need for status, standing, and to belonging’ as being key 
drivers in justice judgments (Skitka et al. 2009: 101).229 It cares less about the steps 
that maximise gain and more about how the processes demonstrate value to the 
group (Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 1989) and validate social identity (Tyler and Blader 
2003). The fairness of the procedures used by the decision-maker and the fairness with 
which they treat the person(s) subject to the decision are central concerns in 
procedural justice.  
There is some tendency to pose these two theoretical approaches as conflicting or in 
tension. However there is now acknowledgment about the strong and interactive 
relationship between assessments of the outcome and of procedural aspects in overall 
justice judgments (Hauenstein et al. 2001; Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996; Folger 1996; 
Tyler 1988). Some contemporary theorists go further to pose distributive and 
procedural justice as dimensions of an integrated, normative conception of justice 
(Colquitt et al. 2005; Folger and Cropanzano 2001; Lind 2001; Van den Bos et al. 1997). 
Moreover, justice judgments have been shown to be context sensitive (Cropanzano 
and Greenberg 1997) as well as malleable and fluid (Clayton and Opotow 2003). Rather 
than ascribe ‘single motives or simple frames’ at singular moments to human 
behaviour, people are ‘both flexible and complex’ in their thinking about justice. 
Reasoning about justice in the real world thus becomes contingent and less about 
‘competing conceptions’ (Skitka et al. 2010: 28). 
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 Skitka (2009: 102) discusses a third metaphor, homo moralis. This conception directs attention away 
from wants and desires and towards ‘ought’. I will draw on this third metaphor later in the chapter. 
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The two dominant theoretical approaches are nonetheless useful to unpack and to 
leverage understanding about what ordinary people think is fair and just. I do not 
ascribe predominance to either the focus on outcome or that on treatment. Nor do I 
intend to show that one is more or less important than the other. Rather, I will 
examine people’s assessments as constructions that integrate variables identified as 
important from both theoretical approaches. Moreover, I intend to illuminate these 
constructions as active, dynamic and interactive. They unfold within criminal justice 
and within their wider social context.  
8.2 VICTIMS IN THE JUSTICE PROCESS 
As a process, criminal justice is at once simple and complex. This section discusses the 
steps as a series of locations and moments in which citizens interact with 
professionals. Here I lay the groundwork to consider ‘the interdependence of sites 
within a larger system’ in which deliberation might take place (Mansbridge et al. 2012: 
1). Use of a systemic approach considers the whole as a sum of parts but, more 
particularly, as creating multiple opportunities for interaction. Thus the different 
exchanges will potentially be experienced positively or negatively; one exchange may 
cancel out the benefits of an earlier positive one or redeem the overall engagement. 
The different moments also grow possibilities for an expansive conception of justice to 
unfold. 
It would be wrong, however, to either over- or under-state the enormity and intrusion 
of this engagement. Over time the intensity of the experience of violence victimisation 
dissipated for the lay participants as the activities constituting their ordinary lives 
continued. Some moved house (even towns), some changed jobs and others 
graduated. For most, life maintained its regular routines. At the same time, each 
person had interactions with institutions that were way outside their everyday life. 
Each person came to the realisation that, to varying degrees, they were not central to 
a process that had evolved from their individual experience. Comments from Holly and 
Bailey show how detached people came to feel from the system. 
‘It took so long I have very little faith in it’, said Holly. ‘For something so 
straightforward it took so long – over a year – just ridiculous.’ 
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‘The communication was a bit lacking at times. It would go a while without 
anything. It would have been nice to feel a bit more in touch’, said Bailey. 
People’s most intense interaction with the system is usually at the beginning. 
Depending on the circumstances, victims can feel a strong connection with 
investigating officers. These are the moments of telling; that is, in response to 
questioning, a narrative of ‘what happened’ begins to emerge. There will be 
accompanying feelings of relief, embarrassment, uncertainty, shame and anxiety. 
Victims may say things without realising the consequences; or say things they think are 
vital which are unnoticed or ignored. Even with questions from police, people may or 
may not have been asked what they wanted to see happen. Victims may or may not be 
told when or if a person is arrested and on what charge. They may or may not be told 
what is to happen next. These steps can take place quickly in the space of 24 hours, or 
they can take weeks or months.  
The laying of a charge against an alleged offender by police generates processes 
potentially involving both the prosecution and the court. To the outsider victim these 
offender-focused processes are almost all but invisible, and the institutions themselves 
opaque. Both processes require basic information about the charge and the alleged 
offender. Information about the victim may accompany the charge but usually doesn’t. 
Within the prosecution, the evidence prepared by police is reviewed and critical 
decisions made about proceeding or not, and on what charge(s). Prosecution may or 
may not seek to contact or liaise with a victim. The confusion people generally feel 
when they learn that the prosecution is not ‘their’ lawyer can quickly turn to anger and 
frustration at what is commonly experienced as obfuscation if not rudeness and 
discourtesy.  
Once the charge enters the court system, it will proceed through a step-by-step 
process of appearances, mentions, case management and – infrequently – a trial.230 
Because of the high rate of guilty pleas, victims as witnesses are rare. The occasion 
afforded to submit a written or verbal victim impact statement is also rarely taken up. 
Mainly victims are not told of their availability and matters are not stood over in order 
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 The majority of criminal offences that enter the court system in Australia result in a guilty plea and do 
not proceed to contested trial. See Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012), Criminal Courts 2010–2011, 
ABS, Canberra. 
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to solicit or produce one. For ordinary people exposed to a steady diet of flash 
television programs showing (usually) empathetic portrayals of interaction with 
victims, dynamic justice practitioners and rapid dénouement, the mannered, long and 
complex reality is a shock. 
8.3 CONSIDERING VICTIM EXPERIENCES WITH JUSTICE 
Any sense that they as victims (or citizens) matter collides rather quickly with this 
reality. The experiences of ordinary people – in all their diversity and victimised by a 
range of personal and property crimes – with the institutions of justice have been 
found almost universally wanting across common law countries.231  
The experiences of victims are often telescoped to certain stock reductions: either that 
dissatisfaction with justice is about its outcomes, most notably sentence leniency; 
and/or that dissatisfaction with justice is about how as victims they were treated, most 
notably by exclusion and discourtesy. Very few studies go behind these narrow and 
particularised assessments of dissatisfaction. Most are limited by the singular, 
retrospective capture of experience at one point in time. Since the 1990s, exceptions 
have focused on restorative justice and on victim roles and perspectives within its 
diverse applications (Weitekamp and Kerner 2002; Zehr 1990; Braithwaite J. 1989). 
Although immensely influential, this work has also been constrained by its focus on the 
beginning or end of the criminal justice process. That is, on restorative justice as a 
diversion from court or in the sentencing process (Wemmers and Cyr 2006; Strang 
2002; Umbreit et.al. 1994). More recent research has sought to examine victim 
experience through a procedural justice lens (Wemmers 2010). 
Notwithstanding these debates, there remains, within the body of scholarship that 
deals with victims and justice, a notable consistency to the core criticisms offered and 
consistency to the critique irrespective of offence type or victim type.232 These centre 
on:233 
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 See for example, with regard to Australia (Cook et al. 1999), the UK (Hall 2009; Walklate 1989; 
Ponting and Maguire 1998), the USA (Davis et al. 2007) and Canada (Roach 1999). 
232
 For seminal texts on the experience of domestic violence victims see Buzawa and Buzawa (2003), 
Temkin and Krahe (2008) on sexual assault, Morgan and Zedner (1992) on child victims, Maguire and 
Bennett (1982) on residential burglary, and Rock (1998) on homicide. 
233
 For discussion of these experiences in the ACT see Holder (2008). 
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 victims’ sense of alienation and exclusion from all aspects of the justice 
process, 
 the experience of routine discourtesy and disrespect, 
 the absence of information and the withholding of information, 
 the lack of support, assistance and advocacy, 
 disquiet as to the thorough, unbiased and timely performance of justice 
functions from investigation to prosecution to adjudication and sentence 
management, 
 the perception that process efficiencies trump the proper administration of 
justice, especially with regard to charge negotiation, 
 inappropriate or inadequate decision-making, especially with regard to 
sentencing, 
 the failure to involve or hear from victims adequately or at all, and 
 a perception that, while defendants have rights and representation, victims 
have neither. 
These elements informed the design of the participant survey and interview questions 
for the current study. To what extent were people given the opportunity to express 
their views, and were these considered? Did they agree with and understand decisions 
reached? Were people treated with respect and provided with information? These 
questions cohere around victim interests in recognition and respect, and with inclusion 
and participation, and drew heavily from procedural and distributive justice literature. 
However, the research did not use existing validated instruments to measure these 
dimensions.234 Decisions were made to draw variables both from existing surveys235 
and to use ones designed specifically for the research population and context. The 
choice of variables was judged in relation to their relevance to the literature.  
8.4 SATISFACTION WITH JUSTICE 
Satisfaction is a common measure of people’s interactions with public authorities and 
services. However, satisfaction has been described as a ‘simplistic criteria for *a+ 
                                                     
234
 See, for example, Reisig et al. (2007) for tests into the reliability and validity of composite measures 
used in procedural justice studies. 
235
 Survey questions were drawn from Braithwaite, V. (March 2001) and Murphy, K. et al. (2010 a, b). 
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dependent variable’ (Sebba 1996: 87). It is a narrow quotient and provides a paucity of 
explanation. It is still less a full picture of complex interactions over time. Nonetheless, 
in this study, satisfaction does service as a measure around which to organise and 
explore different experiences. The rich reflections of the lay participants get behind 
the flat quantitative measures.  
On three separate occasions in relation to four entities, the lay participants were 
asked, ‘generally speaking, how satisfied were you with the [police or prosecution or 
court or justice system overall] handling of your case?’ People were asked to rank their 
response on a five-point Likert scale where 1 = extremely dissatisfied, and 5 = 
extremely satisfied.236 Because the overall satisfaction measure was asked in relation 
to different entities it does not generate direct comparisons. However, it does provide 
a means to reflect different interactions at different times. In Figure 8.1 the 
percentage of those stating they were extremely/very satisfied reveals these 
comparative assessments.237  
 
 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA (analysis of variance) was conducted on the 
mean scores to determine if there was statistical significance on the overall 
satisfaction scores with regard to the different agencies at Time 1, Time 2 and Time 3. 
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 Reverse coded from original. 
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 Only using those respondents who participated in all three interviews (N=19). 
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Figure 8.1: Victims' percentage overall satisfaction with 
justice agencies at Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3 (N=19) 
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An examination of the pairwise comparisons showed a significant difference between 
overall satisfaction with police, and overall satisfaction with regard to prosecution, 
court and the justice system overall. The difference between prosecution and court 
and justice overall, however, is not significant. In essence, the lay people in this study 
were very satisfied with police intervention; but afterwards their satisfaction with 
other agencies and with the justice system overall fell and did not recover. 
What might account for these shifts in opinion and assessment by victims? Given that 
victims commonly initiate the contact with police, part of the explanation relates to 
these being citizen-initiated police encounters.238 Members of the public who have 
sought engagement with law enforcement place a stronger emphasis on performance 
as opposed to procedural fairness (Murphy 2009; Hinds and Murphy 2008; Wells 
2007). That is, the authority is being invited to do or to perform a function unique to it. 
The immediacy of the problem faced by the individual, the availability and salience of 
police, and their perceived and actual effectiveness are important criteria to those 
seeking help. Further, public trust in police is separate from and considerably higher 
than trust in law courts at a national level.239 Clearly, citizens view police as a distinct 
emergency or help agency.  
It is apparent that the institutions of the justice system proper – prosecution and 
courts – are viewed in a different light to law enforcement. Moreover, justice 
judgments are heavily contextualised and comprise a number of components. The 
assessment is also different if made from a disinterested stance, as opposed to those 
made by citizens who have direct experience and involvement. The following sections 
unpack these questions. 
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 Some earlier US research also noted this more positive orientation of victims towards police than 
towards prosecutors, judges and other justice personnel (Forst and Hernon 1985; Kelly 1984). However, 
other survey and population-based studies reveal a different picture. Shapland et.al. (1985) for example 
show that victim satisfaction with police diminishes over time. The British Crime Survey showed that 
victim/witnesses were more likely to be satisfied ‘with other parts of the criminal justice system’ than 
their ‘dealings with police’. But the analysis also showed that people who had been victims of crime or 
witnesses in the past twelve months were less likely than were non-victims to express confidence in the 
criminal justice system (Smith 2010: 2 and 10). The Australian Social Attitudes Survey (AuSSA) showed 
that people who had contact with courts in the previous twelve months (ie, all the respondents 
undifferentiated between victims and non-victims in their contact with the courts) had higher levels of 
confidence and were less likely to support harsher sentencing (Indermaur and Roberts 2009: 3). 
239
 In Valerie Braithwaite’s Australian dataset, 35% of people expressed ‘a lot’ of trust and 45% ‘a fair bit’ 
in police. For law courts the percentages were 9% and 39%. In a Canadian study, Roberts suggests that 
the differences may be due to the crime control mandate of police more closely aligning with public 
priority and perception, and less with the due process model of criminal courts (Roberts 2007).  
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8.5 MEASURING EXPERIENCES OF JUSTICE 
Considerable quantitative and qualitative data were generated in this study through 
which to consider what lies behind simple satisfaction. Quantitative items that focused 
on core conceptual elements of outcome and treatment were asked at the first and 
second interviews and in relation to all three justice entities – police, prosecution and 
court. From the first survey an exploratory factor analysis of these ‘assessment of 
justice’ items was used to reduce the statistical data and to identify clusters that might 
then be used as repeat measures.240  
Clustering several variables suggests measurement of similar dimensions in the data. 
These clustered variables can be grouped into scales, which lends greater parsimony 
and coherence to analysis and interpretation (Pallant 2011: 182).241 Although this 
process helps the researcher to pinpoint what is meaningful or trivial about the data, 
caution must be exercised over assumptions that factor analysis represents ‘real-world 
dimensions’ (Field 2000: 428). While the scales that ultimately result from the data are 
consistent with the literature, Field’s cautionary comment urges that they be used only 
as starting points. Therefore, later in this chapter, discursive accounts of lay participant 
experiences are used to deepen and enlarge analysis.  
Ultimately four conceptually coherent and meaningful scaled measures were derived 
from the data. Each recorded high reliability scores (see Table 8.1). Given the usual 
recommendation for a scale to comprise a minimum of three items, the mean inter-
item correlation is reported for additional reassurance (Pallant 2011: 100).242  
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 The data was somewhat cautiously assessed as suitable for factor analysis using a number of 
different tests. Principal components analysis (PCA) generated seven components with eigenvalues 
exceeding 1 (Pallant 2011: 181). Sampling adequacy usually rests on the number of cases. However, it is 
also argued that the ratio of participants to items is relevant (Nunnally 1978; Tabachnick and Fidell 
2005). In this study the ratio varied between 33:1 (Time 1) and 18:1 (Time 3). Furthermore, while the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure failed, Bartlett’s Test was significant. 
241
 Because of the small sample size, a conservative factor loading of 0.5 was used for interpretation 
purposes (Field 2005: 452). These features necessitated choice of non-parametric tests in analysing the 
data, specifically Spearman’s correlation coefficient two-tailed (Pallant 2011; Field 2000). 
242
 The reliability score is high notwithstanding that it is common to have low scores on scales with 
fewer than ten items (Pallant 2011: 97). A fuller discussion on the data analysis is located in Chapter 4. 
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Table 8.1: Items comprising the justice assessment scales (N=33) 
Scale Variables Reliability 
Scoreᴬ 
Mean inter-item 
correlation  
Outcome 
acceptance 
Agree with decision 
Accept decision 
Honest explanation for decision 
Understand decision 
Decision fair 
Decision expected 
0.9 0.78 
Quality of 
interpersonal 
treatmentᴰ 
I was treated with respect 
I was treated with dignity  
Fair treatment of me 
Respect my rightsᴮ 
Helpfulᴮ 
Treated as victimᴮ 
0.9 0.6 
Influential 
voice 
 
Opportunity to express views 
Able to influence decision 
Views considered before decision 
Decision deserved  
Decision wanted 
0.84 0.52 
Respect 
offender 
rightsᴰ 
Treated the violent person with 
respect 
Respect offender rightsᴮ 
0.83 0.71 
ᴬ Cronbach’s alpha (rounded) 
ᴮ Reverse scored item 
ᴰ Variables comprising these scales in the second survey were scored on a six-point 
Likert scale where 6 = not applicable. The 6 score was treated as a missing value and 
recoded using the mean of 1 to 5 for each variable. 
 
These scales represent dimensions to people’s experiences of justice. At the first 
interview in relation to the experience with police, outcome acceptance is a strong 
predictor, explaining 40.3% of variance. It can be described as a quasi-distributive 
measure. The scale incorporates items measuring victims’ sense of the fairness of the 
decision of the authority as well as their perspective that the decision was expected. 
The items describing interpersonal treatment such as respect and dignity are 
commonly found in the procedural justice literature. However, the quality of that 
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treatment is emphasised with the inclusion of items that acknowledge aspects of the 
person’s status. That is, ‘my rights were respected’ and ‘I was treated as the victim of 
the incident/matter’.243 At this point of interaction with the justice system, this cluster 
of items describing the quality of interpersonal treatment is less strong than the 
outcome acceptance scale, explaining only 13% of variance. The items to do with voice 
in the third scale also tend to be found in procedural justice studies. The scale is 
described as influential voice because of the way in which the expressive and 
participatory items cohered with assessments on the outcome decision – that it was an 
outcome the victim deserved and the outcome the victim wanted. The influential voice 
scale accounted for a modest 8.4% of shared variance at the point of police 
intervention. The fourth scale, respect offender rights, may seem unusual. Concern for 
the treatment and rights of the offender is not generally asked about in victim 
studies.244 Given the importance ascribed by victims to objectives for the offender 
discussed in the previous chapter, this particular measure of respect offender rights is 
perhaps not so surprising. It represented a small 6% of shared variance.245 
The mean of each of the scales (using only those cases N=26 who completed an 
interview at Time 1 and Time 2) allows comparison of interactions across the 
measures. That is, whether people have different views and experiences of police, 
prosecution and court (see Figure 8.2).  
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 In the circumstances of the study, this statement was intended to reveal the extent to which people 
felt disbelieved by authorities. Respondents understood and responded to the statement in this 
manner. Thus, a positive response indicated people’s perception that authorities believed they were a 
victim and treated them as such. 
244
 The study by Wemmers and Cyr (2004) illuminating victim concerns for young offenders stands 
outside this claim. Restorative justice researchers have generally noticed victim concerns for the 
rehabilitation of offenders, especially young offenders. 
245
 For a further check, a second factor analysis was done only using the items that had initially 
clustered. These factored into the same four clusters. On this second analysis, the outcome acceptance 
scale explained 40.5% of shared variance, the quality of interpersonal treatment accounted for 18.3%, 
influential voice for 10.6%, and respect for offender rights accounted for 7.8%. 
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People made strong and positive assessments of the quality of interpersonal treatment 
they received from police. Again using a one-way repeated ANOVA test, this was 
significantly different to the assessments made of the quality of interpersonal 
treatment experienced from prosecution and from court. The difference between 
prosecution and court on the quality of their interpersonal treatment of the victim is 
not significant. People had a negative assessment of the strength of their influential 
voice with regard to the court. The assessment was significantly lower than for police 
and prosecution. The difference between police and prosecution, however, was not 
significant. Finally, there was no statistical significance in assessments of police, 
prosecution and court with regard to the scales measuring victims’ assessed outcome 
acceptance or victims’ perspective on justice entities’ respect for offender rights.  
8.6 DISCURSIVE UNDERPINNINGS TO JUSTICE JUDGMENTS 
Identifying and quantifying the underlying dimensions of the experiences of victims 
with different justice agencies, as in the preceding section, creates only a surface 
picture. If justice judgments are multi-criterion then the discursive underpinnings 
further reveal them as more layered, nuanced and contingent. In this section I use 
people’s narratives to flesh out the integrated assessments they make about 
interpersonal treatment, outcome acceptance, and their influential voice (see Figure 
8.3). 
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Figure 8.3: Integrated components to victims’ justice judgments 
 
 
8.6.1 The quality of interpersonal treatment 
The importance of interpersonal treatment of citizens by authorities has a long 
research history. That people are treated with respect and dignity, and that the 
authority is fair and unbiased246 in its treatment of citizens have been shown as 
important to people in a range of settings (Elliot et al. 2001; Dai et al. 2009; Murphy 
2009).  
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 Among other key procedural features such as voice, accuracy and neutrality. See Thibaut and Walker 
(1975) and Leventhal (1980). And see Tyler (2006/1990) Why People Obey the Law, Princeton University 
Press. 
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8.6.1.1 Correlation with satisfaction 
Certainly the quality of interpersonal treatment was an important element of the 
experience of justice of the lay participants. The scale combining items and measuring 
the quality of interpersonal treatment presented a strong and significant correlation 
with the dependent variable of overall satisfaction with handling in relation to police, 
court and particularly to prosecution. The correlation coefficient between the quality 
of interpersonal treatment by police and overall satisfaction with their handling was rs 
= 0.6 p<0.01 and explained 36% of shared variance. With regard to prosecution, the 
correlation coefficient was rs = 0.76 p<0.01 and explained a strong 58% of shared 
variance. With court, the correlation coefficient was rs = 0.64 p<0.01 and explained 
41% of shared variance. The scale was consistently the strongest across all three 
entities.247  
The actual experience was significantly different with regard to police and the other 
justice entities. This is shown on the multi-item scale (discussed above) as well as on a 
single measure of whether the treatment of the person by the relevant entity was fair 
(Figure 8.4). The vast majority of people (96%) felt that police treatment of them was 
fair. A lesser proportion felt the same with regard to prosecution (58%) and court 
(62%) at their second interview after the case was finalised.  
                                                     
247
 A positive relationship means that the more of the elements in the scale, the more satisfied people 
will be. The strength of the positive relationship is large if the values are between r = 0.50 and 1.0 
(Cohen 1988 in Pallant 2011: 134–135). 
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ᴬ Measured on a five-point Likert scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly 
agree 
ᴮ Measured on a six-point Likert scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly 
agree, and where 6 = not applicable was coded as a missing score 
 
Yet the literature highlights different reasons why these issues about fairness and 
treatment are important. Research has examined the manner in which fair processes 
generate fair outcomes (MacCoun 2005; Thibaut and Walker 1975); and has 
emphasised the ‘effects of values associated with group membership’ and the ways in 
which group procedures work (Lind and Tyler 1988: 231). Overall, the fair, respectful 
and unbiased treatment of individuals by authorities is emphasised as generating 
cooperation and compliance (Tyler 1990/2006; Tyler and Lind 1992).  
The emphasis on compliance may not be as relevant for victims of violence as initiators 
of contact with authorities as it is for encounters with members of the public that are 
instigated by authorities (Murphy 2009). However, the issue of cooperation clearly is 
relevant, especially at the decision-making stage of prosecution. At their second 
interview just over a third (27% n=7) of the lay participants indicated that they did ask 
prosecution not to proceed, and all of these were domestic assault victims.248 Four 
other domestic assault victims were also unsure or cautious about their willingness to 
cooperate with prosecution (19%). Nonetheless, a significant majority (69% n=18) of all 
the lay participants said that they did want all or some of the charges prosecuted. Only 
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Justice entity and interview time 
Figure 8.4. Victims strongly agree/agree (%) that justice entity was 
fair in its treatment of them, Time 1 and Time 2, N=26  
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four of the domestic assault victims expressed a definite preference against 
prosecution.249 Finally, two people – both domestic assault victims (8%) – said that 
they asked the court to drop the charges in relation to the incident. 
Compliance and cooperation reflects a state-centric perspective on the relationship 
between citizens and authorities. A citizen-centric perspective, on the other hand, 
invites a different consideration of a different set of issues. One possibility is simply 
that the victim values ‘customer service’ and feels valued ‘as a person’ (Elliot et al. 
2012). Another is that the quality of treatment carries a social and political message, 
and is a reflection of the justice system’s recognition of the citizen-status of persons 
‘over whom it claims authority’ (Duff 2010: 3).  
8.6.1.2 Recognition of standing 
Among the lay participants, being valued as a person was certainly present. These 
included perceptions that the incident and matter was taken seriously as well as the 
victim-citizen being taken seriously. Police, said Karla, ‘never made me feel like a 
stupid woman’. The nuances and differing qualities to the experience of interpersonal 
treatment seem to signal more than a service-based assessment. Respect was 
experienced expansively and as constituting forms of recognition and equality.  
Recognition connoted a reflection – positive and negative – of the person’s particular 
status. Janelle, for example, said that authorities ‘treated me like a normal person, not 
sorry for me or anything; like I had a right to be there’. Yvette, on the other hand, was 
indignant that the authorities ‘wouldn’t even talk to me’. Edward was also offended 
that he was treated like ‘just another one’.  
The connection between respect and recognition of one’s standing as a citizen was 
particularly acute for people whose relationship with authorities was unstable. For 
Deanna, born outside Australia, the experience initially ‘won my confidence in the 
justice system. At first I was paranoid because I am not a citizen and [I wondered] 
would they be biased. I thought they were fair.’ Indeed, she went on to say, ‘the law 
applies to everyone in the community’. For Birgit, whose life history involved care 
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 That is, 15% of the total sample at Time 2 (N=26), or 19% of the domestic assault group (N=21). 
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arrangements with welfare authorities as well as prior offending, the meaning of her 
positive treatment was clear. She said, ‘it matters what happened to me.’ 
Respectful recognition also went directly to a perspective on the specificity of their 
individual standing. Xenia, for example, said, ‘it’s about me, not them’. At her final 
interview she went further to say, ‘no-one cares what I want. They are only after what 
they want … who’s interest is the law in?’ For some, this sense of their unique role 
expanded to claims for particular advocacy or representation.250 ‘I needed someone 
just for me’, was Ursula’s comment. 
8.6.1.3 Equality of treatment 
Others drew strong connections between recognition and respect, and their 
perception of equal treatment. David, who also had a prior history of non-violent 
offending, felt he was not treated of equal worth to others in the community (in his 
words, like a ‘little old lady’). At his second interview he described how he had wanted 
to change his life but ‘felt discriminated against’. It was, he said, ‘a waste of time and 
effort … we all waited around, I gave evidence but they brought up my old mental 
health history and that I wasn’t a competent witness’. David reckoned, if he ‘had been 
a little old lady they would have put a more experienced lawyer on it. Because I was an 
ex-offender, live in public housing and am a young man there was no effort in it.’ He 
felt that the system had been fairer to him as an accused than when he was a victim. 
At his third interview David again emphasised how it was ‘much harder as a victim, I 
guarantee you that’. He understood that it was not possible to ‘be completely fair to 
everyone’ but that getting ‘torn to pieces’ on the witness stand was ‘ridiculous’. 
‘Before’, he said ‘I thought I had a choice to be a responsible citizen but now I see it’s 
also how they see you’. 
In a different way, Ursula came to feel more unequally treated than her husband who 
had been charged with a violence offence in relation to her. She had pushed strongly 
for her husband’s mental health issues to be taken into account and was relieved that 
the charges were eventually dismissed. But at her third and final interview she felt able 
to notice that her own interests had been unattended. She said ‘you get into issues 
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 For discussion on the issue of victim representation see, for example, McGlynn and Munro eds, 
(2011) on victims of sexual assault, and, for victims more generally, see Davis and Mulford (2008). 
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where you get into human rights. Mine get put to one side but his get thought about.’ 
In the end she said, ‘justice is about fairness to everyone’. Finn’s perspective was that 
police and prosecution just ‘swept it under the carpet’ as the person who assaulted 
him was a juvenile. He said, ‘they didn’t seem to care [about me]’. He claimed that 
‘everyone in the situation should be heard’. 
Equitable treatment also encompassed the offender and was, in the main, commented 
upon as a positive. While the items measuring respect for the rights of the offender did 
cluster in the factor analysis (see Table 8.1) the scale did not correlate strongly with 
overall satisfaction or indeed with any other factors. Nonetheless, the majority agreed 
that prosecution and the courts treated the violent person with respect and with 
respect for his rights. Zola strongly agreed, at her second interview after the case had 
finalised, that justice had been done. Asked why she thought this and she said that ‘the 
fact that they’re all neutral – prosecutors and judges – and they respected both our 
rights. They didn’t eliminate his rights to help me. In that way justice was fair.’ 
However, when asked about fairness to themselves as victims, the assessment 
reversed. 58% agreed/strongly agreed that prosecution treated them fairly, and 62% 
felt this with regard to the court. 
8.6.1.4 Information as reciprocity and recognition 
Respectful treatment was also more than equality, fairness and standing. People saw 
respect discharged practically in part through the provision of information. However, 
the provision of information by authorities was differentiated. A majority (77%) of 
people strongly agreed/agreed that police gave them information useful to help them 
deal with the problem, and 81% that police gave them information about victim 
services. However, comparable figures for prosecution were 35% and 50%. A similar 
experience is revealed in responses to the question whether people strongly 
agreed/agreed that they were kept informed about what was happening to the case 
(see Figure 8.5). 
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ᴬ Measured on a five-point Likert scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly 
agree 
ᴮ Measured on a six-point Likert scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly 
agree, and where 6 = not applicable was coded as a missing score 
 
Edward commented negatively on ‘the lack of information’. He said, ‘it was frustrating. 
You just didn’t know even how to chase the case, chase the police officer. It’s all just 
difficult really. I had to do the chasing.’ 
For many, the case status updates, information about their rights and responsibilities, 
and the sources of support offered and given pointed to their unique importance in a 
very particular space. Charlie’s comment that ‘they made time to see me and tell me’ 
signalled to him that he was important enough for authorities to do so. Deanna 
received a different message about her importance. She said she ‘was never even sent 
a subpoena’ and ‘felt like a ball being tossed about’. The significance of the 
information gulf to Imogene carried negative inferences about the equity of status as 
well as understanding. She said: 
Definitely not enough information is given. [He] was far more thoroughly briefed 
on what was to happen than I was. That’s a huge hole. It says that the system 
doesn’t take the situation seriously enough. It’s just another job without taking 
into consideration that people’s lives are considered. 
65 
39 
46 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Police T1 ᴬ Prosecution T2 ᴮ Courts T2 ᴮ 
%
 S
tr
o
n
gl
y 
ag
re
e
/a
gr
e
e
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Figure 8.5 Victims who strongly agree/agree (%) that the justice 
entity kept them informed about what was happening to the case, 
Time 1 and Time 2, N=26 
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Both men and women commented that, without the victim advocates,251 they might 
never have known what was going on.  
8.6.1.4 Interaction as respect 
To the absence of information was added the absence of interaction with authorities. 
The provision of information indicated the possibility of dialogue – ‘the ability to 
participate in a face-to-face way’ as Karla put it. Without the interaction it was ‘like I 
wasn’t relevant to anything’. Nada further commented that ‘maybe they have a 
mentality that victims are like second-class citizens. Maybe they think victims aren’t 
serious and they don’t take it seriously.’ 
When interaction did take place, people noted its quality in both positive and negative 
terms. Polly felt she was made to ‘feel like a child who didn’t know what was good for 
me’. For her, the interaction were occasions of disrespect. She recounted the 
prosecuting official saying to her, ‘there are women like you all the time and we just 
carry on’. She said, ‘I didn’t like he said I had to do this and I had to do that’. Edward 
observed that he ‘had to do all the chasing’ and that it was ‘no wonder that victims just 
give up’. Charlie, on the other hand, said that even though ‘justice might not have 
been served on the perpetrator … I was certainly included and the positive was that I 
felt I was treated as a member of the community. The circumstances of the incident 
could have been swept away. They followed it as much as they could.’ 
If interaction signalled something important about the particular status and standing 
of the person, it also marked something of the citizen’s wider interests. Nada’s 
concluding comments in her final interview emphasised that ‘part of justice is seeing 
the effort for justice they put in and the impact of that’. Her reflection says something 
of her interest in observing the normative and actual performance of public 
institutions charged with very particular responsibilities. It was her participation in the 
distinctive criminal justice journey that took Nada, as victim-citizen, to this point. 
8.6.2 Outcome acceptance 
The composite scale measuring outcome acceptance was a strong predictor in 
situations involving police (see Table 8.2). As a single item, the measure of acceptance 
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 In this instance, the advocates were staff from a community-based domestic violence advocacy 
service and from a government victim support service. 
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of the decisions of authorities was also very high – 85% strongly agreed/agreed that 
they accepted the decision of police and of court, and 92% for prosecution. However, 
whereas the majority felt that the decision that police (81%) and prosecution (85%) 
made was fair, only 69% felt this with regard to the court. A similar proportion agreed 
with the court decision. Only with the prosecution did a majority of people (69%) 
indicate that the decision made by the agency was what they wanted. With both police 
and court a smaller and similar proportion (46%) indicated that the decision arrived at 
by these entities was what they wanted. 
8.6.2.1 Correlation with satisfaction 
Despite this there was a strong and significant correlation between the scale 
combining items and measuring the outcome acceptance with the dependent variable 
of overall satisfaction with handling in relation to all three justice entities. It was the 
second strongest of the scale measures. The correlation coefficient between outcome 
acceptance at the point of police interaction and overall satisfaction with their 
handling was rs = 0.48 p<0.01 and explained 23% of shared variance. Outcome 
acceptance at the point of prosecution explained 34% of variance, with the correlation 
coefficient being rs = 0.58 p<0.01. The correlation coefficient of outcome acceptance 
and overall satisfaction with court handling was rs = 0.65 p<0.01 and explained 42% of 
shared variance.  
Clearly the very idea of ‘outcome acceptance’ holds considerable nuance in the 
differing contexts of police, prosecution and court. People’s reflections at their second 
and third interviews after the case had finalised at court offered different themes to 
their assessment of the outcomes. These were about: 
 what the offender ‘got’ and the impact on him 
 what the victim ‘got’ and the meaning of this to them  
 the normative and governance implications of the outcome. 
8.6.2.2 Thinking on offender-related outcomes 
The clustering of comments about the outcome the violent person received comprised 
the largest component of reflection for the study participants. These grouped into two 
key sub-themes: the nature and appropriateness of the sentence, and the perceived or 
hoped-for impact of the various decisions on the violent person.  
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Comments on the nature and appropriateness of the sentence were both positive and 
negative. Birgit was pleased that the court did not ‘just let him out on bail’ and ‘the 
time inside [prison] is good’. She said ‘I’m thinking the judge looked back over our 
history and the previous bail and stuff and the judge thought “right, you’re not getting 
this”’. She did, however, think that eight months custody was ‘too long’ and that it 
‘should maybe be four months’. Also commenting on the time her ex-partner spent on 
remand, Holly felt that it was an ‘opportunity to de-tox and that’s been good for him’. 
Nada made a similar comment that ‘the compulsory drug and alcohol attendance was 
really good. He was never going to get better unless that’s done.’ 
Finoula and Aimee were also positive about the provision of mandated on-going 
engagement with the offenders in their case. Finoula was pleased that her ex-partner 
was ‘going to get the counselling’. Aimee felt that the ‘monitoring of [my] partner’s 
counselling activities is helping keep him to his promises’. Similarly, Xenia had wanted 
authorities to look at the situation ‘holistically’. The decision to proceed with some 
charges and not the assault charge ‘was a good outcome for what happened’ she said. 
Yvette, Deanna, Karla, Svetlana and Bailey commented about the simple fact of the 
decision arrived at. Yvette felt the dismissal of the case against her husband was ‘the 
right decision’. Karla thought the plea of guilty by her husband meant ‘it is an 
ownership of his actions rather than it being forced upon him’. For Svetlana, ‘he did 
what he did and got something for it’. Bailey said that the conviction meant ‘something 
happened … there was an outcome’. Similarly, Deanna said, ‘I’m very glad he’s 
convicted’. To her it was modest indication that justice was done but also ‘a personal 
victory’.  
Janelle, on the other hand, felt that the twelve-month good behaviour bond for her ex-
partner was ‘a crock’. She said, ‘I would have preferred weekend detention or lock-up. 
He’s gotten away with so much, for example, his past driving offences. I feel he’s 
gotten away with it and won’t learn anything from it.’  
People’s thinking about the perceived or hoped-for impact of the various decisions on 
the offender were another strong sub-theme that obviously also bled into reflection on 
the appropriateness of the outcome. This sub-theme echoed the interest in efficacy 
that, as citizens, they had earlier articulated. Typically, the observations revolved 
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around the violent person himself having an opportunity to reflect. For Svetlana, ‘he 
needs the supervision to see what he’s done’. Zola was unhappy with the sentence 
arrived at by the court but also said that ‘it has made him stop and think’. Nada’s ex-
partner had already been on a good behaviour bond so she didn’t ‘get it’ that he was 
given another. Nonetheless she felt that the intervention ‘scared him more than 
anything. He wanted to join the army and now he can’t.’ Finoula also said that her ex-
partner ‘has to stop and think about what he is doing now’. He has, she said, ‘to deal 
with his stuff’. At her final interview she reflected that the outcome had ‘planted a 
seed in his mind not to do this to anyone else. I hope he’s learned from it, but I don’t 
think so.’  
The process for Holly had been long drawn out and she expressed dissatisfaction with 
the outcome. She said ‘I want punishment to fit the crime. Two years is massive. If they 
really did give a crap about rehabilitation for him then the outcome of going to gaol 
isn’t right.’ Finn also felt that the good behaviour bond ordered by the court against 
the young offender in his case wasn’t appropriate. He said it was not ‘something he 
has to deal with’. He said that ‘it’s finished and all over in the eyes of the court’ but the 
young person ‘needs to face the fact if he is going to keep being a criminal or is he 
going to do something different’. At his final interview Finn also positioned his 
comments in a wider frame of reference. ‘If you’re hungry and steal a chocolate bar 
you’re likely to get worse’, he said. ‘Stealing is bad but it isn’t life threatening or 
hurting.’  
8.6.2.3 Thinking on victim-related outcomes 
The lay participants also made comment about what they as victims ‘got’ (or did not 
get) through the outcome and its meaning to them. In keeping with the strong 
emphasis on stopping the violence as an initiating motivation, many of the domestic 
assault victims commented about the implications of the outcome for their safety. 
Olivia felt that the outcome had stopped some of ‘the extreme stuff’. However, she 
said that ‘while it recognised what he’d done and was a kind of win … I still sleep with 
[my daughter] with the phone and the keys and with the door locked.’  
On the other hand, for Genevieve the conviction made her ‘feel safer’. Finoula also 
said she felt safer because the authorities ‘wouldn’t let *my ex+ near me’. That her ex-
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partner was ‘banned from the ACT was good for me and good to get him out of the 
environment he was in’, commented Nada. Emphasising the wider implications of 
safety, Birgit felt that the custodial sentence given to her ex-partner gave her and their 
son some ‘time out for us’.  
Teresa had ‘just wanted peace’ and got it. Janelle said that the conviction of her ex-
partner ‘made me realise a lot more what he was really like … I wondered what I was 
doing with him in the first place. The justice system opened my eyes.’ 
Others’ comments reflected on how the outcome missed connecting with what they as 
victims wanted. Although Karla said that the system ‘protected me from verbal 
bullying and assault’ she also wanted something more. She thought that the non-
recorded conviction of her husband was expected ‘but probably not what I hoped for’. 
Instead she ‘would have liked and still would like a true recognition of the pain and 
angst he caused me through the experience’. Edward also felt that justice had been 
done to the offender but not towards himself. He said, ‘the costs [of my injury] are 
significant – thousands of dollars. I was in the wrong place, now I’m out of pocket.’ 
While the court made a reparation order in his favour, he was left to chase payment 
himself. Holly was disgruntled that her ex-partner ‘wasn’t punished for what he did to 
us. He was punished for missing an appointment.’ 
8.6.2.4 Thinking on normative outcomes 
Other comments were emblematic of the normative theme to people’s reflections 
about the outcome. Karla felt the outcome was ‘the right thing’. Lorraine felt that the 
good behaviour bond told her ex-partner that ‘he couldn’t do it’. For Deanna, the 
criminal justice system ‘finally let him know that what he did was wrong’. She said that 
she had ‘warned him lots of times that it wasn’t right. He didn’t listen … now it’s the 
court telling him it’s not acceptable.’ Teresa said something similar in commenting that 
‘the thing I most wanted was that he be shown what he did was wrong. That he was 
convicted and sentenced told him that.’ 
Charlie also had cause to reflect on the normative meaning of outcome when the case 
involving him as a victim was dismissed. He said he was ‘not too fussed’ about its 
dismissal. He said, ‘there was no great injury or emotional pain. I might care more if 
there was but there wasn’t.’ Nonetheless, at his final interview he did not agree that 
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justice had been done ‘because I think there needed to be consequences on his 
actions’.  
The normative meaning of the outcome overlapped with people’s reflections about 
the wider context and governance implications of what had transpired. Bailey felt that 
the outcome ‘was ”fit” for the actual incident’. He was approving that, while his case 
‘was reasonably minor … it was noted and went through a due process’. At his final 
interview he went further, to comment: 
I think the outcome was appropriate to what happened. It wasn’t that serious so 
didn’t need a heavy-handed response. I imagine it’s the same as others like it. I 
don’t think he was mistreated and I wasn’t underdone. He got his punishment and 
I didn’t require any reparation. 
Comments such as these re-focus attention on both the private and public frames 
people apply as citizens as well as victims. Deanna reiterated that ‘the law applies to 
everyone in the community’. At her final interview, Finoula said that her ex-partner 
‘can’t just go bashing people because he thinks he can. It’s about consequences to 
actions. The justice system is there to remind people of this.’ For Aimee, the ‘strength 
of the legal system’ had ‘helped to draw a line at unacceptable behaviour’.  
These comments were emblematic of homo moralis as a metaphor for human 
behaviour. This conception directs attention away from wants and desires and towards 
‘ought’ (Skitka 2009: 102). It is particularly relevant when people feel the harm or 
wrong was intentional and undeserved. In this study, this conception oriented also 
towards wider civic implications.  
8.6.3 Influential voice 
The idea of ‘voice’ is central to procedural justice studies (Van den Bos 1996; Folger 
1977; Thibaut and Walker 1975). In studies on victims of crime, voice has been 
explored in a number of ways: as contributing to higher confidence levels (Bradford 
2011), in regulating anti-social behaviour (Bright and Bakalis 2003), in mediation 
(Wemmers and Cyr 2006), and in victim impact statements (Cassell 2009). Literally 
giving voice can take a range of different forms from vocalising or text, or even 
performance or silence. A key question in this literature is whether voice is passive, 
expressive, or whether it is designed to influence (Roberts and Erez 2004). However, 
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over the course of the three interviews, multiple different meanings emerged out of 
the notion of ‘having a say’ in relation to all three justice agencies – police, prosecution 
and court.  
Phrases such as ‘involvement’, ‘being able to talk’ and ‘being consulted’ were frequent. 
However, these simple phrases hid more nuanced interests that: 
 were about the uniqueness of being known and ‘knowing’, 
 were demonstrations of respect and recognition, 
 were constitutive of a dialogue between themselves and the entity, 
 went to a perception that decision-making itself was full and ‘proper’, and 
 saw the giving and receiving of information as a powerful transaction (as well 
as being powerful in itself). 
The idea of knowing and being known expressed the sense that people knew 
something that was useful and particular; that their views were important and their 
experience valuable. Finn said, ‘I’ve heard from people around here that he’s a little 
bastard. He’s been able to shrug and walk out.’ About her ex-partner, Birgit said, ‘We 
should have a say – we know the violent person better than the judge’. 
More importantly, ‘knowing something’ was ‘being known’ and affirmed the centrality 
of their real lives. ‘This is someone’s life they’re dealing with’, said Roslyn. There was a 
sense that their centre of gravity was being pulled somewhere else – ‘*It’s] about me, 
not them. It was weird’, said Xenia – and that expressing opinions and wants re-
focused back on their known and lived reality – the ‘real world’, not the institutional 
world. Embedded within this assertion was the claim on one’s dignity – ‘[they] kept me 
up-to-date. It really helped’, said Svetlana. 
Having one’s voice heard and understood was, unsurprisingly, experienced as a 
demonstration of respect and recognition. Deanna said that she was ‘kept in the dark 
about the changes and updates, like I did not have a right to know.’ Edward 
commented that – ‘I got the feeling I was “just another one”’. Said Finn: 
I don’t expect them to be over for a cup of tea every day but contact once every 
so often and to know what is happening with dates and things and what is the 
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case made up of. I really didn’t know. I kept the card for ages but there was no 
point. I don’t think they really care that much. 
Critically, victims perceived their own voice as not echoing in the dark but as 
constituting dialogue. At her first interview, Roslyn expected ‘to be asked questions 
about what [I] wanted in the future’. Xenia said simply that the prosecution just ‘never 
called to respond’ to her questions. At her final interview, Olivia said she would have 
‘liked more input, to be more involved and get more information’. Dialogue was not 
undirected communication but went to understanding and ‘answers’ (Charlie). Said 
Teresa, ‘I was never contacted by the prosecution or the court. I would have liked 
them to contact me. The DVCS gave information but if I had questions I don’t know if 
they would have been able to answer. For example, I asked why he had not entered a 
plea and the DVCS couldn’t tell me. I would have thought the DPP could tell me why.’ 
Having dialogue also went to the ‘properness’ of decision-making. Nada said that ‘the 
magistrate needs to hear from the victim to make a proper decision. There is a lot lost 
between what happens and reading something off a paper.’ Properness was about the 
decision-maker being fully informed – ‘It shouldn’t be done in isolation’ said Roslyn. 
‘There should be an interview of sorts.’ Hearing the whole story also meant that the 
decision-maker would see the ‘many shades of grey’ said Teresa; it would mean that 
‘everything’ would be ‘taken into account and … the best interests of everyone 
thought about’, was Xenia’s comment. 
Remarks about the communicative effect of voice acknowledged the power of 
information. ‘If you know something then you don’t feel further victimised’, said 
Roslyn. But, said Karla, ‘who tells you about the process?’ Edward also commented 
that he ‘needed lots of information and had to ask all over the place’. These reflections 
also marked a shift from the subject ‘victim’ back towards the more critically informed 
citizen. Said Winona, ‘I think it would be good to get more technical info about what 
happens in the justice system and a bit more detail on my case and why’. Wanting to 
be and perform as a respected victim-citizen underlay Polly’s statement that, ‘I don’t 
know what the procedures are or what is expected of me. I would expect someone to 
let me know.’ 
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The complexity inherent in voice has been simplified to just its expressive nature 
(Roberts and Erez 2004). As expression within the criminal justice system, the victim’s 
voice is characterised as subjective (Edwards 2004: 976), designed to emote and, in 
consequence, to have therapeutic benefits (Erez et al. 2011).252 The diverse meanings 
here highlighted point to something different; that is, to people’s recognition of the 
unique character of the decision-making spaces with which they are engaged – spaces 
that have functions that address a convergence of different concerns for victims, 
offenders, communities.  To consideration of these concerns victims feel they can, or 
even should, contribute. 
For the lay participants, the variables on voice did in fact cluster with their preferred 
decision or outcome. There clearly was an interest in a voice that influences. So, the 
idea of an influential voice is one of the underlying dimensions to people’s experience 
of justice, and, even when its strength is assessed as moderate to low, it bears a strong 
relationship with their overall satisfaction with each of the justice institutions. 
8.7 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
The nuance that observation and reflection reveal shows the importance of the 
specificity of context to procedural and distributive justice judgments. Satisfaction as a 
measure performed a useful function as dependent variable. Satisfaction with police 
was significantly higher than satisfaction with prosecution, court and with the justice 
system overall. However, as a measure of the long and complex interaction that 
citizens have with the justice process, satisfaction is parsimonious. Getting at the 
contingent nature of justice required ‘real world justice research’ (Skitka 2009: 107). I 
found different dimensions underlie assessments. These dimensions were outcome 
acceptance, the quality of interpersonal treatment, influential voice, and respect for 
offenders’ rights. Under these was further layering of experience.  
These components fluctuate in importance but all are present in assessments about 
the three justice agencies. For all three justice agencies, the strongest positive 
correlation with overall satisfaction was with outcome acceptance and the quality of 
the interpersonal treatment. But the elements also linked strongly with each other to 
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differing degrees. Outcome acceptance and interpersonal treatment correlated 
strongly together. The influential voice scale connected strongly with outcome 
acceptance for all three agencies. While the elements can be separated, they are 
clearly not separate. Rather, they form dimensions of an integrated conception of 
justice that is supple in this real world context and does not require fixing to any single 
understanding of human behaviour.  
Participant narration showed the nuances embedded in these dimensions of justice 
were highly contextualised and particularised. The emphases placed on the quality of 
their interpersonal treatment embraced recognition of their unique standing and 
circumstances, as well as respect for their personhood. Respect and recognition were 
demonstrated through the manner in which information was or was not provided to 
people by authorities. People experienced information both as a power resource and 
as reciprocity. They also understood interaction with authorities as dialogue. The 
strong expectation for fairness in criminal justice that people articulated at their first 
interview emerged here in experiences of equitable and fair treatment for themselves 
as well as for the violent person.  
Justice as the attainment of outcome was experienced in a number of ways. The 
reflections people offered went to the trilogy of interests they articulated at the 
commencement of their engagement with authorities. At the same time these 
reflections sharpened to focus primarily on the nature, appropriateness and impact of 
the sentence on the violent person, and the consequence to themselves as a victim 
and a person. In an echo of their pre-existing citizen evaluations about justice, there 
was reflection on the extent to which the outcome calibrated with the normative and 
governance functions of justice. Perhaps inevitably, the resolutions people 
experienced were partial and incomplete (Sen 2009). 
The importance of ‘voice’ is not just its expressive nature but is related to a sense that 
the outcome arrived at is acceptable and fair. People understood themselves as 
‘knowers’ who added to the quality and meaningfulness of decision-making. To be 
heard was to be recognised as someone with distinctive and important insight into 
particular circumstances that carried more general import. The interest victims might 
have that their voice is influential or directing of the decision-maker is generally 
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disavowed in the criminal justice sphere. Moreover, institutional efforts to become 
‘customer friendly’ miss the mark. As Ursula said, ‘they all listen but you are no further 
ahead’. Common perceptions of voice as ‘simply’ expressive need to be re-thought. 
The key conceptions of justice that were developed in Chapter 2 all emerged here in 
relation to experience, assessment and reflection. That is, justice as a normative guide, 
as duty or obligation, as accountability, as fairness, as relational, and as contextual. 
This chapter has highlighted engagement with justice as a series of interactions with 
different decision-makers through which these conceptions reverberate. Each 
interaction provides opportunities for ideas about justice to be articulated, made 
transparent and enacted. Many of these opportunities were badly handled and lost. 
The significance and implications of these losses are developed further in the next 
chapter. From this point I consider what participation in criminal justice looks like to 
victims of violence and what it might mean to the realisation of justice. 
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CHAPTER 9:  PARTICIPATING IN JUSTICE 
I’m a little undecided *whether justice was done+ because I don’t know what 
happened in the end ... There was no discussion. I just think they have no regard 
for the victim. Maybe they have a mentality that victims are like second-class 
citizens. Maybe they think victims aren’t serious and they don’t take it seriously. 
(Nada 2011) 
The normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to 
which those affected by it have been included in the decision-making process and 
have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes. (Young, 2000: 5–6) 
 
Justice is a complex, dynamic and nuanced conception that unfolds. If this constitutes 
the idea of justice in the real world, how can it be made, seen, experienced, performed 
and validated – in the real world? For hard-pressed systems dealing with multiple 
constituencies and competing demands, achieving thick and rich justice such as this 
can seem like an impossibility. For ordinary citizens made vulnerable through violence 
and unprepared for the industrial dimensions of contemporary justice, just coming 
through unscathed can be an optimistic objective. This chapter considers how 
demanding and citizen-centric expectations for justice can possibly be met through a 
lens of citizen participation.  
Our thinking about justice originates from a multitude of claims and concerns 
(injustices) and many evaluative arguments flow from these, as I have shown in 
preceding chapters. Those from victim-citizens would remain hidden if no 
opportunities for disclosure and discussion were made. A ‘realisation-focused 
understanding’ of justice, given its plural grounding, cannot therefore be done in 
isolation. It is ‘inescapably discursive’ (Sen 2009: 10 and 337). Interviewing people on 
three occasions revealed this scope for involvement, interaction and dialogue under 
the rubric of participation, as well as its boundaries.  
To explore this scope further a starting point is to deepen understanding of the notion 
of the influential voice, identified in the previous chapter. Voice will here be discussed 
not solely as an expressive feature but as a demonstration of participation and 
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engagement. That is, voice is conveyed as a practice of citizenship. In that mode, 
participation is further posed as diverse communicative opportunities that facilitate 
the exchange of information, conversation, observation, and direct and indirect 
engagement in a discursive and deliberative process. I show that it is through these 
participatory processes that the multiplicity of justice goals and orientations can be 
sequenced. 
The chapter works through the notion of voice and the activities of participation to 
sharpen focus on victims’ primary status as citizen. For this I draw on the literature 
dealing with citizen participation in other areas of public life and consider what it 
might say to citizen participation in justice, specifically the victim-citizen. One core 
rationale to citizen participation is that individuals should be involved in and able to 
influence decisions that affect their interests (Mansbridge et al. 2010).253 This 
particular claim is foundational in democracy theory. Ordinarily, criminal justice is 
conceived as a critical pillar of the democratic architecture in liberal societies. Yet it is 
somehow outside the messy exercise and practice of democratic engagement. I argue 
that it is through inclusive participatory practices that this democratic deficit in 
criminal justice can be addressed. 
The chapter first builds on the predominant notion of citizenship-as-status, touched on 
in Chapters 2 and 6, to develop a dynamic conception of citizenship-as-practice. 
Whereas the former encompasses a legal and political identity that is bound by the 
laws of the polity, the latter provides for a more fluid as well as diverse set of actions 
and interactions. 
9.1 CITIZENSHIP PRACTICE 
Presenting victims of crime as citizens first necessarily gives pause on the significance 
and meaning of the status, and then asks what being a citizen does. Citizens enact their 
status in various horizontal and vertical engagements. As activities directed outward 
and horizontally, these are myriad informal actions taken on a day-to-day basis as they 
go about their business. Formal vertical engagements are commonly more deliberate, 
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conscious and confined. Taken together, these are the warp and weave of civic and 
political enterprise.  
While the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘citizenship’ are often elided, the latter serves a strong 
‘integrative function’ in the discourse. It is what people are said to do as citizens. As a 
practice, citizenship does a number of things. Firstly, it facilitates recognition and 
accommodation. Secondly, citizenship connotes social and political practices that 
constitute a thick depiction of people in their communal setting (Kymlicka and Norman 
1994: 373).  
In their various relationships to public and private authorities, citizens do not, 
however, have one identity or speak with one voice. Citizens can be both empowering 
and oppressive (Isin 2002). The political community is comprised of many publics as 
well as complex and shifting identifications. Individually and collectively, citizens are 
polyvocal and voice their interests from and within a range of different contexts 
(Gergen and Gergen 2010). Within debates about uses of the term, one account of 
citizens values transparency, consultation, accountability, and individual 
empowerment and choice. This works well with a dual conception of the victim-citizen 
as consumer (Williams 1999). Another account gives prominence to normative 
concerns in a ‘citizen-facing agenda’ that is located in public policy challenges 
(Livingstone, Lunt and Miller 2007: 79–81).254 That is, those challenges – such as 
achieving justice – that are declared concerns of all members of the polity.  
This plurality of voice and interest is sometimes posed as problematic in conceptions 
of democratic citizenship. Responding to this, political philosopher Chantal Mouffe 
suggests that: 
… what is at stake is to make the fact that we belong to different communities of 
values, language, culture, and others compatible with our common belonging to a 
political community whose rules we have to accept. (Mouffe 1992b: 30) 
I place this idea of making the political community at the heart of notions of citizenship 
– responsible or irresponsible, good or bad, active or inactive, and more commonly all 
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of these at different times. In the various practices of making the citizen body, 
competing versions of ‘the common good’ agitate for ascendancy in particular and 
general situations. While these versions themselves connect to wider bodies of 
political theory,255 there is agreement that citizenship is lateral between citizens as 
well as vertical with the state and its institutions. Thus the citizenry are in ‘continuous 
re-enactment’ and citizenship ‘aims at constructing “we”’ (Mouffe 1992b: 30–31). This 
practice of citizenship is a democratic one. It is enacted in various participatory modes 
and arenas, does not assume arrival at a single point of ‘the good’, and cannot 
presume an end to disagreement or its domestication (Macedo 1999). Whether the 
citizenry are oriented towards cooperation or contestation, their private and 
communal interests enmesh through their many activities and engagements. 
Although the roles of citizen and the activities of citizenship are most commonly 
claimed in relation to governmental and civic affairs, they have a long history in law 
and society scholarship. Writing nearly thirty years ago, on legal mobilisation as 
political participation, political scientist Frances Zemans described the legal system as 
‘quintessentially democratic’. ‘Unlike other governmental structures’, she stated, ‘the 
legal system is structured precisely to promote individual rather than collective action’ 
(Zemans 1983: 692–693). Law is a ‘structural opportunity’ for the citizenry to engage 
directly in a public space on issues of direct concern to them (McCann 1994: 239). 
More recently, citizen participation in criminal justice – juries, restorative conferences, 
panels – has been described as a form of ‘collaborative governance’ where those who 
join in are ‘load-bearing’ (Dzur 2012: 162). Criminal justice entities – comprising a 
system – offer a series of spaces providing opportunities for participation. 
9.2 CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC POLICY 
It is germane to lay out how citizen participation works in other areas of public policy, 
to trace the historic arc to the idea, and some key areas of debate. Firstly, it is 
noticeable that the notion of participation is firmly yoked to that of citizen. Sherry 
Arnstein’s influential work conceptualising the levels to a ladder of citizen participation 
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cemented the connection (Arnstein 1969). Her analysis emerged out of the turbulent 
1960s and carries the zest of critical social movements of the time – civil rights and 
Black Power, feminism and student activism. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that 
she claims ‘citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power’ (1969: 1). Ian 
Edwards, writing at the beginning of the twenty-first century on criminal justice, 
captures the managerialist flavour of the age, where citizens are consumers and clients 
to be folded gently into institutional priorities (Edwards 2004). With these book-ended 
descriptions, it is apparent that citizen participation says something about the 
interface between ordinary people and entities – be they agencies of the state, public 
services, community organisations, political parties and even social movements. It also 
says something about the nature of that interface and asks what is at stake in that 
particular space. 
9.2.1 Conceptions of citizen participation 
Participation is a potent term used in many different contexts (Cornwall 2009). It is 
generally conceived as a means to shape the type, scope and nature of services to 
communities, but also as a means to challenge, subvert, direct and prioritise who gets 
what, when and how. From its social movement roots, citizen participation has always 
been about the ‘have not’s’ and ‘power-holders’. Participation is a means of 
redistributing power and resources, and has valorised citizen control, for example, in 
urban planning and poverty reduction. In areas such as environmental resource 
management, citizen participation is often conceived as a process whereby those with 
a ‘stake’ or ‘interest’ can be identified and engaged to deconstruct and work through 
complex or ‘wicked’ problems, thereby arriving at acceptable or ‘just’ decisions (Collins 
and Ison 2009). 
In social care settings much of the contemporary discourse is emancipatory and 
focuses on the autonomy, inclusion and empowerment of users (Beresford 2002). 
Citizen participation in public health, for example, is active involvement in and being in 
control of assessing, planning, implementing and evaluating their own and collective 
health care (Mullen et al. 2011). Citizen or user participation in social care settings has 
emerged in recent decades to challenge experts, clinicians and providers around issues 
of identity, the nature and definition of the problem, the ‘solutions’ on offer and the 
power to decide more generally (Carr 2007). 
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Users of services have also been characterised as consumers (McLaughlin 2009). In this 
guise, participation is informed both by market-oriented ideology and user advocacy 
(Bochel et al. 2008). It imagines the individual actor as rationally choosing. Here, citizen 
users make their voices known through these choices and through their wallets. The 
transactional nature of the conception is further emphasised in reference to 
consumers as taxpayers, whose contributions are tied to their utilisation of specific 
resources. Participation in this conception is through consultation and feedback.  
Generally there is consensus that engaged citizenry is better than passive populations 
(Irvin and Stansbury 2004: 55). And – in the reverse – that powerlessness and 
alienation are problems for democratic institutions. Further, there is recognition that 
citizens participate when something is at stake that they care about or that is 
important to them, and that conditions exist to enable, facilitate or legitimate their 
involvement. At the same time, citizens are seen to act from different identity and 
social spaces and to seek a range of outcomes. Citizen participation in this conception 
involves a recognised mix of selfish and selfless motivation that is both instrumental 
and ethical. The participation of citizens in matters that affect them ranges from 
‘having a say’, to controlling and directing the outcome.  
This brief overview is captured in Table 9.1. I suggest that the citizen identification 
provides a frame and a platform to incorporate the other participation paradigms. This 
sharpens recognition that citizen participation is not a simple proposition, and that 
citizens occupy multiple roles.  
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Table 9.1: Paradigms of citizen participation 
Population  Identity(ies) Political character Participatory 
sphere 
Philosophy Mode Purpose of 
participation 
Social movement 
(eg urban 
planning, 
environmental, 
poverty 
reduction, 
development) 
Collective 
identity is 
primary 
Rights-based 
Democratic 
Bottom-up 
Interest-based Redistribution of 
power and 
resources 
Citizen control 
Rights-based 
Collective action 
Policy setting 
Decision-making  
Redistribution of 
power, resources 
and control 
Social care users 
(eg disability, HIV, 
mental health) 
Personal identity 
is primary 
Rights-based 
Emancipatory/  
liberatory 
Bottom-up 
Social welfare 
Social care 
Person-centric 
User-led 
Empowerment 
Inclusion 
Autonomy 
Independence 
Rights-based 
Collective action 
Individual choice 
Service planning 
Participation in 
decisions where 
affected 
Redistribution of 
power, resources 
and control 
Consumers 
Producers (eg 
health users, 
taxpayers, 
agriculture, 
development) 
User/producer 
identity is 
primary 
Consumption/ 
production 
based 
New Right market 
orientation 
Top-down 
System-centric 
Provider-led 
Managerial 
Instrumental 
Individual choice 
Individual 
involvement 
Consultation 
Feedback 
Efficiency 
Effectiveness 
Economy 
Productivity 
Citizens 
 
Multiple 
identities 
Rights-based 
Democratic 
Bottom-up 
Multiple 
locations 
Plural interests 
Accountability 
Inclusion 
Equity 
Mass action 
Collective action 
Individual action 
Fair distribution 
of power and 
resources 
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 Equality 
Fair distribution of 
power and 
resources 
Representation 
Mixed mode 
Participation in 
decisions where 
affected 
Fair inclusion 
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Specificity and context obviously matter a lot. The different conceptions of 
participation can work discretely in specific spheres and modes. However, working 
from the premise that citizens have multiple identities, live and act in diverse spaces, 
and have myriad interests that are individual and communal, civic and personal, 
political and social, then these paradigms of participation also overlap and interact. 
The question of where power lies remains of central concern; and with this, who is 
defining the problem(s) as well as the solution(s). These points work to illuminate the 
purpose of participation. That is, if, how, in what ways and to what effects is the 
political community of citizens enacted and made. 
9.2.2 Citizen participation in justice 
Justice systems in many countries have stood resolutely against the citizen 
participation trend, despite low levels of confidence (Roberts and Indermaur 2009). 
For the victim-citizen the barriers to participation are structural and normative (Doak 
2005). I dealt with the history behind this exclusion in Chapter 5, as well as its 
contemporary justifications. A range of reforms have been allowed on the margins and 
have tended not to challenge the fundamental distribution and structure of power. 
Indeed, the paradigm of therapeutic justice that is advocated by some as focussing on 
‘healing’ is alien to criminal justice (Van Stokkom 2011).256 Other reforms such as 
restorative justice and victim–offender mediation have been presented as forms of 
‘civic engagement’ with social change implications (Dzur 2003: 279). Victim impact 
statements have been offered as expressive moments through which emotional, 
physical, social and material impacts are mediated (Pemberton and Reynaers 2011). 
Initiatives aimed at the provision of information and of service have been ‘relatively 
non-contentious’ (Doak 2005: 295). The idea of participatory rights – on a continuum 
from consultation to representation – remains controversial (Englebrecht 2011).257 
Beginning his attempt at a typology of victim participation, Ian Edwards claims that 
‘the victim is not in a position of inequality vis a vis the state’ (Edwards 2004: 972). In 
his perspective, these are persons who can negotiate and demand, and who have 
                                                     
256
 None of the lay participants in this study said that they became involved in criminal justice in order to 
‘heal’ from the traumatic effects of the incident. Also none indicated ‘closure’ as an objective that they 
sought. 
257
 Although in the domains of international criminal justice and post-conflict justice the controversies 
are less about whether and more about how. See McGonigle Leyh (2011).  
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freedom to choose their level of engagement. He further assumes that the interests of 
the victim-citizen are one and the same as the interests of the state as delivered 
through criminal justice institutions. 
Edwards’ focus is on the legal settlement and contains just two purposes for 
participation – getting the disposition (the substantive outcome) or not. At the non-
dispositive levels, he limits victim participation to the optional supply of expression, 
information and preference. The power-holders (though Edwards avoids the term) 
allow or they seek and they consider these expressions. Further, there is no gradation 
between consultation in the non-dispositive group, and control in the dispositive 
layer.258 They are singular and discrete moments. It is assumed that the ultimate aim 
of victim participation is to control the decision and exert authority as the decision-
maker.  
While there is weakness in this typology as well as in participation reforms, they 
sharply illuminate key points in the debate about victim-citizens’ role in and 
relationship with criminal justice. Yet these debates still fail to attend to the 
complexities embedded in victim-citizens’ desires for and their reasoning about 
involvement and participation. The previous chapter revealed that behind the measure 
of their influential voice were:  
 features about the uniqueness of being known and ‘knowing’, 
 demonstrations of respect and recognition, 
 features constituting dialogue between themselves and the entity, 
 features that went to a perception that decision-making itself is full and 
‘proper’, and 
 features that saw the giving and receiving of information as a powerful 
transaction (as well as being powerful in itself). 
The next section explores these nuanced practices further. I ask whether voice is 
important and whether, through their influential voice, people wanted to control the 
                                                     
258
 Edwards’ contextualising of the victim control proposition within certain supposed Islamic criminal 
justice codes is what Australians would call dog whistling (2004: 974–975). 
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outcome. Finally, I ask what were people’s orientations towards the different 
possibilities for participation and their reasoning about their interest in them.  
9.3 THE INFLUENTIAL VOICE IN PARTICIPATION 
This multi-faceted depiction of the nature and power of voice is broader and deeper 
than the more usual suggestion of ‘giving voice’ as simply expressive (Roberts and Erez 
2004). As expression within the criminal justice system, the victim’s voice is commonly 
characterised as subjective, designed to emote and, in consequence, to have 
therapeutic benefits (Pemberton and Reynaers 2011). The diverse meanings that the 
lay participants actually articulated point to something different. But how different?  
For the study participants, the variables on voice clustered with their preferred 
decision or outcome (see Table 9.2). This is a voice that influences.  
Table 9.2: Scale comprising items clustered as ‘influential voice’ 
 Variables Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Mean inter-
item correlation  
Influential 
voice 
Opportunity to express my views 
Able to influence decision 
Views considered before decision 
Decision I deserved  
Decision I wanted 
0.84 0.52 
 
A different study in the Netherlands illustrates this point. In that study 59% of victims 
said they would welcome the opportunity to submit a victim impact statement, even if 
it did not have any impact on the sentence. However, if it would have an influence, this 
percentage increased to 84% (Pemberton 2005).  
However, the opportunities for a voice that is influential in criminal justice are not 
restricted to the sentencing court. Lay participants were asked about their interaction 
with three different justice entities. Figure 9.1 shows how much people felt that their 
voice was influential with police, prosecution and the court. The higher score measures 
strongest agreement. People assessed their voice as moderately influential with police 
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and prosecution and weakly influential with court. An examination of the pairwise 
comparisons table showed that there is a significant difference between the scale 
measuring influential voice with regard to the court, and the same scale with regard to 
police and prosecution.259 
 
 
These findings about voice being influential and being experienced differently at 
different points in justice could be disregarded except for its strong positive 
relationship to overall satisfaction. The influential voice scale correlated in a strong 
and significant measure with the dependent variable for prosecution and court (see 
Table 9.3). 
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 There was significant effect for time, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.54, F (2, 24) = 10.3, p < .0005, multivariate 
partial eta squared = 0.5 (Pallant 2011: 263). Using Cohen’s guidelines (1988: 284–287), the latter 
suggests a very large effect size.  
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Figure 9.1:  Victims' rating of their influential voice N=26 
Mean of 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree 
 228 
Table 9.3: Correlation coefficient between victims’ overall satisfaction and scale 
measuring their influential voice (N=26) 
Police (Time 1) Prosecution (Time 2) Court (Time 2) 
 
0.36* 
 
 
0.55** 
 
 
0.61** 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Also important to note is the strength of the relationships between the scales. With 
regard to all three agencies, the stronger the influential voice the more accepting are 
victims of outcomes reached by the entity.  
9.3.1 Decision control 
Statistics like this only tell a small part of the story, however. They don’t say how 
people thought about the nature of influence. For example, unprompted comments 
some people made around this question on the degree of influence they had over the 
decision-maker indicated that to have had influence would have been somehow 
‘improper’. So, if the influential voice is important, a next question is whether there is 
a desire for it to be dominant? Put more broadly, does the citizen participate in order 
to get what he or she wants? Do they aim for control?  
On this point, people were asked whether they agreed or disagreed that justice 
decision-makers (police, prosecution and judiciary) should have responsibility to 
decide ‘in situations such as theirs’. Figure 9.2 shows that a majority of people did in 
fact agree with this – although less strongly with regard to prosecution.260 
                                                     
260
 This finding concurs with a Canadian study into victim involvement with restorative justice by 
Wemmers and Cyr (2004). 
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This finding says that people are open to ‘decision by non-deliberative methods’ – to 
use Jane Mansbridge’s term (Mansbridge et al. 2010: 68).261 In their dual identity as 
victim-citizen, the panellists viewed constraint on their self-interest as expected and 
acceptable in the criminal justice space.  
9.3.1.1 Expertise, experience, function 
When asking people why they thought this, they reasoned in a number of ways. 
Strongest was the perspective that justice decision-makers were expert, were trained 
and experienced. This expertise was both formal: ‘They’re trained, qualified and 
educated and they are neutral’ (Polly) and lived: ‘Because they see different characters 
every day and it’s their line of work and they are in the best position to make these 
types of decisions’ (Quinn). Moreover, it was ‘their job’: ‘That’s what they’re there for’ 
(Genevieve); and ‘it’s the police job to protect society’ (Alex). 
9.3.1.2 Governance 
Next were wider contextual and social meanings given to the perspective of the justice 
decision-makers doing their job. Not only was there a sense of – ‘If they don’t then 
who would’? (Teresa), but also ‘you can’t have ordinary people deciding these things. 
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Figure 9.2: Victims think entity should have responsibility to decide in 
situations like theirs, % Definitely/maybe agree N=26 
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Imagine the chaos if they did’ (Edward). Molly said something similar: ‘Otherwise you 
could turn around and lock up the neighbours. It is trust in the justice system.’ 
Charlie’s comment went wider, to the public good focus of the justice decision-makers, 
in saying: ‘Just because violence is a public crime and there are public policy concerns’.  
9.3.1.3 Normative values 
Reflections also related directly to the normative values that are constitutive of the 
justice concept – those of fairness, impartiality, and attention to evidence. Fairness 
was uppermost in Charlie’s mind when he commented that, ‘they are more 
experienced in knowing what is fair, that *the offender’s+ career might be affected’. 
Bailey concurred by saying, ‘it removes the emotional factor and allows for the most 
fair method of decision making’. Emphasising a different perspective on fairness, 
Imogene felt that ‘it has to be a third party. It’s the only way of protecting the person.’ 
Teresa reflected on the need for fairness to both parties when she said that: 
If the decision was to be made by me I wouldn’t know what was reasonable or 
fair. I trust the system enough to know what to do, what is fair to both the 
parties. 
Part of the issue of fairness was that the decision-makers were seen as impartial, 
trained and as working within a larger frame of reference. Svetlana commented that 
‘they are a whole group of people, not just one, who decide’. David concurred when 
he said that ‘they should do it for the community’. Holly felt that impartiality had to do 
with dispassionate perspective when she said that, ‘I guess because they’re not 
emotionally involved in the situation they can be objective about it. If it was left up to 
me, who would know?!’ Janelle said that she agreed with decision-makers having 
responsibility ‘because they know the laws better than anyone. If they think what he 
did was wrong then it should go ahead.’ 
People also commented that decision-makers’ access to more information and to 
evidence was a factor in supporting their responsibility. As Xenia said, ‘they’re the 
ultimate decision-maker and have all the evidence in front of them’. Olivia concurred 
by saying, ‘they are impartial and do this on the evidence’. 
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9.3.1.4 Victim vulnerabilities 
Finally, another strong convergence of reasoning was people’s recognition of their own 
human frailties and that of others in a ‘victim’ position. Edward – even though he did 
not demonstrate this at all – commented that ‘it would be crazy for victims to have this 
because there’d be a lot of revenge and eye for eye stuff’. Domestic assault victims 
were very aware of the vulnerability and complexity inherent in their position. 
Commenting about whether police should have the responsibility to decide in charging 
an alleged assailant, Imogene commented that: 
I think it’s important because if the victim has *that+ power then they can be 
influenced or persuaded or harassed or threatened to withdraw, therefore it’s 
important that it is this way. 
Further reflecting on the prosecution’s responsibility to decide to prosecute, she said: 
It takes away the fear of being bullied and pressured and forced to drop the 
charge, which is also takes away the fear of reprisal. I have no doubt that if it was 
me then I would have been subject to all amounts of pressure including a belting 
to get me to drop the charges. 
Karla also felt that the different pressures on her as an individual meant it was 
important for others to make the hard decisions. She said:  
It’s easy for your mind to own some of the guilt or rationale on oneself. But in the 
light of day there’s no excuse for violence. Those who are removed from the 
intense feelings of a relationship are in the best place to make decisions. 
For those who were more uncertain about police, prosecution or court having 
responsibility to make decisions in situations such as theirs, there was recognition of 
the need for independent decision-makers combined with a desire for something 
more. For example, Aimee said, ‘I have very mixed emotions about it. On the one hand 
I felt really empowered. I got a lot of support and he was gone out of the house. But 
on the other hand I felt powerless and I was told there was nothing I could do.’ 
Repeated most often on this issue was a refrain about being asked, being consulted, 
having views taken into account, and involving others. Basically having ‘some say’ 
somewhere (D16, A7, D24).  
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9.4 PROCESS PREFERENCES AND THE INFLUENTIAL VOICE 
If this group of people brought multiple meanings to the idea of voice, including that it 
be influential, but generally abjured control, how did they envisage the 
operationalising of voice? To examine this question, the lay participants were asked 
their preferences as to the process for resolving the issue. Options were put to people 
(in both visual and written formats) that were descriptions of real possibilities to the 
process that was unfolding before them.262 At the second interview after the case had 
finalised at court people were asked if they would have liked a restorative opportunity 
if they had been offered it. If they answered yes, then they were asked at what stage 
in the process would have they liked this opportunity. 
The options are presented here as preferences with a variety of participatory and 
restorative opportunities. I understand restorative opportunities to fall under a 
broader participatory justice rubric.  
At the first interview after the violent person had been charged by police and before 
the matter had been to court, of those who were interviewed twice, a majority (62%) 
expressed a first preference for a process that entailed some form of participatory 
opportunity (see Table 9.4).263 
  
                                                     
262
 Restorative opportunities are only available after sentencing for adult criminal matters in the ACT. 
However, pre-conviction options for a restorative encounter were put to the study participants. They 
were advised that these options were not actually available to them and that they were being asked in 
order to gain some idea of the interest. 
263
 There was a total of thirty-two responses to the question at Time 1. Of this number, 63% preferred a 
non-restorative process. Only those responses from persons interviewed twice (n=26) are discussed 
here. 
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Table 9.4: Time 1 preferred justice process (N=26) 
Process options Non-DV 
N=5 
DV 
N=21 
Total 
N=26 
Diversion 
(4=15%) 
Admission, divert 
and mediate 
0 3 3 
Admission, 
restorative 
opportunity, no 
formal sentence 
0 1 1 
No/minimal 
participation 
(6=23%) 
Finding and 
sentence 
1 5 6 
Participation, no 
restorative 
opportunity 
(8=31%) 
Finding, victim 
impact statement 
(VIS) and sentence 
3 5 8 
Participation and 
restorative 
opportunities 
(8=31%) 
Finding, restorative 
opportunity, no 
sentence 
0 0 0 
Finding, restorative 
opportunity, court 
hears agreement, 
sentence 
0 3 3 
Finding, sentence, 
restorative 
opportunity 
0 1 1 
Finding, VIS, 
sentence, 
restorative 
opportunity 
1 3 4 
 
9.4.1 Reasoning prospective process preferences 
How did people understand and consider these participatory opportunities? What did 
these mean to their influential voice? The minority (15%) who expressed a first 
preference for diversion away from the formal justice system following the police 
intervention were domestic assault victims who wished to remain in the relationship 
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with the person who had assaulted them.264 However, this was not a simple 
connection. Xenia’s interest in diversion was strong although qualified. She said: 
The first one [diversion] is attractive because it recognises the situation may have 
changed from the emotion fuelled night. His rehabilitation has already started. 
The desired effect of the arrest has started. A mediator would help us talk about 
where to from here. If he hadn’t hit rock bottom and bounced back I might have a 
different opinion. 
Roslyn mentioned a similar contingency. She had had a previous domestic assault case 
before the courts and had been troubled by the delays in the process and the 
consequences in her relationship. On this second occasion she preferred ‘avoiding the 
justice system but being able to work out the dilemma that’s got us to this point. The 
others [process options] are unattractive because they all involve long timeframes. If 
you can work it out with a facilitator then the time would be considerably lessened.’ 
Yvette as also interested in the possibility of working the issues through with her 
partner directly. She was adamant that ‘in our situation I think it’s wrong that people 
are making decisions on our behalf and not actually listening to us. All because it’s got 
to go through “a process”!’ 
In contrast, a small majority of people expressed a preference for processes that 
entailed no or minimal participatory interaction. The interest in the court making a 
finding meant to Finn that ‘there is no question he is guilty’. Others wanted authorities 
to just ‘deal with it’. Eliza said, ‘I just want them to deal with it. I don’t want to have to. 
I just don’t want any contact.’ Zola said something similar. She said, ‘I’d like the people 
in the right positions to make the decisions. I want it taken out of my hands.’ Finoula 
commented that, ‘I don’t like the idea of the restorative justice. I don’t want to see 
him, don’t want anything to do with him.’ 
Others emphasised their process preference for an authoritative decision-maker (23%) 
by referencing to its meaning to or influence on the violent person. David’s preference 
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 Of domestic assault victims interviewed twice, at their first interview 48% (n=10) indicated a first 
preference for a non-restorative opportunity and 52% (n=11) indicated a first preference for a process 
that included a restorative opportunity. Of this latter group, 66% (n=7) expressed a preference for the 
restorative opportunity to take place after a formal finding. Of non-domestic assault victims interviewed 
twice, at their first interview 80% (n=4) indicated a first preference for a non-restorative opportunity 
and 20% (n=1) indicated a first preference for a restorative opportunity.  
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for the court to deal with the case was reasoned on the basis that, ‘people like *…+ is 
just a “crim”, so a face-to-face wouldn’t do anything. He brags about being a crim. 
He’d play along to get a bit off his sentence.’ Lorraine felt that even a victim impact 
statement from her would be unhelpful in the process. She commented, ‘I feel if I put 
in a VIS he will take it all negative and it will make this worse’. 
Quinn also emphasised that it was the potential impact of the public authority on the 
violent person that she was looking for. She said, ‘the fact that I don’t have to be 
around him and that it’s done by someone who is seen to be “the law” so it sends the 
message to him that what he’s done is not acceptable’. This point was also made by 
Holly when she said, ‘basically because if he doesn’t get time he’ll just keep doing it. 
It’s all too stressful for me. I prefer the Magistrate.’ 
A substantial proportion of people (31%) felt that it was important for the court and 
the violent person to hear about the impact of the offence on them through a victim 
impact statement. Edward wanted the harm done to be heard in addition to the case 
being dealt with efficiently. He said, ‘the system costs a lot to us in the community so 
we don’t want the case coming to and fro. I would like the accused person to know the 
effect on me.’ Janelle also commented on the opportunity to convey the harm done. 
She said, ‘because I can tell him what it [the incident/abuse] has done and how it has 
made me feel. I couldn’t face him without being in the court because we’d just yell at 
each other.’ 
However, reflection on the possibility of a victim impact statement was not simply 
about conveying the harm done as is commonly claimed. Polly felt that the statement 
meant: 
The judge hears what effects this has had on me, an opportunity to ask for what 
outcome I would like to see happen. For example, a twelve-month suspended 
sentence if he breaks A, B, C etc. Then the judge decides the sentence preferably 
so maybe it could be doing some good and gives a chance to make matters right. 
Hopefully by paper! I want to hear what he has to say and admits to and then I 
can respond and tell the judge how I feel and be able to respond and then the 
judge decide what is fair. 
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Similarly, Nada felt that the victim impact statement (VIS) was not just giving 
information but was also an opportunity for dialogue. She said, ‘I think the Magistrate 
really needs to hear from the victim to make a proper decision. There is a lot lost 
between what happens and reading something off a paper. If they can read a VIS and 
ask questions it would be good. They need to hear the whole history.’ The notion of 
the victim impact statement being influential informed the comments of a number of 
people. Alice, for example, said, ‘I think what level of impact it has made on my life 
now and at the time should be dealt with accordingly – which should aid their 
sentence’. On the other hand, Bailey, who expressed a first preference for the court to 
hear his victim impact statement and to then sentence, was more ambivalent about 
the potential meaning of his input. He said: 
My preference is that I don’t want to feel like … I want to feel like my impact has 
been heard but I don’t want to feel like I’m sentencing. I don’t think it is right for 
my personal feelings to be part of this. It is a conflict of interest. I do see the 
benefit of restorative justice after all of this in sorting out bad feelings and help 
clear the air and make sure there is nothing further there. 
Another substantial proportion of people (31%) did express an interest in a hybrid mix 
of participation with a restorative opportunity. Most wanted this after the 
authoritative finding. Karla’s preference for the court to make a finding, having a 
restorative opportunity, then the court hearing the agreement and sentencing 
reflected multi-layered interests. She reasoned her preference in the following way: 
I’d like him actively taking responsibility for his actions and being part of deciding 
what should happen in front of me would be quite healing for me. At the moment 
he has nothing but hatred and blame for me and I’d like that responsibility to 
shift. The feeling of his consent to the sentence feels important. The judge can 
impose it but he can still not own it. 
Decision-making in a way that involved private interests and public authority was also 
part of Olivia’s reasoning. She preferred the same process as Karla. She said: 
He’s been found guilty and then the chance to come together to talk about the 
impacts on me but also to work together about how to make things different in 
the future. Also for me to highlight the services that could help. These could be 
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agreed and then come back to the court. Both able to be heard and be heard at 
the sentence where our ideas are taken into account at sentence. Both have a 
chance to influence the sentence. But if you can’t then the judge would make the 
final sentence. 
For Winona and Aimee, having the public authority make the decision first was about 
clarity on the wrongdoing. Winona said, ‘I prefer him to be found guilty and then have 
a face-to-face. Then he can be ashamed of what he did.’ Aimee reasoned in the 
following way: ‘If there was the finding from an authority and then the mandatory 
phase of examining what happened and working out steps so it doesn’t happen again.’ 
Finn expressed something similar in saying that, ‘the attractive thing about it is the 
judge deciding first, hears the impact and then there’s the opportunity for face-to-face 
where there is no question he is guilty. There’s no chance for crossed lines during 
court proceedings.’ Imogene could almost have been reading from the formal 
objectives of sentencing when she reasoned her preference for a finding, a VIS, the 
sentence and a restorative opportunity by saying, ‘I like the mesh between justice and 
mercy, between acceptance of responsibility combined with finger-waving deterrence 
“don’t do it again”’. 
The reasons lay participants gave for their prospective process preferences are 
summarised in Table 9.5. 
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Table 9.5: Summary of prospective process preferences and reasons (Time 1) 
Process preferences Reasons 
Diversion 
 
Commitment to relationship  
Work through issues themselves 
Avoid time of justice process 
Wrong for others to make decisions on others’ lives 
Rehabilitation started after arrest 
Help from mediator 
No/minimal 
participation 
 
Public authority impact on VP 
Definite finding by authority – wrongfulness, clarity 
Just ‘deal with it’ – no contact, system to do it, no stress 
Make things worse 
Participation, no 
restorative 
opportunity 
 
Get help for VP 
Get on with own life 
VP to hear impact in ‘safe’ space 
Find answers 
Avoid cost to community of on-going process 
Impact and ‘whole story’ to aid sentencer 
Dialogue with sentencer 
Participation &  
restorative 
opportunities 
 
Find guilt first – no ‘crossed lines’ 
‘Mesh of justice and mercy’ 
VP to hear impact 
Feel part of process 
VP take active responsibility, then be part of deciding what to 
do 
VP to ‘own’ outcome 
Care for VP – give information on sources of help 
Work out together and sentence to hear from each; work out 
prevention together 
 
9.5 RETROSPECTIVE REFLECTION ON RESTORATIVE AND PARTICIPATORY 
OPPORTUNITIES 
At their second interview once the court case had finished, people were asked if they 
would have liked a restorative opportunity had it been offered. A third (n=8, 31%) 
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agreed that they would definitely have taken the opportunity with a further third (n=7, 
27%) indicating that ‘maybe’ they would have liked the opportunity. Of these, all of 
those with a definite opinion were domestic assault victims, and two non-domestic 
assault victims thought that ‘maybe’ they would have liked the opportunity.265 Five 
people overall (19%) were unsure if they would have taken up the opportunity if it had 
been offered. 
There were different views about when in the justice process the interaction could or 
should take place. Of the two non-domestic assault victims who maybe agreed that 
they would have taken up the offer of a restorative opportunity, both said they would 
prefer it after the finding.266 Combining the domestic assault victims who 
definitely/maybe agreed that they would have taken up the offer of a restorative 
opportunity, about half said that they would prefer this before a finding and a further 
half after a finding.267 For example, Yvette said she would definitely have taken up an 
offer of a restorative opportunity and expressed a preference for it to be ‘towards the 
beginning’. In explaining her interest, she said, ‘because in the early days you are in 
shock but it would make a better understanding for all involved and it might give 
another idea other than prosecuting – maybe counselling’. 
The interest in the possibility of interaction envisaged opportunity to consider non-
prosecution alternatives such as this. It also encompassed other things including 
getting answers, understanding, closure, forgiveness, getting things in the open and 
realisation of the impacts and of the wrongdoing.  
For the non-domestic assault victims, the idea of a restorative opportunity appeared to 
provide a means of getting answers and satisfying their curiosity about why someone 
would have hit them. Edward said, ‘I’m curious to know why. Was it entertainment for 
these guys?’ Finn was both curious and cautious in his reasons for maybe taking up a 
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 Calculating the percentage preferences just among the twenty-one domestic assault victims, 38% 
(n=8) said they would definitely have liked the opportunity, with a further five (24%) saying that they 
‘maybe’ would have liked it. Four (19%) were unsure with a further four (19%) saying definitely/maybe 
not. 
266
 Only one of these non-domestic assault victims had said he was interested in a restorative 
engagement at his first interview (A7). 
267
 Of those who would have taken up the offer of a restorative opportunity before the finding (n=7), 
three were wanting to continue their relationship with the violent person, and two did not. Six indicated 
a preference for the opportunity after the finding. 
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restorative opportunity. He said, ‘I’m curious I suppose to see his reaction and my 
reaction’. He added his preference for the offer being made ‘after the guilty because 
there’s no error for him arguing the fact’. 
For domestic assault victims, there was also an interest in answers. Polly would 
definitely have taken up a restorative opportunity had it been offered. In expressing an 
interest for the opportunity ‘for prosecution maybe’, she said, ‘I wanted to know why. 
It ate away [at me]. It was really because it was just so aggressive.’ 
Deanna and Holly were also interested in the way an interactive process might work 
for them. However, both preferred the option to be available after conviction. Deanna 
said: 
It would have given us an opportunity for some understandings to be talked 
about. It would have helped give closure. Also if I had offended against someone 
it would mean a lot for me to be forgiven. I wrote to him to say I forgive him but I 
don’t know if he got it. I don’t think he is taking it in a positive manner. 
Holly said, ‘I don’t think it would have hurt. It would have been a good opportunity to 
get everything out in the open and to sort of understand each other a bit better, why 
he needed to do his drink and drugs all the time. And for me to get it off my chest.’ In 
responding to the question of when she would have taken up the opportunity, Holly 
said, ‘probably after conviction and during the deferred sentence’. She said this was 
‘mainly because if he hadn’t learned how to control his anger I’d feel safer. If I was to 
say something he didn’t like.’ 
Mostly the interest of domestic assault victims was for being able to convey something 
to the violent person – about the harm, the consequences to others, the wrongfulness, 
the desire for a different person or relationship. Genevieve said she would ‘have liked 
to have gotten him to admit what he was doing was wrong or to see if he could even 
admit this’. Karla expressed a definite interest in a restorative opportunity ‘so to get 
the opportunity to try to make him realise how the violence made me feel’. She 
thought the opportunity could have been provided at ‘any stage’. Imogene would 
definitely have taken up a restorative opportunity had it been offered. She said: 
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It’s an opportunity for actually being able to say ‘ok this is what you did and these 
are the consequences to me and your son’ and to try to get him to understand 
that there are consequences to others. 
In response to a question about when in the process she would have liked the 
opportunity, she responded rhetorically by saying, ‘when would be most likely to have 
an effect? After court I think – a closure and a move on for me and for him.’ 
Some felt that a restorative opportunity offered scope for more informed decision-
making both by themselves as principal parties as well as by authorities. Roslyn said 
she definitely would have taken the opportunity ‘right at the outset’. She reasoned 
that, ‘I think so that from the outset they would have had information about me and 
about why it was an issue for me. We’re only now talking about it and it should have 
happened earlier to make peace if wanted.’ Olivia was also definitely interested in an 
early opportunity ‘because it would be with a mediator and we hadn’t had an 
opportunity to discuss the issues, why it had happened and what the law was. He 
could see it wasn’t me. It would be negotiation and acknowledged.’ 
For those who were unsure or not interested in a restorative opportunity – both 
domestic and non-domestic assault victims – there was a preference for keeping or 
extending the distance between themselves and the violent person. Alex was 
assaulted by a neighbour and said, ‘as there was no real relationship between us there 
is nothing to “salvage” through that conference’. Nada also recognised the distance 
between herself and her ex-partner. She said, ‘I think I needed to be as removed as 
possible from the situation. He was such in a bad state that anything I would have 
done would have inflamed.’ 
For some of the domestic assault victims, concern about their safety underlay their 
caution about a possible restorative interaction. Winona said she wasn’t sure ‘because 
I don’t really have anything to say to him and maybe I’d be a bit scared he would lash 
out at me again’. Ursula, who did want to continue her relationship with her husband, 
was nonetheless cautious. She said, ‘because of the way he’s a bit unpredictable. I’m 
not sure how he is at the time. This felt a bit unsure, unsafe. We talked about things 
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together at the hospital. This was OK. I don’t believe in hiding things but I understand 
there’s some problems and I do want to make sure that I’m safe.’ 
Some domestic and non-domestic assault victims commented that the violent person 
would not have been genuine or would have been manipulative, blaming or 
threatening in a restorative interaction. David, assaulted by a neighbour, said that ‘he 
*the assailant+ was happy about what he did. There’d be no point. He was just smiling 
all the way through.’ Lorraine was unsure about a restorative opportunity. Talking 
about her ex-partner, she said, ‘I’d have to think about it. He’s very good at putting on 
a front especially when it comes to guilt. He’s a very good actor.’ Birgit also said, ‘it 
wouldn’t have made any difference. We spoke on the phone and he was blaming me 
for being in [custody]. Even after three weeks he was blaming me. He’s just got to take 
responsibility.’ Svetlana’s past experience discouraged her. She said ‘we’d done it 
before and tried. No.’ 
People’s interest in participation in the justice process is discussed here primarily 
through their perspective on restorative opportunities. What is clear, however, is that 
their perspective on these and other participatory opportunities perceived the level of 
involvement they chose as entirely legitimate and reasonable. Their influencing voice 
was directed to conveying information, impact and consequences, both to the violent 
person and to the public authority.  
Participation as a set of practices carried multiple ideas and was intended to enhance 
the justice process. Moreover, the lay participants recognised the unique character of 
the decision-making spaces in which they were engaged. They understood and 
accepted constraint on their role as necessary and even welcome.  
9.6 PARTICIPATION AND SEQUENCING 
The degrees of interest in interactive opportunities with the violent person may not be 
surprising. What is noteworthy is the sequencing that is revealed in people’s reasoning 
and reflections.268 At the commencement of the process the study participants 
expressed multiple goals (discussed in Chapter 7) for their engagement with justice, 
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 For discussion on the sequencing of justice objectives in post-conflict settings, see Braithwaite and 
Nickson (2012). 
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that looked in three directions – towards themselves, to the violent person and 
towards the community. This trilogy of justice interests raises questions of which 
comes first and how can they be realised? The social dilemma created within the space 
and ideation of justice asks for ‘selfish’ individual objectives to be accommodated in 
addition to a ’joint payoff’ for a wider good (Schroeder et al. 2003: 374). The process 
preferences expressed at the first and second interviews and the reasoning associated 
with these suggest that there is both sequencing of objectives and sequencing of 
process options in achieving these that enable attendance to the dilemma.  
The priority given by the lay participants to offender accountability at their first 
interview was confirmed by their interest in the court making a finding. After this, it is 
apparent that people are interested in differing interactive possibilities. A minority just 
want the court to come to a finding and to make a decision as to consequence. For 
example, Alex said, ‘I guess I don’t want to get that involved and just get on with it. I 
don’t want to be involved in an on-going process. I just want *…+ to get the help he 
obviously needs and I can get on with my life.’ Most people, however, were interested 
in something more. 
Accountability is a threshold from which other justice goals can be contemplated. For 
some, these would be obtained through an orientation towards the violent person. It 
is with this person that they were primarily interested in communicating. Others 
oriented their goals and their communication primarily to the public authority. They 
saw their interaction here as informing or assisting the court to arrive at decisions that 
were appropriate, responsive, equitable and holistic to both parties and to the wider 
community. Still others expressed their interest in interactive opportunities as an 
engagement with both the violent person and the public authority. This triangulation 
of interaction269 is made manifest with regard to that particular institution that is most 
associated with the idea of justice by ordinary people – the court. 
Within the temporal and procedural space of the court, the sequencing of steps in the 
process facilitates this sequencing of justice objectives. Sequencing enables a partial 
ordering of justice objectives or priorities (Sen 2009). Citizen participation in justice is 
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 This is somewhat similar though additional to the idea of the ‘virtuous circle’ between top-down 
settlement and bottom-up restorative justice discussed by Braithwaite and Nickson (2012: 461). 
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not, therefore, a singular moment. Neither is it easily contained. The interest is clearly 
in the give and take of information and reflection upon it. This account argues that 
arriving at an idea and a sense of justice that is deep, broad and rich requires just this 
interaction and dialogue:  
… understanding the demands of justice is no more of a solitarist exercise than 
any other human discipline … not only are dialogue and communication part of 
the subject matter of the theory of justice … it is also the case that the nature, 
robustness and reach of the theories proposed themselves depend on 
contributions from discussion and discourse. (Sen 2009: 88–89).  
The sequenced architecture that can be placed around the resolution of a violent 
event does not necessarily oblige that a particular objective is prioritised over another 
(Braithwaite and Nickson 2012: 473–474). What is suggested is that the different 
objectives and objects of value can be accommodated in a step-by-step manner. It is 
simply not necessary to pose multiple objectives and different actors as in perpetual 
and irreconcilable conflict. 
9.7 REFLECTING ON JUSTICE FOLLOWING PARTICIPATION 
Notwithstanding these possibilities, at the end of this particular criminal justice 
journey, at their third and final interview, the idea of justice emerged humbled for the 
victim-citizens, and somewhat hobbled in its institutional form. In Finn’s view, ‘it would 
be a good thing if it works. I know why the statue is blind. It doesn’t have favouritism 
one way or another, victim or criminal. I don’t know if that’s a good thing. I know it’s a 
way to get society to function.’ From Teresa’s perspective it was ‘so broad and there 
are so many areas of grey … the law applies to different cases in different ways even 
though the laws are the same’. 
The slippery contingent nature of justice left Janelle ‘not really sure’ and Nada ‘a little 
confused’. Some people struggled to contain its meaning: ‘To me justice … you say the 
word and you know almost what it means’, said Edward. Holly also felt that ‘it’s hard 
to explain. Justice would be to protect the victim and to try and help the person who 
did it fix themselves up, to rehabilitate them.’ David was sure ‘it’s not like the movies 
or TV. It’s based on money and circumstances.’  
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At the same time, the idea of justice as a multi-criterion subject was sustained. 
Thinking on the question harder, Edward said justice meant ‘there’s an action and a 
reaction. Something that’s fair and equitable. Something that helps get the victim back 
together and to feel protected and safe to go back into society. And for the 
perpetrator – a bit of a wake-up call that you can’t perform like that.’ Aimee’s 
reflections emphasised justice working in multiple ways over time. She said: 
I think it’s being confronted, that I am made aware that the perpetrator has 
been made to confront in a court of law the seriousness of his actions in a time 
frame that doesn’t infringe on my rights and is compelled to continue to assess 
the consequences of these actions over twelve months or so that’s suitable to 
the gravity of the crime. And that there are change behaviour techniques 
interwoven into that follow-up. 
Svetlana reflected that ‘I’ve learned everyone has a different *idea of justice] and 
everyone interprets it so differently it’s ironic.’ There is a way in which her comment 
captures the manner in which both justice and participation are demanding of citizens. 
Both ask people to consider possibilities other than their own, and to step up to 
something more – even something higher – without presuming eventual agreement or 
consensus.  
In centring the victim on their status as a citizen first, what has been illuminated? Most 
obviously there are all the activities assumed without much acknowledgment – 
reporting, attending, meeting, and being available for authorities. But what else is 
added to the vocabulary of citizenship? Definitely there is speaking up and being 
involved where voice and being heard constitute a form of civic practice. But there are 
other contributions to this unique democratic practice that are more socially and 
politically situated. That is, adding specificity to certain social and legal norms, playing 
a part in public discourse about the nature of the common good, participating in re-
calibration of inter-connectedness, and advancing inclusive justice to notice a few.  
9.8 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
In the wider public policy context of citizen participation these practices of citizenship 
are prized. Through their involvement in criminal justice, victim-citizens are able to 
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convey complex messages about what happened, why it happened, the after-effects 
and implications, and what they seek for the future for themselves, the offender and 
for others. Their various interests – as social group members, users, consumers, 
taxpayers, and as witness and victim – can be accommodated under the citizen 
mantle. They do not have to choose or be forced to choose. 
This chapter has shown that participatory justice is a series of processes and 
interactions in which matters of importance to the victim, the violent person and the 
community at large ‘unfold’ (Skitka and Crosby 2003: x). Viewed in this light, the justice 
process comes more clearly into view as a (potentially) deliberative one involving 
citizens and justice decision-makers. The idea of citizen power that Arnstein equates 
with citizen participation we then see not as power over but power to. Citizens here 
are not conceived as passive and external, but as people with agency, intimately 
connected to achieving a just outcome in a just process. That is, as people whose voice 
is influential in the settling of matters of importance to them in their community. 
Justice in its institutional manifestation becomes a ‘creative space’270 for citizens to 
engage with each other and with authorities, and to deliberate what is fair and just.  
In this context, influence means influence and not control. Victim-citizens’ interest is in 
an interactive and communicative dialogue with decision-makers in which features of 
both their victim status and their citizen identities are respected. Their reasoning and 
reflections recognise the particular nature of the decision-making spaces and the 
multiple civic values (fairness, equality, efficiency) that inhabit these. They accept 
constraint on their self-interest in this unique public space. Self-constraint in this 
public domain is not abnegation of self. In the ‘distinctive enterprise of living together’ 
(Duff 2010: 5), this requires recognition, adjustment and the likelihood of incomplete 
resolutions. 
Inclusion is demanding of citizens. Interviewing people three times over the course of 
the process revealed a shift from them (as any of us might) expressing a general 
opinion about the ‘idea of justice’, to thinking hard about it. They had to. Justice as a 
deliberative and participatory process asks people really what they think and really 
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what they think in this particular circumstance. Asking about their reasoning opens the 
deliberative space further. This is hard work on people and work which takes time. But 
it is work which nurtures judgment and decision in citizens (Barber 1984). Their justice 
interests are revealed as expansive multi-criterion and multi-dimensional concerns 
that connect to a trilogy of interests. What they bring from their private world is 
codetermined with public concerns.  
In claiming that justice is not a solitarist exercise, John Dryzek says that Sen has ‘made 
democracy central’ to justice (Dryzek 2013: 2). In this democratic evocation, citizens’ 
voices are multi-faceted. They are constituted as being influential, and saying 
something about their identities and their connections and disconnections to the 
social world. Their involvement rests on the ‘core principle’ that those ‘affected’ – 
those with a direct interest in a matter – ought to be involved (Dryzek 2013: 6). The 
voices of victim-citizens are made manifest in the criminal justice process because of 
this democratic principle.  
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CHAPTER 10:  CONCLUSION 
You need to have time to think. It can’t be a heat of the moment but also not too 
long that it’s forgotten. (Bailey 2011) 
Understanding the demands of justice is no more of a solitarist exercise than any 
other human discipline ... (Sen 2009: 88–89) 
 
This thesis has surfaced citizen conversations about justice.  It has offered a number of 
different lenses through which to read their ideas about justice, and to read at 
moments sharpened by the convergence of conflict. The lenses have filtered ancient 
and contemporary thought through more vernacular frames, and have illuminated 
focus on a number of concerns that demand the attention of justice. Seeing through 
the eyes of citizens has revealed justice as a means of critical evaluation, a standard of 
assessment, an inclusive structure, as a communal construct, and as an improbable 
horizon. Working towards justice was, for the victim-citizens in this study, frustrating, 
agitating, puzzling and demanding. That they were, nonetheless, prepared to be 
involved in a process intended to achieve justice is a core feature that has enlivened 
this enquiry. 
It is well known that people who are victimised by violence and who engage with the 
criminal justice system usually find the experience unsatisfactory and bruising. On this 
point, scholars, legal officials, victim advocates and even the general public can agree. 
What flows from this recognition diverges widely. Some want to abandon formal 
criminal justice, some argue to graft ameliorative processes to the larger framework, 
and some in institutional elites argue for orthodox continuity. Underpinning these 
disparate visions are much larger debates about the values and reasoning that people 
ascribe to actions, cooperation or conflict models of society, the role of criminal law in 
social and political systems, and the nature and extent of state authority over peoples. 
Threaded through it all are questions about the involvement of ordinary people in 
decision-making on matters in which they are directly affected. 
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In this concluding chapter I draw on these deep debates to indicate the significance of 
my work. Amartya Sen’s idea and analysis of justice in the real world made it possible 
for me to refigure and reconceptualise what has been to date a confused and 
somewhat toxic clash about victims. I extend his framework by drawing on other ideas 
regarding direct interests in deliberation, and on democracy and difference. I frame 
and briefly summarise my findings. I draw attention to the strengths and limitations in 
my research. In closing, I contemplate further lines of inquiry that arise from the 
tensions inherent in deliberating injustice.  
10.1 REVISITING THE BEGINNING 
Having commenced this thesis worrying over the procedural treatment of people who 
were victims of violence, their voices stilled and stabilised me to focus on what they 
were saying about the nature of justice itself. In many ways their bewilderment in 
encountering a system that was both familiar and foreign, mirrored my own confusion 
about its justifying arguments. In talking and working with the thirty-three people who 
comprise the bedrock to this study, I was encouraged to go below the surface 
arguments in search of what was really at stake. Returning to speak with many of them 
over several months showed the potency of the Gramscian assertion that ordinary 
people are philosophers of their everyday lives. It was this journey of reflection that 
pointed me towards justice as deliberation.  
Ultimately, my thesis amplifies these voices from below – in all their diversity and 
complexity – in a place where power-holders circumscribe who may speak, when and 
how. Being heard, however, is more than a platitude. This is the challenge that victim-
citizens acting to shape their individual and communal lives make of justice institutions 
in a democracy. I argue for the capacity and the right of the citizen to speak frankly 
and with dignity (White 1990). I imagine recognition of victim-citizens as members of a 
political community where collective and individual interests are accommodated; and 
where plurality and contestation may work towards that accommodation but not 
actually require it. I understand that some injustices in actual lives may not be 
amenable to the comprehensive outcome that Sen theorises. I expect that it is a 
particular challenge for the criminal justice system to be open to the indeterminate. 
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Nonetheless I further emphasise the obligation of the state to ensure conditions for 
the active participation of citizens in matters in which they have a direct stake; but also 
because it should and must check its own power. I join emphatically with Iris Young in 
prioritising inclusion as a fundamental ideal of democratic citizenship and democratic 
decision-making. 
Recognising the citizen status of the victim enabled this democratic turn in my thesis. I 
used this lens to reframe justice as a civic institution that is, or should be, deferential 
to the people it serves. Introducing the demos, however, does bring inconvenience, 
uncertainty, contradiction and ambiguity. They are unruly and difficult to contain. All 
of these are things that the modernist project of institutional justice (represented in 
this thesis by my small group of legal mandarins) seeks to replace with consistency, 
regularity and stability. The narrowing and concentration of power that public 
prosecution has accrued, with token formal checks, is a manifestation of ‘de-
democratisation’ (Tilley 2007: 59). Challenging this trend certainly raises a counter-
argument about populist justice. Acknowledging the (entirely predictable) manner in 
which media and politicians conjure menacing majorities or oppressive opinion does 
not, I contend, detract from the main point. Attention to inflammatory representations 
of victim, victimhood and visions of public order mask authentic complexities. It 
obscures many publics with an abstract singular public. Perhaps worst of all, it 
confuses direct affected interest with majoritarian clamour.  
10.2 MY ARGUMENT IN BRIEF – JUST INTERESTS 
This thesis shows that justice emerges from injustice as means and a measure to 
address it. Justice acts as an imaginary that opens and orders action(s) but does not 
drive it. In the public space designated for matters that seek justice, people victimised 
by violence think in an expanded frame that is inhabited by three key areas of concern 
– victim, offender and community. These relational and communal concerns reveal 
private and public interests as constitutive and co-determining. 
To these three domains the victim – posed as a citizen first – brings multiple goals that 
follow accountability and are grounded in reasoning that also reflects private and 
public interests. The victim-citizen draws on public policy narratives about ending 
 251 
violence and places their personal desire to be safe within that frame. They bring with 
them the further public policy outlook that justice institutions will do their jobs, be fair 
and efficacious. Yet their actual expectations are uncertain. In reasoning their 
motivations, goals and expectations in the different decision-making moments of the 
justice process, victim-citizens comment through moral commitments and 
contemplate what might occur in the future. The conceptions of justice that spoke of 
normative guidance, of duty and of accountability all influenced victim thinking about 
goals. 
Behind flat statements of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with justice lie a number of 
dimensions that constitute integrated justice judgements. These reveal the premium 
placed on fair outcome, fair and respectful treatment of victims and of the offender, 
and for the victim voice to be influential. Conceptions of justice that were context 
sensitive and contingent operated to calibrate these judgements. 
In a further iteration of the interactive nature of private and public, victim-citizens 
indicate preferences for a range of participatory opportunities while deferring to 
public authorities as ultimate decision-makers. These opportunities denote occasions 
when citizenship becomes demanding. That is, where a person’s everyday opinion on 
what is just must evolve to actual expressions with real consequence for all concerned. 
Principles of fairness, equality, respect and recognition underpinned victim-citizens’ 
thinking about participation. 
As a set of findings, none settles argument about what the constituency of victims of 
violence want, or identifies the correct emphasis to place on proper treatment or 
substantive outcome. Law is neither wholly certain nor a simple solution in this 
argument. The significance of my work lies in part on laying out the complexity of 
justice in real lives; and showing that the different philosophical approaches to justice 
do not reside only in libraries. I am aware that the ways in which I have examined 
justice in this thesis should arguably be separated – that is, justice as normative value, 
justice as judgement, justice as standard, and justice as institution. However, in real 
lives in a real and complex process, such separations slip. People confronted with 
radical particularity must step up to give opinion, respond to options, puzzle, think, 
reason, manage emotional states, and deliberate what justice means to them and to 
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those around them. They do not want a single thing; they want a lot of things. We 
cannot arrive at a sense of deep justice through one moment. 
10.3 EXPANDED THESIS SUMMARY  
This section sets out in more detail the findings and discussion. These follow the 
chapter chronology. 
10.3.1 Mapping institutional justice 
The first data chapter unpicked certain of the institutional logics to criminal justice. I 
did this through the narratives of an elite group of ex-Directors of Public Prosecution. 
This chapter worked from the questions of where power resides in criminal justice and 
how it works. Posed on the one hand as commonplace administrators and on the other 
as exercising sovereign prerogative, I see contemporary public prosecution as 
emblematic of actual institutional power and of symbolic command of criminal justice. 
Yet I could not spend a couple of hours in deep discussion on a subject about which 
they are passionate, and not also see good people. Good people putting their intellect, 
compassion and expertise to work. As good people they could not, however, say the 
unsayable – that individual members of the public are sacrificed to this work.  
I am conscious of the irony in using the reflections of this elite group, good people 
though they are, in a depersonalised single narrative form. In the public realm it is 
usually they who have individual identity and substance. I showed the way in which, 
representative of institutional power, their selective telling of certain historical 
transitions has silenced a more complex account of the evolution and invocation of 
criminal law and criminal justice. That is, one in which private citizens emerged from 
their varied publics to author their own story of prosecution and what seeking justice 
meant to them. While the institutional birth of public prosecution is very recent, 
prosecutors nonetheless have attached themselves to an extended master narrative 
that maps to a civilising trajectory. They project a discourse of benign competence, 
inevitability and naturalness.  
To this image of the benevolent mandarin, prosecutors add the language of high 
principle. The assertion of independence connects to visions of integrity. The claim to 
represent community diverts scrutiny; just as custodianship of public interest suggests 
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democratic authenticity. Essential to the authoritarian discourse are seemingly 
opposing depictions of a public that is vulnerable and in need of protection, and a 
public that is vengeful. The element to the discourse that is commonly ignored is that 
the prosecution is also the state.  
I argue that it is through the claim to be the entity representing public with the 
mandate to determine who and what among the publics are legitimated, plus 
definitional authority on what constitutes the interests of that public that the unique 
ideological power of prosecution achieves pre-eminence. As discourse it compels 
universal acceptance. As ideology it masks hegemony. As hegemony it makes itself felt 
in the day-to-day exercise of unfettered discretion. 
Does this practice of discretion always work to the interest of institutional power? It is, 
after all, flexibility in response to case circumstances. It takes place within a gap in the 
rules where public prosecution, representing the state and its own idea of common 
good, may appear merciful or may disadvantage individual members of the public.271 It 
masks the fact that prosecution decision-making is absolute and essentially without 
review. The rights-bearing victim-citizen is simply impossible to recognise, whereas 
there is no doubt that the accused has rights. The idea of justice becomes simply a 
calculation of risk and benefit. Ironically, institutional constraint meant that 
prosecutors’ reflections on justice were less resonant with the philosophical ideal than 
were those of lay people. 
However, I also showed that the gap in which prosecution and the victim-citizen 
interact and where discretion plays out is richly textured. Considerable diversity of 
characterisation and experience inhabit prosecution anecdotes about their work with 
victims and offenders. That which is posed as rigidly formal is actually trodden with 
informality. A generic and abstract figure of the public is deeply marked by private 
tragedies and transgressions. Legal formality requires a particular modelling of these 
private affairs of citizens but it cannot change their essential informal nature. Pierre 
Bourdieu’s suggestion that the distinction between public and private is over-
                                                     
271
 Both the alleged offender and the victim, both being citizens, are disadvantaged if a prosecution 
proceeds or if it does not. Sometimes the disadvantage to each is similar and sometimes not. It may be 
argued that proceeding to prosecute is more likely in the victim’s interests. However, this is a 
contestable proposition. 
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determined therefore works two ways. He illuminates those who benefit from the 
boundary setting. But he also invites us to look the other way, to notice the 
constitutive nature of public and private such that it emerges in the public realm of 
criminal justice. 
10.3.2 Ordinary people and citizens 
Looking down from above – as prosecutors do – people who are victims come from a 
private elsewhere and enter a public somewhere. Essentially, the individual becomes a 
tool for their larger project. Rather than articulate this, splintered pictures of the 
victim fill the public space. 
In various realms – of the legal official, academia and wider society – these splinters 
are rendered pathetic or as punitive victims in others’ media and political wars. In 
Chapter 5 I stepped away from this noise. In an effort to characterise people as more 
than their transitional victim status, I borrowed the terms ‘ordinary people’ and 
‘citizen’. I wanted to follow Amartya Sen’s exhortation that a theory of justice must 
account for actual lives in the real world. In the first iteration I added flesh and depth 
to the lay participants by exploring the latent structure of values, attitudes and beliefs 
which revealed them embedded within a social world that is both various and regular. 
As ordinary people they have varied lives and histories, and different engagements 
with the civic world. They are part of a larger mass. By connecting people to this mass I 
made a pronounced distinction between them and power-holders such as public 
prosecutors. With this distinction in place, naming them next as citizen married social 
status with political status. As a definitional concept, describing victims as ‘citizens 
first’ opened a larger space in which the lay participants could talk about their ideas of 
justice.  
While each of the lay people who participated was generous with their time, I fear I 
have not done justice to the light and shade of their thinking. At the second and third 
interviews the intensity of the incident and police intervention was subsumed by a 
different tone of comment about prosecution and court. I was struck by how 
consistently people would say, ‘I know they have a job to do’ and then go on to ask for 
something more individual to their circumstance. They wanted account taken of their 
questions, requirements, requests and reasons. At the same time, they were acutely 
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aware of the public function and duties of the various institutions. As citizens do, they 
thought of the particular and the general – a characteristic that is deep in ideas of 
justice. 
In terms of their personal values, beliefs and attitudes about criminal justice the lay 
participants were not so different to the wider Australian population. They felt a 
strong commitment to the moral obligation of the law even though some of them had 
mixed histories with legal and welfare authorities. However, they were significantly 
more muted in their confidence in criminal justice. In this too they were similar to the 
wider Australian community. When faced with decisions in circumstances in which 
their control was circumscribed, these latent features were influential. But their beliefs 
were also unstable. If people expected the justice system to be fair, they also expected 
fairness to be discharged unevenly and differentially. This complex thinking in victim-
citizens is generally veiled and unacknowledged in scholarly and public discourse.  
This psychological infrastructure is one among a number of elements contributing to 
decision-making. The meanings that people make of the incident draw upon an 
emotional, cognitive and contextual mix that is intensely personal. Yet, in their 
engagement with significant others and with authorities, both men and women were 
informed by reasoning that was relational and communal, and that linked to public 
policy appeals that violence was wrong and not to be tolerated. This wider orientation 
showed that ‘thinking like a citizen’ did not oblige people to discard their own 
interests. It suggests that the idea of justice may act to engage people’s ‘ethical 
identity’ in a unique and pivotal manner (Harris 2007). 
Of critical importance to this possibility is seeing the number of ways justice was 
constructed by the lay participants. From the standpoint of disinterested citizen, 
justice is conceived from the potency of its symbols, to assessment of its efficacy, 
acknowledgment of its multiple governance functions, and finally to evaluation of its 
performance of certain norms that are core to the wider ideal. In unwrapping this 
imaginary, I showed justice to have concrete manifestations, performances and 
idealisations. In this latter form, the ideal elements of justice – fairness, equality, 
respect for all, and neutrality – are clearly compelling to lay people. However, they are 
also viewed as contingent and ambiguous in the real world. 
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10.3.3 Exploring justice goals 
If the justice imaginary is unstable, then mobilising law is made with a hesitant step. In 
Chapter 6 I assert that the mobilisation of law by citizens is one among a number of 
options and is discretionary – even in the face of violence. It is a structural opportunity 
infused with drawbacks as much as with possibilities. To this opportunity I show that 
the victim-citizen brings multiple goals. Asking people what they wanted and why at 
different points in the justice process and at different times was revealing of how the 
idea of justice lived and moved. 
The after-effects of violence – emotional and physical – were significant, although 
different in intensity and degree among the lay participants. Between the first and 
second interviews, feelings of anger and fear towards the person who had used the 
violence lessened for the victims. However, there was no change to the ascription of 
intentionality. Having been motivated to seek justice through the experience of 
injustice, the sense of a wrong done did not diminish over time. The desire for the 
wrong to be brought to account and for persons to be held to account is strong for the 
victim-citizen. Reasoning here was deontological in character. I conclude that 
accountability is a unifying threshold condition for justice and one that is sustained 
over the course of multiple encounters with different justice entities.  
But if accountability is a starting point for the realisation of justice, is it also an end? On 
this point the idea of justice shifted to thinking about consequence. Here the lay 
participants articulated diverse goals to their reasons for seeking justice. These were 
instrumental and non-instrumental, personal and public. They were consistent in the 
abstract as well as the concrete. As goals they were directed towards three domains – 
to the victim, the offender and the community. This trilogy of interests represented 
different objects of value to which the good of justice was to be directed. This is the 
‘plural grounding’ to ideas of justice that Amartya Sen asks us to attend to. Through 
the reflections of the lay participants I confirmed this inherent power and capacity in 
the idea of justice to trigger expansive thinking. In asking about justice, people 
necessarily thought of others. 
What this point then complicates is the proposition that achieving justice for victims is 
getting what they want, or ‘outcome preference’. If getting a favourable outcome is 
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something that is personally beneficial, then can this work with the different objects to 
which justice is directed? Part of the answer to this puzzle is Sen’s argument that the 
plural grounds for justice can be ‘partially ordered’. Interviewing people three times in 
a prospective longitudinal panel showed their multiple goals to be sequenced. The 
priorities of one person, however, are different to those of another and for different 
reasons. As a composite group, the lay participants wanted the court to arrive at 
sentences that were protective, rehabilitative and that drew on the authority of the 
court. They prioritised principles of rehabilitation, specific deterrence and victim 
protection. As a group they drew on reasons that were private as well as reasons that 
were communal. Each, however, ordered all of these features differently.  
Plurality, ordering and sequencing illuminated a further puzzle. The lay participants 
were asked questions about getting the outcome they wanted, whether they were 
satisfied with the outcome, and whether justice was done. There was complexity and 
contradiction in just about every person’s responses. People even said that the 
sentence (as one manifestation of outcome) was ‘about right’ even when it was not 
what they wanted. Clearly contrary positions appear to survive. In puzzling this 
complexity, what was revealing in people’s reflections at their final interview was a 
sense of incomplete resolution. That is, that the interests of the offender and the 
community were accounted for in the justice deliberation, but not those of the victim. 
This chapter highlighted informationally rich thinking about justice goals. As ordinary 
citizens, people carry, interpret and manage their own and others’ ideas about justice 
as a multi-directional conception. Their thinking is infused with relational and 
emotional content that responds to shifts in context and emphasis. Reasoning their 
motivations and goals showed people thinking from moral commitments and as 
consequentialists. There is an oscillation that works between these two modes of 
thinking about justice that is particularly noticeable in interactions where people are 
provided with a number of occasions and a number of probes.  
10.3.4 Experiencing justice 
Chapter 8 explored further what lay behind flat assessments of satisfaction – this time 
through procedural and substantive justice inquiry. When the lay participants actually 
experienced justice as a series of interactions with authoritative decision-makers, I 
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weighed how their reflections sat alongside their earlier citizen-based expectations. 
Rather than arriving at an end point where procedural or substantive justice 
predominated in justice judgments, I came to see these as components that interacted 
strongly in an integrated conception of justice. Moreover, interviewing the lay 
participants a number of times showed their justice judgments to be context sensitive 
as well as malleable and fluid. I conclude that, rather than ascribe ‘single motives or 
simple frames’ at singular moments to human behaviour, people are ‘both flexible and 
complex’ in their thinking about justice. Reasoning about justice in the real world is 
contingent and less about ‘competing conceptions’ (Skitka et al. 2010: 28).  
However, the procedural and substantive approaches did help unpack and to leverage 
understanding about what ordinary people think is fair and just. I illuminated these 
constructions as active, dynamic, interactive and unfolding within criminal justice and 
within people’s wider social context. The interactions with authorities were moments 
during which ideas about justice could be experienced and enacted, and which then 
flowed into and changed with the next interface. Satisfaction with police is significantly 
higher than satisfaction with prosecution, court and with the justice system overall. 
However, I found that different dimensions, consistent with the literature, underlie 
assessments. These criteria of outcome acceptance, the quality of interpersonal 
treatment, influential voice, and respect for offenders’ rights showed the experience 
of justice to be multi-layered. 
These components fluctuate in importance but all are present in assessments about 
the three justice agencies. For all three justice agencies, the strongest positive 
correlation with overall satisfaction was with outcome acceptance and the quality of 
the interpersonal treatment. But the elements also linked strongly with each other in 
differing ways. Outcome acceptance and interpersonal treatment correlated strongly 
together; and the influential voice connected strongly with outcome acceptance for all 
three agencies. While the elements can be separated, they are clearly not separate. 
Rather, they form supple dimensions. 
Moreover, these different dimensions were permeated with nuance in highly 
contextualised and particularised reflection from the lay participants. The emphases 
people placed on the quality of their interpersonal treatment embraced recognition of 
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their unique standing and circumstances, as well as respect for their personhood. 
Respect and recognition were demonstrated through the manner in which information 
was or was not provided by authorities. Victim-citizens clearly experienced information 
as a power resource. They also understood interaction with authorities as dialogue. 
The strong expectation for fairness in criminal justice that the lay participants 
articulated at their first interview emerged on later occasions in how they experienced 
equitable and fair treatment of themselves as well as of the violent person.  
Justice as the attainment of outcome was also experienced in a number of ways. The 
reflections people offered went to the trilogy of interests they articulated at the 
commencement of their engagement with authorities. At the same time, these 
considerations sharpened at the second interview to focus primarily on the nature, 
appropriateness and impact of the sentence on the violent person, and the 
consequences to themselves and others. In an echo of their initial citizen evaluations 
about justice, people further pondered the extent to which the outcome calibrated 
with the normative and governance functions of justice. Perhaps inevitably, the 
resolutions they experienced were partial and incomplete.  
10.3.5 Participating in justice 
Chapter 9 expanded on the nature and reach of victim-citizens’ voice as one of the 
components underpinning justice judgments. I showed that the importance of ‘voice’ 
is not just its expressive nature but that it is related to a sense that the outcome 
arrived at is acceptable and fair. The lay participants assessed their voice as 
moderately influential with police and prosecution and weakly influential with court. 
As a composite scale, influential voice showed strong and significant correlation 
between overall satisfaction with prosecution and with court.  
People’s narratives signalled voice to be a unique set of practices. They indicated that 
being heard was to be recognised as someone with distinctive and important insight 
into particular circumstances. To be heard was about influence that was meaningful; 
to be heard by authorities was a way of connecting ‘the victim’ to their different 
publics. To be heard was to have and to experience an influential voice embodied in 
the dual status of victim-citizen. Notwithstanding the stress placed on the influence of 
voice, the lay participants did not wish to supplant or dominate decision-makers. They 
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deferred to their expert status, to the experience and to the distinctive roles of 
authorities. In deferring they also referred to values constitutive of justice – fairness, 
impartiality and attention to evidence. They understood constraint in a unique public 
space. 
Given the demanding expectations of justice that the longitudinal interviews revealed 
– including the importance of voice – I paid attention to how these could possibly be 
met and were actually met. At their first interview the majority of victim-citizens 
indicated a preference for a process that emphasised a finding. This particular decision 
is of course central to their desire for accountability. A majority also preferred that the 
process include some participatory opportunities. Of those who did indicate an 
interest in these as restorative opportunities, it was predominately for something after 
the finding and after the point of formal sentence. Interest in these opportunities was 
grounded in desires for the decision-maker as well as the offender to listen, to hear 
and to understand issues that referenced private and public concerns.  
At their second interview (after the case had finalised) more people were prepared to 
consider a restorative opportunity had it been offered. Central to this interest was a 
desire to find answers, and to interact with both the offender and with the decision-
maker. Through interaction, people felt they would have been able to convey 
messages about the harm, the wrongfulness, the consequences, and what was hoped 
for in the future. Restorative justice theorists emphasise these messages as flowing 
between victim and offender. I show that the interest in interaction triangulates 
between victim, offender and the public authority. I further conclude that, to the idea 
of sequencing justice goals, we can add sequenced steps in a process that works 
towards achieving multiple goals. 
At the end of their justice journey, only a third of those participants interviewed on all 
three occasions expressed overall satisfaction with the handling of the case by the 
justice system. In their reflections on what the idea of justice now meant to them they 
pondered its contingent and slippery nature. At the same time, their remarks affirmed 
the expansive capacity of the term. That is, the different objects of value that comes 
within justice’s realm, the many criteria embedded within it, and its ability to 
accommodate the ordering and sequencing of priorities. 
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10.4 AFTER THE DEMOCRATIC TURN  
So where does the democratic turn to this thesis take debate about victims and 
justice? Firstly, it must be recognised that people who become victims of violence also 
exist as citizens in a social space and as members of a political community before, 
during and after their engagements with justice authorities. The political character of 
citizen status then argues for a humbler set of institutions, and for attention to the 
nature and meaning of the claims that citizens make. Here the standing of persons is 
not a legal construct. Moreover, it says that to exclude affected persons with a direct 
interest in a matter from its resolution is profoundly anti-democratic (Mansbridge et 
al. 2010; Fung 2010). 
From this point comes a second one, that citizens have a range of interests in how 
justice is seen and done. Their justice interests look to different objects of value, and 
integrate a number of dimensions. When they interact on an individual basis with 
justice institutions their personal interests’ surface but do not eradicate continuing 
attentiveness to public values and concerns. Thus private and public are not – as both 
restorative and orthodox justice advocates claim – in essential and irreconcilable 
conflict (Strang 2002: 201). Rather, they are constitutive and co-determining. In 
interpreting what is a wrong, one does not exist without the other; and in accepting 
complex accountabilities, neither what is public nor who is private are abstractions.  
Third, bringing in these affected and affective voices necessarily makes transparent 
multiple meanings to the idea of justice and different principles for arriving at justice. 
Plurality and difference are not only part and parcel of contemporary democracy, but 
are arguably necessary to it. It seems ridiculous to have to state that people who are 
victims are as diverse as people who offend. Just as institutions of representative 
democracy must constantly adjust and respond to many communities and overlapping 
concerns, so too must justice institutions in serving diversity (Fung 2012). These 
institutions may be essential to the architecture of a democratic system, but 
engagement with its demos is essential to the legitimacy of justice in a wider and 
deeper sense. 
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Emerging from these three points is recognition that space272 designed with particular 
characteristics – here actually spaces to achieve justice for the political community – 
can work to demand more of citizens. While some deliberative democrats may look for 
disinterested publics or non-partisan discussants, it is directly affected citizens who 
bring issues of personal and public concern to the door of criminal justice. Some quite 
obviously walk away and leave it to authorities to deal with. Most would like 
information about what is to be done, and many ask for more involvement. These 
spaces ask for a unique practice of citizenship – reporting, giving information, 
responding to query, being available, asking questions, being interviewed, giving 
evidence, offering impact and so on. Presently the institutions simply take these 
actions. As an opportunity, however, it is rich with potential; potential to recast the 
process as a deliberative system (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012). It might ask what 
justice means to the individual (and those around them), what values they think might 
inhabit a just process and just outcome, and what outcomes they might wish to see for 
the trilogy of victim, offender and community. Moreover, the space can be made to do 
further work by asking for reasoning about preferences and encouraging thinking and 
discussion that is broad and deep, collective and individual. This is hard work, work 
that nurtures judgment and decision. It argues making deliberation work for justice 
(Dryzek 2013).  
This argument imagines justice as a space for an emergent ethical citizen. Crucially, 
however, a fifth point necessarily must recognise that not everything can be resolved 
or is reconcilable after violence and from the experience of injustice (Mouffe 2005; 
Young 2002). While the emphasis on participation in justice of affected persons 
recognises a human capacity for reflexivity, it does not assume or require forgiveness, 
healing, restoration or even agreement. Inclusive deliberation is not a guarantee of an 
agreed shared outcome (if this is one idea of justice). It is certainly also no assurance of 
‘satisfaction’. Participation is simply based on rights of more profound origin than a 
legal nod. 
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 Braithwaite & Nickson, in their discussion about the sequencing of objectives in post-conflict settings, 
talk about the creativity in making space for justice (2012). 
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Finally, if the democratic turn I make to debate about victims is demanding of them as 
citizens, it is also (perhaps most importantly) demanding of authorities. On this point 
there is no gesturing to courtesy or reliance on good people. This point demands that 
authorities recognise and discharge their duties to people (victims and offenders) as 
rights-bearing citizens. Lest this assertion suggest subservience, the space creates 
demands for active ethical practice on authorities to guard against their own power as 
well as to engage with individuals. The victim-citizens in this study articulated goals for 
themselves as well as for others. When matters came to court, however, the personal 
goals often fell away. How easy it is for authorities to let victim-oriented concerns 
disappear into the shadows of the law. An ethical practice of justice would accept and 
act upon obligation to each in the justice trilogy. 
10.5 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
I started this project determined to employ a method that would make transparent 
the range of interactions and decisions that comprised the justice system to victims of 
violence. I especially wanted to make space for different, sometimes contradictory, 
voices and to reveal the ways in which, in my working life, I had seen people’s thinking 
about justice unfold. I had been critical of the single survey methodologies of so many 
studies of victims of crime and violence. The longitudinal prospective methodology 
certainly gave up rich and complex data, as I had hoped. Equally, the rapport that 
developed over time between me and the lay participants served to emphasise the 
reflective and communicative potential of shared deliberation over time. There is 
strength also in the interplay of narrative and quantitative data. Mixed longitudinal 
data is, however, difficult to work with and to wrestle into shape.  
While I criticise the manner in which single survey researchers’ box complex and fluid 
voices, it is a weakness that I did not manage to fully overcome. Each of the chapters 
broke stories into digestible parts. I pulled narratives apart to make particular points 
transparent. I wrestled with different ways in which I might give the reader a person’s 
‘whole’ story, and with which criteria to choose. So in placing David’s story at the 
beginning, I hoped his voice would speak to the reader and for all the others. I hope 
this has, in some small way, honoured them. 
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Panel attrition is a real challenge. However, the 20% reduction in lay participants 
between each of the three interviews is consistent with other studies. I would have 
liked a better balance between domestic and non-domestic assault victims. However, 
this too had adjusted by the third interview.  At that time, after proportionately more 
domestic assault victims had ceased participating, 26% of the final panel comprised 
men assaulted by strangers or known others. As an exploratory and interpretive study, 
issues of representativeness and numbers sufficient to establish causality were not 
vital. Nonetheless a future study would benefit from a larger sample and more 
equitable proportions between any sub-groups.273 
10.6 THE PLACE AND POLITICS OF JUSTICE 
In closing I return to ponder Jonathon Simon’s remarks that people who were victims 
of crime and who sought recognition from and involvement with the justice system 
were anti-democratic. It was this inference that turned me to consider whether 
democratic theory had anything to say to justice. I hope I have been able to show a 
little of how ‘solidarity and responsibility’ can be enacted in spaces where people are 
afforded equal respect and concern.  
Hitherto, the victim’s exclusion from criminal justice has not been recognised as a 
democratic deficit. The orthodox space of contemporary criminal justice allows only 
strictly circumscribed roles and recitals to victims – and also to offenders. Criminal 
justice evokes different fears, expectations and imagery. It is a powerful presence in 
our democratic society more than it is actually present in ordinary people’s lives. It 
provides a window through which to see mundane even squalid pictures of human 
interaction. It is a platform on which different performances are enacted – those 
drawing on the flourish of high principle and lofty language, and those depicting 
skirmish and dissonance. 
The justice system highlights the social divisions, conflicts and entitlements that give 
rise to the commission of crime. It draws attention to ways in which the system 
                                                     
273
 Future research using longitudinal prospective methodology may also explore differences and 
similarities across diverse categories. For example, between victims of property offences and victims of 
violence offences; or between victims of physical violence and victims of sexual violence; or between 
victims in one legal system and victims in another different legal system. 
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regulates these divisions and acts to punish transgression. This way of thinking about 
the political in justice – its social control function – is recognised. Obscured from our 
understanding of the justice system as political is the exclusion of affected citizens – 
victims as well as offenders – from a direct and dignified role. The legal justification for 
this marginalisation has masked what is in effect a profoundly anti-democratic 
rationale. Underneath the high rhetoric about public interest and representing 
community is simply utilitarian logic. This is a project that human rights law and 
activism has yet to discover. What is at stake is not only fair and inclusive justice, but 
deep democracy. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Prosecution Interview Schedule 
I want to commence with some questions that are very broad, but I think are 
necessary to understand and frame your opinions. 
Overview 
What do you think is the role that criminal law & justice performs in our society? 
Where and how do you think ‘legitimacy’ for those roles come from in Australia? 
What do you think ‘the community’ think of criminal law & justice?  Are the viewpoints 
similar to or different from victims of violence in your experience? 
How do you think public prosecution in Australia has gained (or lost) & maintains (or 
doesn’t) its legitimacy with the community & with victims of violence? 
Does confidence in justice equate with the legitimacy of justice?  Is one necessary for 
the other? 
Does anything need to change in your view – why & how? 
Conceptions of Justice 
What was the conception of justice you carried in your working life as a prosecutor?  
What are its main components? In what ways did you find your ideas of justice 
challenged/ affirmed in your working life as a prosecutor?   
In your working life as a prosecutor, did you develop a sense of what justice meant to 
victims of violence?  What were the similarities & differences to your own conception? 
In your mind, why would a member of the public (as a victim of violence) report 
violence to police & cooperate with prosecution?   
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Prosecution role 
What are the key historical influences to the establishment of public prosecution in 
Australia?  Are there differences and similarities to this history with that for the 
evolution of public prosecution in England (other common law countries)? 
What are the core legal and policy underpinnings to the role of a public prosecutor?  
Were there tensions, pressures and dilemmas for you in executing this role?  If yes, can 
you expand on these? 
How do you define the public interest in criminal law and justice?  Is there any 
information or mechanisms (legal, administrative or other) you used to help you 
understand and work with this concept as a prosecutor?  Were there tensions, 
pressures and dilemmas for you in performing your role in the public interest?  If yes, 
can you expand on these? 
How do you understand the private interest of a victim in criminal law and justice?  Is 
there any information or mechanisms (legal, administrative or other) you used to help 
you understand and work with victims’ private interests as a prosecutor?  What were 
the tensions, pressures and dilemmas for you in accommodating (or not) these 
interests while performing your role in the public interest?   
Do you see any connections between these issues and community confidence in the 
fair administration of justice? If yes, can you expand on these? 
Future changes 
There is debate amongst researchers, victim advocates & others about the issue of 
‘victim choice’ as an aspect of empowerment and/or their ‘rights’ as citizens.  What 
does this mean to you as a prosecutor?  What choices do victims have/not have? 
If there were to be structural, conceptual or legal changes to the ways in which 
criminal law and justice accommodates or involves the private interests of victims of 
violence, what might these look like to you? 
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APPENDIX B 
VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE & JUSTICE (TIME 1) 
 
 
 
REF NO: ______________DATE OF INTERVIEW: ________________________________ 
 
NAME OF INTERVIEWEE: 
___________________________________________________ 
 
DATE OF BIRTH: 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
DATE OF INCIDENT: 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
PROMIS NUMBER: 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
CONTACT DETAILS: 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
PERSON ALLEGED TO HAVE COMMITTED THE INCIDENT:  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
DATE OF BIRTH: 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
CHARGES HOW FINALISED DATE FINALISED SENTENCE 
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INTRODUCTION 
This survey is about listening to victims of violence.  What you as a victim of violence 
say you would like from justice is vitally important to help improve the system.  The 
research will explore in depth your experience and opinions.  What you have to say 
matters very much! 
NOTE ABOUT LANGUAGE:  The term “violence” is used to describe the recent incident 
from which police became involved.  This might not be the term that you prefer. 
The survey asks you about a whole range of things.  It asks you a bit about the recent 
incident itself and its impact on you.  It asks about the response of the police and 
about what you want to see happen to the case at court.  It also asks about some of 
your values and beliefs. 
The survey starts off by asking you some basic questions about you and your family 
background.  The questions are the same as asked in the national census. 
SECTION ONE:  PARTICIPANT BACKGROUND 
Q1.  Are you? 
 Male ................................................................ 1 
 Female............................................................. 2 
Q2.  Gender of person who used violence against you? MORE THAN ONE? 
 Male ................................................................ 1 
 Female............................................................. 2 
Q3.  What country were you born in? Please circle one. 
Australia 
Overseas (specify) ………………………………………………. 
Q4.  What country was your mother born in? Please circle one. 
Australia 
Overseas (specify) ………………………………………………. 
Q5.  What country was your father born in? Please circle one. 
Australia 
Overseas (specify) ………………………………………………. 
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Q6. Do you speak a language other than English at home? Please circle one. 
 No, English only ....................... 1 
 Yes, Italian ................................ 2 
 Yes, Greek ................................ 3 
 Yes, Cantonese ......................... 4 
 Yes, Mandarin .......................... 5 
 Yes, Arabic ................................ 6 
 Yes, Vietnamese ....................... 7 
 Yes, other ................................. 8 
Specify ……………………………………………..…………… 
Q7. Do you identify yourself as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander? 
 No ............................................. 1 
 Yes, Aboriginal ......................... 2 
 Yes, Torres Strait Islander ........ 2 
Q8. Do you have a disability of any kind? 
 No ............................................. 1 
 Yes (please specify) .................. 2 
…………………………………………………………………..…. 
Q9.  What is your current relationship status? (Please circle one)  
 Married (including de facto relationships) ..................... 1 
 Single (including divorced, separated, widowed) ........... 2 
Q10.  Did you have any children living with you at the time of the incident? (Please 
circle one) 
 No ............................................. 1 
 Yes ............................................ 2 
Q11.  Did you own or rent your home at the time of the incident? (Please circle one) 
 Own (including paying off a mortgage) ............................. 1 
 Rent .................................................................................... 2 
 Other .................................................................................. 3 
Q12.  At the time of the incident, what was your employment status? (Please circle 
one) 
 Working full-time ........................................................................ 1 
 Working part-time ...................................................................... 2 
 Not employed ............................................................................. 3 
 Retired ........................................................................................ 4 
 Studying full-time................................................5      (Go to Q14) 
 Home duties ........................................................6      (Go to Q14) 
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Q13  And your occupation? Please circle one. 
 Manager or Administrator .............................. 1 
 Professional .................................................... 2 
 Tradesperson .................................................. 3 
 Clerical, sales or service worker ..................... 4 
 Labourer, transport or factory worker ........... 5 
 
Q14  What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Please circle one) 
 Received no formal schooling ......................... 1 
 Primary school ................................................ 2 
 High school ...................................................... 3 
 College/TAFE ................................................... 4 
 Bachelor's Degree ........................................... 5 
 Post Grad qualification (of some kind) ........... 6 
 Masters or PhD ............................................... 7 
Q15  What is your gross annual income, before tax or other deductions, from all 
sources? (Please circle a number) 
 0 – 25,000 ....................................................... 1 
 25,001 – 45,000 .............................................. 2 
 45,001 – 100,000 ............................................ 3 
 100,001 – 250,000 .......................................... 4 
 250,001 - above .............................................. 5 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU!  This is the end of that personal background information. 
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SECTION TWO: THE RECENT INCIDENT 
 
This section asks you a bit about the recent incident, but firstly I’d like to ask about 
some of your thinking beforehand. 
Q16. Prior to this incident, had you thought or talked with anyone about using some 
sort of law or the justice system or something to try and address the problem?  Can 
you tell me a bit about your thinking?  For example, why, why not? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………..……………………………………………………………………………………..….. 
Q17.  Prior to this incident, if someone had asked you what you thought about the 
justice system in our community, what might you have said? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q18.  When you think about the idea of justice what sorts of things might come to 
mind for you? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………………………… 
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Q19. Now I would like to ask you some questions about the incident where police 
became involved and a person was charged.  Did the incident involve: (please answer 
all options) 
None at all  A little bit Quite a bit  Quite a lot 
a. Physical abuse 1 2 3 4 
b. Verbal abuse 1 2 3 4 
c. Sexual abuse 1 2 3 4 
d. Other (please state 
what) 1 2 3 4 
 
Q20. Did you suffer any effects as a result of the incident? Please answer all options 
 None at all  A little bit Quite a bit  Quite a lot 
a. Physical injury 1 2 3 4 
b. Emotional injury 1 2 3 4 
c. Damage to your 
property 1 2 3 4 
d. Other (please state 
what) 1 2 3 4 
 
Q21. Thinking about how you felt at the time of the incident, can you say if you felt: 
(Please circle one on each line)  
Not at all  Not very  Somewhat  Very Extremely  
a. Distressed 1 2 3 4 5  
b. Angry 1 2 3 4 5  
c. Frightened 1 2 3 4 5  
d. Humiliated 1 2 3 4 5  
e. Other please 
state what) 1 2 3 4 5  
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Q22. Do you think that this incident was: (Please circle one) 
Not at all serious 
Not very 
serious 
Somewha
t serious 
Very 
serious Extremely serious 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q23. At the time of this incident, was there a protection order in place between you 
and the person using the violence?  If more than 1 person, refer to main or primary 
charged person throughout. 
 Yes ................................................................................................ 1 
 No (Go to Q25) ............................................................................. 2 
 Don’t know/Can’t recall (Go to Q25) ........................................... 3 
 
Q24. Who was the applicant for the order? 
 You (victim interviewee) .............................................................. 1 
 Other person ................................................................................ 2 
 
Q25. When the incident took place, what is/was your relationship with the person 
using violence? 
 Husband/wife .............................................................................. 1 
 Ex-husband/wife .......................................................................... 2 
 De facto partner ........................................................................... 3 
 Ex-de facto partner ...................................................................... 4 
 Boyfriend/girlfriend ..................................................................... 5 
 Ex-Boyfriend/girlfriend ................................................................ 6 
 Other (state what relationship to you) ........................................ 7 
 ....................................................................... 
 
Q26. How long have you had/or did you have, this relationship with this person? 
 Under 12 months ......................................................................... 1 
 1-3 years ...................................................................................... 2 
 3-5 years ...................................................................................... 3 
 Between 5-10 years ..................................................................... 4 
 More than 10 years ...................................................................... 5 
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Q27. Do you wish for this relationship to continue? Please circle one. 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q28. Has the person who was violent to you in this incident done so on a previous 
occasion? 
 Yes ................................................................................................ 1 
 No (go to question 29) ................................................................. 2 
 Can’t Recall (go to question 29) ................................................... 3 
 
(a) If yes, how frequently has this person done something like this to you before?  
(Please circle one) 
Never done  
this before 
Once or twice 
before 
A few times 
before 
Quite a few 
times before 
Many  
times before 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
(b) In recent times, would you say that the violence has become: (please circle one) 
a lot  
less serious 
a bit less 
serious 
about the 
same 
a bit more 
serious 
pretty 
serious 
very 
serious 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
(c) In recent times, would you say that the violent situation you are in has become:  
(Please circle one) 
a lot less bad 
a bit less bad about the 
same a bit worse pretty bad very bad  
 1 2 3 4 5 6  
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Q29. Have you sought help about the violence/the situation before the recent 
incident? 
Never done  
this before 
Once or 
twice before 
A few times 
before 
Quite a few 
times before 
Many  
times before 
a. From my family ....................................................................................  1 2 3 4 5  
b. From friends ........................................................................................  1 2 3 4 5  
c. From a health service ..........................................................................  1 2 3 4 5  
d. From a community service ..................................................................  1 2 3 4 5  
e. From a spiritual leader ........................................................................  1 2 3 4 5  
f. From a lawyer ......................................................................................  1 2 3 4 5  
g. From a mental health 
service .....................................................................................................  1 2 3 4 5  
h. From the police ...................................................................................  1 2 3 4 5  
i. Other (please state 
who/what)……………………. 1 2 3 4 5  
 
Q30. Did any of these people/services encourage or support you to contact police? If 
yes, which ones? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q31. Thinking about the person who used violence in this most recent incident, how 
would you describe your feelings (emotions) now about him?  (Please answer every 
statement) 
 Definitel
y not 
Maybe 
not 
I am 
not 
sure 
Mayb
e yes 
Definitely 
yes 
a. I don’t have any particular feelings for 
this person ...............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I feel numb about this person .............................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. I feel frightened of this person. ...........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I feel love for this person. ...................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I feel angry at this person ....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. I feel empathy for this person ..............................................................  .................. 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. I feel like getting even with this person ..............................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
h. I feel forgiving toward this person ......................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. I feel confused/puzzled about this person ...........................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
j. I feel sad for this person .......................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
k. I feel pity for this person .....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q32. With reference to the most recent incident please say how much you agree or 
disagree with the following statements.  
Please answer every statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. I think the offender knew what he was 
doing at the time. ....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I think the offender did not mean to hurt 
me at the time .........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. I think the offender was provoked to do 
what he did at the time ...........................................................................  .................. 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I think the offender was influenced by 
other people at the time .........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I think the offender was influenced by 
drink/drugs at the time ...........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q33. Have a look at these statements.  How much do they seem like you and your 
feelings about your future at this time?  
 
Please answer each statement 
Not at all 
like me 
Not 
much 
like me 
Not 
sure 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very 
much 
like me 
a. What happens to me in the future 
mostly depends on me ............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I feel that I have control over the 
direction my life is taking ........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. I often feel helpless in dealing with the 
problems of life .......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. There is really no way I can solve some 
of the problems I have ............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q34. Would you say that you feel good about yourself: -  
never 
hardly ever now and then some of the 
time 
most of the 
time all the time  
 1 2 3 4 5 6  
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SECTION THREE: REPORTING TO POLICE & TREATMENT 
Now I would like to ask you some questions about reporting the incident to police 
and the police response. 
 
Q35. Who reported the incident to police? 
 You (victim interviewee) (go to Q 37).......................................... 1 
 The person using violence ........................................................... 2 
 One of your children .................................................................... 3 
 Neighbour .................................................................................... 4 
 Don’t know who reported it ........................................................ 5 
 Other (state what relationship to you) ........................................ 6 
 ....................................................................... 
 
Q36. If the person who reported to police was not you, did you: 
 Want the report made ................................................................. 1 
 Not want the report made (Go to Q39 ........................................ 2 
Was unsure whether I wanted the report 
made or not ................................................................................. 3 
  
Q37. If you did want the report made, what were the main reasons for getting police 
involved? 
………………........................................................................................................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q38. If you did want the report made, would you say why the police and not some 
other service/ agency or person at this time? 
………………........................................................................................................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
39 If you did not report the incident to police or were unsure, why not and what might 
be the circumstances in the future when you might seek help from police? 
………………........................................................................................................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q40. Below are some statements about how others might view the incident that 
took place.  Can you say how much you agree or disagree with them?  Please answer 
each statement. 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. The community sees incidents such as 
happened to me as serious. ....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Police see incidents such as happened to 
me as serious. ..........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Police understand how it feels to be a 
victim of violence ....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q41. When police attended the incident, which of the following did you mainly want 
them to do? (Please answer one) 
 
I didn’t want them there in the first place ............................................................... 1 
I wanted them to arrest the violent person & take him away ................................ 2 
I wanted them to take the violent person away but not arrest .............................. 3 
I wanted them to calm down the violent person but not arrest 
or take away  ..................................................................................................... 4 
I wanted them to take me away .............................................................................. 5 
I didn’t want them to do anything significant .......................................................... 6 
I wasn’t sure/didn’t know what I wanted them to do ............................................. 7 
Other (please state what you wanted them to do).................................................. 8 
………………........................................................................................................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q42. Can you say why you mainly wanted them to do this [what were you trying to 
achieve/your objective]?   
………………........................................................................................................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q43. When police attended the most recent incident, what did they actually do? Please 
answer each option. 
a. They arrested the violent person & took him away ......................................... No Yes 
b. They took the violent person away but did not arrest ..................................... No Yes 
c. They calmed down the violent person but not arrest or take 
away  .................................................................................................. No Yes 
d. They arrested me and took me away ............................................................... No Yes 
e. They took me away ........................................................................................... No Yes 
f. They didn’t do anything significant .................................................................... No Yes 
g. They gave me information about services ........................................................ No Yes 
h. They applied for a protection order  ................................................................. No Yes 
i. They gave me advice about options I might have ............................................. No Yes 
j. I don’t know what they did ................................................................................ No Yes 
k. Other (please state what they did) ................................................................... No Yes 
 
Q44. When you think about the way you were treated by police during the recent 
incident, do you feel…?  
Please answer each statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. I was given the opportunity to express 
my views before a decision was made ...................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I was able to influence the decision 
made by police ........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. My views were considered when a 
decision was made ..................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I agree with the decision the police made 
about the incident. ..................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I accept the decision the police made 
about the incident ...................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. I was given an honest explanation for 
why the decision was made. ...................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
g. I understand why the police made the 
decision s/he did. ....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q45. It is the police responsibility to decide to press charges if they think someone has 
broken a law.  Can you say if you agree that they should have this responsibility in 
situations like yours? 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) Why is this? ………………............................................................................................... 
 
Q46. Thinking about the decisions the police made to charge the person, would you 
say… 
Please answer each statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. I was satisfied with this decision .........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. This decision I received was fair ..........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. This decision I received was what I 
expected ..................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I received the decision I deserved.......................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I received the decision I wanted .........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q47. Generally speaking, how satisfied were you with the way the police handled your 
case at the time of the incident?  (Please circle one) 
 Extremely satisfied ....................................................................... 1 
 Very satisfied ............................................................................... 2 
 Somewhat satisfied ...................................................................... 3 
 Very dissatisfied ........................................................................... 4 
 Extremely dissatisfied .................................................................. 5 
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Q48. Thinking about the police response to the incident, do you think that you would 
call for police assistance in the future if something similar happened to you again? 
(Please circle one) 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q49. In a similar situation in the future, would you like police to deal with it in a similar 
way?  (Please circle one) 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q50. Thinking about how you were treated by police in relation to the incident can you 
indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Please answer every statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. The police did not take the incident 
seriously. .................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I was treated with respect ..................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. The police did not respect my rights ...................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I was treated with dignity by police ....................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. The police treated the violent person with 
respect .....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. The police did not respect the rights of the 
violent person .........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
g. I felt reasonably safe once police left .................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
h. The police were polite to me ..............................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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i. Police did not investigate the incident 
thoroughly ...............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
j. I was given information from police that 
was useful to me to help deal with the 
problem ...................................................................................................  .................. 
1 2 3 4 5 
k. Police kept me informed about what was 
happening to my case .............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
l. Police did not give me information about 
services for victims ..................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
m. Police got enough information to make a 
proper decision about the incident ........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
n. Police were unhelpful .........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
o. Police treated me as they would any other 
member of the community .....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
p. Police did not treat me as the victim of the 
incident ....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
q. Police were fair in their treatment of me ...........................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q51. Thinking about what police did as a result of the incident can you indicate 
whether you agree or disagree with the following statements in relation to your case? 
Please answer every statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. The procedures the police used were fair 
to me .......................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. The procedures the police used were not 
fair to the violent person ........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. The police made the right decision 
according to the law ................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. The laws the police used are not right for 
these situations .......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. The police were not effective in dealing 
with the situation ....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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g. I would expect police to make similar 
decisions with other people in the 
community ..............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q52. Thinking ahead to what might happen next in the justice process, do you agree or 
disagree with the following? 
Please answer every statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. I expect that the prosecution lawyers will 
ask me what I want to see happen to the 
case ..........................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b I expect to have my say at court about the 
case ..........................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c I expect the justice system to be able to 
stop the violence .....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d I expect the justice system to be fair  ..................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q53. Thinking ahead to what might happen next in the justice process, what sort of 
expectations do you have about it? 
………………........................................................................................................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q54. Did police put you in contact with the DVCS at the time of the incident? 
 Yes ................................................................................................ 1 
 No (go to Q57) ............................................................................. 2 
 Can’t recall (go to Q57) ................................................................ 3 
Q55. Did DVCS attend or did you speak with them on the phone at the time of the 
incident? 
 They attended .............................................................................. 1 
 They telephoned .......................................................................... 2 
 Can’t recall (go to Q57) ................................................................ 3 
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Q56. Was the contact with the DVCS support person at the time of the incident helpful 
or unhelpful to you? 
Completely unhelpful Very unhelpful 
Somewhat 
helpful Very helpful Extremely helpful 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q57. Now thinking about the violent person and the decision made by police to charge 
him, do you think he “got the outcome he deserved”?   
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither disagree or 
agree 
Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
PREVIOUS INCIDENTS REPORTED 
 
Q58. Has the person who was violent to you on this occasion been reported to police 
before for abusing you? 
 Yes (go to question 60) ................................................................ 1 
 No ................................................................................................. 2 
 Don’t know/Can’t recall (go to question 62) ............................... 3 
 
Q59. If no, why not? 
………………........................................................................................................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q60. If yes, can you recall what happened as a result of the most recent previous 
report to police? Please circle any that apply. 
 
a. I don’t know/can’t recall what they did ............................................................ No Yes 
b. They arrested the violent person & took him away ......................................... No Yes 
c. They took the violent person away but did not arrest...................................... No Yes 
d. They calmed down the violent person but did not arrest or 
take away  .................................................................................................. No Yes 
e. They arrested me and took me away ............................................................... No Yes 
f. They took me away ............................................................................................ No Yes 
g. They didn’t do anything significant ................................................................... No Yes 
h. Other (please state what they did) ................................................................... No Yes 
 
Q61. Thinking about how you were treated by police at that most recent previous 
report made to them, would you indicate if you agree or disagree with the following 
statements about how you were treated then?   
 
Please answer every statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. The police did not take the incident 
seriously. .................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I was treated with respect ..................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. The police did not respect my rights ...................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I was treated with dignity by police ....................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. The police treated the violent person with 
respect .....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. The police did not respect the rights of the 
violent person .........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
g. I felt reasonably safe once police left .................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
h. The police were polite to me ..............................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Police did not investigate the incident 
thoroughly ...............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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j. I was given information from police that 
was useful to me to help deal with the 
problem ...................................................................................................  .................. 
1 2 3 4 5 
k. Police kept me informed about what was 
happening to my case .............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
l. Police did not give me information about 
the Crisis Service (DVCS) or other victim 
service .....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
m. Police got enough information to make a 
proper decision about the incident ........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
n. Police were unhelpful .........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
o. Police treated me as they would any other 
member of the community .....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
p. Police did not treat me as the victim of the 
incident ....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
q. Police were fair in their treatment of me ...........................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
r. Police did not give me an opportunity to 
tell them what had happened .................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
s. The police were impartial. ...................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
t. Police arrested the person who had used 
violence. ..................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
u. Police helped me get a protection order. ...........................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
v. The police did not believe me. ............................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
w. The police were effective in dealing with 
the situation. ...........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION FOUR: YOUR JUSTICE GOALS (PROCESS AND OUTCOME) 
This section is about what you would prefer to see happen now that the person who 
used violence against you has been charged with a criminal offence.  I ask what 
decision you would like made about the case, what sort of outcome you would 
prefer, what type of process you would prefer, and what are your goals for justice.  
Q62. Firstly, thinking about the incident that has recently happened to you when 
police became involved, what would be the three most important things for you to 
“see justice done”? 
………………........................................................................................................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q63.Have you asked police or prosecution to drop the charges in relation to the recent 
incident? 
 No ............................................................................................. Yes 
 
(a) Why is that? 
………………........................................................................................................................... 
 
Q64. If charges are not dropped, what decision at court would you like made about 
your case? 
 
Please answer every statement 
Strongly 
against 
Against Neither in 
favour 
nor 
against 
In favour Strongly 
in favour 
a. Charges Dismissed - To have the 
charges withdrawn and/or dismissed 
at court ....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Not guilty - The violent person be 
found not guilty [not proved]..................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Guilty - The violent person be 
found or plead guilty [proved] ................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q65. In our system, a person can be convicted but have no conviction recorded by the 
court and have no sentence.  Or a person can have a conviction recorded and some 
sort of sanction or penalty decided by the court.  This question asks you what you 
would like the offender to receive from the court? 
 
Please answer every statement 
Undesirable, 
would make 
things worse 
Neither 
desirable 
nor 
undesirable 
Somewhat 
desirable, 
not a high 
priority 
Desirable, 
high 
priority 
Essential 
the 
highest 
priority 
No Conviction Recorded 
     
a. not have any sentence 
imposed ...................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. not have a sentence imposed 
but to hear a message of 
condemnation from the 
judge/magistrate .....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
Conviction Recorded & 
Sentence Options 
     
c. to hear a message of 
condemnation from the 
judge/magistrate .....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. perform a service for the 
community ..............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. perform a service for me .....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. perform a service that I decide ............................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
g. apologise to me in person ...................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
h. apologise to me in writing ...................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. pay a fine to the court ..........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
j. pay me for the costs I incurred 
as a result of the incident ........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
k. attend a violence 
rehabilitation program ............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 292 
l. attend a drug/alcohol 
rehabilitation program ............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
m. be ordered by the court not 
to come near me  ....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
n. be ordered by the court to 
follow certain directions .........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
o. to receive a good behaviour 
bond from the court 
1 2 3 4 5 
p. receive a custodial sentence 
(Please specify weekend?  
Suspended? Full time? Period of 
time?) 
 .................................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
q. Other outcome (Please state 
what) .......................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q66. Out of these sanctions or penalties, what would be your top 3 preferences? 
Perhaps write first, second or third alongside your answers at Q65 or below. 
 
First preference…………………………………………………………..……… 
Second preference……………………………………………………………… 
Third preference…… …………………………………………………..……… 
 
Q67. In our criminal justice system there is a step-by-step process in the court for 
decisions to be made about a case.  This question gives you some options about what 
steps you would like to see happen and in what order.  The options look similar but 
some of the steps are switched around to help you choose.  Some of these options are 
not actually possible in our current system.  However, the question asks you what 
process you would favour in order to achieve the decision and outcomes you indicated 
that you would prefer (Q63 and 64).  It is helpful to you to know that a “restorative 
conference” is a meeting between the victim and offender with a trained facilitator. 
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Please answer every statement Strongly 
against 
Against Neither in 
favour of 
nor 
against 
In 
favour 
Strongly 
in 
favour 
a. Judge/magistrate to make a finding of 
guilt and, after this, deciding the 
sentence ..................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Judge/magistrate to make a finding of 
guilt, hear about the impact of the 
offence on me and, after this, judge/ 
magistrate deciding the sentence ...........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. The case not going to court but have 
police divert the case to some sort of 
mediation or restorative conference*. ...................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Judge/magistrate sending us both to a 
restorative justice conference before the 
finding of guilt and instead of a sentence 
at court* ..................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. Judge/magistrate sending us both to a 
restorative justice conference after the 
finding of guilt and instead of a sentence 
at court ....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. Judge/magistrate sending us both to a 
restorative justice conference after the 
finding of guilt and, after this, for the 
case to come back to court for a 
sentence* 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. Judge/magistrate making a finding of 
guilt and, after this, deciding the 
sentence, and then us having the 
opportunity for a restorative conference 
1 2 3 4 5 
h. Judge/magistrate making a finding of 
guilt, hear about the impact of the 
offence on me, then decides the 
sentence, and then us having the 
opportunity for a restorative conference 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q68. Can you tell me what would be your top three preferences from these options? 
Perhaps write first, second or third alongside your answers at Q67 or below. 
 
First preference………………………………………………………………… 
Second preference……………………………………………………………… 
Third preference…… ………………………………………………………… 
 
(a) What is it about these particular processes or steps that is most attractive to you? 
OR what is it about the processes and steps that you would not prefer that are 
unattractive to you? 
………………........................................................................................................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q69. In our system, if a person is convicted of a criminal offence, the Magistrate or 
Judge has to decide what the sentence (if any) should be.  I have a list of the things 
that a Magistrate or Judge must think about in deciding on a sentence.  Thinking about 
your particular case, please indicate the extent to which you accept or reject each of 
the following as principles that would guide you. 
1 = Reject 
2 = Inclined to reject 
3 = Neither reject nor accept 
4 = Inclined to accept 
5 = Accept as important 
6 = Accept as very important 
7 = Accept as of utmost importance 
 
Read through the list before you start.  This will give you an opportunity to decide 
which are the most important principles for you personally. 
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Justice Principles 
Reject   Inclined 
to 
accept 
  Utmost 
importance 
a. To punish - do something to 
punish/discipline/penalize/chast
ise the person. .........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. To deter[specific] – do 
something to stop the person 
from committing violence again .............................................................  .................. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. To deter [general] – do 
something as a message to stop 
others in the community from 
committing violence 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 
d. To rehabilitate – do 
something to help the violent 
person face their problems and 
to help them change ...............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. To protect [victim] – do 
something to the violent person 
for the protection of the victim  .............................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. To protect [community] – do 
something to the violent person 
for the protection of the 
community  .............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. To restore – do something to 
recognize the harm caused and 
to help restore all parties ........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. To denounce – do something 
to give a stern message about 
how wrong the violence is/was. .............................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. To incapacitate – do 
something to remove the 
capacity of the person to 
commit violence in the future.................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Q70. What is important to you about the principles you chose? 
………………........................................................................................................................ 
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SECTION FIVE: ABOUT YOU – ATTITUDES, BELIEFS AND VALUES 
 
The previous sections asked about the incident and what you would like from the 
justice system in relation to your case.  This section asks you some questions about a 
variety of issues such as what you think about certain institutions, about other 
people, some ideas about justice in general and something about your own values as 
a person.    
 
Q71. Following is a list of organisations & community groups.  Please indicate how 
much you trust each one.  
 
Please answer every option 
Trust them 
a lot 
Trust them a 
fair bit 
Trust them 
only a little 
Do not trust 
them at all 
a. Newspapers & television stations .......................................................  
1 2 3 4 
b. The public schools in your area ...........................................................  
1 2 3 4 
c. The firestation in your area .................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
d. Your local government ........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
e. The hospitals in your area ...................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
f. The police stations in your area ...........................................................  
1 2 3 4 
g. The federal government ......................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
h. The local law courts.............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
i. Charities ................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
j. Neighbours ...........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
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Q72. How often do you think that people would try to take advantage of you if they 
got the chance?  (Please circle one)  
Almost never Some of the 
time 
Half the time Much of the time Almost always 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Q73. Here are some statements about our laws and justice, please indicate whether 
you agree or disagree with them.  
Please answer each 
statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. Obeying the law is the 
right thing to do ......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I feel a moral obligation 
to obey the law .......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. I may not like all the laws 
and rules we have in place, 
but obeying them is a part 
of life we must accept .............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Our criminal justice 
system needs to undergo 
significant changes to make 
it a fairer system for all ...........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I feel our criminal justice 
system reflects the needs of 
the community ........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. The laws of our criminal 
justice system are generally 
consistent with the views of 
ordinary Australians about 
what is right and wrong ..........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
g. Australia’s criminal justice 
system does not protect my 
interests...................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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h. I have a great deal of 
confidence in our criminal 
justice system ..........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. I sometimes question the 
laws we are asked to obey ......................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
j. People should accept the 
decisions of police even if 
they think they are wrong .......................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
k. Disobeying the law is 
sometimes justified .................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
And now, some questions about what you think about courts and the sentences they 
give. 
Q74. In general, would you say that sentences handed down by the courts are too 
tough, about right, or too lenient?  
Much too tough A little too 
tough 
About right A little too lenient Much too lenient 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q75. What type of criminal were you mainly thinking of when you answered this 
question? 
……………………………………………………….………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q76.  What about non-violent offenders, would you say that sentences handed down 
by the courts are too tough, about right, or too lenient?  
Much too tough A little too 
tough 
About right A little too 
lenient 
Much too lenient 
 1 2 3 4 5 
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Q77.  And drug-addicted offenders?  
Much too tough A little too 
tough 
About right A little too 
lenient 
Much too lenient 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q78.  Finally, what about young offenders?  
Much too tough A little too 
tough 
About right A little too 
lenient 
Much too lenient 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Q79. What you value as a person is important to understanding your beliefs and 
attitudes.  Below is a list of values.  Please read through the list.  To what extent do 
you accept or reject these values?  You may choose the same response as often as you 
wish.  
 
1 = Reject 
2 = Inclined to reject 
3 = Neither reject nor accept 
4 = Inclined to accept 
5 = Accept as important 
6 = Accept as very important 
7 = Accept as of utmost importance 
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Do you value …….?  Please give an answer to each.  
 
Please answer every statement 
Reject   Inclined 
to 
accept 
  Utmost 
importance 
a. Self-knowledge or self-insight (being 
aware of what sort of person you are). ..................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Recognition by the community 
(having a high standing in the 
community ..............................................................................................  .................. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Inner harmony (feeling free of conflict 
within yourself) .......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Self-improvement (striving to be a 
better person) .........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Economic prosperity (being 
financially well off) ..................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Authority (having power to influence 
others and control decisions) .................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Ambition (eager to do well) ................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Wisdom (having a mature 
understanding of life) ..............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Self-respect (believing in your own 
worth) ......................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. The pursuit of knowledge (always 
trying to find out new things about the 
world we live in) ......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
k. Competition (always trying to do/be 
better than others) .................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Q80. Now here are some statements about “being a good citizen”.  How strongly do 
you agree or disagree with each of them? 
 
Please answer each statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. Being a good citizen is about 
becoming involved in your 
community ............................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Being a good citizen means 
taking an active interest in 
politics ...................................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Being a good citizen means 
standing up for what you think 
is right even if others disagree ................................................................ 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Good citizens do not rely on 
government, they take 
responsibility for themselves .................................................................. 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. Good citizens give a helping 
hand to others ......................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. Good citizens accept that 
others have a right to be 
different ................................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. Good citizens work hard and 
do their fair share .................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
h. Good citizens get on with 
their own lives and let others 
live as they want to .................................................................................. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q81. Finally, I have just a couple of questions about your activities in the community.  
In the past 12 months, how often have you participated in the activities of one of the 
following associations or groups?  
 
Please answer every option 
At least 
once a 
week 
At least 
once a 
month 
Several 
times 
Once 
or 
twice 
Never 
a. A sports association .............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. A cultural association ..........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. A church or other religious organisation .............................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. A community service or civic association ............................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. A political party or organisation ..........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q82. How interested would you say you personally are in politics?  
 
Very interested Fairly interested Not very interested Not at all interested 
 1 2 3 4 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR COMPLETING THIS INTERVIEW! 
 
I know that this was a long interview but your views and experiences are important 
and I really appreciate your dedication in seeing it through to the end. 
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Do you agree for me to contact you again at the conclusion of your case at court?  
You do not have to agree to a second interview at this stage, just to me contacting 
you. 
 
Yes 
No 
 
Primary contact number: ………………………………………………………………………….. 
Second contact number: …………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q83. Finally, is there anything else you would like to tell me about what you feel as a 
victim of violence and want from police as a victim of violence? 
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APPENDIX C 
VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE STUDY – TIME 2 INTERVIEWS 
Some time ago you were kind enough to tell me what you wanted from the justice 
process after a person was charged in relation to an incident of violence against you.  
This second survey asks what happened about the case and what you think and feel 
about this.  What you have to say for this research matters very much! 
NOTE ABOUT LANGUAGE:  Some of the terms used by the researcher may not be 
ones you would use yourself.   
This second survey asks you about a whole range of things.  It asks you how you feel 
now about justice and about your safety.  It asks you about your experience with 
prosecution and with the court.  It also asks you what you think about the outcome 
of the case.  
 
SECTION ONE: OVERALL FEELING ABOUT JUSTICE & SAFETY 
Q1. How are you feeling now about the justice system response to the violent incident 
from which criminal charges arose? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
 (a) Why is that? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………… 
Q2. What 2 or 3 things do you feel most positive about with regard to the justice 
system response? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………… 
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(a) Why is that? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………… 
Q3. What 2 or 3 things do you feel most negative about with regard to the justice 
system response? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………… 
(a) Why is that? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………… 
Q4. Since the case has been finalised, how safe do you feel from further violence and 
abuse from the violent person? 
Not at all safe Not very safe Somewhat safe Fairly safe Very safe 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q5. Here is a statement:- The justice system intervention has had an impact in stopping 
the violence against me.  Do you agree or disagree with it? 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Disagree 
Neither disagree 
or agree 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
Why do you think this?.....…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q6. Has a protection order been taken out between you and the violent person since 
the original incident from which charges were laid against this person?  If more than 1 
person, refer to main or primary charged person throughout. 
 Yes ................................................................................................ 1 
 No (Go to Q9) ............................................................................... 2 
 Don’t know/Can’t recall (Go to Q9) ............................................. 3 
 
Q7. Who was the applicant for the order? 
 You (victim interviewee) .............................................................. 1 
 The violent person ....................................................................... 2 
 
Q8. Have the conditions of the protection order been breached, and if so how? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………… 
 
Q9. Since the original incident, has the violent person done any of the following to 
you? 
How many times since the original incident? 
       
a. Physical abuse Yes - 1 No - 2 0 1 2 3 4 or more 
b. Verbal abuse Yes - 1 No - 2 0 1 2 3 4 or more 
c. Sexual abuse Yes - 1 No - 2 0 1 2 3 4 or more 
d. Other (please 
state what) Yes - 1 No - 2 
0 1 2 3 4 or more 
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Q10. As a result of the original incident, have you had any continuing effects? Please 
answer all options 
 None at all  A little bit Quite a bit  Quite a lot 
a. Physical effects 1 2 3 4 
b. Emotional effects 1 2 3 4 
c. Financial effects 1 2 3 4 
d. Other (please state what) 1 2 3 4 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………… 
Q11. Thinking about the violent person, how would you describe your feelings 
(emotions) now about him?  (Please answer every statement) 
 Definitely 
not 
Maybe 
not 
I am 
not 
sure 
Maybe 
yes 
Definitely 
yes 
a. I don’t have any particular feelings for 
this person ...............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I feel numb about this person .............................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. I feel frightened of this person. ...........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I feel love for this person. ...................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I feel angry at this person ....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. I feel empathy for this person ..............................................................  .................. 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. I feel like getting even with this person ..............................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
h. I feel forgiving toward this person ......................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. I feel confused/puzzled about this 
person .....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
j. I feel sad for this person .......................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
k. I feel pity for this person .....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q12. Do you wish for your relationship with this person to continue? Please circle 
one. 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q13. Thinking about the violent person and the original incident, please say how much 
you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
 
Please answer every statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Disagree 
Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
a. I think the offender knew what he 
was doing at the time. ............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I think the offender did not mean 
to hurt me at the time ............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. I think the offender was provoked 
by me to do what he did at the time ......................................................  .................. 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I think the offender was 
influenced by other people at the 
time .........................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I think the offender was 
influenced by drink/drugs at the 
time .........................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q14. Thinking about the violent person and the original incident, please say how much 
you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
 
Please answer every statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Disagree 
Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
a. I think the offender feels remorse 
about what he did to me. .......................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I think the offender feels justified 
about what he did to me ........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. I think the offender feels sorry 
about what he did to me ........................................................................  .................. 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I think the offender feels guilty 
about what he did to me ........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I think the offender blames me 
about what he did  ..................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. I think the offender feels shame 
for what he did  .......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q15. Have a look at these statements.  How much do they seem like you and your 
feelings about your future at this time?  
 
Please answer each statement 
Not at 
all like 
me 
Not 
much 
like 
me 
Not 
sure 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very 
much 
like 
me 
a. What happens to me in the future 
mostly depends on me ............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I feel that I have control over the 
direction my life is taking ........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. I often feel helpless in dealing with 
the problems of life .................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. There is really no way I can solve 
some of the problems I have ...................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q16. Would you say that you feel good about yourself: -  
never 
hardly ever now and 
then 
some of the 
time 
most of the 
time all the time  
 1 2 3 4 5 6  
 
SECTION TWO: THE PROSECUTION 
This section asks you about the prosecution and their activities in dealing with your 
case. 
 
Q17. At any time, did you ask someone from the prosecution office to drop the 
charges in relation to the incident of violence against you? 
 No………………………………………………………………..Yes 
(a) Why is that? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Q18. It is the prosecution’s responsibility to decide to prosecute criminal charges if 
they think there is sufficient evidence.  Do you agree that they should have this 
responsibility in situations like yours? 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) Why do you think this? …………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q19.  Did you have much contact with prosecutors or other prosecution staff during 
the case? 
No contact at all Not much contact Some contact A fair bit of contact A lot of contact 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q20. Would you say that, as a victim/witness, you were willing to cooperate with the 
prosecution during the case? 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q21. When prosecution were dealing with your case, which of the following did you 
mainly want them to do? (Please answer one) 
 
I didn’t want them to prosecute at all ..................................................................... 1 
I wanted them to prosecute all the charges against the violent 
person   ..................................................................................................... 2 
I wanted them to prosecute some of the charges against the 
violent person  ..................................................................................................... 3 
I wan’t them to send us both to counselling and still prosecute ............................. 4 
I wan’t them to send us both to counselling and not prosecute ............................. 5 
I wan’t them to send us both to a restorative conference and 
still prosecute  ..................................................................................................... 6 
I wan’t them to send us both to a restorative conference and 
not prosecute  ..................................................................................................... 7 
I wasn’t sure/didn’t know what I wanted them to do ............................................. 8 
Other (please state what you wanted them to do).................................................. 9 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Q22. Can you say why you mainly wanted them to do this [what were you trying to 
achieve/your objective]?   
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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Q23. When prosecution were dealing with your case, what did they actually do?  
 
Please answer each option 
No Yes Don’t 
Know 
a. They prosecuted all of the charges against the violent 
person .....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 
b. They prosecuted some of the charges against the violent 
person .....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 
c. They prosecuted none of the charges against the violent 
person .....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 
d. They accepted a plea to lesser charges. .............................................  
1 2 3 
e. They asked me about bail conditions. ................................................  
1 2 3 
f. They asked me what I wanted to see happen with the 
case. .........................................................................................................  
1 2 3 
g. They asked if I wanted to make a Victim Impact 
Statement. ...............................................................................................  
1 2 3 
h. They put me in contact with a witness assistant. ...............................  
1 2 3 
i. They didn’t do anything significant. .....................................................  
1 2 3 
j. They gave me information about services for victims. ........................  
1 2 3 
k. They gave me advice about options I might have. ..............................  
1 2 3 
l. I don’t know what they did. .................................................................  
1 2 3 
m. Other (please state what they did. ....................................................  
1 2 3 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q24. When you think about the way you were treated by prosecution during the case, 
do you feel…?  NOTE:  The decisions referred to are the decision to prosecute, or not; 
the decision to accept a plea, or not; the decision to accept a plea to lesser charges, or 
not. 
 
Please answer each statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Disagree 
Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
a. I was given the opportunity to 
express my views before decisions 
were made ..............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I was able to influence decisions 
made by prosecution ..............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. My views were considered when 
decisions were made ..............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I agree with the decisions the 
prosecution made about the case. .........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I accept the decisions the 
prosecution made about the case ..........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. I was given an honest explanation 
for why the decisions were made. ..........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
g. I understand why the prosecution 
made the decisions they did. ..................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q25. Thinking about the decisions the prosecution made to prosecute (or not) the 
violent person, would you say… 
 
Please answer each statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Disagree 
Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
a. I was satisfied with this outcome ........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. This outcome I received was fair ........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. This outcome I received was what 
I expected ................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I received the outcome I 
deserved ..................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I received the outcome I wanted ........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q26. Thinking about what prosecution did in relation to the case can you indicate 
whether you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
Please answer every statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Disagree 
Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
a. The procedures the prosecution 
used were fair to me ................................................................................ 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. The procedures the prosecution 
used were not fair to the violent 
person ...................................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. The prosecution made the right 
decisions according to the law ................................................................ 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. The laws the prosecution used are 
not right for these situations ................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. The prosecution were not effective 
in dealing with the situation .................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
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g. I would expect prosecution to make 
similar decisions with other people in 
the community......................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q27. Thinking about how you were treated by prosecution in relation to the case can 
you indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
Please answer every 
statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Not 
Applicable 
a. The prosecution did not 
take the case seriously. ...........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. I was treated with respect ..................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. The prosecution did not 
respect my rights .....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. I was treated with dignity 
by prosecution .........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
e. The prosecution treated 
the violent person with 
respect .....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. The prosecution did not 
respect the rights of the 
violent person .........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
g. I felt reasonably safe during 
the prosecution .......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
h. The prosecution were 
polite to me .............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
i. Prosecution did not prepare 
for the case thoroughly ...........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
j. I was given information 
from prosecution that was 
useful to me to help deal with 
the problem .............................................................................................  .................. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
k. Prosecution kept me 
informed about what was 
happening to my case .............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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l. Prosecution did not give me 
information about services 
for victims ................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
m. Prosecution got enough 
information to make proper 
decisions about the case .........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
n. Prosecution were unhelpful ................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
o. Prosecution treated me as 
they would any other 
member of the community .....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
p. Prosecution did not treat 
me as the victim in the case ....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
q. Prosecution were fair in 
their treatment of me .............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Q28. Thinking about the prosecution decisions & actions with the case, do you think 
that you would be involved in another prosecution in the future if something similar 
happened to you again? (Please circle one) 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) Why do you think this? 
..……………………………………………………………………..………….………………………………………………… 
 
Q29. In a similar situation in the future, would you like the prosecution to deal with it 
in a similar way?  (Please circle one) 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) Why do you think this? 
..……………………………………………………………………..………….…………………………………………… 
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Q30. Generally speaking, how satisfied were you with the way the prosecution 
handled your case?  (Please circle one) 
 Extremely satisfied ....................................................................... 1 
 Very satisfied ............................................................................... 2 
 Somewhat satisfied ...................................................................... 3 
 Very dissatisfied ........................................................................... 4 
 Extremely dissatisfied .................................................................. 5 
 
SECTION FOUR: THE COURT (PROCESS AND OUTCOME) 
This section is about what happened at court and what you think about what 
happened. If the case did not proceed to court, go to Q56 section five. 
 
Q31. Firstly, did you ask the court to drop the charges in relation to the case? 
 No ............................................................................................. Yes 
(a) Why is that? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
 
Q32. Did you attend court in relation to the prosecution of the case? 
 Yes ................................................................................................ 1 
 No (Go to Q36) ............................................................................. 2 
 Don’t know/Can’t recall (Go to Q36) ........................................... 3 
 
Q33. If yes, in what capacity did you attend court?  
Please answer each option No Yes 
a. To observe what was happening ........................................................  
1 2 
b. To find out what was happening ........................................................  
1 2 
c. To give evidence about the incident ...................................................  
1 2 
d. To give a Victim Impact Statement .....................................................  
1 2 
e. Other (please state what) ...................................................................  
1 2 
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Q34. In order to attend court, were you provided with any of the following?  
Please answer each option No Yes 
a. I was provided with CCTV at court for me to give evidence ...............  
1 2 
b. I was provided with protection at court .............................................  
1 2 
c. I was provided with a support person at court ...................................  
1 2 
d. I was provided with information about what to expect at court  ......  
1 2 
e. I was provided with information about the date and time of court ...  
1 2 
f. I was not provided with anything significant for court. .......................  
1 2 
g. Other (please state what you were provided. .....................................  
1 2 
 
 
Q35. In attending court, can you say if you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? 
 
Please answer each statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. I was given the opportunity to ask 
questions about the court ......................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I felt well supported to attend court ..................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. I understood what was required of 
me at court ..............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I felt safe in attending court ................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q36. How involved would you say you were with the case at court? 
Not at all involved Not very involved I am not sure Involved Very involved 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q37. Would you say you had enough involvement with the case at court? 
Definitely not 
enough 
Maybe not 
enough I am not sure Maybe enough Definitely enough 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
WHEN THE QUESTION ASKS ABOUT “THE COURT” IT IS TAKEN TO MEAN “THE JUDGE 
OR MAGISTRATE” 
 
Q38. When you think about the way you were treated during the court process, do you 
feel…?  
 
Please answer each statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. I was given the opportunity to 
express my views before the court 
made its decision ....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I was able to influence decisions 
made by the court ...................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. My views were considered by the 
court when decisions were made ...........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I agree with the decisions the 
court made about the case. ....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I accept the decisions the court 
made about the case...............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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f. I was given an honest explanation 
for why the decisions were made. ..........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
g. I understand why the court made 
the decisions they did. ............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q39 What actually was the decision arrived at by the court in relation to you case?  
…………………………………………………………………………………….……………………………………………… 
 
Q40. Thinking about the actual outcome at court, would you say that it was too tough, 
about right or too lenient? 
Much too tough A little too 
tough 
About right A little too 
lenient 
Much too lenient 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q41.  Thinking about the court decision in your case, can you indicate whether you 
agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
Please answer each statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. The court did something to 
punish/discipline/penalize/chastise the 
violent person .........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. The court did something to stop the 
person from committing violence again .................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. The court did something as a message to 
stop others in the community from 
committing violence ................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. The court did something to help the 
violent person face their problems and to 
help them change. ..................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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e. The court did something to the violent 
person for the protection of the victim ..................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. The court did something to the violent 
person for the protection of the 
community. .............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
g. The court did something to recognize the 
harm caused and to help restore all parties. ..........................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
h. The court did something to give a stern 
message about how wrong the violence 
is/was. .....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. The court did something to remove the 
capacity of the person to commit violence 
in the future. ...........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q42. What would have you preferred the court to decide about your case? 
 
Please answer every 
statement 
Strongly 
against 
Against Neither 
in 
favour 
nor 
against 
In 
favour 
Strongly 
in 
favour 
a. Charges Dismissed - To have 
the charges withdrawn and/or 
dismissed at court ...................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Not guilty - The violent 
person be found not guilty [not 
proved] ....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Guilty - The violent person 
be found or plead guilty 
[proved] ...................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) Why do you think this? 
..……………………………………………………………………..………….…………………………………………… 
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Q43. What sort of sanction or penalty would you have preferred the court to make in 
relation to the violent person? 
 
Please answer every statement 
Undesirable, 
would make 
things worse 
Neither 
desirable 
nor 
undesirable 
Somewhat 
desirable, 
not a high 
priority 
Desirable, 
high 
priority 
Essential 
the 
highest 
priority 
No Conviction Recorded 
     
a. not have any sentence 
imposed ...................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. not have a sentence imposed 
but to hear a message of 
condemnation from the 
judge/magistrate .....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
Conviction Recorded & 
Sentence Options 
     
c. to hear a message of 
condemnation from the 
judge/magistrate .....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. perform a service for the 
community ..............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. perform a service for me .....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. perform a service that I decide ............................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
g. apologise to me in person ...................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
h. apologise to me in writing ...................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. pay a fine to the court ..........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
j. pay me for the costs I incurred 
as a result of the incident ........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
k. attend a violence 
rehabilitation program ............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
l. attend a drug/alcohol 
rehabilitation program ............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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m. be ordered by the court not 
to come near me  ....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
n. be ordered by the court to 
follow certain directions .........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
o. to receive a good behaviour 
bond from the court 
1 2 3 4 5 
p. receive a custodial sentence 
(Please specify weekend?  
Suspended? Full time? Period of 
time?) 
 .................................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
q. Other outcome (Please state 
what) .......................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q44. Out of these sanctions or penalties, what would have been your top 3 
preferences? Perhaps write first, second or third alongside your answers at Q43 or 
below. 
 
First preference………………………………………………………………… 
Second preference……………………………………………………………… 
Third preference…… ………………………………………………………… 
 
Q45.  Can you say why you would have wanted these preferences? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
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Q46. Now thinking about the violent person and the outcome at court, do you think he 
“got the outcome he deserved”?   
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither disagree or 
agree 
Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q47. Thinking about the violent person and the outcome at court, how likely do you 
think it will get him to stop being violent towards you?   
Very 
unlikely 
Unlikely Unsure  Likely Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q48. Thinking about the decisions the court made about the case, would you say… 
 
Please answer each statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. I was satisfied with this outcome ........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. This outcome I received was fair ........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. This outcome I received was what 
I expected ................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I received the outcome I 
deserved ..................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I received the outcome I wanted ........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q49. It is the responsibility of the judge or magistrate to decide what sentence to give 
an offender if the person is found guilty.  Can you say if you agree that they should 
have this responsibility in situations like yours? 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) Why do you think this? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q50. If offered an opportunity by the court for a face-to-face discussion with the 
violent person and with a trained facilitator (restorative justice conference), would you 
have taken it up?   
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) Why is this? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 (b) If yes, at what stage in proceedings would you like to have taken it up? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
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Q51. Thinking about what the court did in relation to the case can you say whether you 
agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
Please answer every statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. The procedures the court used were fair to 
me ............................................................................................................ 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. The procedures the court used were not 
fair to the violent person ......................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. The court made the right decisions 
according to the law ................................................................................ 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. The laws the court used are not right for 
these situations ........................................................................................ 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. The court were not effective in dealing 
with the situation ..................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. I would expect the court to make similar 
decisions with other people in the 
community ............................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q52. Thinking about how you were treated by the court in relation to the case, can you 
indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Please answer every 
statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Not 
Applicable 
a. The court did not take the 
case seriously. .........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. I was treated with respect ..................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. The court did not respect 
my rights ..................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. I was treated with dignity 
by the court .............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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e. The court treated the 
violent person with respect ....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. The court did not respect 
the rights of the violent 
person......................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
g. I felt reasonably safe during 
the court process.....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
k. I was kept informed about 
what was happening to my 
case ..........................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
m. The court got enough 
information to make proper 
decisions about the case .........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
n. The court was unhelpful......................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
o. The court treated me as 
they would any other 
member of the community .....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
p. The court did not treat me 
as the victim in the case ..........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
q. The court were fair in their 
treatment of me ......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
q. The court were fair in their 
treatment of the offender .......................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Q53. Generally speaking, how satisfied were you with the way the court handled your 
case?  (Please circle one) 
 Extremely satisfied ....................................................................... 1 
 Very satisfied ............................................................................... 2 
 Somewhat satisfied ...................................................................... 3 
 Very dissatisfied ........................................................................... 4 
 Extremely dissatisfied .................................................................. 5 
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Q54. Thinking about the court decisions & actions with the case, do you think that you 
would be involved in court proceedings in the future if something similar happened to 
you again? (Please circle one) 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
(a) Why do you think this?................................................................................................. 
 
Q55. In a similar situation in the future, would you like the court to deal with it in a 
similar way?  (Please circle one) 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
(a) Why do you think this?.................................................................................................. 
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SECTION FIVE: SUPPORT FOR YOU 
This section is about what you think in the end and about the support for you as a 
victim of violence in relation to this incident.  
 
Q56.  Which of the following statements best describes your views about the outcome 
of the case? 
Please answer every statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. I feel satisfied with the outcome and feel 
justice was done ...................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I am not satisfied with the outcome and 
feel that justice has not been done ......................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I am not sure if I am satisfied with the 
outcome or not ........................................................................................ 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I don’t know what I think ..................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) Can you say why you think this? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Q57. The DVCS provides a range of services for victims during the justice process.  For 
each of these services provided by DVCS during the justice process, please indicate 
how satisfied you were with the support you received. 
 
Please answer very option 
Very dis-
satisfied 
Dis-
satisfied 
Not 
sure 
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Not 
applicable 
– did not 
receive 
a. Crisis visit. ............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. Follow-up phone calls..........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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c. Being updated on the case. .................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. Advocacy on my behalf. ......................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
e. Court support. .....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. Other (please specify). ..........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q58. How easy was it for you going through the criminal justice process in relation to 
the case? 
Very difficult Fairly 
difficult 
Neither difficult 
nor easy 
Fairly 
easy 
Very easy 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) Why was this………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q59. How easy do you think it would have been without the support of DVCS? 
Very difficult Fairly 
difficult 
Neither difficult 
nor easy 
Fairly 
easy 
Very easy 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) Why was this………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q60. What further support or assistance do you think could be provided to victims of 
violence in the justice process? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
 
 331 
Q61. Would you say how much you agree or disagree with the following statements in 
relation to your case? 
Please answer every statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. I feel it was the right thing to do to have 
taken this case through the justice process ............................................ 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I do not feel it was beneficial to me to 
have taken this case through the justice 
process ..................................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. I feel I had the respect of the community 
in taking this case through the justice 
process ..................................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I do not feel the community supported 
taking this case through the justice process ........................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I feel my interests as a victim of violence 
were well represented in the justice process.......................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. I feel my interests as a member of the 
community were well represented in the 
justice process ......................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q62.Here are some statements about our laws and justice, please indicate whether 
you agree or disagree with them.  
 
Please answer each statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. Obeying the law is the right 
thing to do ................................................................................................ 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I feel a moral obligation to 
obey the law ............................................................................................. 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. I may not like all the laws and 
rules we have in place, but 
obeying them is a part of life 
we must accept ........................................................................................ 
1 2 3 4 5 
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d. Our criminal justice system 
needs to undergo significant 
changes to make it a fairer 
system for all ............................................................................................ 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I feel our criminal justice 
system reflects the needs of the 
community ............................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. The laws of our criminal 
justice system are generally 
consistent with the views of 
ordinary Australians about 
what is right and wrong ........................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. Australia’s criminal justice 
system does not protect my 
interests ................................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
h. I have a great deal of 
confidence in our criminal 
justice system ........................................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
i. I sometimes question the 
laws we are asked to obey ....................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
j. People should accept the 
decisions of the court even if 
they think they are wrong ....................................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
k. Disobeying the law is 
sometimes justified .................................................................................. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION SIX: PREVIOUS INCIDENTS PROSECUTED OR THAT WENT TO COURT 
This section is about previous times when the violent person may have been 
prosecuted for earlier incident f violence against you and went to court. 
 
Q63. Has the person who was violent to you on this occasion been prosecuted before 
for abusing you? 
 Yes ................................................................................................ 1 
 No (go to question 68) ................................................................. 2 
 Don’t know/Can’t recall (go to question 68) ............................... 3 
 
Q64. Can you recall what happened as a result of the most recent previous 
prosecution? Please circle any that apply. 
Please answer each option No Yes 
a. They prosecuted all of the charges against the violent person ..........  
1 2 
b. They prosecuted some of the charges against the violent 
person .....................................................................................................  
1 2 
c. They prosecuted none of the charges against the violent person ......  
1 2 
d. They didn’t do anything significant. ....................................................  
1 2 
e. I don’t know/can’t recall what they did. .............................................  
1 2 
f. Other (please state what they did. ......................................................  
1 2 
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Q65. Thinking about how you were treated by prosecution in relation to the most 
recent previous prosecution, can you indicate whether you agree or disagree with the 
following statements? 
Please answer every 
statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagre
e 
Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Not 
Applicabl
e 
a. The prosecution did not 
take the case seriously. ...........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. I was treated with respect ..................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. The prosecution did not 
respect my rights .....................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. I was treated with dignity 
by prosecution .........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
e. The prosecution treated 
the violent person with 
respect .....................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. The prosecution did not 
respect the rights of the 
violent person .........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
g. I felt reasonably safe during 
the prosecution .......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
h. The prosecution were 
polite to me .............................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
i. Prosecution did not prepare 
for the case thoroughly ...........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
j. I was given information 
from prosecution that was 
useful to me to help deal with 
the problem .............................................................................................  .................. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
k. Prosecution kept me 
informed about what was 
happening to my case .............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
l. Prosecution did not give me 
information about services 
for victims ................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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m. Prosecution got enough 
information to make proper 
decisions about the case .........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
n. Prosecution were unhelpful ................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
o. Prosecution treated me as 
they would any other 
member of the community .....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
p. Prosecution did not treat 
me as the victim in the case ....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
q. Prosecution were fair in 
their treatment of me .............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Q66. Did the most recent previous incident of violence committed by the violent 
person, come before a criminal court? 
 Yes ................................................................................................ 1 
 No (go to question 68) ................................................................. 2 
 Don’t know/Can’t recall (go to question 68) ............................... 3 
 
Q67. Can you recall what happened as a result of the most recent previous court 
actions? Please circle any that apply. 
 
a. I don’t know/can’t recall what they did ............................................................ No Yes 
b. The court dismissed the charges....................................................................... No Yes 
c. The person pleaded guilty at court ................................................................... No Yes 
d. The court found the person guilty after a trial ................................................. No Yes 
e. They didn’t do anything significant ................................................................... No Yes 
f. Other (please state what they did) .................................................................... No Yes 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR COMPLETING THIS INTERVIEW! 
 
I know that this was a long interview but your views and experiences are important 
and I really appreciate your dedication in seeing it through to the end. 
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Do you agree for me to contact you again 6 months from now?  You do not have to 
agree to a second interview at this stage, just to me contacting you. 
 
Yes 
No 
 
Primary contact number: ………………………………………………………………………….. 
Second contact number: …………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q68.Is there anything else you would like to tell me about what you feel as a victim of 
violence and the response of the justice system to you? 
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APPENDIX D 
VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE & JUSTICE (TIME 3) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Some time ago you were kind enough to tell me what you wanted from the justice 
process after a person was charged in relation to an incident of violence against you.  
This third and final survey asks your feelings and views about justice 6 months after 
the case finished at court.  What you have to say for this research matters very 
much! 
NOTE ABOUT LANGUAGE:  Some of the terms used by the researcher may not be 
ones you would use yourself.   
 
SECTION ONE: OVERALL FEELING ABOUT JUSTICE & SAFETY 
Q1. How are you feeling now about the justice system response to the violent incident 
from which criminal charges arose? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
(a) Why is that? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q2. What 2 or 3 things do you feel most positive about with regard to the justice 
system response? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 (a) Why is that? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q3. What 2 or 3 things do you feel most negative about with regard to the justice 
system response? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
(a) Why is that? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q4. Since the case has been finalised, how safe do you feel from further violence and 
abuse from the violent person? 
Not at all safe Not very safe Somewhat safe Fairly safe Very safe 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
Q5. The justice system intervention has had an impact in stopping the violence against 
me.  Do you agree or disagree with statement? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(b) Why do you think this?.....……………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q6. Have you had any contact with the violent person since the case finished at court? 
None at all Once or twice A few times Quite a bit A lot 
1 2 3 4 5 
IF NONE, PLEASE GO TO QUESTION 9 
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(b) If yes, what has this been like for you?  
….………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 (c) If no, would you like there to be contact (why)?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q7. Since the case finished at court, has there been any other abuse or violence 
(physical, verbal or other) against you from the violent person?   
None at all Once or twice A few times Quite a bit A lot 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) If yes, can you describe a little what this has been? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(b) If yes, did you report any of these incidents to police?  Why/why not? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(c) If yes, did you contact DVCS (other victim service) for assistance?  Why/why not? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q8. Do you wish for your relationship with this person to continue? Please circle 
one. 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
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Q9. Since the case finished, have you had any continuing effects or impacts from the 
situation (positive or negative or mixed)?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q10. Have a look at these statements.  How much do they seem like you and your 
feelings about your future at this time?  
 
Please answer each statement 
Not at all 
like me 
Not 
much 
like me 
Not 
sure 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very 
much 
like me 
a. What happens to me in the future 
mostly depends on me ............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I feel that I have control over the 
direction my life is taking ........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. I often feel helpless in dealing with the 
problems of life .......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. There is really no way I can solve some 
of the problems I have ............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q11. Would you say that you feel good about yourself: -  
never 
hardly ever now and then some of the 
time 
most of the 
time all the time  
 1 2 3 4 5 6  
 
Q12. Was there anything about the justice system response or the response of DVCS 
(or victim services) to you that contributed to these feelings?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q13. After everything, how do you feel the justice system treated you as a member of 
our community?   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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SECTION TWO: JUSTICE SYSTEM RESPONSE 
This section asks a bit about your thoughts & feelings now about the justice system 
response to you. 
 
Q14. Thinking about the decisions made by the justice system, would you say… 
Please answer each statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. I was satisfied with the outcome ........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. The outcome I received was fair .........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. The outcome I received was what I 
expected ..................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I received the outcome I deserved .....................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I received the outcome I wanted ........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q15. Thinking now about the actual outcome in your case, can you say what you would 
have preferred to see happen? Why do you think this? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q16. Would you say you had enough involvement with the case as it went through the 
justice system? 
Definitely not 
enough 
Maybe not 
enough I am not sure Maybe enough Definitely enough 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q17. Can you tell me a bit more about why you think this? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q18. How well do you think your interests as a victim of violence were looked after by 
the justice system? 
Definitely not 
enough 
Maybe not 
enough I am not sure Maybe enough Definitely enough 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q19. Can you tell me a bit more about why you think this? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q20. Generally speaking, how satisfied were you with the way the justice system 
handled your case?  (Please circle one) 
 Extremely satisfied ....................................................................... 1 
 Very satisfied ............................................................................... 2 
 Somewhat satisfied ...................................................................... 3 
 Very dissatisfied ........................................................................... 4 
 Extremely dissatisfied .................................................................. 5 
 
Q21. Can you tell me a bit more about why you think this? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q22. Thinking about the decisions & actions taken with the case, do you think that you 
would seek the help of the justice system in the future if something similar happened 
to you again? (Please circle one) 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
(b) Why do you think this? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q23. In a similar situation in the future, would you like the justice system to deal with 
it in a similar way?  (Please circle one) 
Definitely not Maybe not I am not sure Maybe yes Definitely yes 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
(b) Why do you think this? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q24.  Which of the following statements now best describes your views now about the 
outcome of the case? 
Please answer every statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
disagree 
or agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. I feel satisfied with the outcome and feel 
justice was done ......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. I am not satisfied with the outcome and 
feel that justice has not been done ........................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
d. I am not sure if I am satisfied with the 
outcome or not .......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. I don’t know what I think ....................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) Can you say why you think this? 
….………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q25. Would you say you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
Please answer every statement 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither 
disagree 
or agree Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
a. I wish I had never become involved with 
the justice system ...................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. After my experience, I would encourage 
my sister/brother to get help from the 
justice system if they experienced violence ...........................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
c. After my experience, I would not 
cooperate with the justice system to help 
out with a problem in my neighbourhood ..............................................  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q26. What support or assistance do you think is needed for victims of violence in the 
justice process? 
….………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q27. How much support have you received as a victim of violence since the case 
finished at court? 
 
None at all 
 
Not much 
Didn’t want/need 
anything 
 
A bit 
 
A fair bit 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(a) Can you say a bit more about your answer? 
….………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Q28. Could you tell me a bit about what the idea of justice now means to you? 
….………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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SECTION FOUR: YOUR VALUES, ATTITUDES & BELIEFS 
This section asks you some questions about what you think about certain 
institutions, some ideas about justice in general and something about your own 
values as a person.  
 
Q29. Following is a list of organisations & community groups.  Please indicate how 
much you trust each one.  
 
Please answer every option 
Trust them 
a lot 
Trust them a 
fair bit 
Trust them 
only a little 
Do not trust 
them at all 
a. Newspapers & television stations .......................................................  
1 2 3 4 
b. The public schools in your area ...........................................................  
1 2 3 4 
c. The firestation in your area .................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
d. Your local government ........................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
e. The hospitals in your area ...................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
f. The police stations in your area ...........................................................  
1 2 3 4 
g. The federal government ......................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
h. The local law courts.............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
i. Charities ................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
j. Neighbours ...........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 
 
 
Q30. In general, would you say that sentences handed down by the courts are too 
tough, about right, or too lenient?  
 
Much too tough A little too 
tough 
About right A little too lenient Much too lenient 
 1 2 3 4 5 
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Q31. What type of criminal were you mainly thinking of when you answered this 
question? 
…………………………………………………….…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Q32. What you value as a person is important to understanding your beliefs and 
attitudes.  Below is a list of values.  Please read through the list.  To what extent do 
you accept or reject these values?  You may choose the same response as often as you 
wish.  
 
1 = Reject 
2 = Inclined to reject 
3 = Neither reject nor accept 
4 = Inclined to accept 
5 = Accept as important 
6 = Accept as very important 
7 = Accept as of utmost importance 
 
Do you value …….?  Please give an answer to each.  
 
Please answer every statement 
Reject   Inclined 
to 
accept 
  Utmost 
importance 
a. Self-knowledge or self-insight (being 
aware of what sort of person you are). ..................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Recognition by the community 
(having a high standing in the 
community ..............................................................................................  .................. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Inner harmony (feeling free of conflict 
within yourself) .......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Self-improvement (striving to be a 
better person) .........................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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e. Economic prosperity (being 
financially well off) ..................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Authority (having power to influence 
others and control decisions) .................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Ambition (eager to do well) ................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Wisdom (having a mature 
understanding of life) ..............................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Self-respect (believing in your own 
worth) ......................................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. The pursuit of knowledge (always 
trying to find out new things about the 
world we live in) ......................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
k. Competition (always trying to do/be 
better than others) .................................................................................  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR COMPLETING THIS INTERVIEW! 
 
I know that this was a long interview but your views and experiences are important 
and I really appreciate your dedication in seeing it through to the end. 
Do you agree for me to contact you again when the research is finished in order to 
tell you the results?  You do not have to agree to an interview, just to me contacting 
you and giving you information. 
Yes 
No 
Primary contact number: ………………………………………………………………………….. 
Contact address: ……………………….…………………………………………………………… 
Contact email………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q32. Is there anything else you would like to tell me about what you feel as a victim of 
violence and the response of the justice system to you? 
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